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Abstract
My study focuses on the working lives of Chinese women in the light of 
China’s attempt to incorporate its socialist system into the world economy in the 
Reform era. My cardinal concern is the formation of a new social body - dagongmei - 
in contemporary China.
The great transformation experienced during the reform era creates significant 
social changes, and the lives of dagongmei are the living embodiments of such 
paradoxical processes and experiences. The first part of my thesis looks at how the 
desire of the peasant girls - the desire of moving out of rural China to the urban 
industrial zones - is produced to meet the demands of industrial capitalism.
The second part, based on an ethnographic study of an electronic factory in 
Shenzhen, studies the processes of constitution of the subject - dagongmei - in the 
workplace. First, I look at the disciplines and techniques of the production machine 
deployed over the female bodies, and see how these young and rural bodies are 
turned into docile and productive workers. Secondly, the politics of identity and 
differences is analyzed, to see how the existing social relations and local cultural 
practices are manipulated to craft abject subjects. Thirdly, the processes of 
sexualizing the abject subjects in relation to cultural discourses and language politics 
is unfolded.
The final part examines the relation of domination and resistance inside the 
workplace. Dream, scream and bodily pain are seen as the actual form of struggle 
against the enormous power of capitalist relations in Chinese society.
In short, my study explores the process, the desire, the struggle of young rural 
girls to become dagongmei; and in the rite of their passages, unravels how these 
female bodies experience the politics and tension produced by a hybrid mixture of 
the state socialist and capitalist relations.
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Chapter 1 Introduction: the Poetics of Becoming Dagongmei
A big and prosperous China in the 21st century is first dreamed in 
the West, then re-dreamed by the Chinese elite. It is a misfortune 
o f  our epoch. What is more tragic is the calling o f  the young  
generation o f  our daughters not only to live, but work out for the 
project o f  the dream1.
Gaze/Gate: On the Day o f Recruiting Labour 4 th March 1996
It was Monday, a week after the Chinese New Year holiday and a day that rural 
migrant girls looked in hope for chances to enter a factory in the Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ). At one o'clock after lunch, the factory gate was surrounded by a 
crowd of people crushing to the door hoping to get in for an interview. There were more 
than two hundred people, most of them were female and only a few male. Judging by 
their appearance, it was easy to see that they were the mang liu, blind nomads among the 
first migration wave that came yearly, immediately after the Chinese New Year, to hunt 
for jobs in the city. The Economic Reform launched by the Chinese state in the early
1980s decided not only to open the door of the country to foreign capital, but also the
urban door to the rural people. The whole society then began to ride on top of a great 
movement: a movement of the economic system, a movement of political ideology, a 
movement of everyday living culture, and a movement of real people. These movements 
create the new hopes, new dreams, new desires and new politics that are my cardinal 
concerns.
It was a day important not merely for the migrant rural girls finding chances to 
become dagongmei, working girls, but also for providing ways for a novice and native 
anthropologist learning to make sense of her own society out of its impossibility.
The factory where I worked in Shenzhen during 1995 and 1996 was an electronic 
company owned by Hong Kong capital. For anonymous and aesthetic reasons, I named 
it Meteor Electronic Company Limited. Meteor, a kind of shooting star, evoked the 
figuration of rapid change and the epic shifting of contemporary Chinese society.
1 My own words.
Three uniformed factory guards, male, tall and strong, each holding an electric 
stick and standing beside the gate, tried to maintain an order in the crowd that seemed 
impossible. Two ladies, Ying and Jun, the staff of Personnel Department, stood at the 
entrance examining the certificates the job-seekers held. I stood behind Ying and Jun, 
who worked busily and tried to explain the situation to me at the same time.
Ying We didn’t do ads in the newspaper or on street notice boards. We just
spread out the news on the shopfloor that we were going to recruit labour 
this afternoon. Now here come so many people we can’t handle them. 
Every year is like this.
Pun Where do they come from?
Ying Oh, provinces all over the country. But anyway, I am sure they are
people who have relationships with our factory. Maybe relatives, or co­
villagers or peers of our factory workers.
Ying and Jun checked four kinds of certificates:
1. Shenzhen SEZ Permit
2. Identity Card
3. Certificate for Secondary School Graduation
4. Certificate for the Unmarried
Ying Our priority goes to the Guangdong local workers, aged over 16, but
better 18 to 23, single and with a high middle school education.
Jun Nowadays, people can easily buy a school certificate at a low price. So it
is difficult for us to tell the real from the fraud. We need to judge not only 
from the certificates, but also from their appearances.
It was not the first time that I heard the story that people could easily buy school 
certificates from some schools. Following Jun’s eyes, I looked at the crowd as well, 
focusing on their faces and bodies. They were so different, some tall, some short, some 
thin, some fat, and some had a more urban-look than the others. Whatever appearance 
they gave, the whole crowd concentrated their gaze in my direction. The only direction, 
the gaze of the factory, where gaze and gate met, absorbing all kinds o f expectations into 
one flow of desire: the desire for factory life.
Today twenty people were chosen. The gate was pulled down, leaving the crowd 
in the outside world of disappointment. It became extraordinarily silent, more silent than 
the usual day in the factory. The Meteor Electronic Company, now possessed 526 
workers and planned to hire fifty workers this year. Last year they lost about 40 workers 
who returned to their hometowns during the Chinese New Year holidays and never came 
back. The twenty people were directed to a huge dining room in the second floor. Ying 
and Jun had them sit at the table and distributed application forms for them to fill in. No 
guidance was given. After ten minutes, Ying and Jun collected all the filled forms and 
started the first round interviewing.
“Liu Siu Hua” was the first one to be called. A young girl with a round face 
stood up among the group and came to the table. She looked firm, and a little bit 
nervous. Jun looked over her certificates again, this time more deliberately in order to 
make sure that the information on age, place of residence, marital status and education 
level corresponded in each certificate. If she had any suspicion, she would not ask for 
any explanation and simply sent her off. The basic information was correct, so Ying 
started asking questions.
Ying (in Cantonese) Can you speak Cantonese? You are a Hakka?
Siu Hua (reply in Cantonese) Yes, at least I can understand almost all.
Ying Our Department heads all come from Hong
Kong. You need to understand them without any 
mistake.
Ying continued to ask about her past work history, wages, working hours, 
accommodation and other fringe benefits that the factory she worked for previously 
provided.
Siu Hua I did QC2 jobs. I worked in Tim Lee Electronic Plant for two more
than two years. They paid me a basic wage of RMB 3753 and 
overtime of RMB 200 to 300.
Ying What were the working hours?
Siu Hua 7:30 AM to 11:30 AM, 12:30 PM to 5:00 PM and 6:30 PM to
10:00 PM.
: QC refers to Quality Control.
’ The exchange rate o f  sterling against renm inbi is 1: 13,18, and US dollar against renm inbi is 1: 8.31 
on 15th August 1997. The unit o f  RMB is yuan.
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Ying Did they provide meals and accommodation?
Siu Hua Yes.
Ying Then why did you leave?
Siu Hua The factory moved to Guangzhou and we all lost our jobs.
Ying Did you find a job elsewhere?
Siu Hua No.
Ying ' No? Really? You are so lazy then?
Siu Hua I did try ,... b u t... but I got no interviews.
Ying Hm, go back to your seat and wait.
Siu Hua left the table, with her face worn by a sense of uneasiness. Ying put 
remarks 011 the application form, suggesting that she see the QC department staff. Jun 
soon arranged for Ah Biao, the QC foreman, to come down, Biao, at his early thirties, 
holding an internal mobile phone in his hand, looked confident and talented. He walked 
straight to another table, going through the application form and the remarks. I moved 
my seat to his table; he gave me a nod and a look of surprise that I was there. I was 
supposed to be working on the line in the Production Department, I had been granted 
permission to observe the recruitment on the first day of annual labour recruiting.
“Liu Siu Hua,” Biao shouted. Siu Hua looked more nervous this time and walked 
fast to the table.
Biao You are aged 20, with two year working experience. What
did you do in the factory?
Siu Hua I did I did QC.
Biao I know, but what stuff did you do?
Siu Hua I did checking the functions, the defects, an d .......
Biao Okay, okay, if I give you this mobile phone to check, what
will you do?
Siu Hua (more hesitantly, with her hand shaking from holding the phone)
I will, I will look over the appearance, and check the 
function. I will follow the steps carefully.
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Biao (showing a little bit of impatience but laughing when he saw the shaking hand)
What’s the problem with your hand? You haven’t eaten * 
full enough to hold the phone? Let me look at your hand.
Siu Hua stretched out her palm, small and soft. Biao held her fingers and Siu Hua
wanted to draw back but controlled herself. She flushed.
Biao Oh, not too bad. I guess you didn’t do farming work at
home. I hope you didn't.
Siu Hua No, I did not do farming at home.
Biao So you are the lucky one. What is your schooling?
Siu Hua Middle high school.
Biao Completed?
Siu Hua Yes.
Biao Really, then you should have the talent to recognize the
English word “open”.
(Biao wrote down the English word on a paper, passed it to her and smiled at me.)
Siu Hua bi, pen, isn't it bi?
Biao (laughing) You said you have completed secondary school, and you
can't distinguish the word between “pen” and “open”.
Biao (passing the paper to Siu Hua)
Well, if you really have secondary schooling, write me ten 
English letters of the alphabet, starting from the 13th to the 
23 rd.
Siu Hua hesitated for a while, and immediately wrote down all 26 letters and simply 
crossed out the first twelve and the last three. We all smiled, and I thought she was 
clever, but Biao said that was always the way the silly workers did it. Siu Hua was told 
to sit back and wait.
Ying and Jun finished the first round of interviewing and asked two people to 
leave immediately after looking at their certificates. Among eighteen people, sixteen 
female and two male, twelve were assigned to the Production Department, while six 
were sent to QC Department for further interviewing. After the second round of 
interviewing, seven were asked to leave and the remainder were going to see the
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Department heads or assistants. This was a terrible time of selecting workers into the 
disciplinary machine; criteria were set, though flexible and situational according to the 
demands of different departments and work positions. Commanding Cantonese, 
education level, work experience, nimble fingers, and good attitudes were all basic 
requirements.
Ms Tang, the QC Department Manager, a Hong Kong citizen, showed up at 4:00 
PM. With casual wear, she looked stout, energetic and quite handsome in a short-cut and 
curled hair style. “Any perfect stuff? I want the perfect!” she asked, Biao did not give 
her a direct answer but said, “If  s like finding needles in the sea.” Five people were 
going to see her, and the interviewing was arranged in a meal room for the Hong Kong 
staff who worked in the factory, situated at the far end of the large common dining room. 
Biao and I sat beside Ms Tang. Biao tried to provide as much as information he could.
Liu Siu Hua's name was called for a third time. Siu Hua already looked tired, still 
fraught and nerve-wracked. She walked to the table and sat down.
Tang Sit Straight. Don't bend your back. You're not farming now, are
you?
Siu Hua showed fear when Ms Tang spoke. She instantly stretched her back right 
straight and looked at Ms Tang. Ms Tang turned her voice soft when she was satisfied at 
Siu Hua adjusting her body.
Tang You’ve got experience of working in an electronic plant. How
many models have you touched?
Siu Hua (hesitated) Perhaps ten models, or more.
Tang Were the checking processes similar or different?
Siu Hua Similar.
Tang Did you do the bookkeeping yourself? Could you recognize those
Siu Hua
Siu Hua 
Tang
English model names?
Yes, I did. And I seldom made mistakes.
Hm, I will give you three months of probation period. During the 
probation period, the basic wage is RMB 320 per month, and the 
over time work is RMB 2.5 per hour. Do the rates sound 
reasonable to you?
Yes, Madam.
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Tang Hm, then start working tomorrow. And if you are hardworking
and skillful, I will shorten your probation period and adjust your 
wage. Alright?
Siu Hua Yes, thank you.
Ms Tang turned to me and said, “I won’t waste time asking questions. I judge
them more on attitudes. It is politeness, honesty and obedience that I coimt most, and
their readiness to be a dagongmei that matters.”
On the second day, after entering the factory gate, where gaze and gate met and 
fused into one desire: Siu Hua became a dagongmei.4
Situating my cardinal concerns
The body is the inscribed surface o f  events (traced by language and 
dissolved by ideas), the locus o f  a dissociated se lf  (adopting the 
illusion o f  a substantial unity), and a volum e in perpetual 
disintegration. Genealogy as an analysis o f  descent, is thus situated 
within the articulation o f  the body and history and the processes o f  
history’s destruction o f  the body.
M. Foucault (1984), Nietzche, Genealogy, History
Siu Hua's passage to become a dagongmei coincided with the transformation 
since the early 1980s of the state socialist regime in contemporary China from a rigid
planned economy to a market economy. The quest for China’s modernity in the reform
era means the opening of the state socialist regime to international and private capital 
and the advent of the capitalist apparatus and relations in regulating not only economic 
life, but also social and cultural life. The first broad question which comes to my mind is 
that of change of social and individual life in the wake of China's search for modernity in 
the reform era. In a society in transition, what does the hybrid mixture of state socialist 
and capitalist relations ask individuals to live up to? What sort of new desires, 
new identities and new relationships of power and resistance emerge? Girls like Siu Hua,
4 Siu Hua is chosen here, not because her experiences are exceptional, but as usual and ordinary as 
others are,
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the dagongmei, the migrant female workers working in foreign-invested factories are the 
first pioneers to experience the deep and rapid social transformation of the Chinese 
society - the change of an agricultural and state socialist mode of production to an 
industrial and capitalist mode of production. As women, as peasants and as migrant 
workers, dagongmei are liminal subjects living in a shifting Chinese society. Their 
ambiguous and overlapping identities entailed rich stories of how the state-party, the 
capitalist market and the patriarchal culture work hand in hand to produce new relations 
of power and domination. And as historical agents they actively meet those changes, 
powers, and spaces of transgression.
The dramatic changes in the lives of contemporary Chinese women workers have 
elicited much less academic study than the issue deserves, despite their substantial part in 
the socio-economic transformation and the modernity project of the Chinese society in the 
period of economic reform. My study hopes to explore the process, the desires and the 
struggles of young rural girls to become dagongmei. In the rites of passage, hard, bitter, 
varicoloured and intriguing, I want to unravel how these young female bodies experience 
the politics and tensions produced by the hybrid mixture of the state socialist and capitalist 
relations. A dagongmei is a sexed social body, inscribed with specific, yet contingent and 
arbitrary historical forces that are urgently ready to unfold. The body, the regulating and 
fracturing of the female body in the workplace in response to the demands of industrial 
capitalism, will be my particular interest. Based on an ethnographic study in the factory, I 
will look at the processes of political technologizing of the body, intertwined with the 
dynamics of registering a feminine identity in relation to the production of sexedly 
disciplined subjects. Workers’ subjectivity, their ways of accommodating and fissures of 
transgression, gone deep into the personal psyche, will all be my concerns. The body, 
particularly the female body in the study, is the contested site, the threshold that the 
transformative forces of the Chinese society work upon to build up the project of 
modernity. The regulation, the technology of the body and self in the course of capitalist 
transformation opens up horizons for our understanding of the way that the quest for 
Chinese modernity is not only a socio-economic project, but a bio-cultural one as well.
The episode of recruiting labour that opens up the thesis contains nearly all the 
crucial intriguing plots that need to be resolved in the following chapters. First of all, the 
meeting of gaze and gate insinuates in our minds the politics of desire in contemporary 
China- the desire of industrial capitalism to produce wants, lacks and wishes of the 
individual to serve the force and demand of the society at large. As Deleuze and Guattari 
put it clearly, desire is the social unconscious; “lack is created, planned and organized in 
and through social production.” (1983:28) The creation of desire and lack is the art of 
market economy that “involves deliberately organizing wants and needs {manque) amid an 
abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great fear of not 
having one’s needs satisfied” (ibid.) The socius, the body of the society records all 
production of desire and creates its own delirium by constructing a collective passion that 
acts through every individual as though they are members of its body (Deleuze 1988:109). 
The desire to be dagongmei, shown by the great flux of migration to the urban industrial 
areas, traces the politics of the capitalist machine in producing social lack and generating 
the desire of individuals to fill the void. The urge and eagerness of the young girls to leave 
their hometown depicts a story far more complicated than the simple explanation that 
current migration flows in the reform China are dictated by the logic of poverty. Poverty as 
the crystalized form of social lack is produced and organized by the power of state and 
capital. Poverty, especially the huge gap between the urban and rural societies, is not 
unreal, but artificial and historically made, and, most important of all, is needed to be 
consumed.
The depreciation of farming work and the contrast of farming and industrial work 
in the management interview hint that the politics of differance, hierarchy and othering are 
involved in the process of producing new industrial subjects- dagongmei. Siu Hua, coming 
from a rural area, was often questioned about doing agricultural work, since farming, 
imagined as rough and rustic toiling, would spoil the sharpness and dextrousness of the 
body, and particularly the fingers. The constitution of new selves and new identities is an 
act of power (Laclau 1990), an enforcement of reactive forces and homogenization 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1984), and a process of self-subjectivization, exclusion and 
displacement (Foucault 1988) that involve the deployment of institutional controls, 
disciplinary techniques, the ait of naming and the power of language. To construct new 
capitalist industrial subjects in the workplace, the old socialist and rural beings are
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constantly devalued, downgraded and forsaken. Rural subjects, especially non-Cantonese 
speakers, are imaged as abject subjects, and thus the dark flip side of the new, modem and 
desirable identity. Dagongmei, as a new identity, as an cultural artefact, is produced at the 
particular moment when industrial capitalist machine comes to fruition in post-Mao China, 
and the beginning of the process of proletarianization regulated by both market and state 
forces. Existing social differences such as the divisions between the rural and the urban, 
the north and the south, the male and female, the married and the single are all manipulated 
to maintain, extend or modify the new power of domination and hierarchies.
The regulation of the body starts at the very moment when one comes to confront 
the production machine at the entrance of the factory gate. Power simply cannot wait to 
invest on the body when both parties meet. The chosen twenty interviewees among two 
hundred people were picked up arbitrarily by judging at first glance their appearances and 
then their certificates. Siu Hua was asked by the foreman, Biao, to show her hand, and then 
by the Hong Kong manager, Ms Tang, to stretch her back right straight at the beginning of 
the interview. The body is the primary site that attracts the investment of the disciplinary 
power, which always aims at imagining, and then crafting an idealized type of docile and 
productive labour. As Foucault poignantly says, the political technology of the body is 
bound up with its economic use; “it is largely as a force of production that the body is 
invested with relations of power and domination”, and “its constitution as labour power is 
possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection” (1977:25-26). Turning rural and 
“lazy” “socialist bodies” into industrialized, efficient and productive bodies is the 
fundamental work of the production machine. And if, as Frantz Fanon says, the black 
man’s soul is the white man’s artefact (1967), we say that the dagongmei's body is the 
production of the production machine.
If Karl Marx has already taught us that the division between town and country is 
the basis of the accumulation of capital, I am going to argue that sexual difference is 
another must, especially in the age of the new international division of labour. Mao’s 
China highlighted the category of class whilst negating sexual differentiation. Deng’s 
China, on the other hand, is marked by the proliferation of sexual discourses and female 
bodily images (Croll 1995; Evans 1997). Capitalist production and consumption need sex, 
want sex and rely on sex as the basic constitution of the system of difference and hierarchy. 
Dagongmei is an embodied identity of class and sex; what the production machine wants is
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not a naturalized body, but a sexed female body. Siu Hua was recruited not only because 
she was an immigrant worker, but also a girl, a female who was cheaper and easier to 
regulate and control. Foreign-owned electronic compounds in China are depicted as 
orchards of peaches, in metaphor the world of female adolescents wait for men to pursue 
them. The bio-power of the production machine has no interest in modelling a general 
body, but in a particular sexed body, a feminine body, which is imagined as more obedient, 
tolerant and comforming to the factory machine. A docile but productive female body is 
the “perfect stuff’ that Ms Tang wants.
“Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1984); even though the 
relation of power and domination over the female body is tremendous, dagongmei, as a 
specific embodied Chinese subaltern group, are never totally subjugated and muted. The 
process of subordination and domination is seldom complete, and it is marked by various 
forms of collaboration, transgression and resistance which together come to make up its 
complex, dissident and heterogeneous subjects (de Certeau 1984; Guha and Spivak 1988; 
Scott 1990; Willis 1977). Dagongmei are complex, dissenting and tactical subjects who 
live up against a system of domination which is inherently incomplete, and who know how 
to find out the fissures for transgression in the grid of discipline and power. In the struggle 
of everyday life, these women workers are practical and strategic agents who strive to 
survive in an alienated milieu by manipulating the situational opportunities, or even 
making use of hegemonic discourses and mechanisms in protecting themselves. Siu Hua, 
in the situational struggle, created the subaltern’s wisdom by writing down all twenty-six 
letters of the alphabet and then crossing out the unnecessary ones. Before the male 
disciplinary machine, no matter how powerless they are, dagongmei are never “docile 
bodies”, but “tactical and resistant bodies” who sometimes covertly or overtly confront the 
domination, and sometimes successfully subvert or break down the disciplinary power. I 
am not going to romantize these “everyday life practices” (de Certeau 1984) , or “cultural 
struggles” (Ong 1991), but the stories and the experiences, the pains and the suffering, the 
screams and dreams of the women workers on the shop floor unfold the intriguing portrait 
of “the politics and poetics of transgression” that I am so eager to open up.
How can I  speak?: a crisis o f  representation
The quest for modernity in China, the broad subject matter I would like to study, 
meets the post-modern challenges to the epistemological legitimacy of the human 
sciences in general and anthropology in particular in 1980s. Those challenges make me 
hesitate to begin the portrait, for I never knew the act of creation was so problematic. 
Never have the questions of “truth” and representation raised such an agenda and never 
have the doubts of representation been so pervasive as in our age. As George Marcus and 
Michael Fischer put it, “The present is a time of reassessment of dominant ideas across 
the human sciences, extending to law, art, architecture, philosophy, literature, and even 
the natural sciences. ... It is not just the ideas themselves that are coming under attack 
but the paradigmatic style in which they have been presented. Particularly in the social 
sciences, the goal of organizing disciplines by abstract, generalizing frameworks that 
encompass and guide all efforts at empirical research is being fundamentally 
challenged.” (1986:7) The crisis of representation at stake is about the trustworthy means 
and possible methods of understanding and describing social reality. Positivism, 
empiricism, structuralism, and symbolism all are put into doubt, and the legitimacy of 
their producing accurate knowledge is seriously questioned. Jean-Fransois Lyotard’s 
representative work The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984) attacks 
these “grand theories” or “metanarratives” that have legitimated the rules of social 
science since the age of the Enlightenment. Totalizing visions or generalizing paradigms 
are condemned as building up authority other than “truth” in disciplining practices. 
Lyotard argues for “micronarratives” or multiple “language games” instead and says that 
postmodern knowledge is “not simply a tool of the authorities; it refines our sensitivity 
to differences and reinforces our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.” (1984:xxv)
In the discipline of anthropology, the challenges from postmodern knowledge 
push positivist anthropology to give way to the interpretive anthropology for which 
Clifford Geertz is a spokesman and there is a deep reflection on ethnographic writing by 
both British and American anthropologists. Recent practices come to a consensus, 
though not without polemics, that “ethnographic truths are inherently partial - 
committed and incomplete” (Clifford and Marcus 1986:7). The making of ethnography 
is thus artisanal, and the poetic and political are inseparable and inevitable. An
accusation from Edward Said (1979) that anthropology as a discipline is a participant in, 
if not a creator of, orientalism further perplexes the current generation. The fundamental 
shattering of the conventional authority of the discipline contributes to at least two 
reflections: first, the advocacy of ethnography as experimental writing; and second, 
anthropology as a cultural critique of one’s own society. These two trends are inter­
related and mutually conditioned. For the former, Marcus and Fisher put it,
A period of experimentation is characterized by eclecticism, the play of 
ideas free of authoritative paradigms, critical and reflexive views of 
subject matter, openness to diverse influences embracing whatever seems 
to work in practice, and tolerance of uncertainty about a field’s direction 
and of incompleteness in some of its projects.
(1986: x)
For the latter, Marcus and Fisher insist that anthropology is no longer the simple 
collection of the exotic, but the use of cultural richness for self-reflection and self­
growth. They explain that “one distinguishing feature of the experimentation is the 
sophisticated reflection by the anthropologist about herself and her own society that 
describing an alien culture engenders. This reflection can be harnessed from the field of 
experimental writing and redirected for full-scale projects of cultural critique at home.” 
(1986:4) Thus the study of other cultures is no longer to seek empirical evidences to 
prove any universal rules of western progress or stages of human evolution. Rather, it 
opens up horizons to reflect that the western ways, especially the capitalist modes of 
organizing human societies and activities, are not the only possibilities, let alone the 
best.
Politics o f  Location
While the American interpretive anthropology is preoccupied with the new 
criticism of representation, British anthropologists in recent years have been more 
concerned with the political engagement and localizing strategies in ethnographic 
writing. Richard Fardon and Mark Hobart share the view that self-critique of American
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interpretive anthropology still can not escape ethnocentric views of other cultures. Given 
the inequality of political relations, and the unidirectional flow of academic authority, 
Mark Hobart argues, “So, despite claiming to embrace the Other and liberate its 
polyphonic discourse, such approaches perpetuate the vision of the anthropologist as the 
superior 'knowing subject’ who beneficently grants the Other its right to appear on its 
own behalf in the circus of contemporary academe. ... The crudest cut of all, however, is 
that the Other is only authorized to participate according to Western notions of self and 
action, and so is liable to be deemed not to playing fair when it does not co-operate.” 
(1990:306) In brief, the problems of registering the Western self as the knowing subject 
in anthropological practice are still not solved. The post-modern turn thus on the one 
hand shatters the legitimacy of Western knowledge, but on the other hand equally admits 
that the authority of Western self is inevitable since what matters is the self-critique of 
one’s own society and the other cultures are only taken as reference images. The West 
still has the power to speak, and still speaks to a Western audience.
Attempting to go beyond post-modem critiques, the British anthropologists ask 
us to take the action and agency of both the fieldworker and the field agents into 
account. The field, the real space of encoimtering other culture, is less like a text than a 
con-text that is historical, temporal and locally situated. Bruce Kapferer, in a critique of 
postmodern anthropology, also raised the problem of relating a philosophy of 
deconstruction to a political radicalism committed to understanding processes of power, 
resistance and suffering (1988:81). Jonathan Spencer argued that ethnographic 
knowledge was produced through complex processes of interaction between informants 
and the anthropologist. Field encounters create “a kind of intermediate ground between 
cultures”, and “the beginnings of a hybrid cross-cultural object 01* product” (1989:155), 
that is the only possible result of the dialogue in ethnography. Nancy Lindisfarne puts it 
simply and powerfully, “The anthropologist is both changed and an agent of change.” 
(1996:13). Recently devoting herself to writing in Arabic, she struggled to fight 
ethnocentrism and the seemingly never defeated Western subject, by addressing herself 
to a merely native audience. By putting the local audience on stage for the first time, 
Lindisfarne has no way to go but a reorientation of her academic interests. She must 
rethink the whole anthropological practice - what kinds of questions are to be asked? 
What will make sense to the local audience? Once no longer serving a western academe,
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she says, political engagement in the field is inevitable (1996:1). What she means by 
“political” is an active commitment to dissent and an understanding of local power and ' 
resistance. As she puts it,
An active commitment to dissent is also necessary if the anthropologist- 
of whatever political colouring - hopes to offer insights which go beyond 
the banal and the prejudgments of dominant political formations. Such an 
attitude of dissent depends on affirming the place of human agency and 
moral or ethical choice in all interactions and exploring the forms of local 
resistance which emerge from the nuanced differences, incompatibility 
and contestation of those choices.
(1996:1)
Practising Native Anthropology
I do not agree with the recent argument that the aim of native anthropology 
should be set in articulating alternative modernities of non-western societies in contrast 
to western modernity (Ong 1996). In the paper, “Anthropology, China and modernities: 
the geopolitics of cultural knowledge”, Ong argues for redefining the meanings and uses 
of alternative modernity in the local geopolitical context as the practice and contribution 
of native anthropological knowledge (1996:60-65). Although she strives to articulate a 
non-western oriented anthropological practice, the audience she addresses is still and 
only the western audience. The paradox is clear: is it good for the Chinese to hear again 
an official version of the “Chinese road to modernization” (an imagined state version)? 
What are the insights she could provide for the Chinese who live under an “alternative 
modernity” she argues for? The mirror for what is distinctive, what is alternative, is 
always the stereotype, the normative of western modernity. Thus the mirror of reflecting 
Chinese modernity is still the western societies, which are often essentialized as well. 
The dichotomy of the western ego/oriental other dyad is still not solved. For me, what is 
more interesting for native anthropology is not to argue for an otherness or 
distinctiveness, but to go deep to understand the relation of domination and resistance in 
one’s own society. Native anthropology, I believe, will not have a more authentic voice
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or more authority in producing local knowledge. Rather, a practice of self-critique, self­
deconstruction and a preference for nuanced differences, may help to find out the 
possibilities of self-healing.
Preoccupation with my “own” society grants me a position as a “native” 
anthropologist whether I like it or not. But for me, what is “own” and what is “native” is 
always ambiguous, contradictory and self-defeating. Born in a small city in South China, 
I followed my family migration to Hong Kong in 1979, when I had not completed my 
primary schooling, and at the time when China started to launch the reform policies. I 
completed my undergraduate and postgraduate studies in Hong Kong. There a Chinese 
society, but at the same time a British colony and a “successful” capitalist city, provided 
me with a western education and different values and styles of life. Hong Kong, before 
the hand over of 1997, was a distinctly colonial society, where over 95% of the 
population was Chinese. The daily language was mostly Cantonese, one of the dominant 
dialects in Guangdong Province, while the official and formal language was English. 
Family values were often articulated to maintain a stable social order, accompanied by a 
“money-oriented” capitalist culture and bureaucratic and technocratic politics. It was a 
place culturally identified with Chinese tradition, albeit imagined and reinvented, while 
economically oriented to Western consumption values.
Torn apart by two systems, it was particularly hard to assimilate into the host 
culture, the new mode of life, as childhood memory of the state socialist system 
continued to affect my experiences growing up in Hong Kong. Thanks to the 
experiences of displacement, I am acutely aware of the differences between the political 
systems and the ways social and individual life are shaped. I am also sensitive to social 
inequalities generated in the capitalist Hong Kong society, as the Chinese official 
version of Marxist idioms still haunted in my mind. For a long time, I have found myself 
an exile rather than an immigrant. I could never absorb a new subjectivity in the host 
community, nor could I find an identification with the culture of the motherland. 
Cultural exile creates a deep sense of identity crisis, resistant to any identification of 
“home”. Intellectually, I can never escape from being “homeless”. I cannot identify with 
the mainland elite whose project, though it sometimes seems radical enough in a state 
socialist country, is to look for western modernity, or speaking plainly, western 
capitalism to replace Chinese culture and the socialist system. Nor can I agree with
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mainstream Western "China studies," which can hardly escape the trap of orientalism. 
Nor can I applaud some famous American scholars who act as experts and guardians 
who can supposedly diagnose the problems of China better than the insiders.
The sense of “homelessness” excludes me from the possibility of standing in the 
mainstream or sympathizing with either side. Instead, like a nomad (in the Deleuzian 
sense) I am always forced to look for borderlands or peripheral positions to breathe, to 
think and to write. Mayfair Yang, an overseas Chinese anthropologist, is right to say, 
“The question of a decentered anthropological subject-position from which to diagnose 
China’s modern afflictions challenges not only Eurocentrism, but also the “center” of 
contemporary Chinese culture. At a time when the center of Chinese culture in the world 
is unable to articulate the concerns of a significant portion of people who call themselves 
Chinese, it is on the “peripheries” of Chinese culture where dynamic cultural 
innovations and self-questioning will have to take place.” (1994:29) These “peripheries”, 
Yang says, are the product of waves of Chinese “diaspora” in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, people fleeing warfare, impoverishment, and political persecution on 
the troubled mainland. They include the Chinese societies of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore, as well as Chinese communities scattered in the West (1994:29). It is 
insightful to say that exiles or immigrants in a peripheral position can provide a new 
understanding of the Chinese culture and a cultural critique of the center. But for me it is 
not true that people in the center cannot articulate themselves as Chinese on their own 
without help from the outside. Rather, people in the center, especially the center elites, 
always overreact with the sense of superiority of their national and cultural identity as 
Chinese. Sinocentrism is the common disease not only prevalent in the 19th century but 
also at the end of 20th century when the center is being incorporated into the 
international order. “Native” anthropology can contribute not only to challenging 
Eurocentrism, but Sinocentrism as well, by always taking a peripheral position in the 
borderland.
This thesis was written as the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China 
approached. That did not help much to lessen my sense of “homelessness”, nor shorten 
the cultural distance to the center. The whole Hong Kong community was very alert to 
the political and cultural shock of the motherland political system. Economically 
speaking, the two places have been integrated with each other since the early 80s when
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the setting up of the Special Economic Zones in South China absorbed much of Hong 
Kong capital. South China became an important base providing abundant land and cheap 
labour for the Hong Kong industrial capital, and a demand for Hong Kong popular and 
consumer culture. But economic cooperation in the past decades can hardly shorten the 
cultural distance. Instead it creates more misunderstandings, discriminations and 
mistrust as economic interactions and power are structurally skewed. The long 
segregation and the dissimiliarity of the two cultures has pushed the identity crisis of the 
Hong Kong people to an extreme limit. As a city of diaspora, Hong Kong is a place 
where individuals can hold several passports or nationalities, and at the same time still 
have the right of abode there. Blurred identities, if not resistant identities, are a feature of 
post-colonial society, since no single political power or value system can provide 
legitimate cultural identification. My practice as a “native” anthropologist thus is 
embedded in these historical conjunctures that help to construe a fluid, nomadic, 
peripheral, yet distinctive position.
Studies on Chinese Women
The study of Chinese women was made visible by Western academics in the 
1970s, often female writers influenced by western feminism and wanting to look for 
and compare women’s inequality and oppression in other cultures (Croll 1978; Wolf 
1972; Young 1973). With the presupposition that Chinese society was oriented on a 
family-based structure, the studies of the 70s and 80s were often confined to the area of 
reproduction and family in order to unravel gender asymmetries. They stressed that the 
low status of Chinese women was rooted in the Chinese family system, which was 
organized along male kinship lines and was patrilineal, patrilocal and patriarchal in 
nature (Johnson 1983; Kung 1983; Andors 1983; Stacey 1983; Wolf 1972; 1985). 
Women in traditional China, it was often argued, were deprived of the means of 
production and the right of property. Their personal autonomy was totally submerged 
under male authority, either of their father or husband. As Kay A. Johnson puts it, "the 
patriarchal-patrilineal-patrilocal configuration, in China, as elsewhere, made women 
marginal members of the entire family system. They were temporary members or 
future deserters of their natal families and stranger-intruders in their new husbands'
families." (Johnson 1983:9). Women, then, were bom into a system which structurally 
placed them in a very vulnerable position and were basically powerless (Johnson 1983; 
Kung 1983). Girls were “goods on which one lost money”, and they would marry out 
once they grew up. They were doomed to be "useless things" because they could not 
contribute to the natal family's survival or provide care for their parents in their old age. 
Women's labour would be given to another family, and they were considered as "water 
spilled on the ground." No family would invest time and money in educating their 
daughters who one day would become the daughter-in-law of someone else (Croll 
1983, 1994; Kung 1983; Wolf 1985). A sense of inferiority and degradation was 
nurtured when the girls were very young, and their inferior position in the family and in 
the community was structurally located.
Forty yeai-s' experience of “socialism” in China did not fulfil its promise of 
"women's liberation", which was one of the revolutionary goals expected from socialist 
development. Studies on modem Chinese women convinced us that "the Chinese Road 
to Socialism" was built on the path of patriarchy (Johnson 1983; Andors, 1983; Stacey 
1983; Wolf 1985). Many scholars support the argument that both the revolutionary 
strategies in the pre-Liberation period and the development policies in the socialist 
construction era perpetuated and reinforced, rather than destroyed, the traditional 
family system and ideology. They argue that the reluctance of the government to 
vigorously pursue family reform goals, and the failure of the government to perceive 
and act on the patrilocal, and patriarchal marriage patterns which maintain traditional 
male-centered family structures, are partly due to the leadership's recognition of the 
utility of strong families for their economic and political goals (Johnson 1983; Stacey 
1983). The priorities of economic and political goals nevertheless overshadowed the 
goals of social change, even at the cost of sacrificing the promise of women's 
emancipation. Judith Stacey firmly believes that patriarchy lived throughout the history 
of the Chinese Communist Party, and the CCP made use of the patriarchal system to 
win a revolution. Margery Wolf, on the other hand, does not believe the CCP 
intentionally modelled their new society on the patriarchy of the old. She argues that 
"the leadership did hope to relieve women of the patriarchal burden but were defeated 
because they did not recognise their own cultural blinders. Despite their good
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intentions, their patriarchal lenses ruled out alternatives that might have changed 
China's history and the future of international feminism." (Wolf 1985:261)
All the above studies cast light in illustrating that “socialism” in China did not 
provide a model for achieving gender equality; rather “socialism” could cohabit with 
patriarchy. Studies during the last decade have made the argument more sophisticated 
by reformulating the concepts of “patriarchy” and “family”, taking them not as fixed 
universal systems, but as changing processes in specific temporal situations. Recent 
researches on Chinese women and families have argued that the family system has 
been further consolidated in the reform period. After the rural land reforms in the 
1980s, rural families have reverted to their importance in the pre-Liberation period 
(Croll 1985, 1994; Davin 1991; Davis and Harrell 1993; Fei 1991; Johnson 1993). As 
Croll has put it, "the reversal of the process of collectivisation was primarily a 
consequence of the contracting out of land and production quota to the peasant 
household, which brought about the simultaneous decline of the collective and the 
emergence of the peasant household as the dominant economic, political and social unit 
in the Chinese countryside." (Croll 1994:20) With the restoration of production 
functions, the family as a collective unit in rural society is the centre of resource 
allocation, division of labour and final income redistribution. Thus family strategies 
become particularly important in allocating labourers, deciding what types of crops 
should be planted and choosing to develop non-agricultural production sidelines or 
send labourers to wage work in the industrial cities (Croll 1994; Johnson 1993). At the 
cultural level, the family is where cultural norms are enmeshed, power relations 
anticipated, and decisions made.
The existing research on Chinese women and the family contributes a valuable 
understanding of women’s situations and gender relationships in Chinese society. It is, 
nevertheless, prone to rely on grand theories such as "patriarchy" and "patrilineality" to 
discern the conditions of Chinese women's lives. Structural approaches tend to 
universalize the experiences of women, whose inequality and oppression are believed 
to be rooted in the family system. The subject of the study, "women", has seldom 
undergone serious epistemological reflection and is often taken for granted as an 
unproblematic concept. Differences among and within women themselves are often
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neglected. Even worse, women in China were viewed as the passive victims of 
structural configuration, especially the seemingly never fading Chinese family system.
Studies in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s call for attention to 
women’s experiences, differences and agency. The category of "Chinese women" is 
problematized in order to attune to the multiplicity of identities, voices and locations of 
different generations of women in specific historical time (Croll 1995; Gilmartin, 
Hershatter, Rofel and White 1994; Barlow 1994; Evans 1997). Croll in her recent book 
Changing Identities o f Chinese Women (1995) points out the importance of 
understanding the experiences of women, and the gap between the female experiences 
of familial and social life and the hegemonic rhetoric of the socialist state. As she puts 
it, “One of the most marked characteristics of the Reform period is the open recognition 
of the discrepancy between the rhetoric of equality and the female experience of 
inequality.” (1995:8) The diversity of female experiences, the changing identities and 
the plural rites of passage in acquiring womanhood thus are the agenda for future 
women’s studies. The search for women’s lived experiences and agency is opposed to 
the view of Chinese women as passive acceptors, a view of historical agents with a 
great variety of experiences. Chinese women are no longer the passive victims of 
structural oppression, rather they are, temporally and situationally, strategic agents in 
making their own lives. While there are active calls to look for women’s agency and 
daily experiences, recent study so far has not put enough effort into exploring the 
heterogeneous identities and actions of Chinese women as social agents, nor has it 
provided in-depth ethnographic studies recording them as active, lively strategic agents 
participating to create and defend their lives,
Chinese Women and Work
Literature on Chinese women and work, on the other hand, has a long tradition 
of depicting Chinese daughters as active labourers, participating vigorously in the 
production sphere. As Kay Ann Johnson states, "the commonly held notion that women 
in traditional Chinese society were restricted to the home and were never allowed to 
participate in ‘productive’ labour is an exaggeration." (Johnson 1983:15) Among poor 
peasant families, keeping girls at home was only an ideal that could rarely be achieved.
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Many historical studies show that women frequently participated in productive work 
and contributed a considerable share to their family economy (Buck 1937; Feng and 
Chang 1945). In addition to farming work, women also participated in a variety of 
productive jobs. In late 1920s Hakka women in Elizabeth Johnson's study were 
involved in various form of transport work such as carrying coal, charcoal, steel, and 
cement for construction, even when they were over forty years old (Johnson 1984:81). 
Some women were good at selling, since women peddlers were allowed to enter the 
house of the affluent families, according to the Pruitt's story of a Han daughter (Pruitt 
1967:175). Some women were also active in home industries. Rawski's study (1972) 
shows that women in weaving and spinning jobs contributed income to their families at 
least equal to or more than men made from farming. Rawski reported that a skilled 
woman weaver could weave in four or five days a bolt of cotton cloth, whose value was 
equal to one sixth of the annual production from one mou of fertile land (Rawski 
1972:47). In Suzhou, a wife could earn as much through weaving as her husband who 
was a model farmer. The women could earn twenty silver Hang a year, while a hired 
labourer only cost 13 liang a year (Rawski 1972:55).
Girls in the Canton Delta were famous for participating in the silk production in 
the early twentieth century, and earned considerable wages from mulberry leaf 
harvesting, silkworm raising and silk reeling (Topley 1975; Stockard 1989). This 
income provided the economic base for girls to develop many strategies to resist 
marriage. It contributed to the rise of a “resisting marriage culture” in the Canton delta, 
especially in the Sundak region in the early twentieth century. While daughters in 
Canton were active in silk industries, girls in Shanghai in the pre-1949 period were 
predominant in the early textile industry. Emily Honig, in her study of Shanghai 
women workers, states, "In Shanghai, China's largest industrial centre prior to 1949, 
cotton was king and the majority of mill workers were women. Including those 
employed in the silk and tobacco factories, women accounted for almost two-thirds of 
the total industrial work force in Shanghai." (Honig 1986:1) The above studies show 
that Chinese women's experiences were diverse and naunced according to their local 
economic roles and cultural practices. They were never totally passive, nor absolutely 
economically dependent as the common assumption held, though their economic power 
might not necessarily increase their status. Janet Salaffs studies on Hong Kong
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working daughters in the 1960s and 1970s reported that girls were able to expand 
personal consumption levels and gained certain freedoms in social life through their 
wage-earning power, though most of their earnings contributed to the family income 
(1981:170). Lydia Kirng's work on Taiwanese women echoes this: “I do not wish to 
deny the very real transformations that have occurred: working daughters enjoy greater 
mobility, peer contacts, and their participation in production has enhanced their 
economic value to their families. These conditions have not, however, substantially 
elevated the standing of women at home or in society” (Kung 1983: xiii-xiv).
Phillis Andors was the first scholar to do research on the situation of 
contemporary Chinese women workers at the Shenzhen SEZ in the mid 1980s. She 
points out the increased feminization of labour as China started to adopt export 
industrialization: women workers, mainly single and under 35, composed 70% of the 
work force in most of the light industries like textiles and electronics (1988). Maria 
Tam is a native anthropologist who records a lot of interesting stories of women 
workers in a joint corporation in Shekou Industrial Zone. Employing Anthony 
Giddens’ structuration theory, she argues that modernization as “an overwhelming and 
impersonal process, would be related to those individuals who made it a reality through 
day-to-day ‘getting by”’, and “in fact by definition ‘modem-zahW requires human 
action” (1992:xi). Women workers, thus, were taken as “social agents that helped to 
bring out modernization by grasping new opportunities and exploiting resources under 
a new set of rules” (ibid). Ching Kwan Lee, a local sociologist, on the other hand, 
deploys Michael Burawoy’s theory of production politics to make a comparative study 
on two factory regimes: one in Hong Kong and one in Shenzhen (1995). Based on 
ethnographic study, she argues that the factory regime in Shenzhen was one of 
localistic despotism, while in Hong Kong it was one of familial hegemony. The two 
plants where she conducted research were owned by the same Hong Kong enterprise, 
managed by the same team of managers, and produced the same electronic products, 
yet had two different modes of disciplinary control which aroused her academic interest 
(ibid). Though her study aims at reformulating Burawoy’s theory on the politics of 
production by putting in gender and the factors of social organization of labour market 
such as familial, kin and localistic ties, she nevertheless provides rich and intriguing 
stories of women workers on the shopfloor. These existing studies, by and large,
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contribute to the understanding of women’s agency and actions and provide us with 
valuable empirical researches and personal accords showing how individuals actively 
participate in creating their own life worlds. My project is inspired by these studies.
Sex, gender and body in Studies o f China
Harriet Evans has said that the exploration of the specific meanings inscribed in 
the Chinese use of the terms xing (sex) and xingbie (gender) is a vital political project 
in contemporary China (1997:30). But the study of sex and gender in modem or reform 
China still lags behind other fields of interest, though there have been increasingly 
demanding voices in recent years. The volume Engendering China (1994), a collection 
of essays, is the first attempt to highlight the importance of the subject in China. The 
problem for western academics, or even local scholars trained in western feminist 
canons, is the difficulty of employing the Chinese terms xing and xingbie translating 
them into western concepts (Evans 1997). There are no Chinese terms corresponding to 
the western concepts of sex, sexuality and gender. Most scholars, including Chinese 
writers, use the term xingbie to denote gender (a social and cultural construct) in 
contrast to xing, sex (a natural and biological attribute). But the term xingbie literally 
only means “sex difference” and is most often used to differentiate male and female in 
many Chinese documents or records (Evans 1997:28). Yet the lack of distinct concepts 
for sex and gender, with the ambiguity thereby entailed, does not necessarily prevent 
communication. Rather, it can provide a good way to reflect on the artificial or arbitrary 
division of sex and gender in western concepts.
Harriet Evans’s recent book, Women and Sexuality in China (1997), provides a 
detailed analysis of the dominant discourses on sexuality in the socialist period and the 
reform era. As she puts it, “Sexuality is a key site of the construction of gender 
differences and of the hierarchies inscribed in them. My aim in analysing modem and 
contemporary Chinese sexual discourses on the basis of theoretical insights located in a 
cultural context far removed from them is to attempt to unravel the specific modalities 
of meanings - particularly those that target and appropriate women - inscribed in their 
conflation of sex, sexuality and gender.” (1997:29). Most of the studies on sex or 
sexuality, however, are historical works such as Frank Dikotter's outstanding Sex,
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Culture and Modernity (1995), and Gail Hers hatter’s paper (1994), “Modernizing Sex, 
Sexing Modernity: Prostitution in Early Twentieth-Century Shanghai”. Both studies 
focus on the discourses of sex, the construction of knowledge and its relation to 
China’s quest for modernity in the early twentieth century, Dikotter explores the 
emergence of modem medical science in changing and regulating sexuality at a time 
when China was undergoing rapid change towards modem state-building and 
nationalist zeal. Hershatter, on the other hand, confines herself to prostitution in 
Shanghai, tracing changes in the discourse oil sex and prostitution, and the way the 
categories were embedded in political power, social transformation, and ideas about 
nationhood and cultural identity (1994:147). These studies focus on the period of 
Republican China and contribute to the understanding of the nexus between sex, 
discourse and power in a specific time and cultural place.
The study of the Chinese body, like the study of sex and gender, attracts less 
attention than the issue deserves, except in the confines of medicine, painting and 
literature. The neglect of the study of the body was not an idiosyncrasy of China 
studies, but a general symptom of the social sciences (Turner 1991). Stimulated by the 
poststructuralist and postmodernist critique of the concepts of subject, self, and body, 
some scholars have started to re-frame the paradigms of China studies and turn their 
attention to the body. All the essays directly or indirectly addressing the Chinese body 
are collected in Body, Subject and Power in China (1994), which is the first monograph 
on the investigation of the body in China. Another monograph on the Chinese body is 
Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order o f  the People’s Republic 
(1995) by Susan Brownell.
The study of the Chinese body, in a reflection of the Western knowledge 
paradigm, is posited as a counter-construct to the Western Cartesian body. As the 
editors of Body, Subject and Power, Angela Zito and Tani Barlow, say, "We quickly 
realized that if we wished to talk about the body - our own or other people's - and failed 
to address our own assumptions, we could easily ensnare ourselves. We may imagine 
that other people's bodies are just like ours, or that they have no bodies at all, or that 
their bodies are so different that we cannot possibly understand them, trapped as we are 
in a particularly Western post-Cartesian body-mind." (1994:1-2) They understand that 
the Western concept of one biological, unitary body, generalizable to all human beings
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in all social contexts, is problematic. They argue that "China possesses a multiplicity of 
"bodies" subject to historical and cultural variation that is as deep and complex as any 
charted for Europe." (1994:4)
In contrast to a Western unitary, anatomical body, Kuriyama believes that 
Chinese bodies are constructed within two confines: li, rituals, and qi, energy (or feng, 
wind). In the philosophy of Chinese classical medicine, Chinese bodies are believed 
never to be one, but multiple, dispersing and fragmented (Kuriyama 1994). Against the 
traditional emphasis on cosmic harmony and unity, Kuriyama highlights the decisive 
role of disharmony and individuation in the development of Chinese medicine. He 
stresses that individuation in classical China had no ontological basis, "the nature of the 
self that slipped out of phase was ultimately the same as that of the environment it 
emerged from: the self was itself windlike."(Kuriyama 1994:33) Individuals, in this 
Chinese medical view, are not distinct essences. Rather individuation simply mirrors 
the plurality and unpredictability of winds. Different localities have different airs, 
individuals have personal breaths, and individualized orifices on the body's surface 
mediate the confluence of cosmic, local, and personal winds (ibid. 1994:34).
While Kuriyama employs the Chinese concepts of wind to deconstruct a stable 
and unitary body, Judith Farquhar works on a reinterpretation of the discursive practice 
of contemporary Chinese medicine. In "Multiplicity, Point of View, and Responsibility 
in Traditional Chinese Healing," she argues explicitly that there is nothing which can 
properly be called "the body" in Chinese medicine. Body is not discrete but a 
multiplicity. Many subject positions are acknowledged in medical practices which give 
emphasis to specific points of view (1994:78). She points out, "What I find instead in 
the discursive practice of contemporary Chinese medicine are numerous subject 
positions, constant reminders that perceptions are contingent upon the point of view of 
the perceiver, and an organisation of knowledge (of disease, of medical tradition) as a 
specific and momentary relation unifying knower and known." (Ibid. 1994:78-79) 
Farquhar argues that anatomy is entirely missing in Chinese medical discourse, and the 
Chinese body is historical and constructed, ever vulnerable to disorganisation and in 
need of continued reinvention in the form of a proper hygiene of eating, washing, 
sleeping, sexual practice, and feeling (ibid. 1994:93). In contrast to a Western objective
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and unified body, the Chinese body is in fact a processual body, which offers a site of 
struggle against the claims of medical "Western" epistemologies.
In his discussion of Chinese art, John Hay asks: where is the body in Chinese 
painting? He points out that sculpture of the nude body has been extraordinarily 
prominent in Western society for millennia. In China, not only has the nude been 
entirely absent, but so has sculpture (1994:68). He argues that Chinese art was 
produced and seen within a very different set of frames. And though there was no nude, 
the human body was far from invisible. It was dispersed through metaphors locating it 
in the natural world by transformational resonance and brushwork that embodied the 
cosmic-human reality of qi, or energy (1994:44). He continues, “When trying to 
understand the human figure in Chinese art in contrast to the nude in Western art, we 
must also bear in mind the naked body's complex and inextricable dialectic with 
clothing. Although there was no nude in China, there was certainly nakedness.” 
(1994:44). In his view, the body of qi is hardly invisible but it is dispersed. Thus the 
question ultimately becomes how to represent qi in brushwork. Since this is 
accomplished with lines, clothing turns out to be more useful than flesh.
Kuriyama’s, Farquhar’s, and Hay's papers are very interesting for their attempts 
to interpret the Chinese body as a dispersing, processual and social body. But there is a 
risk of romanticizing the Chinese body in order to attack the Western body. That the 
Chinese body is not constructed in an anatomical structure, nor is it conceptualized as 
an objective reality, does not mean that the Chinese body can live out of the 
knowledge/power/body nexus, and be less subjected to domination. The "fluid reality" 
and social embeddedness of the material Chinese body contains more complicated and 
sophisticated power relations which need to be exposed, rather than hidden and then 
beautified.
Ann Anagnost is the only author who argues clearly that the Chinese body is a 
political body as well. Many insights can be gained from her paper, "The Politicized 
Body", in which she explores how the docile political subjects were produced and 
undergirded by a projection of the party/state as a subject writ large. Employing a news 
item from the Peasant Daily (1987) about a peasant striving for a "law-abiding 
household" plaque, she analyzes how the power of the state, through the bestowal of 
status honours, defines positions in political culture through its classificatory strategies-
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its power to name and to sort persons into the hierarchically arranged categories of a 
moral order (Anagnost 1994:133-134). Anagnost argues that "rituals objectify 
subjects"; they “produce docile bodies and transform these bodies into signifiers that 
figure in a master narrative of progress toward a socialist modernity. These rituals 
objectify subjects in a way that does not individuate them but causes them to be 
subsumed within a mass identity” (ibid. 1994:139). In other words, she traces a process 
of how a subject recognizes itself in a hegemonic discourse by which the state-party 
claims to correctly "represent" subjects. The consequent "politicized body" is the 
subject of endless state narratives.
Anagnost goes on to argue that the processes of subject making and the 
technologies of power over the body in China are different from the West. In contrast 
to the individuation of the political subject of the Western disciplinary technologies, 
she argues, the Chinese context operates according to a different principle. The 
disciplinary technology deployed by the Chinese state at first glance seems similar to 
what Foucault called "semiotechnique". She says,
in order to work, it must make its subjects visible rather than invisible and 
anonymous as are the individuals produced in the West. Signs play on the 
surface of subjects, reordering their outward practice rather than their inner 
psyches. It is not that these techniques fail to affect one's sense of self, but 
they affect it more in terms of a submersion of the self into a moral
category, The goal is not so much the orthopaedic refashioning of the
individual, so that deviance is made to conform to a norm presumed to be 
present in the social body, as it is the radical re-formation o f that very 
social body, in which old practices are displaced by new in the 
teleological movement toward a modernity that calls itself socialist.
(1994:150)
In short, Anagnost’s essay contributes to the understanding of the constitution of 
subject through performing, regulating and politicizing the body in the Chinese context. 
She stresses that the meaning inscribed on bodies, their modality of power, and the 
processes of subject construction are all different from the West.
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My own project builds upon the insights of the above studies on the Chinese 
body. But I myself, as an embodied Chinese subject, have quickly come to realize that 
the counter-discourse that the contributors to the collection, Body, Subject and Power 
in China formulate to attack Western epistemologies (the Cartesian body/mind 
dichotomy, the universal subject and the individualized self) can easily result in 
romanticizing the Chinese body. The fascinating paradigm they build is the claim that 
the Chinese bodies, by their very presence, are multiple, shifting, processual and social. 
Except for Anagnost, who pays attention to the specific socialist political culture, all 
the other authors to certain degree essentialize the Chinese body in order to argue that 
there is intrinsic difference between the West’s body/subject and the East’s 
body/subject. For me, there is no essentializing difference as such. "Chineseness" 
should not be granted an ontological status, rather, it should be deconstructed and 
returned to its historical and temporal presence. The critique of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism on the Western body, self and subject should not let itself turn to the 
Chinese body, constructed as romantic Other, to dissolve its epistemological cul-de- 
sac.
Women’s Movement and Women’s Studies in Mainland China
Women’s studies in mainland China are rarely pure agendas of academics. 
They are often offshoots of women’s movements in the early 20th century and in 
contemporary period. The first tide of women’s movement in China emerged in May 
Fourth movement of 1919, and it was at that period that women’s issues were seriously 
raised out and openly discussed for the first time in Chinese history. Women’s studies 
groups were formed, and many were led by female intellectuals who were allowed to 
study in public schools since the end of the 20th century. Many issues such as women’s 
education, women’s right to vote, women’s freedom to choose marriage partners, and 
women’s work and foot-binding were hotly debated in colleges, or in newspapers and 
magazines (Pun, 1995:246). Women’s movements sprouted in May Fourth period, 
however, were soon subsumed under the nationalist movement and the communist 
movement, and became parts of political movements (Pun 1995:245-263).
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All-China Women’s Federation led and shaped women movements in China 
after the Chinese Communist Party took over mainland China in 1949. Women’s issues 
were then restricted to be discussed under the cannon of Chinese Marxism and dictated 
by the Chinese government. Women issues were almost silenced when All-China 
Women’s Federation was forced to shut down during the decade of Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. It was not until the early 80s, after launching of economic reform, that the 
Federation was allowed to re-establish itself. But its legitimacy as the only agent to 
represent and handle women issues in China was questioned, especially from women 
intellectuals in the academy, despite the Federation founded the first Institute of 
Women’s Studies in 1983 (Li and Zhang 1994:141). With relative eased control on 
academic activities, many women intellectuals in various university started to speak out 
their views on women’s issues and show their differences from the Federation. In 1987, 
the first non-govemmental Women’s Studies Center was formed in Zhengzhou 
University in Henan. Hereafter, there was a boom of women’s studies in colleges over 
the country since the mid 1980s and reached the climax in mid 1990s, as China hosted 
the 1995 World Women Conference in Beijing.
Many influential works on women’s studies in this period cover several 
disciplines such history, literature, sociology, demography and methodology. 
Representatives are Li Xiaojiang’s Eve’s Search (1988) and Gender Gap (1989) in 
women’s studies theory; Meng Yue and Dai Jinhua’s Emerging from the Horizon o f  
History (1989) in the study of women’s literature; Lti Meiyi and Zhen Yongfii’s 
Chinese Women's Movement, 1984-1921 (1990) in the field of women’s history; Zhu 
Chuzhu’s The Population o f Chinese Women (1991), and Women’s Studies Institute’s 
A Review o f the Social Status o f Women in China (1995) in the field of social studies 
(Li and Zhang, 1994:143-145). There are also a large number of large scale surveys on 
family, marriage, work and sex either in city, provincial or national level. Recently, 
Women Workers’s Committee of All-China Trade Union compiles a book on Chinese 
Women Workers's Situation (1997), covering reports and surveys from thirteen 
provinces. These studies contribute to raising concern on Chinese women’s issues in 
national level as well as in international community. Despite many efforts are made and 
valuable information is provided, micro studies or ethnographic investigations are, 
nevertheless, lacking and there is still little space left for the women we studied, who
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can speak out themselves and address their own problems. Often the women studied, 
especially in those large scale surveys are reified and even worse, treated as data, but 
not living agents.
Fieldsite and Fieldworker
The field is a labyrinth for most ethnographers, and the attraction of the labyrinth 
comes from temptation, often cultural or ideological. The desire followed is the pain, the 
difficulty of getting access to the right site, like a lover wandering if the one he or she 
pursues is the one true love. My urge to work in a factory and act as a dagongmei is 
definitely subjective, loaded with ideological burden. My childhood memory of living in 
a worker’s country and my youthful training in feminism merge into a search for an 
identity of female worker. It all helps to shore up my intellectual and “radical” fantasy. 
Before going to the field, I was often excited when I dreamed of myself toiling on the 
line in an electronic factory, or when I told my friends and my family about my project 
which they thought was insane. The workplace, I believe, is the “right” space in which 
the female bodies of dagongmei, myself, and my project will be properly situated. The 
blooming of foreign invested factories in Shenzhen SEZ demonstrates the rapid 
transformation of Chinese society in the last decade. These factories provide the best 
locales to see how the microphysics of the power of capitalist forces and the existing 
state socialist relations produce the new subjects - dagongmei. I then decided to intrude 
into one of them and start my nomadic ethnographic journey. The failure of Mayfair 
Yang’s attempt to get into a factory in China by using introductions from state 
bureaucratic agents warned me to avoid contact any state organs, if  at all possible. My 
identity as a Hong Kong person, rather, helped me to make connections with these 
foreign invested factories, since more than 80% of these factories in Shenzhen are owned 
by Hong Kong capital. Meteor Electronic Company, the one I chose, is owned by a good 
friend of my elder brother, Mr Chou. As the major shareholder and the company 
director, Mr Chou approved my research project.
My enthusiasm for work in a factory was somewhat cooled down, not by the 
difficulty of getting access to the field, but by the postmodern critique of the fieldwork 
experience, and by the actual negotiation in the field site later. The critique says directly
that there is no “field” as such, and thus there should be no “reality” of Chinese society 
“out there” waiting for me to know and understand. The knowing subject is not value- 
free but complicitous in creating known objects. Foucauldian insights tell us that the 
making of “truth” and knowledge is about power, resistance and social practice 
(Rabinow 1986). Yet for me, it is clear that the “field” in China is neither “out there”, 
nor can it be freely and arbitrarily constructed by one’s own will; rather, it is always 
historical, political and locally constrained. The field as a living text, an orchestration of 
moving signs is surely not an individual construct; I would not dare to claim it as my 
own. I will rather argue that the field in China is delimited by: a) the political situation 
of China; b) the agency of the field informants; and c) my experience and interpretations 
as a novice and native anthropologist.
My access to the field was made possible, however, by the Open-door policy 
adopted since 1979. Anthropologists from the outside are now for the first time allowed 
to stay in China doing intensive fieldwork, though most of the time under official 
supervision. My research proposal, written for the management in the summer of 1995, 
emphasized the understanding of labour relations and workers’ psychology and thus the 
need to work on the shopfloor and sleep in the workers’ dormitory. I received a response 
in August 1995, confirming that I could start my fieldwork in two months’ time. I had 
visited the company twice before I formally became a full-time worker in November 
1995. My proposal was modified by the company director, Mr Chou, who acted for 
health and safety reasons rather than because of political or sensitive issues. He 
suggested that I work in the general office as a clerk rather than as a worker on the line. 
For working hours, he suggested I go off work at 5:00 p.m. and do no overtime work at 
night. For accommodation and food arrangement, he suggested I eat and stay with the 
Hong Kong staff in a shared apartment rather than with the local workers in the 
dormitory. It took me a long time to convince him that his good intentions would spoil 
the depth of my research if I could not work and live directly with the shopfloor workers. 
My insistence surprised him, as if he could never believe that doing research should be 
so hard and demanding. He simply took me as an idealist student who had no experience' 
of working and thus did not understand the hardship of factory life. He allowed me to try 
out the first month and readjust my demands afterward.
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My ambition to go directly to the heart of workers’ lives did me little good. 
Though I tried to present myself as a “student trainee” who came to learn the operation 
of the factory system and the lives of women workers, most of the line workers did not 
trust me at first. Instead, I was encircled by the supervisory ranks, such as department 
managers, forepersons and line leaders, who showed the most curiosity and interest in 
me. These people were much more educated and could imagine what a Ph.D. meant. 
They often directed and delineated my research interest by their own imagination. 
Surprisingly, I was heartily helped by these people, as they enthusiastically showed me 
their work and explained to me in detail what they were doing. At first I found myself 
too exhausted to cope with the long working hours, as I had not yet got used to them. I 
was forced to develop too many “friendships” that I did not know how to handle. The 
intimate relationship developed with the supervisory staff hindered my communication 
with the shopfloor workers. I was always treated as a “special guest” in the workplace, 
which spoiled my dream of becoming a “real” dagongmei.
It took at least a month or two for the managerial staff to lessen their curiosity 
about me and my presence on the line. As days went by, I became “normal”. Workers on 
the line started to talk to me. They shared their hardships and feelings, hoping that I 
could understand them, since I was working on the line and was more willing to listen to 
them. My merging into the workplace community was much helped by staying in the 
workers’ dormitory, where all private spaces were shared and one could not hide 
anything. Mistrust was clear, as every day we chatted, ate, read, and listened to popular 
songs together. While most of my co-workers or room mates could never make sense of 
what a doctoral thesis meant, they nevertheless had their own understanding and 
imagination. Writing fiction about “real” workers’ lives and poor people was the role 
they imagined and inscribed on me as an ethnographer. “Bitter” stories and female 
grievances, somewhat exaggerated or invented, started to bombard me, the never failing 
good listener. On many occasions some Hakka women talked to me with great passion 
in local dialects for a long time, murmuring their hard experiences of life while I 
understood nothing. What I could speak fluently were Mandarin, Cantonese and 
Chaozhou hua. So, except for those who could speak Cantonese, most of the workers 
talked to me in Mandarin, though with strong local accents. Cantonese was the official
33
company language, while in daily life Mandarin was the most common language that 
workers of different origins used to communicate with each other.
My fieldwork in the company ended in April 1996, at a time when I already had 
a lot of good friends, and when I started to understand various dialects and could 
communicate with my co-workers without language difficulties. Knowing that time was 
never enough, I had no choice but to stop the fieldwork, especially in a situation where I 
had little time to write down field notes while I was working in the company. Eleven to 
twelve hours working each day sapped me all my energy. And if there was still 
something left, I preferred chatting with my co-workers before we went to sleep. If there 
was a rest day on Sunday, everybody slept like “pigs” until noon time and then in the 
afternoon went out shopping. Most of the time I struggled to get up early in the morning 
to write down what I thought was particularly important and what should not be 
forgotten. Failure to do so was the normal case. So I wrote field notes based on memory 
and afterthought, which gave me an acute sense that ethnography, after all, is a 
subjective construct. Ethnographic reconstruction is an attempt, a never fulfilled attempt, 
to make sense, to order and reorder rich yet chaotic lived experiences which are 
inherently resistant to patterning and conceptualizing.
Overview o f the thesis
Becoming dagongmei is the central theme of the thesis. Dagongmei is a specific 
cultural-symbolic artifact, produced at the particular moment when international capital 
came to China in the Post-Mao period. Dagongmei, literally “working girls”, is a new 
term coined in Reform China, denoting a new kind of labour relations fundamentally 
different from those of Mao’s period. A Cantonese term imported from Hong Kong, 
dagong means “working for the boss”, or “selling labour.” The term has a fierce 
connotation of commodification and a capitalist exchange of labour for wage. Mei means 
the sister, the girl, which further illustrates that the selling of labour is gender specific. In 
contrast to the term gongren, the proletariat class, the master of the state socialist 
country, the use of the new word dagong signifies the end of the old Chinese working 
class solely regulated by state mechanisms and the rise of market factors in shaping 
labour relations. Dagongmei thus is a newly embodied social identity emergent in
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contemporary China, produced to meet the changing socio-economic relations of the 
country and the needs of the capital. As a condensed identity, it unfolds the full story of 
how a state socialist system gives way to the capitalist world economy and how 
capitalist practices depend on the regulation of class and sexual relations.
Chapter II, besides providing a brief introduction to local changes in an industrial 
village in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, will illustrate the making of the new 
Chinese working class emerging in the contemporary period. The argument of the 
chapter is that making and unmaking are aspects of the same process, as the new Chinese 
working class struggles to emerge in a rapidly changing market socialist economy in the 
Reform period. I will try to elucidate how the newly formed working class, bom under 
the light of the Chinese socialist economy integrating into the world economy, are 
subjected to both the workings of the market and state forces, and are specific to the 
form and process of its historical making. The specificity of the new working class lies 
in the paradoxical processes by which it is often deformed, or even killed, at the moment 
of its birth. The emergence is transient and rootless. The analysis of class in this chapter 
is taken as active processes, in which the subjective experiences of the workers will be 
stressed.
Chapter III deals with the production of desire: the desire of the young rural girls 
leaving home, driving themselves into industrial work. The puzzle in this chapter is that 
there is no violence, no coercive force, no misrecognition involved in the process of 
moving labour into the industrial world. Young Chinese village girls know well about 
sweatshops and the hardship of the factory life. Yet they are still eager to leave the 
village by selling their labour in the urban area. Marx’s concept of “alienation of 
labour” will be re-evaluated and further elaborated from the workers’ subjective 
experiences and the processes through which the rural girls actualize themselves as 
labourers. The huge migrant waves, the flow of population from the rural areas to the 
cities, give a living picture of the great hope and desire of a whole society steering into a 
market economy. How individual desires are articulated and produced, and why 
individual desires are so in harmony with the demand of the industrial capitalism- all 
these questions are the central concerns of this chapter. The contention is that “desire” or 
“lack” itself is an ideology, a social need, a creation of the market economy and a 
function of power. Desire is generated to act as a common “passion” of society that
35
individual social agents are induced to live up. A changing society contains psychic 
politics which are social and historical: living on desire, living on power.
Situating myself in the electronics factory, Chapter IV discusses the imperatives 
and techniques of the production machine in producing a social body: docile, disciplined 
yet productive dagongmei. Drawing insights from Foucault’s surveiller et punir (1979), 
I will show the political technologizing of the body, and the techniques of disciplinary 
power deployed in the Meteor workplace. The study of the body, especially the female 
body, will be particularly crucial in this chapter, because we can see vividly how the 
production machine can work arbitrarily and violently on it, and how the lived body 
reacts and resists. All the disciplinary power and techniques, either institutional or 
discursive, are embedded in specific local practices. My interest is in the modalities of 
power specific to the Chinese society in the contemporary period. Besides unveiling the 
relations of domination, the microphysics of power over the Chinese female body, I will 
also look at the relations of resistance and practices of transgression in the workplace. 
The female body I study is never the “docile body”, but the “tactical body” of its agents 
who strive to survive, who know how to find out transgressive ways in order to live in a 
newly oppressive industrial world. The notion of “work culture” helps to reveal the 
creative attempts of women at developing everyday life tactics to confront disciplinary 
power, such as forming kin and ethnic forces in efforts to assert control over work 
processes, manipulating hegemonic language to challenge factory regulations or 
formulating innumerable informal codes of workplace defiance.
Chapter V asks the questions of “who need identity?”, “who need (to be) 
workers?” and “who need (to be) dagongmeiT, and their relation to power and capital. 
Dagongmei, as a new social identity, is crafted and then inscribed on the rural female 
body when the young girls enter into a particular set of production relations, 
experiencing the process of proletarianization and alienation. I will probe the process 
and analyze the regulatory and identificatory practices inside and outside the workplace.
I will see how the production of identity deploys the art of metaphor, the power of 
language and the politics of othering and differentiating. I will also study how the 
regional, kin and ethnic differences are imaged to craft identities in the workplace. The 
central argument in this chapter is that the identification of person according to the 
principle of locality or ethnicity is political, embodying rural-urban disparity and spatial
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inequality. Rural-urban disparity, as the major social difference in China, is manipulated, 
invented and reinvented to create abject subjects in the workplace. Local and kin-ethnic 
identities will be seen as performative cultural artifacts and practical relationships which 
are produced at instantaneous moments in specific situations. The politics of dialects, as 
a system of social differences, hierarchies and distinctions, will also be looked at to 
disclose the struggle over power, resources and identities in the workplace.
Chapter VI discusses the power, the discourses and the perversity of sexualizing 
female bodies in the workplace. Sexed subjects will be seen as the effects of power and 
themselves are constructed through a process of signification and resignification, 
differentiation and exclusion, situated in specific times and places. For Foucault, the 
body is “sexed” within a discourse of sex which is itself an effect of a specific 
organization of power, discourses and pleasures (1978). While he deals with body and 
sexuality, he has long been criticized for neglecting the gendered nature of disciplinary 
techniques on the body, or a sexually differentiated body which is particularly necessary 
for certain types of mechanisms or apparatuses (McNay, 1992). Thus, in this chapter I 
will try to link up the process of politically technologizing the body, with the process of 
registering a feminine identity (gendering), at its nodal point: daily language, local 
practices, social discourse and institutionalized regulations. Particular attention will be 
drawn to the conflict embedded in the process of gendering, and the perversity, not the 
homogeneity, of workings on bodies. The point in this chapter is that sexualizing 
labouring bodies is another necessary project of capital in contemporary China. 
Dagongmei as a class and sexual subject, is in great contrast to the asexual subject 
gongren in Mao’s era. Dagongmei highlights the sexual re-orientation to industrial work 
that is crucial to industrial capitalism, which is a system of hierarchy and distinction. I 
will see how the regulation of a sexed body is fundamental to the disciplinary techniques 
in the workplace and how individuals cope, negotiate and transgress against hegemonic 
control.
Chapter VII finally arrives at the scene of bodily pain, the scream and dream of 
workplace life. I will trace how individuals are torn by the tensions between capitalist 
force, state socialist power and the local patriarchal culture; I will show how they meet 
social violence and how bodily pains develop in the workplace. The painful body, I 
argue, is not the defeated body, but the resistant body. Chronic pains, such as headaches,
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back aches and menstrual pain, are pervasive in the factory, and provide an index of 
social alienation and domination of the female body. But as Arthur Kleinman said, 
chronic pain as the embodiment of human suffering, could be viewed as “the same 
process of embodiment of resistance to the lived flow of daily experience” (1994:174). 
Menstrual pain, the specific feminine experience, lets us unravel the inevitable conflict 
between women’s bodily time and industrial time. With Julia Kristeva’s insight, 
women’s time is periodical and cyclical in nature (1986), inherently contradictory to the 
linear and progressive industrial time. Thus, no matter how overwhelming the 
disciplinary power is, the female body cannot but resist it through various chronic pains, 
dymenorrhea or fainting in the workplace. Scream and dream, in Bataille’s sense, are the 
extreme limit of human experience (1995), crying out the impossibility of human 
suffering and the possibility of human freedom and transgression. I am going to argue, 
followed Foucault’s reading of dreams (1985), that struggling in the borderland between 
the consciousness and the unconsciousness, the dagongmef s scream and dream is an 
odyssey of human freedom.
Chapter VIII ends with a reflection on the thesis as a political project and the 
practice of native anthropology. A brief concluding effort marks the (in)conclusiveness 
of the project and asks for an open and participatory reading.
Chapter II Shenzhen, A Society of Change:
The Making of the New Chinese Working Class
M aking, because it is a study in an active process, which ow es as 
much to agency as to conditioning. The working class did not rise 
like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own  
m aking .... More than this, the notion o f  class entails the notion o f  
historical relationship. Like any other relationship, it is a fluency  
which evades analysis if  w e attempt to stop it dead at any given
moment and anatomize its structure. ... The relationship must
always be embodied in real people and in a real context.
E. P. Thompson, The M aking o f  the English W orking C lass
The subtitle of this chapter, “Making the new Chinese working class”, is a 
trope, or an irony more than a statement. I want to avoid turning real lives into dead
data, pattern, or structures by the enunciation of the word “class”. And I do not want
to stifle an analysis of “class”, as some trends in post-modern studies try to do by
announcing the death of class analysis. So I will regard “class”, not only as fluid
historical relationships, but also as relationships that contain many tensions, 
contradictions and even self-defeating elements. In this chapter, my argument is that 
making and unmaking are aspects of the same process as the new Chinese working 
class struggles to emerge in a rapidly changing market socialist economy in Reform 
China.1 As Andrew Walder argues, the process of proletarianization in socialist 
China was unique in the way that it was political force rather market force which 
dictated the whole process. The second Chinese working class, differed from its 
embryonic form in the 1920s. It was formed within a short period - a few years under 
a command state economy, in contrast to the English or other European working 
classes that took at least half a century and were dictated to by a market economy 
(Walder 1984). The third Chinese working class, bom under the light of the Chinese 
socialist economy integrating into the world economy, is subjected to both the
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workings of the “invisible” hand of market and the “authoritarian” state, again is 
specific in the form and process of its historical making. The word “class” in this 
chapter is used as a singular noun, though I do not intent to neglect the complexities 
and variations of the new working classes emergent in different regions of China, 
migrant workers in South China, as they share many of the same characteristics. My 
study was focused on the migrant workers in South China. It can only shed light on 
one particular form of working class emerging in the changing society of Shenzhen, 
shaped both by the forces of capital and the state. However, this form of working 
class will become more and more important in the future China as a whole.
My contention is simple: this newly formed third Chinese working class in 
the region of Pearl River delta, and maybe in other economic developing zones as 
well, is checked at the particular moment of its birth as a class force. This hybrid 
phenomenon is one of the interests of my study. Based on five-months stay in a 
foreign-owned factory in an industrial village in Shenzhen, I attempt not only to offer 
the subjective experiences of the workers to see how far they experience themselves 
as class agents, but also try to nail down to details of the state mechanisms and 
factory measures in (un)making the newly bom working class. Situated in a most 
micro environment, I attempt to find and analyze the documents issued at the lowest 
level of government and observe the implementation of the policies.
Mapping the Factory in a Changing Community
“Shooting Star” was a nickname the workers gave to the factory where I 
worked between November 1995 and April 1996, so I simply fixed on that name as 
the Meteor factory throughout the whole thesis. On a usual day, everybody rushed for 
breakfast in the canteen at 7:00 p.m., and work would start at eight o’clock. It was a 
ten minutes walk from our dormitory to the factory. The air was fresh and chilly in 
the mid autumn morning. Girls, like morning birds, flocked together, talking and
1 See Andrew Walder (1984) “The Remaking o f  the Chinese Working Class, 1949-1981” for the 
argument o f  (un)making o f  the Chinese working class in the socialist China.
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laughing on the way to the factory. We would pass the workers’ dormitory zone, 
market streets, shops, clinics and a large playground in order to reach our factory 
premises. There was a great contrast among those old and new buildings and our 
modern factory premises, which had been built less than five years ago. Like other 
big companies in Shenzhen, the five storey building was furnished with large 
window glass and air-conditioners and was fenced by a wall and guarded by a huge 
iron-barred gate. The premises looked modem, elegant and outstanding. The gate 
simply separated those who were inside and outside, giving them distinct identities 
and status. Over five hundred workers, ranging from 520 to 580 during my stay, were 
employed by the Company. Most of them were from rural areas all over the country 
and nearly 75% were female.
The Meteor is located in one of the industrial villages in Nanshan District, 
Shenzhen, within the confines of the Special Economic Zone. To preserve its 
anonymity, I call the village “Blue River”. It is in the eastern part of Nanshan 
District, connecting Shekou Industrial Zone and the main highway of Shenzhen to 
Guangzhou, the provincial capital of Guangdong. Nanshan is a former official 
administrative name given to the place in 1985 when the Shenzhen SEZ rearranged 
itself into three administrative districts, namely Luo Wu, Fu Tian and Nan Shan 
districts. Local people call it Nantou in daily language. As an old town, Nantou is 
famous, with a timeworn castle. After fifteen years of rapid development, the sense 
of historical antiquity of the space has already been lost and everywhere there is a 
mixture of new and old buildings. In the centre of the town is a market place, where 
numerous fashion shops, department stores, hairdressers, book shops and restaurants 
are clustered. At night the place is crowded by people, especially young factory 
workers who come here for shopping once work is done. Shopping, and most of the 
time not buying, is the most favourite pastime among my co-workers. Wandering 
around and spotting cheap and good stuff helps to kill the boredom of working whole 
days on the shopfloor. Since central Shenzhen is far away from the Company and it 
takes at least forty-five minutes to get there, workers in the Meteor often go shopping 
in the market place of Nantou instead. The appearance of the town is still different
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from central Shenzhen, where skyscrapers, modern commercial centres, five-starred 
hotels and international banks all swarm. Nantou, rather, is more spacious and 
features groupings of industrial villages.
Historically, Nantou was an important township site in Bao’an county in the 
southernmost tip of Ancient China. It suffered very seriously in the time of the early 
Qing Dynasty, when the Qing government ordered all the population in the Coastal 
areas to move northward away from the share and banned all fishing and sea trading 
activities, in order to prevent anti-Qing revolts and pirate raids. Harsh government 
measures were launched: all the houses and boats were burnt and those who refused 
to move were killed. Nantou castle was nearly destroyed and turned into a barren 
area. It was not until 1670 that the government relaxed the sea ban and a new county, 
Xinan, was established. During the mid 19th century, Nantou became an important 
military base for defending against colonial aggression, especially after the British 
government took Hong Kong island. In October 1900 Sun Yatsen, “the father of the 
Chinese revolution”, formed a revolutionary base in Bao’an and started the anti-Qing 
movement there. When the new Republic was set up, the old name Xinan county was 
changed to Bao’an county, still with Nantou as the county town. During the Sino- 
Japanese War and the Civil War (1937-1949), Bao’an was occupied by the Japanese 
army and then reigned over by Chiang Kai Shek’s government. It was not until 
October 16, 1949 that the Communist army succeeded in entering the old castle of 
Nantou, and the Bao’an County People’s government was formed. Afterwards the 
county town was moved to central Shenzhen and Nantou became one of the 
communes. In 1980, when the SEZ was set up, Nantou became an administrative 
district, the official name changed to Nanshan, and it was enlarged to include both 
the old towns of Nantou and Shekou.
The Changing Community o f Blue River Village
The history of Meteor Electronic Company Ltd. in Shenzhen has exemplified 
the development of the Blue River village in Nantou, and the changing social
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relations of the local community for more than one decade. The Meteor was set up in 
1985, a year after the village, formerly a rural commune, had undergone a dramatic 
change. Shenzhen was chosen to set up a special economic zone by the Central State 
and the Guangdong Provincial Government in 1981, as a stepping stone to introduce 
international capital and as an experimental model to encourage other mainland 
cities. Encouraged by the Open-door policies and the economic reforms, the local 
government of the village, supported by the Nanshan District government decided to 
form a company in 1984. In the reform period it was not at all unusual for all levels 
of local governments to set up companies. But what interests us is that the local state 
of Blue River not only merely formed a company, but completely turned itself into a 
company. A rural commune formed in 60s in Mao’s era then became an industrial 
commune in Deng’s period. The former name Blue River People’s Commune was 
changed to Blue River Manufacturers’ Chief Company, imder which it owned or 
joint-ventured over thirteen companies.
The old government offices building remained, but it was expanded to 
include a new wing of four storeys connected to the old one. The “bureaucratic” 
structure of the Chief Company was changed and expanded as well. Now there was a 
General Office, an External Trade Department, a Finance Department, an 
Administrative Department, a Population and Birth Control Department, a Labour 
Regulation Department, and a Mass Organization Division which included a Youth 
Committee, a Women’s Federation and Trade Union. The Company itself was a 
mixture of pre-existing socialist “politics” and a reform market “economy”, a hybrid 
if not absurd reflection of the ongoing development of the socialist market economy. 
By turning itself into a company, the Blue River government gained complete 
independence in regulating foreign investment and local trade without any 
intervention from the upper governmental levels like District Government or City 
Government. The local people believed that more freedom, more efficiency, and then 
more development would avoid possible “administrative intervention” from higher 
political forces. Blue River was not an exceptional case; it was rather a common 
practice throughout Shenzhen, as many a rural town transformed itself rapidly into a
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modem industrial city in the course of 1980s. The process of industrialization and 
urbanization in China was always distinctive in the way that it was the state, or 
political forces rather than capital, which served as the locomotive of economic 
development. Where could we find a place like Blue River, as a local government, as 
a company, which can more fully disclose the essence of political economy?
Blue River is not only an exemplar of political economy; it is itself a complex 
cultural-political economy. As a Hakka ethnic village, it is dominated by the surname 
chon and has a local population of less than two thousand, who hold a Shenzhen 
hnkou, the household residence registration. Previously the local residents held rural 
agricultural hukon and were officially categorized as peasants. Shenzhen urban hukou 
were granted when the Shenzhen government set on the course of rapid change to 
this “backward” area. Land was distributed for less than two years in Blue River and 
requisitioned again in 1984 for the use of industrial development. It was not 
confiscated at once as happened in the 50s and 60s, but rather step by step, though in 
a speedy way.
Mr Chou, the Director of the Meteor, chatted to me in a small restaurant, “It 
was really a backward place when I came here in 1985. Where we sit now was a 
paddy field; everywhere there were paddy field and lychee trees. The people were 
farmers and very poor. But now none of them do farming; they own shops, 
restaurants, do business or work in the factory.”
Land was requisitioned for compensation; every household, according to the 
number of household members, was to be allocated a share each year in the yearly 
profit made by the Chief Company, formerly their village government. Villagers time 
and time again told me about the corruption of the Chief Company and how it was 
owned by father and son. But their grievances never ended up as direct 
confrontations, which were frequent in other villages in the Pearl River Delta zone in 
the past ten years.
One local shop owner talked to me when I was having tea in his shop: “I 
know there is serious corruption; the leaders of our village drive expensive, famous 
branded cars and live in luxurious houses. But what can we do? It is they who make
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us rich.” Every year, households obtained share dividends ranging from RMB 15,000 
to 20,000; the variations were seen as following the ups and downs of the Company 
earning capabilities.
A local cadre proudly told me, “It was almost ten times what the family could 
earn before. Nowadays people don’t need to do anything but just wait for their share 
dividend at the end of the year. What’s more, the family can free hands from farming 
and they can choose to do business.”
The local residents here suddenly became rich, with their official identity 
changed from rural people to urban citizens and, more strikingly, with their economic 
status or class position totally altered. They were no longer part of the agricultural 
population lying at the bottom of the status society in Socialist China, but the 
privileged class of urban people who held a valuable Shenzhen hukou living in the 
Special Economic Zone. In terms of occupation, almost 80% of the local working 
population were self-employed persons. About 10% were managerial or supervisory 
staff in the companies newly set up in the village. Roughly another 10% worked 
outside the village, some holding a position in the District government or employed 
in big companies in Central Shenzhen or Guangzhou. The working population in the 
Blue River were predominately male, in contrast to the collective period when both 
female and male villagers were required to participate in commune production. Most 
of the women now stayed at home, doing housework rather than going out to work. 
Their income was no longer seen as important to the family economy, and there was 
a strong patriarchal belief in the village that the man should be the bread-earner of 
the family. Giving birth, preferably to sons, and doing household chores were 
women’s main responsibilities. The living standard of the village nevertheless was 
rising and comparatively higher than any other cities in China. Every family was well 
furnished with electric appliances, a colour TV set, hi-fi disc and air-conditioners. 
But it was not without worry. There has been an economic recession in Shenzhen 
from 1993 till, as more and more foreign capital moved out of the special economic 
zone to the much cheaper area in the internal mainland. Foods, goods and daily 
necessities here were relatively very expensive. The prices were one-third higher in
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Guangzhou and probably double those in other northern cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai. Yet as long as a family could afford it, they still preferred to buy imported 
foreign-labeled goods even if they knew these products in fact were made in China. 
The local residents here considered themselves as Shenzhen ren, the people of 
Shenzhen, a broad cultural identity signifying a modern cosmopolitanism attached to 
the space and the people who lived there. Few would identify themselves in class 
terms, despite the fact that class consciousness was so well nurtured in Mao’s period 
and indoctrinated into people’s minds, and the local people here enjoyed a middle 
class or upper middle class living style. However, economic differentiation existed in 
the village, as was easily recognized from the housing2. The richest not only owned a 
big house, but also a modem, stylish villa, with an appearance different to traditional 
buildings. Some of the families owned more than one or two houses and rented 
empty house or rooms out to outsiders, most of them migrant workers. Wealth in the 
community was less determined by the ratio of working labour in the household than 
by the possession of political and cultural capital which could generate economic 
resources.
The majority of economic producers, or the working class in the village, on 
the other hand, were not local residents. The total population, including permanent 
and temporary residents, amounted to 8,126 at the end of 1995. Of these over 75% 
were temporary residents, migrant workers who had moved in from outside the 
village. Besides the thirteen big factories affiliated to the Chief Company, all the 
other small-sized companies owned by locals employed workers from other areas, 
especially from rural areas, both inside and outside Guangdong Province. As in the 
Meteor, apart from three staff who held Shenzhen hukou, all the mainland Chinese 
staff and workers were hired as temporary labour and held a temporary hukou. 
Except for most of the engineers, technicians, managers, supervisors and some office 
clerks who came from urban areas, more than 80% of the work force formerly held a 
rural hukou, and thus were “agricultural producers” in the official categorization. The
2 For references to econom ic differentiation in the rural areas in China, see Howard, 1988; Martin, 
1990; Selden 1993; and Yang 1994.
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work force in the Meteor, and in manufacturing industry as a whole both in the 
village and in Shenzhen, was mainly made up of the rural population, who were only 
allowed a temporary hukou when they were employed by the factories in Shenzhen. 
A hukou is attached to employment, and once a migrant worker was dismissed, or 
left the job, he or she was not granted the right to stay in Shenzhen. The socio­
economic structure of Blue River village was thus conditioned mainly by a two- 
tiered system. One tier was local urban residents who not only possessed the means 
of production but also the space, the right of abode. The other tier consisted of rural 
migrants who had to sell their labour to the factories in which they worked, while 
having no right to stay permanently where they worked. These migrant temporary 
labour were three times the number of the local residents, and were the lowest status 
workers in the community.
Shenzhen as an immigrant city
It has often been said that Shenzhen is an immigrant city, built quickly with a 
borrowed population. In 1979, after the 11th Plenum of the Third Plenary Session of 
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Central government and the 
Guangdong Government decided to upgrade a small town, Bao’an county, to the 
status of a city named Shenzhen. In May 1980 the Special Economic Zone was set 
up. Shenzhen then became the first immigrant city in Reform China, erected as a test 
case as an economic development zone open to the international capital. I chose 
Shenzhen for my study because it was the specific place where international capital and 
the socialist state encountered each other and worked hand in hand, though not always 
in harmony, in shaping a new Chinese working class.
Situated in the far south of mainland China, Shenzhen is close to Hong Kong, 
and every day thousands and thousands of people go hurriedly back and forth across 
the Lo Wu bridge separating the two places. After the transfer of Hong Kong 
sovereignty on 30 June 1997, it is unlikely that the Customer Gate will be closed. It 
takes about forty-five minutes by train from the Kowloon Railway Station to Lo Wu
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bridge, and then queues to go through the Customer Gate. During weekends, or at the 
Chinese New Year and other big traditional festivals like Ching Ming or Mid-Autumn, 
queuing up for an hour or more is normal.
Shenzhen is on the east of the Pearl River Delta. In the north it is connected to 
Dongguan, Weiyuan, in the south to Hong Kong, and in the east it faces Daya Bay. The 
total area is about 2,020 square miles. The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) is 
only part of Shenzhen city. It occupies one sixth of the whole city, with an area of 
327.5 square miles. The SEZ is shaped like a triangle; one can travel by bus across the 
whole zone in less than two hours. The SEZ is special not only in its economic but also 
in its political and social aspects. There is a long iron curtain from east to west 
separating the SEZ from the non-special zone of the whole country; the Customer Gate 
is set up at the western end of Nantou district. Those who wanted to enter the SEZ 
require special permission from the Public Security Branch in their local regions.
Before the setting up of the SEZ, Shenzhen was only a small town with 
310,000 residents and less than 30,000 workers. The total population at the end of 1994 
was 3.35 million and the total labour force 2.23 million. In its population composition, 
less than 30% are categorized as permanent residents who have come from major cities 
and become state officials, entrepreneurs, technicians and skilled workers. Over 70% 
are temporary residents, which means they do not have the official household 
registration entitling them to recognized citizenship in Shenzhen. So, when they lose 
their jobs in Shenzhen, they are not officially permitted to stay in Shenzhen. At the end 
of 1994, out of 3.35 million total population, 2.41 million were temporary residents 
(Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook, 1995).
48
Table 1 Ratio of Temporary Residents to Permanent Residents
(permanent residents as 100)
Year Permanent residents Temporary residents ratio
Shenzhen SEZ Shenzhen SEZ Shenzhen
1979 312.6 71 1.5 0.5 0.5
1980 320 84.1 12 10 3.8
1985 478.6 231.9 402.9 237.9 84.2
1986 514.5 257.4 421.1 231.3 81.8
1987 556 286.9 598.4 312.7 107.6
1988 601.4 321.9 930 462.2 154.7
1989 648.2 362 1267.8 664.9 195.6
1990 686.5 395.3 1332.9 614.5 194.2
1991 732.2 432.1 1653.1 765.9 225.8
1993 876.9 521.4 2073.0 668.0 236.4
1994 939.7 565.2 2415.4 910.1 257.0
Unit: in thousands
Sources: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995.
It is clear that the expansion of Shenzhen and its Special Economic Zone is 
based on the mobility of migrants as temporary residents. Most manual labour in the 
SEZ is undertaken by these temporary residents from rural areas. In Shenzhen, as soon 
as one becomes a legal temporary worker, one is then entitled to be a temporary
resident. Of course not every temporary resident is necessarily a temporary worker, but 
a rural laborer can get a temporary hukou in Shenzhen only if he/she is hired as a 
temporary worker. In Shenzhen all workers and staff members are categorized into 
three kinds: guding z hi gong, regular workers and staff members, hetong zhigong, 
contract workers and staff members, and I ins hi zhigong, temporary workers and staff 
members. Guding zhigong refers to those employed by state-owned enterprises or 
government organs and they enjoy all the state welfare such as housing and food 
provision. Hetong zhigong refers to those employed on a contract basis by all kinds of 
enterprises; the contracts may last for three or five years. Most contract workers in 
Shenzhen are university graduates who are employed as technicians, skilled workers or 
management staff. Linshi zhigong, temporary workers are the most disadvantaged in 
Shenzhen; not until 1988 were they officially given temporary contracts on a yearly 
basis.
In the second half of the 1980s, the number of temporary workers increased 
rapidly and in 1988 the number of temporary workers began to surpass the total 
number of regular workers and contract workers. Most of them are employed in either 
collectively owned or privately owned enterprises, especially in foreign-owned 
enterprises. In 1990 the total number of workers and staff was over 550,000, of whom 
over 290,000 were temporary workers. In 1991 the total number of workers and staff 
members increased by nearly 100,000, totaling 648,800. Of these, 362,300 were 
temporary workers, equal to 55.8% of the total work force, 180% of the regular 
workers and over four times the number of contract workers (Shenzhen Statistical 
Yearbook, 1992).
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Table 2 Regular, Contract and Temporary workers and staff members in
Shenzhen
Year Total No. of 
workers and 
staff members
No. of Regular 
workers & 
staff members
No. of
Contract workers 
& staff members
No. of Temporary 
workers & staff 
members
1985 226.6 128.6 28.6 69.4
1986 258.8 137.9 34.4 86.5
1987 322.9 145.5 46.7 130.7
1988 417.4 159.3 64.7 193.4
1989 482.4 176.2 67.5 238.7
1990 554.1 186.5 73.6 293.9
1991 648.9 201.1 85.4 362.4
1992 710.9 205.8 102.6 402.5
Unit: in thousands
Sources: Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 1991, 1992, 1993.
Labour appropriation in Shenzhen is unique in its use of temporary labour from 
the rural areas. The use of temporary labour is not new in Mao’s socialist period 
(Walder 1986:48-54), but it is surely a specific phenomenon in the SEZs and a 
significant developmental strategy of the state in the reform period. The mobilization of 
migrant labour or casual labour, which in China is termed temporary labour, is one of 
the most distinctive elements of capitalist development in both developed countries in 
the last century and the newly developing countries in the 1960s (Cheng 1984; 
Burawoy 1976; Sassen 1988). Reform China, like other developing counfries, depends
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on the mobilization of rural labour as the cheapest labour supply, as part of the process 
of primitive accumulation in industrial development.
In the three decades of socialist development, the strategy of the command 
economy was to extract raw material and resources from the peasantry to support 
industrialization (Selden 1988, 1993; Riskin 1991). The exploitation of the peasantry 
was then in a way more camouflaged. Now in the market socialist economy, the 
process of accumulation is to appropriate labour directly from the rural areas, through 
both state and market mechanisms. It is justified by an estimate of a rural labour 
surplus of 100 million people at the end of 1970s, that continued to grow in the 1980s3. 
Solving the problem of employment was thus the most urgent task of Deng’s state, 
especially when the rural floating population became a thorny issue in the mid 1980s. 
The failure of the planned economy to provide employment for the entire population is 
a well known fact. But the questions are whether the pro-market economy with its new 
labour mechanisms will alleviate or aggravate the old problem of mass unemployment 
and urban-rural dichotomy, and whether the way the state deals with rural labour 
provides a solution for surplus labour or further exploits rural labour for the sake of 
urban economic development. These questions are controversial, and require further 
theoretical formulation as well as empirical investigation.
The industrial development of Shenzhen is not only dependent on the extraction 
of labour from the rural areas, but more specifically female labour. As Lucie Cheng and 
Ping-Chun Hsiung show in their study of Taiwan women workers, the emergence of 
Taiwan's economic "miracle" and the advancement of Taiwan's position in the world 
system is dependent on the specific use of women's labour, both cheaply paid and 
unpaid (Cheng and Hsiung 1992:233-234). So does China depend on female labour, 
which is the cheapest and most compliant labour, in the development of export- 
processing industries (Andors 1988:22-23). However both the Shenzhen Statistical 
Yearbook and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Yearbook choose not to give 
estimates of the sex ratio of the temporary labourers as a whole as well as in different
1 National Studies Team o f  the Chinese Academy o f  Science, Shengcun Yu Fazhan  (Survival and 
Developm ent), Hong Kong: Ke Hua Press, 1991.
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economic sectors. Therefore the number of female temporary laborers in the 
manufacturing sectors is unknown. However, by a careful reading of the statistics we 
can find some clues. According to a Shenzhen statistical publication of 1991, out of 
255,371 workers and staff members in the manufacturing sector in 1989, 156,184 were 
female, which was about 61.2%.4 In the light industry sector, the percentage of female 
labour was higher; of 223,732 workers, 64.7% (144,752) were female.5 Especially in 
foreign-owned enterprises, female labour comprises the most dominant part. 65.5% 
(8283) of the 12,642 staff and workers were female.6 In 1991 female labour in the light 
industry sectors made up 62.8% of the total work force, while in 1994, female labour in 
the whole manufacturing sector accounted for 60.2%.7
4 Shenzhen Statistical Bureau, Shenzhen Shi "Qiwu" Shiqi Gnomin Jingji He Shehui Tongji Z iliao  
(1986-1990) (M aterials on the N ational Economy an d  Social S tatistics o f  the 7 th FYP o f  Shenzhen 
1 9 8 6 -/9 9 0  )(Shenzhen: Shenzhen Statistical Publication, 1991), p.370.
5 Ibid., p.370.
6 Ibid., p.373.
7 Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook, 1992, 1995.
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Table 3 Number of Female Labourers in Shenzhen
Year Total No. of 
female workers
No. of female workers in 
manufacturing sectors
No. of female workers 
in light industries
1979 2,567 715
1980 19,502 6,169
1981 23,014 8,052
1982 31,982 9,161
1983 45,683 17,764
1984 60,346 21,460
1985 74,836 35,769
1986 106,512 49,757 42,238
1987 145,285 84,269 71,667
1988 201,956 120,281 106,627
1989 238,636 156,184 144,752
1990 278,608 186,145 169,223
1991 323,336 203,350 180,444
1992 339,215 213,073 164,769
1993 373,343 202182
1994 394,979 232,347
1995 417,213 250,614
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Sources:
1. Shenzhen Shi Guomin Jingji He Shehui Tongji Ziliao(1979-1985) (Materials
on the National Economy and Social Statistics of Shenzhen 1979-1985);
2. Shenzhen Shi "Qiwu" Shiqi Guomin Jingji He Shehui Tongji Ziliao (1986-
1990) (Materials on the National Economy and Social Statistics of the 7th FYP 
of Shenzhen 1986-1990);
3. Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996.
Since the statistics include regular, contract and temporary labour, and do not 
distinguish among them, we cannot know the exact percentage of temporary female 
laborers working in the manufacturing sectors; but still we can infer the percentage to 
be higher than the percentage of total female labour. Phyllis Andors estimated in 1988 
that over 70% of the temporary labour force in Shenzhen was female (Andors, 
1988:31-32). Josephine Smart even believes that about 90% (in 1989) of the total 
labour force in the light manufacturing industries run by Hong Kong capital was young 
female labour under 25 years of age.8 In my study in Meteor Electronic Company, I 
found that all women workers except one were classified as temporary workers. No 
matter how long they had worked in Shenzhen, they could never become gongren, 
(worker), in the official categorization of status.
s Josephine Smart, "Coercion, Consent, Reciprocity and Exploitation: Labour M anagement in 
Hong Kong Enterprises in China," a paper presented at the Centre o f  Asian Studies, the University o f  
Hong Kong in February 1993, p. 10.
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The Emergent Working Class as Dagongzai(mei) and as Mingong
We are a mass of dagongzai,
coming from the north, coming from the west.
At first we didn’t know what dagongzai meant;
Now we know, toiling from sunrise to sunset,
Toiling with drops of blood and sweat.
Selling our labour to the boss, selling our bodies to the factory, 
Do what they demand of you, no discussion, no reflection just 
obey.
Money is the magic, and what the capitalists bestow on you.
A commodity, a commodity.
I found the above verse, written with a ball-point pen, on the wall of a male 
dormitory room in the Meteor Company. No one staying in the room admitted that they 
had written it, saying that the writer might already be gone. Dagongzai, the working 
boys, and dagongmei, the working girls were the new terms widely used in Reform 
China, denoting a new kind of labour relations fundamentally different from those of 
Mao’s period. Imported from the Cantonese in Hong Kong where labour relations are 
mainly regulated by the market and explicitly laissez-faire capitalist, dagong means 
“working for the boss” , a term which aggressively connotes commodification of 
labour, or the exchange of labour for a wage. The term dagongzai(mei), used 
extensively in the past two decades, contrasts with the term gongren, a far more 
popular usage in Mao’s period, and one that denoted a highly privileged class status in 
the Chinese society out of the reach of the Chinese peasantry. State propaganda said 
Gongren, the proletariat class, were the masters of the country in the course of socialist 
construction; gongren was not the alienated labour Marx argued existed in capitalist 
society. Gongren as an ideal type was a new kind of subject produced by the Chinese 
socialist state to liberate labour from alienation and fully actualize itself in the process 
of production. In actuality in the past three decades of state socialist experiences, the
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Chinese gongren virtually worked for the state, with the state as a socialist boss 
providing not only wages, but permanent employment, housing, medical care and 
education for the younger generation. It was nevertheless a special type of state 
socialist labour relation that struggled to change the capitalist labour relations.
The use of the term dagong does not merely signify the change of the “ socialist 
boss” , but also the coming of a new boss from the capitalist society. No longer imder 
the protection of the state, dagong are casual labour, that can be dismissed at will, that 
can be replaced by anyone who is willing to sell his or her labour. This value is 
determined mainly by market forces and surplus value is extracted as the component of 
the capitalist profit. In a word, dagong is a term signifying the change to capitalist 
labour relationships and dagongzai(mei) is a term designating an identity that is imbued 
with connotative awareness of labour exploitation and class consciousness. One 
question I often put to the workers in the Meteor was: “Do you consider yourself as a 
peasant or a worker?” While some young workers were puzzled by my question and 
did not understand what I was asking, some treated it simply: “ I am a dagongzai or a 
dagongmei”
Given that there are a large number of temporary labourers in Shenzhen and 
that they share common characteristics and identity as dagongzai(mei), both the 
objective conditions and subjective experiences for articulating a new working class are 
present. Class identity was constructed by the hierarchical division of labour in the 
workplace and the sharp income differentiation between the local urban people and the 
rural migrant workers. While the urban citizens occupied the managerial and 
supervisory positions in the factory, the rural migrants formed the bottom of the 
pyramid as cheap manual labour. The average income of a shopfloor worker in the 
Meteor was about 520 yuan. A supervisor made nearly one thousand renminbi, and an 
assistant manager between one thousand and fifty and two thousand renminbi, three to 
four times a manual worker’s income. There were four Hong Kong staff working in 
Meteor as Department Heads, and though their income was highly confidential, 
workers guessed that it was twenty to thirty times theirs. The boss’s income, they 
thought, was out of their estimation. But what they knew was that what he spent on a
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meal in the restaurant was equal to one month of their salary. Class consciousness was 
acute when workers were harshly treated or dismissed at will. Enduring working hours 
for twelve hours each day, with no regular holidays on Sunday, and simple meals with 
little meat and poor rice, most of the workers in the Meteor often joked about 
themselves as undergoing “a dog’s life” , saying even “ a foreign dog is better than a 
dagongzai or dagongmei” .
Class identity became more conspicuous when the migrant workers came into 
contact with local citizens in daily life. The following was an experience four women 
workers and I had in a cultural park. On a holiday Sunday, I invited four girls from 
Sichuan, who stayed next to my dorm room, to go for fun to a famous cultural park in 
Shenzhen. Since the entrance fee was quite high, migrant workers could not easily 
afford to go; the cultural park was mainly constructed for local people and tourists. Due 
to the small wage they earned, not only was the entrance fee too high for them, 
everything sold in the park shops was too expensive as well. At noon, we all were 
hungry and I suggested we go to a restaurant and I would treat them. Yet everywhere 
we tried was very crowded and we decided to eat in one of the small restaurants. When 
we went into the restaurant, and before I could ask the waitress for seats, the waitress 
directly refused us entrance and said in a very annoying and rough way,
“No seats, no seats. Dagongmei, how much money could you possibly afford 
to spend in a restaurant?”
Judging us by our appearance, the rustic look of the four Sichuan girls, and the way we 
were dressed, the waitress, a local, could easily recognize us as dagongmei. I was 
furious as well as sorry that my co-workers had to experience such discrimination. But 
one girl consoled me,
“ We are rural people, and having no money, we shouldn’t go to a restaurant. 
It’s a place not for us. But then we can save a lot of money, can’t we?”
My dagongmei companions were often discriminated by urban people and they had 
gotten used to it. Shenzhen was a place “ of them” , but not “ for them” . 
Dagongzai(mei) was an abject class subject to different life chances and life styles.
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Mingong, directly translated as peasant-worker, was an official term given to 
rural migrant workers. It was widely used in such mass media as TV news reporting 
and newspapers. The term mingong entailed all the complexities and ambiguities of the 
identity that a migrant worker inscribed. More important in the term is that we can see 
how the state and urban society labeled these workers, shaped their relationship to 
capital, and thus their socio-economic position in the changing market socialist 
economy. By examining these two terms, dagongzai (met) and mingong, I argue that I 
can get near to disclosing the process of making and unmaking of the new Chinese 
working class. The term mingong foretells the impossibility of the rural peasantry 
becoming an urban proletariat. First of all they were not allowed to change their 
previous status as peasant; their labour was needed, but not their labour identity, and 
thus the possibility of changing social status from peasant to worker. So even though 
our workers in the Meteor had worked in Shenzhen for more than five years, they were 
still officially classified as peasant-worker despite their actual relation to production 
had long been changed as industrial laborers. A “proper” identity as “ worker” was not 
granted. It was restricted not by the market, but the state. Economic development in 
China, the incorporation of the national economy into the international division of 
labour, nevertheless, greatly differed from other developing countries in the Third 
World, not only in path and in speed, but also in how the state and the past socialist 
social relations intervened and affected its course.
Mechanisms o f  Labour Appropriation: Labour Service Market
China as a state socialist regime is not unique in its taking the initiative to bring 
in capitalist elements in the course of national development. Like the reform 
programmes in Eastern Europe, China, after the failure of totalitarian state planning, 
tried to usher in market mechanisms to solve social crises such as low-level 
development, massive unemployment and underemployment, and the lowering of 
living standards, especially at the end of the Cultural Revolution (Dirlik and Meisner 
1989; Nee and Stark 1989; White 1993). Shenzhen then became the bridgehead of
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intersection between a socialist state and international capitals. But it should be borne 
in mind that the retreat of state planned economy in the Shenzhen SEZ does not mean 
that the socialist state gave over all its power to the so-called market mechanism or 
international capital. As Vivienne Shue reminds us, "it is essential to recognize that 
more power to the market has not so far in human history, and does not now in China,
necessarily mean less power for the state over the society  And indeed, when a
relatively strong state power is already in existence- as in China now- the further 
development of capitalism has historically tended to lead not to lesser but to greater 
bureaucratic expansion and control." (Shue 1988:119) In Shenzhen power is given to 
the local government, which tries to impose strict social control for the purpose of 
purely economic development, even at the expense of socialist goals. And it is in the 
gap between the dream of a "big" modem state and the failure to impose greater 
bureaucratization upon the people that the particularly complicated and exploitative 
mechanisms of labour* appropriation and labour control in Shenzhen are engendered.5
In setting up laowu shichang, the labour service market in Shenzhen, the local 
state intervenes politically in the extraction of labour for the sake of foreign 
investments. The intervention of the state is not only in its administrative regulation of 
labour, but also in its changing control of population migration and of labour 
recruitment. The labour service market represents the reorganization of labour by the 
state, to help it cope with the new international division of labour in its transition to 
market socialism. The labour* service market can be divided into two parts: one 
organized and one unorganized. The organized labour service market shows the 
strategy of the state to regulate labour appropriation under its reach of administration; 
the unorganized sector reveals the failure of labour control in the process of rapid 
development.
9 The analysis o f  the state in China should be careful enough to discern the concrete situation, 
avoiding over-generalization. For example by "state o f  China", it can be the Central government, 
Provincial Government and local governments. The interests among them are diverse and often in 
conflict. The relation becomes tense when the Central State tries to limit the pace o f  econom ic  
developm ent to control financial disorders.
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When the SEZ was formally set up in 1980, the Shenzhen Labour Service 
Company (LSC) was founded. This is an official organ for labour supply under the 
control of the Shenzhen Labour Bureau. The purpose of the company is to regulate the 
transfer of labour from inland China, especially from rural areas to the newly 
established enterprises in Shenzhen. Migrants are not officially allowed to find 
themselves jobs without the mediation of the Labour Service Company and the 
regulation of the Labour Bureau in Shenzhen. With strict social control in China, 
accompanied by the well-known hukou system, people were not permitted to move 
freely from one place to another in the pre-Refoim era. At the start of the 1980s the 
Labour Service Company had the power to transfer labour legally from all provinces as 
it was required by foreign enterprises. In Shenzhen, each administrative district (Lo 
Wu, Fu Tian, Nanshan) and the county (Bao’an) has its own labour service company 
and Labour Bureau. These form a network to regulate the transfer of labour as well as 
the control of labour recruitment in Shenzhen. In the first half of the 1980s, about 
250,000 labourers were transferred by the labour service companies every year.10 In the 
second half of the 1980s, the number of labourers increased by 350,000 yearly. The 
network of the labour service market was further developed with over 60 labour service 
stations formed in Shenzhen by cities and counties of Guangdong Province. These 
stations helped to send laborers from their local regions and also helped to manage and 
control labour migration. Every two years starting from 1987, these labour service 
companies convened labour service exchange conferences, in which both the 
employers and the job seekers would come and be introduced to the companies which 
conducted interviews and offered contracts. In the Labour Exchange Conference of 
1987, the labour service stations from Shantou, Mei County, Shaoguan, Weiyuan, 
Jiangmen and others made agreements with 161 enterprises to transfer about 3,017 
laborers from the rural areas into Shenzhen.11 In the 1990 Conference, about 10,467 job 
seekers came to the meeting, and 5,778 of them signed agreements with 174 enterprises
10 Shenzhen Labour Bureau, Shenzhen Tequ Laodong Zhidu Shinian G aige L icheng (Ten Years o f  
Reform o f  the Labour System  in the Shenzhen SEZ) (Shenzhen: Haitian Press, 1991), p. 5 7.
11 ibid., pp63-64.
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which participated in the Conference.12 Though the local state is active in allocating 
labourers, it is still a danger to overestimate the capability of the state in shaping the 
labour force. The actual number of labourers supplied by the organized labour service 
market is still unknown.
The unorganized labour service market is far closer to the real practice of labour 
appropriation in the Shenzhen SEZ. It is impossible for the local government to control 
the rapid increase of temporary workers every year through its administrative network 
(Andors 1988:29). What the government can do is to let the migrants find a job 
themselves, while at the same time blaming enterprises, especially the foreign-invested 
enterprises, for recruiting labour privately. But it is generally known that the actual 
labour recruitment is done privately without the regulation of the labour service 
companies. Job seekers from the rural areas just wander from one factory to another to 
find opportunities by themselves, and the employers just select suitable ones among 
them. The labour recruitment history of Meteor showed that at the early set-up stage, 
the Company depended mainly on the local labour bureau to help them recruit laborers 
in large numbers. But after 1990, the labour used kept constantly growing and they 
staited to hire workers privately. The practice is convenient and cheaper since the 
Company does not need to pay the service fees. The Shenzhen government does not 
and cannot prohibit such practices, but sets up new mechanisms to control labour 
appropriation.
Spontaneous Labour Migration and Kin-ethnic Ties
Spontaneous labour migration is the common reality of labour appropriation in 
Shenzhen, though migration is strictly controlled under the hukou system. Personal 
migration without official permission is regarded as illegal and the person can be sent 
away at any time. Strict population control in turn forces the migrants to rely on 
existing social networks to provide information and assistance in job-seeking, 
temporary lodging and escape from civic regulations. Kin and ethnic networks, in this
12 Ibid., p.68.
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context, are particularly important in providing buffers to facilitate the mobility of 
labour from anal areas. For most of the rural girls, migration without the help of kin 
ties is impossible. Great rural-urban differences and rigid hukou controls created 
obstacles to moving to the cities in the pre-reform era. Few women have the chance to 
visit cities before they come to work in Shenzhen. Besides rigorous state controls, rural 
customs inhibiting female movement, and the severe cultural shock of a big city - 
contribute to the difficulties of female migration from rural areas to urban cities. The 
village community recognizes kinship ties, the familiar and close bond as the best 
guarantee the rural girls had of mutual rights and obligations (Haraven 1982).
Chain migration, through kin and ethnic ties, took form within a short period in 
the Shenzhen workplaces. The pattern was often that one or two persons would come 
out first to Shenzhen to find a job, sometimes by the introduction of the village leaders 
or relatives. Once they found a job, they would tell their family members, relatives and 
tongxiang, co-villagers, and soon these kin and tongxiang would follow the migration 
trip. The rural labourers flowed into the city in groups. The story of a group of women 
workers coming from Jiangxi to the Meteor Company was typical in illustrating the 
chain migration and the formation of kin and ethnic enclaves in the Shenzhen 
workplace.
Shui Ming, at the age of 23 was considered the “big sister” in her group. The 
identification of the core person in a group was not only based on age, but who came to 
the factory earliest and who had built up the network to help kin and tongxiang in the 
workplace. Shui Ming and her tongxiang, Li Ling were the first ones among the group 
to find a job in Shenzhen in May 1992. The experience of hunting for jobs, they said, 
was extremely difficult for them because none of their village folks worked in 
Shenzhen at the time of their migration. There was only a distant relative, living in a 
different village, who worked in a shoe factory. And when Shui Ming and Li Ling 
came to find her, she had already left and no address was available. Wandering for five 
days in the streets of the industrial zones in Shenzhen, visiting more than ten 
companies, with empty stomachs and exhausted bodies, they finally found the Meteor 
in Blue River Village. Shui Ming said they were lucky to be hired at the Meteor. But
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her sisters considered her a capable person, since she was not shocked by the totally 
strange situation and was daring enough to knock on every personnel office door in 
order to find a job. Having worked in the Meteor for half a year, she got used to the 
factory regime and started to arrange for her kin and tongxiang to come to Shenzhen. 
At the end of 1992, another cousin, who stayed at home after graduating from the 
secondary school in the summer that year, came to the Meteor to join Shui Ming. In the 
Chinese New Year, Shui Ming and Li Ling went back to their home village and were 
welcomed by their family and all the village folks. Besides bringing back RMB 1500 
for eight months’ work, they also conveyed many exciting experiences and stories 
about Shenzhen. Their stories quickly spread in the village and to other nearby villages 
and after the Chinese New Year, two relatives from a nearby village came to find them 
and asked them to bring them to Shenzhen. Shui Ming agreed and accompanied by her 
own younger sister, the five of them together formed a chain movement to Shenzhen 
again. In this kin and ethnic group, it was clear that Shui Ming and Li Ling formed the 
core, and surrounding the core her cousins, relatives and sister shaped the periphery. 
Mutual obligation and the principle of reciprocity were presumed in the chain 
migration and in the kin group with Shui Ming as the head figure, obliged to take care 
of all her kin and tongxiang.
In a word, rural women workers in Shenzhen have reasons specific to 
themselves for building up kin and ethnic networks, for rural-urban migration creates 
special problems which must be overcome if the migrant is to adapt to a new life in the 
strange industrial environment. Girls are not culturally prohibited from working outside 
the village, but they are discouraged unless the family economy is in dire straits. 
Compared with men, women are perceived as more vulnerable and less able to adapt to 
new and alien environments. They seem to require more care and assistance, especially 
when personal safety is concerned. Having and enlarging social networks are thus 
particularly important to female workers, for these networks provide reliable support 
they can obtain in no other way. Labour movement in Reform China relies heavily on 
the co-optation of existing social networks among the rural communities, and the
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efficient appropriation of labour to the labour market was largely indebted to non­
market modes of social relationships (Taussig 1980).
Labour Control in Shenzhen
With the rapid increase in labour migration beyond the control of the 
organized labour service market, the Shenzhen Labour Bureau in late 1988 set up new 
regulations whereby private labour recruitment by enterprises is recognized if not 
formally accepted. The regulations state that all temporary laborers in Shenzhen shall 
sign a one-year- temporary contract, and at the beginning of the year all enterprises in 
Shenzhen are required to submit their estimate of new recruitment, which has to be 
approved by the District Labour Bureau. Thus enterprises are allowed to employ 
laborers throughout the year by themselves if the number is kept within the quota. In 
the case of Meteor, the employer is required to inform the Labour Bureau whenever 
they hire labourers and a sum is paid to the Bureau to buy a temporary labour contract. 
When the contract is signed by both parties, the employer and the employee, the 
Labour Bureau will check the quota, then provide a Temporary Labour Handbook for 
the worker employed, charging 50 yuan each. The Handbook is a register of the 
background information on the worker, including the name, sex, date of birth, 
education level, marriage status and original place, as well as the duration of the 
employment. This Handbook is kept by the employer and when the temporary worker 
leaves the enterprise, the Handbook shall be sent back to the Labour Bureau. The 
government hopes that regulation through the system of the Temporary Labour 
Handbooks will enable it to control the migration of rural labour including numbers 
and mobility and thereby retain its macro-planning.13
The enterprises are supposed to renew the application procedures for every 
worker each year, which means that the enterprises pay the Labour Bureau every year.
IJ However som e enterprises in Shenzhen, especially small and local capital owned  
enterprises, simply neglect the labour control measures. Few send the Handbooks back to the 
Labour Bureau and I found a lot o f  original copies in the Meteor, even though the workers had 
already left the factory.
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According to the Documentation of the Labour Bureau of Nanshan District, Shenzhen 
City [1996] No.3, the enterprises shall decide how many temporary workers they 
intend to use in the next year and then go to the District Labour Service Company to 
renew the certification. If the original place of residence of the temporary workers is 
within the Guangdong Province, the enterprises shall go to the labour service stations, 
set up by different cities and counties of Guangdong Province in Shenzhen, to renew 
the extension of use of labour at the beginning of the year.14 Another lump-sum of 20 
yuan to 60 yuan per labourer shall be paid, for issuing a card named Registration of 
Employment for Out-going Person Card. The justification for collecting money is that 
in sending out labour (though most of the rural laborers come out by themselves) to 
help Shenzhen's economic development, their original counties will lose the 
productivity of labour. So they should receive some compensation. If the temporary 
workers come from other provinces, the enterprises need not pay the money since 
labour service stations from other provinces are not allowed in Shenzhen. The 
Shenzhen government does not welcome labour from other provinces and tries to give 
priority of employment to labour in Guangdong Province. However, no matter whether 
the labourer comes from within the province or from outside the province, after the 
application for a temporary labour certification, the enterprises have to pay another 300 
to 400 yuan for each worker they hire each year. Labourers coming from outside 
Guangdong Province have to pay a higher fee. This payment, known as chengshi 
zengrong fe i , City Increased Capacity Fee, is justified by the argument that the 
migration of labour increases the workload of management and the burden of 
urbanization. In order to prevent escape from payment, the Shenzhen Labour Bureau 
eveiy year will set up an Inspection Team to check the enterprises on their use of 
labour. If the enterprises do not follow the procedures to apply for the number of 
labourers used, and do not pay the City Increased Capacity Fee, they will be punished 
with a fine. Nevertheless, there are still loopholes. The practice of Meteor is that they
N Shenzhen Labour Bureau, "Announcement About Applying the Continued Employment o f  
1995 Temporary Labour, Service Labour Procedure", Shenzhen Labour Bureau 1995, N o.229.
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will apply for a quota of four hundred labourers each year-, and ignore registration for 
man one hundred unregistered workers.
It is clear that the regulation of labour by the state is not only for the sake of 
pooling labour for foreign investments, but, by appropriating labour for the enterprises, 
to make profit from it. As Phyllis Andors points out,
since contract negotiation is the major source of revenue for the labour 
service companies, the greater the management fee paid to the LSC 
(Labour Service Company), and the less welfare monies to be paid out to 
workers, the more money retained by the LSC. This gives the LSC an 
incentive to increase the temporary portion of the labour force, which is 
overwhelmingly female.
(1988:31)
Making money from labour control is an open secret and is detested by 
employers in Shenzhen. Mr. Chou, Director of Meteor, talked to me,
These are only formal procedures. Actually we can hire as many laborers 
as we like and whenever we consider necessary. In the past five years, we 
have hired all our labourers by ourselves. To inform the Labour Bureau, 
to apply for the temporary hukou and temporary labour permit is only a 
waste of time. Sure the bureaucrats of the local government depend on 
these to make money. We loathe these procedures because they do not do 
anything for us and our workers.
Thus, for every worker the Meteor hires, they need to pay a total of four hundred 
renminbi to the district government each year. Mr Chou said this was an invisible 
production cost that people seldom noticed, but the company pay for four himdred 
workers, and so the amount was considerable: an extra labour cost of RMB 160,000 
annually. In addition to the payment to the district government, the money paid to the
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local government of Blue River village is even more notable. The local government 
draws 30% from the total wage bill of the enterprises, leaving only 70% to go to the 
workers. In the case of Meteor Company, every month they pay seven hundred and 
fifty Hong Kong dollars15 per worker employed to Blue River Chief Company, to 
which the Meteor is affiliated as a sanlai yibu enterprise, that is a production- 
processing enteiprise. The Chief Company then exchanges the Hong Kong dollars into 
renminbi at the official rate and returns 70% of the amount to Meteor as workers' 
wages. Thus, at the 1996 rate, for every worker the Meteor employed, the local 
government can earn about RMB 240. This kind of labour payment to an affiliated 
company, often set up by the local government, is the common practice in Shenzhen. 
The rationale is that since the local governments allow foreign capital to invest in their 
administrative patch, they need management fees to regulate labour, and provide land 
for factory premises and workers5 dormitories. Additionally, of course the enterprises 
still have to pay rent for whatever land they use. Nevertheless the labour payment is 
negotiable. Some companies have to pay more, some less, depending on the numbers 
of workers the companies employ and the guanxi, the good relationship with the local 
government. Since all the workers except one in the Meteor are not Blue River 
residents, it is quite clear that the local government makes a profit on the migrant 
workers from outside the community, especially those from rural areas.
Ambiguous Identity: Mixing Population Control with Labour Control
Besides labour control, population control is another specific strategy of the 
Chinese socialist state in appropriating labour into industrial capitalism. It is the most 
important mechanism in perpetuating the exploitative nature of labour appropriation in 
Shenzhen. Population control in China is effected by a system called hukou, household 
registration, which was formally set up in 1958 when the Central State promulgated the 
Regulations of Household Registration(Zhang 1988:35); we will discuss it in detail in 
the next chapter. As Dorothy Solinger points out, the hukou system in China
15 The exchange rate o f  sterling against Hong Kong dollar is 1:12.6 on 15th August 1997.
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determined not just where a person could live but along with that the person's entire life 
chances — his or her social rank, wage, welfare, food rations, and housing (Solinger 
1991:8). In the pre-Reform era, there was only one strict system of hukou: the 
registered urban permanent residence and rural permanent residence. No one could 
change their identity except under state planning. In some cases university graduates 
were allowed to change their hukou to work in big cities because they were considered 
professionals. Peasants, with their fate sealed by the rural hukou, were banned from 
leaving the land for over three decades. Loopholes did exist, but in terms of numbers, 
the illegal migration was still not able to challenge the bifurcated social order between 
the rural peasantry and the urban working class.
Shenzhen is the first city which changed its hukou system dramatically. It 
introduced provisional measures of control on the moving population. Beside the 
former permanent household registration, temporary household registration is now 
issued to hired temporary labourers. Over two-thirds of the population in Shenzhen are 
registered as temporary residents, holding temporary hukou. In Shenzhen the hukou 
system is well connected with labour control. The mechanism of regulation is that 
when rural migrants are hired by enterprises and approved by the Labour Bureau as 
temporary laborers, after the payment of Increased City Capacity Fee, the enterprises 
should apply with the Public Security Bureau for a certification of temporary residence 
registration and with the local police station for registering a temporary hukou, and, 
finally, with the District Public Security Bureau for a Temporary Residence Certificate 
so that their workers can become legal temporary workers in Shenzhen.16 The 
temporary residence is only for one year and needs to be renewed and fees paid 
annually. The hukou system in Shenzhen works to keep the urban status sacred and 
restricted, and no matter how long a worker has been in the city, he/she would remain 
only a temporary resident.17 The strategy of the local government is regularly to 
change the use of rural labour. The principle is that if there is work, rural labour can
Documentation o f  hukou Management Division, Shenzhen Public Security Bureau, 1990.
17 Ibid.
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come and be given a temporary residence; if there is no work, they will have to leave so 
the local government will not take up the burden of proletarianization and urbanization.
On the other hand, the intersection of labour control with population control is 
revealed in the system of inspecting temporary residents. The inspection in 1995 was 
carried out in mid-June with a search of all the enterprises including the foreign 
invested and local owned enterprises in the Nanshan District. The puipose of the 
inspection was to see whether or not the enterprises had applied for the quota of use of 
labour, completed the procedure of use of temporary labour, paid the Increased City 
Capacity Fee, and applied for the certificate of temporary residence for all their 
workers. If any enterprise was found not to have followed all the labour regulations and 
had not applied for the certificate of temporary residence for its workers, it could be 
punished by a fine of RMB 300 per month for a worker from other provinces and RMB 
100 per month for a worker from Guangdong Province.18
No doubt the hukou system in China helps to create the exploitative 
mechanisms of labour appropriation in Shenzhen. Hukou defines one's identity and 
status, according to which urban residents are put under the state planning of food, 
employment, housing, education, health and other social welfare. The maintenance of 
the distinction between permanent and temporary residents is to shirk the obligation of 
the state to provide housing, job security or welfare for the newly forming working 
class in Shenzhen. As we said before, the labour of the rural population is wanted, but 
not their survival in the city if their labour is not given. The newly forming working 
class has and is allowed no roots in the city.
Still worse, the hukou system mixed with the labour control in Shenzhen is the 
specific mechanism which makes up the ambiguous identity of the rural migrant labour 
that deepens but at the same time obscures their exploitation. Are the temporary 
residents treated as urban residents or not? Are the temporary laborers regarded as 
workers or peasants? The answers are ambiguous (Andors, 1988). The ambiguous 
identity of the migrant labour is the special phenomenon created by the specific
ls Documentation o f  Urban Population Control Leading Group, Nanshan District o f  Shenzhen 
(1995) N o. 1, Population Management, Nanshan District o f  Shenzhen, 1995.
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mechanisms of population and labour control in Shenzhen, or elsewhere in other 
economic developing zones in China. The ambiguity of the status helps to appropriate 
labour from the rural areas without giving them full recognition as laborers by the 
Chinese state in the process of development in the Reform era. The term mingong, 
'‘peasant-workers” or temporary workers, blurs the line of identity between peasant 
and worker. The contention here is that this process of proletarianization is launched by 
the Chinese socialist state when it allows the rural migration to meet the needs of 
international capital and regional development, while at the same time obscuring or 
diluting the phenomenon of proletarianization. The non recognition is not due to the 
embarrassment that China is a socialist state facing large-scale unemployment or 
underemployment and dismissal of workers, evils considered to be part of capitalist 
society. On the contrary, the socialist state acts as a developmentalist state, contriving 
to interpose some capitalist mechanisms into the state socialist system while at the 
same time refusing, or being unable, to undertake the cost of proletarianization and its 
generational reproduction. The blurring of the peasant/worker identity, or the non­
articulation of the newly born working class, is the weird outgrowth of the Chinese 
socialist state in its extraction of labour from rural areas. Actually, the strategy of 
appropriating rural labour to support economic development but being reluctant to 
undertake the responsibility of rural proletarianization is clearly stated by the Shenzhen 
Labour Bureau itself:
The major component of the labour service market is the temporary 
workers. Their characteristic is that they are active and flexible in the 
market. They are assiduous, hardworking, easily manageable and 
economically productive. What's more they do not transfer their hukou, 
(actually they are not permitted to do so). If there is work, they come; if 
not, they go. This lessens the burden of enterprises, solves the problem
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of labour use and at the same time does not result in urban 
overpopulation.19
Furthermore, housing, education and other environmental infrastructure is not 
provided by the Shenzhen Government to the temporary residents. As over 70% of 
workers in Shenzhen are considered temporary labour and temporary residents, they are 
not entitled to use the urban facilities. When the migrant workers themselves are not 
rightful citizens, their family members are not allowed to live in Shenzhen as well 
unless they can find a job and acquire the status of temporary worker. Marriage and 
childbirth cannot be registered in Shenzhen. Officially these workers are still regarded 
as peasants and are supposed to have backup from their family in the rural areas. Thus 
the local government and the foreign enterprises can shirk its responsibilities while at 
the same time making use of the rural labour for its own development. The cost of 
labour reproduction is left to be borne by the rural society. Migrant labour is specific in 
its transient nature. Normally a worker, especially a female worker, will spend three to 
five years working as a wage labourer in the industrial city before getting married. The 
long-term planning of life activities such as marriage, procreation and family were all 
expected in the rural community. As in other developing countries in the Third World, 
the process of proletarianization in contemporary China relies heavily on the 
subsistence mode of agricultural production. China is an extreme case in that the 
process of proletarianization was highly dictated by the politico-administrative rather 
than market forces, and it was the politico-administrative forces that helped to co-opt 
the existing social relationship and economic structure into the capitalist development. 
Given that there is a great labour surplus in rural China, it is almost not necessary for 
the urban government to consider the reproduction of labour in the long run.
Since the newly formed proletariat are not allowed to build their slums in the 
urban areas, the burden of daily reproduction of labour is left to the factory. Most 
workers live inside the factory buildings with about 50 workers in one flat or house
|y Shenzhen Labour Bureau, 1992, Shenzhen Tequ Laodong Zhidu Shinian G aige Licheng (Ten 
Years o f  Reform o f  the Labour System in the Shenzhen SEZ), pp80.
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built of wood and iron sheet provided by their employers. Again Mr Chou, the Director 
of the Meteor, complained,
The Shenzhen government does not provide any housing and basic 
infrastructure for the workers but demands money for every worker we 
hire. The money is claimed for the so-called Increased City Capacity 
Fee. However the city does not provide any facilities for them. Our 
factory still needs to provide food and housing on our own.
Yet, Mr. Chou also admitted that the Company benefits from the status of the workers 
too. Since the temporary laborers are not officially recognized as gongren, neither does 
their factory recognize them as such. Mr. Chou said that the workers they previously 
employed in Hong Kong are still under the protection of the labour law in Hong Kong, 
and they cannot dismiss the workers arbitrarily without compensation. Here they can 
dismiss the workers in Shenzhen at any time they want: “The labour regulations simply 
are not working here, nobody cares to enforce them, not even the trade union and 
labour bureau.” The insecure nature of the job often makes the temporary workers very 
compliant, passive and willing to work longer hours, usually twelve to fourteen hours a 
day. The reluctance of the socialist state to undertake the costs of the reproduction of 
the proletariat creates a particular space for international capital to extract labour 
surplus in China at an extremely cheap cost.
In a word, the role of the Chinese state in regulating labour appropriation and 
labour control in the process of development in the reform era does not benefit the 
working class newly formed from the peasantry. On the contrary, labour control, 
population control, and the non-articulation of the identity of the proletarian class 
deepens the exploitation of the laborers who come from rural areas. The extraction of 
rural labour, especially female labour, does prove that the economic development of the 
Shenzhen SEZ is dependent on the specific use of cheap and flexible female labour. 
The blurring of the identity is the weird outgrowth of the blending of the exploitative 
mechanisms of population control and labour control, which helps to maintain the
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availability of a massive cheap and flexible labour force for the sake of the 
development. As Michael Burawoy holds, the ideology which justifies the central 
appropriation and redistribution of surplus of state socialism is Marxism, or Marxism- 
Leninism;20 however, the ideology which justifies the new mechanisms of exploitation 
in the reform era is developmentalism or modernization. What is significant for the 
third Chinese working class is that the basis for its formation is uprooted, as the right of 
abode of the migrant workers in urban industrial centers is usurped by the state. Urban 
slums, places for migrant workers to aggregate themselves as class force, are severely 
wiped out, despite there are rapid growth of slums in some big cities like Guangzhou. 
Rural proletarianization in the contemporary China is unique in its nature that for every 
rural migrant, life as an industrial worker is transient and few have the hope of 
changing their social status from peasant to worker. The growing roots of a constant 
and substantial working class force are dispersed when the migrant workers at the end 
are sent back to their rural hometown. Administro-political forces, albeit in a chaotic 
way, shape and mis-shape the nature of the newly formed working class.
■° Micheal Burawoy, 1992 "A V iew  From Production: The Hungarian Transition from Socialism  to 
Capitalism," in Chris Smith and Paul Thompson (ed.) Labour in Transition: the Labour 
P rocess in Eastern Europe and China, p. 184.
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Chapter III The Production of Desire: Leaving the Village
What, then, constitutes the alienation o f  labour?
First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e. it does not 
belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does 
not affirm him self but denies him self, does not feel content but 
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy  
but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore 
only feels h im self outside his work, and in his work feels outside 
himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is 
working he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, 
but coerced; it is fo r c e d  labour.
Karl Marx, Econom ic an d  P hilosophic M anuscripts o f  1844
Jin; “I  knew I  had to go. "
Jin was one of my best friends in the factory. The friendship started by chance 
when I came across her one day in the dormitory. I had left the factory premises 
directly after the afternoon work because I was too tired to take the evening meal and 
wanted to take a rest at once. It was at dinner time and nobody was supposed in the 
dormitory, I found Jin sitting on the trunk in her room, wearing a gloomy look. I 
headed into the room and then started talking with her. She was unhappy because she 
lost her meal card, which would be stamped each time when she took a meal. For the 
renewal of the card she would be fined ten yuan, and she needed to pay for all meals 
in the last month even if she didn’t take them all. “I am not hungry. I have no 
appetite... You know, it is my own fault. I am always careless,” Jin murmured. I 
insisted on inviting her to eat outside, though neither of us had any appetite at all.
Jin, aged eighteen, was an assembly operator on Line A. This was her first job 
since she had left her hometown in Sichuan five months previously. Jin was the only 
daughter in her family in the village, but she had two elder brothers. One was staying 
on the farm and one was working in Zhuhai, another industrial town in Guangdong.
“The land is so little, it doesn’t need many hands to till it. My father and my 
eldest brother will do,” Jin told me one night when she visited me in my room. Land 
was redistributed in 1981 on a family basis when the state launched the land reform
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policies and overturned the collective system. Jin’s family got two acres of arable 
land and three acres of mountainous land. For merely “feeding mouths” that would 
be no problem, Jin said, since besides farming, her family invested in poultry rearing 
as well. Pigs and chickens were the main sources of cash and would be enough to 
buy basic necessities and even some of household electrical appliances. “After my 
schooling, I stayed at home and helped my mother to feed the pigs. Other than that, I 
got nothing to do and was so bored. ... But my father didn’t allow me to go out with 
other girls. They all went to dagong in Guangdong.”
Her father refused to let his daughter work outside the village because the 
family did not need extra money, even though they were poor compared to other 
families in the village. The father did not want the only daughter to be spoiled in the 
city or to take any risks in unfamiliar situations.
“I stayed home for a whole year, seeing all my friends in the village going out to 
find jobs elsewhere. They could all earn their own money and bought back rice 
cookers, electric fans and radio recorders. ... I was so envious and angry with my 
father for keeping me at home. There was no reason, I thought,” Jin kept on saying.
Cash was very important to the peasants for buying industrial products to 
improve living standards. For the youth in the village, cash signified one’s own 
labour capability and independence from the family. Jin was also attracted by the 
idea of changing her appearance from farming girl to factory worker in fashionable 
T-shirt and jeans. Jeans were definitely a cultural product of industrial life, and not fit 
for farming in paddy field. Changing youth culture in the village and the possibility 
of new life style in the city all helped to produce Jin’s desires to leave the village.
Jin planned to run away from home when she knew there was no way to 
persuade her father.
“When my best friend, Ping, came back home in midsummer, I asked her to take 
me away. I was very afraid actually. I had never left my hometown before. And I 
didn’t know where Guangdong was. Ping told me we had to take a coach to Chengdu 
first, then change onto a train to Guangzhou and then another train to Shenzhen.”
The whole trip was three days and nights and would cost her about two hundred 
yuan, her whole life savings at the age of eighteen.
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“I don’t know where I got the guts. At that time I so terribly desired to leave the 
village, just for the sake of leaving the village...”
Jin was fed up staying in the village, finding most of her young co-villagers 
working in big cities. Stories and anecdotes about industrial life were not new to her; 
everybody coming back from the factories would bring back tales of city life as well. 
Be these tales interesting, dreadful or sweating, Jin decided to find them out herself. 
“At midnight, when all my family fell asleep, I packed my luggage. To keep it 
simple, I just brought two sets of clothes and some basic necessities, thinking that 
Ping would help me in need. I went to bed, but I was too excited and for the whole 
night, I couldn’t sleep...” At four, before the dawn broke, Jin moved out of the house 
and left a letter for her family. Jin had to walk about half an hour to leave the village 
and met Ping at the coach station in the town.
“What did you write in your letter?” I couldn’t help interrupting her.
“I told my father I was not an unfilial daughter. I wanted to earn money myself 
and I would send it back home. I would take care of myself and find a job in 
Shenzhen...” Her response still showed a sense of pride.
“I met Ping at the coach station...” Jin was eager to continue her story. “She told 
me the coach would leave at five and we decided to have breakfast near the station. ... 
When I sat down, I saw a woman running from the field towards the station. She was 
approaching, it was my mother. I was terribly frightened and stunned. ... My mother 
saw me and shouted my nam e.... At that moment, I thought my dream was dashed.” 
But her mother did not dash her dream; instead she gave her one hundred yuan, 
her si fang qian, the private savings of a married woman, and an umbrella. “My 
mother promised to keep my secret. She repeatedly asked me to write letters once I 
arrived in Shenzhen, and I definitely should be back home for the Spring Festival...” 
“The coach was leaving, my mother handed me the umbrella. It was raining 
slightly but I didn’t realize it until I saw my mother standing by the station from the 
coach. She was weeping, but I knew I had to go...” Jin left her mother, left the 
village, left the earth.
Marx is quoted at the beginning of the chapter, not for the sake of joking at a 
great thinker, but from the pain of teasing out the contemporary scenery in China: the
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desire to leave home for the industrial work. Marx said that when the worker is at 
home, he or she is not working, and when the worker is working, he or she is not at 
home. Of course for Marx “at home” means more than a geographical location, but 
also an existential mode of being by which a man or woman actualize his or her 
being in the world.
The puzzle dominating this chapter is that Chinese workers did not feel “at 
home” when they were really at home, in the village where self-subsistence could 
provide a better degree of harmony between wo/man and nature. Rather, they desired 
to leave “home” by choosing to sell their labour to capitalists. This, according to 
Marx, leads to the fatal process of self-estrangement and self-objectification of their 
true selves through their participation in the activity of wage labour. Immediately 
following the above quotation, Marx wrote:
It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy 
needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as 
soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the 
plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour 
of self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour 
for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else’s, 
that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to 
another.
(1964:110-111)
But there was no violence, no coercive force involved when a young Chinese village 
girl like Jin who was so determined to escape her home, made herself “alienated” 
through industrial labour. Also, there was no misrecognition o f the “I” as suggested 
by Althusser, who argued that the domain of ideology was paramount in 
interpellating individuals, and fooling them into following the interests of the 
dominant class. Most of the factory girls knew quite well before they left their village 
that they were going to be imprisoned in a sweatshop for twelve hours each day, 
earning about five hundred renminbi per month. They knew the factory boss would 
not be lenient and treat them as an equal human being. They knew there was huge
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gap between the industrial life and rustic life. They knew they were going to sell their 
bodies. They knew almost everything...
Then why, why were these young Chinese girls so eager to leave their parents, 
and the land, in order to enter the capitalist consumerist world? Or why were their 
individual desires in harmony with the social demands? More specifically, why did 
Jin’s desire coincide so happily with the demands of industrial capitalism? Here, 
there are at least three questions, or three aspects of the same question we need to 
explore:
1. How state socialist China becomes capitalist and forces mobility;
2. The colonization of social desire by the metaphysical signifer: Capital;
3. The desire for one’s own oppression and alienation.
What is desire?
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari are absolutely right to say that Wilhelm Reich “is at 
his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the 
part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will 
take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms of desire: no, the 
masses were never innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of 
conditions, they wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses 
that needs to be accounted for.” (1984:29) The central question of Reich in The Mass 
Psychology o f Fascism is why the mass desired their own repression: “Why do men 
fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?” Yet Reich, 
as Deleuze and Guattari say, himself never manages to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of this phenomenon, because at a certain point he reintroduces precisely 
the line of argument he was in the process of demolishing. He does this by creating a 
distinction between rationality as it is or ought to be in the process of social 
production, and the irrational element in desire, and by regarding only this latter as 
suitable subject for psychoanalytic investigation. Hence the sole task he assigns 
psychoanalysis is the explanation of the “negative,” the “subjective,” the “inhibited” 
within the social field, and yet the social field is undifferentiated. The oppressors and 
the oppressed are surely different kind of people. He therefore necessarily returns to a
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dualism between the real object rationally produced on the one hand, and irrational, 
fantasizing production on the other. He gives up trying to discover the common 
denominator or the coextension o f the social fie ld  and desire (1984:29-30).
Then, what is desire? How can we follow Reich’s question but by going beyond 
his explanation. First of all, Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia help us:
It (desiring-machine) is at work everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, 
at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and 
fucks.
(1984:1)
Desiring-machines are binary machines, obeying a binary law or set of 
rules governing associations: one machine is always coupled with another.
The productive synthesis, the production of production, is inherently 
connective in nature: “and...” “and then...” This is because there is always a 
flow-producing machine, and another machine connected to it that 
interrupts or draws off part of this flow. And because the first machine is in 
turn connected to another whose flow it interrupts or partially drains off, 
the binary series is linear in every direction. Desire constantly couples 
continuous flows and partial objects that are by nature fragmentary and 
fragmented. Desire causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and 
breaks the flows.
(1984:5)
Going beyond both Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Deleuze and 
Guattari try to tell us a fundamentally different story of desire: desire runs here and 
there, like a river flowing day in and day out, knowing no final destination. Deleuze 
and Guattari do not want to attribute the machine that it only has a physical image of 
a machine to desire. But they do see a mechanistic process of non-human energy that 
produces and continuously deterritorizes its routes. For Deleuze, there is a joy 
immanent in desire; but desire only exists in the relations of production that it 
creates. Desire produces itself, spreading by contagion; but this contagion is the real
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production of mutually affective and transformative social relations. To produce and 
know desire, therefore, is to express a politics of desire: the production of desire is 
inseparable from the creation of new modes of social existence (Goodchild 1996:41).
Desire is neither a biological impulse, nor a metaphysical energy, nor a 
symbolic structure, as Freud or Lacan believed. There are no pre-social instincts or 
drives, whether towards aggression or sexual activity that can transcend society, nor 
a universal psychical essence like the Oedipus complex that guides the formation of 
subject and society (Goodchild 1996:74). Instead, desire, previously taken as a sexual 
energy, is extended into all social, political and psychological processes. As Deleuze 
and Guattari argue,
The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, 
of the productions of the unconscious. But once Oedipus entered the 
picture, this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a 
classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory; 
representation was substituted for the units of production of the 
unconscious; and an unconscious that was capable of nothing but 
expressing itself- in myth, tragedy, dreams- was substituted for the 
productive unconscious.
(1984:24)
For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is not a concept that derives its entire meaning 
from sexual relations; desire is a ‘sexuality5 which extends beyond gender relations, 
because it can relate entirely heterogeneous terms and territories, a multiplicity of 
sexes (Goodchild 1996:41). Nor is desire the idea of phantasy, nor a rhapsody of 
image that comes to be repressed when it encounters with the “reality55. Neither is 
desire derived from lack. By contrast, desire is all source of reality and truth, is the 
production of the real, the subject and the social:
If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be 
productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the 
set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and
81
that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result 
of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. 
Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the 
subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is 
no fixed subject unless there is repression.
(1984:26)
Unlike Lacan and Zizek, Deleuze and Guattari stated that desire is never bom from 
lack. As a machine, desire is the spring of production, the production of production. 
It never lacks anything. There is no transcendental lack that organized the psychic 
activity and pre-determined the unconscious. For them,
The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is 
possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar 
lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of 
its objective being.
(1984:27)
One of the greatest contributions of Deleuze and Guattari in their theory and 
politics of desire is the breakthrough of all dualisms that posit the false opposition 
between the psychic and the social, between the individual and the social, between 
the personal desire and the social unconscious. For them, both the individual and the 
social Eire the production of the desiring-machines. The division is not an 
essentialized fracture, but a coin of two sides when looked at from a different 
perspective. There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one 
hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other:
The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply 
desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that 
the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically 
determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation 
or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to
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invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production.
There is only desire and the social, and nothing else,
(1984:29)
Desiring-production is one and the same thing as social production. It is not possible 
to attribute a special form of existence to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is 
presumably different from the material reality of social production. Desiring- 
machines are not fantasy-machines or dream-machines, which supposedly can be 
distinguished from social machines (1984:30). Thus, Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasize, there is never any difference in nature between the desiring-machines and 
the social machines. There is a certain distinction between them, but it is merely a 
distinction of regime. And,
despite the fact that they are governed by two different regimes- and 
despite the fact that it is admittedly a strange adventure for desire to desire 
repression, there is only one kind of production, the production of the real.
And doubtless we can express this identity in two different ways, even 
though these two ways together constitute the autoproduction of 
unconsciousness as a cycle. We can say that social production, under 
determinate conditions, derives primarily from desiring-production: which 
is to say that Homo natura comes first. But we must also say more 
accurately, that desiring-production is first and foremost social in nature, 
and tends to free itself only at the end: which is to say that Homo historia 
comes first.
(1984:32-33)
Homo natura and Homo historia are two different faces of the same identity. 
Desiring production is first and foremost social in nature. The social provides the 
repressive potential, the signifying structure, the organ-machine that waits for the 
psychic, the desiring-machine, the body without organs to breathe, to eat, to shit and 
to fuck. With these insights into how desiring-machines work, of course in the
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abstract, then it is high time to come back to Jin’s story in particular and to Chinese 
history in general.
When Jin said: “I knew I had to go”, how many voices did she echo in Chinese 
society? When she escaped and moved out the village, how many people did she join 
and accompany? The post-Mao era was characterized by these desiring voices and 
actions that created and captured the ethos of the society. Nothing is more useful for 
understanding the force and pattern of mobility, especially rural to urban mobility in 
the past decade, or for grasping the changing nature of the Chinese society. It 
discloses at least two processes: capitalization of the state socialist society and the 
reworking of worker and peasant relations.
The Change o f Production Mode and the Force o f Mobility
The mobility of the agricultural population marked the beginning of the history 
of primitive accumulation in the process of capitalization, as Marx discloses:
In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making 
that act as levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above 
all, those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly 
torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and “unattached” 
proletarians on the labour market. The expropriation of the agricultural 
producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.
The history of this expropriation, in different countries, assumes different 
aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders of 
succession, and at different periods.
(Capital Vol. 1, 1954:669-670)
The process of expropriation of the agricultural producers in contemporary China did 
run its own way, assume it own specific aspects. The nature of exploitation was 
different from what Marx and Thompson described in the history of English 
capitalism. The striking difference we observe in China was that the process of 
expropriation of agricultural producers from the soil did not lead to the formation of
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working class. Rather, based on the legacy of Mao’s policies, the process of 
expropriation makes use of the existing social relations and state bureaucracy to 
assist the economic force. The result is that the emergence of the Chinese agricultural 
proletariat is checked at the moment of birth as a class force. The state machine 
crushes the class formation of an agricultural proletariat in the cradle. I have 
described this process in the last chapter. Here, let us come back to the change of the 
mode of production in China.
As Marx said, a change in the economic structure was the pre-condition for 
freeing agricultural producers from the land and the creation of a relatively surplus 
population. The mode of production should be changed, Marx argued. So in 
contemporary China, the state socialist mode of production should be changed too. 
Mao Zedong died in 1976, and two years later Deng Xiaoping launched the 
economic reforms and started the new era of capitalization in China. It ended the 
collectivization of three decades. Land first of all would be divided and given back to 
individual households, and the state control of the market would be eased. The 
historical transitional moment is often said to be at the Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1978, when the party claimed to 
undertake new historical responsibility and turned the job of the government back to 
shehui zhuyi xiandaihua, the so called “socialist modernization”. The Session Report 
advocated launching a deep social revolution to actualize the “four modemizatons”, 
of agriculture, industry, military and scientific technology:
To actualize the four modernizations, that are demanded to enhance highly 
productivity, what is needed is to change production relations and an upper 
infrastructure that is not suitable to the development of productivity in 
various aspects. The inadequate management mode, activity mode and 
thought mode should all be changed; therefore it should be a broad and 
deep revolution.1
1 quoted from the Report of the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee of the China Communist Party. Hong Kong: Joint Publishers. 
1978, p 5 , My own translation.
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The Third Plenum initiated Deng’s reform policy though at that time nobody knew 
how far the state socialist mode of production would be changed. Yet land reforms 
were extensively carried out until the Sixth Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of 
CCP in 1981, which promulgated the “Resolution of Certain Historical Problems of 
the Party since the Construction of the Nation” that helped to confirm the ideological 
base. The Resolution blamed that the backwardness, the poverty, and the stagnation 
of the country on “personal mistakes”, that is, the mistakes of Mao Zedong.
It stated,
In 1958, the Second Plenum of the 8th Central Committee of the Party- 
passed the general line and basic direction of socialist construction. It 
accurately reflects the universal will and demand of the mass of the people 
to change the backward economic and cultural situation of our country. Its 
drawback, however, was that it neglected objective economic rules. Before 
and after the session, all party comrades and all peoples had developed 
socialist activity and creative spirit in the productive construction. But, due 
to lack of experience in socialist construction, and lack of recognition of an 
economic development rule and the basic situation of China’s economy, 
and due to the pride and self-complacency of Comrade Mao Zedong, and 
many central and local comrades nurtured in the victory, the subjective will 
and subjective effects were exaggerated because of the urgent need to make 
achievements. Without serious investigation, research and testing, the 
“Great Leap Forward” movement and the rural collectivization movement 
were carelessly set in motion soon after the launch of General Line. Thus, 
the “leftist” orientation, characterized by high goals, blind direction, 
exaggeration and the “communist wind” was extensively prevalent.2
" see Sanzhong quanhui y i l a i :  Zhongyao wenxian xuanb ian  x i a  
(Seclected Important documents: from the Third Plenum). Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe. 1982:805. My own translation.
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Deng’s new regime tried to create a picture: the backwardness and poverty of the 
country was produced by the “leftist” policy dictated by Mao Zedong. Mao’s further 
mistake was mobilizing the Cultural Revolution which seriously damaged the 
country’s economy and political situation. Deng’s willingness to question the 
authority of the Communist Party, to portray Mao as a maniac, irrational 
revolutionary was simply for the sake of coating himself in a new cloth of 
rationalism and finding legitimacy for his new reform policy. Deng surely conceived 
his reform policy as a deep social revolution, and its consequences for Chinese 
“socialist” history would be far greater than the Cultural Revolution launched by 
Mao.
However, history is not merely made by a single man; Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiao-ping, no matter how “great” they were, were simply the leaders and then the 
symbols of two different forces in history. At the end of the Cultural Revolution in 
1976, the legitimacy of the ruling state party was seriously questioned and the society 
at the bottom had already changed, despite the existence of the repressive state 
machine at the top.
The mode of production, especially in the rural areas experienced spontaneous 
changes at the end of 1970s. Various studies found out that some rural communes in 
villages had already divided land by themselves long before Deng launched the land 
reform, and the “black” market selling staple foods was never totally under control. 
The repressive state never proved successful; a totalitarian model able to fetter the 
society was merely imaginary. There are many examples to illustrate the failure of 
the state to control the social and of the spontaneous modifications of the mode of 
production in various rural communes before agricultural reforms were formerly 
carried out in 1982. Ezra F. Vogel, in his study of Guangdong Province, provides us 
with interesting and detailed stories on how the villages in poor mountainous areas 
divided land, without the permission of the provincial government:
In early 1979 Guangdong provincial officials received reports that in every 
poor area like Haikang County (Zhcinjicing Prefecture) and in remote 
mountainous areas like Zijin County (Huiyang Prefecture), local teams had 
taken the initiative on a wide scale in assigning land to households even
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during rice-growing season. Official policy did not yet permit this, and 
local officials tried to clamp down. In Zijin, higher-level cadres went down 
to villages to stop it in March, June, and September 1979, and yet over the 
year, as they later discovered, the number of teams practising it increased 
from 1300 to 3700. An investigation of the situation there and in nearby 
Heyuan and Heiping counties began on June 10, 1980, led by the head of 
the Provincial Agriculture Commission, Du Ruizhi. At meetings from June 
19 to 25, the team members discussed their findings with officials. Du 
reported back to the province that the assignment of land to individual 
families was even more widespread than previously reported, that the 
peasants were pleased, and that despite bad weather, production had 
improved substantially. Nevertheless, Du could not persuade the province 
to approve the practice openly. Some feared that Beijing might disapprove, 
some feared loss of cadre authority in the countryside, some feared 
difficulty in collecting grain, and some feared that after success in the first 
year, production of basic crops would later fall off and that once land was 
distributed it could not easily be taken back.
(1989:95)
Another sociologist, Graham Johnson (1982), who also did his field work in Pearl 
River delta, found out that more than 20% of the work teams there had already 
privately adopted the family contract system, especially on land growing sugar cane 
and fruit. The work teams divided the land and worked for themselves. The peasants 
created all kinds of flexible production methods adjusted to their different ecologies.
As for the local rural “black” market, it never died out throughout the 1970s, 
though it was completely banned in 1957. Terry Sicular found out that though 
massive private exchange of grain could not formally exist in the Cultural 
Revolution period, rural marketing and exchange on a small scale was actually 
prevalent. After 1977, the state did relax its control on the private exchange, so in 
addition to cotton and cotton products, all sorts of agricultural products were 
extensively exchanged. Over five million tons of grain were sold through rural 
markets in 1979; that is, about 10% of the state planned quota. The amount of
agricultural products exchanged through the local rural markets was about 170 
billion renminbi (1989:104). Vivienne Shue even discovered that private exchange 
not only existed among individual households, but also among brigades and 
communes. One cadre from a brigade in Dong-guan told Shue:
In our brigade supply and marketing coop we tended to try to handle 
problems that arose for ourselves and did not expect help from higher 
levels or ask them for help. We even did things that were illegal to solve 
our own problems. One of these involved violation of the state’s unified 
purchase and supply policy. Adjacent to our commune was another 
commune called XX commune and there they grew a lot of peanuts. But 
our commune grew a lot of sugar cane. The land in our commune was not 
suitable for peanuts and the amount of oil supplied to us by the state did 
not meet our needs. Now our brigade was very close to this other 
commune; our people saw each other all the time and we were linked by 
marital ties. So what happened? Our brigade party secretary and brigade 
leader and several others in the brigade got their heads together to decide 
whether or not it would be possible to trade some of our sugar for some of 
their peanut oil. This was without a doubt illegal and not permissible. Both 
of these commodities came under unified purchase and supply and both 
should have been turned over to the state for distribution. At first the party 
branch secretary didn’t know what to do. He was a little afraid. Then the 
brigade went to consult the people in XX commune to see if they would 
agree. They replied that they’d be happy to do so. They never had enough 
sugar you see. So a brigade boat was secretly sent over there loaded with 
sugar and came back with peanut oil. We didn’t just do this once either; we 
did it many times.
(1988:110)
Besides private trading among communes, individual peasants also made exchanges 
among themselves without the notice of the commune leaders. The cadre continued 
his story:
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Sometimes we did things without ever informing the commune supply and 
marketing coop too. For example, during the busy season the peasants 
didn’t have time to take off to buy vegetables and other things to eat. So 
the brigade leader suggested that we could catch shrimp in the reservoir at 
night and have them ready for sale to brigade members in the morning. He 
discussed it with us and others first and then checked with the brigade party 
branch secretary, who also agreed that it was a good idea. On the one hand 
it meant we at the supply and marketing coop would earn a little more 
money. And on the other, it would be providing the brigade members with 
something better to eat. Of course, most of the shrimp and fish that we 
caught in the reservoir were supposed to be taken on the commune. So 
when we decided to do this during the busy season, we most certainly 
didn’t tell the commune about it. ... Yes, almost everybody in the brigade 
knew about it and they knew it was illegal, but it was beneficial for them 
and so no one ever said anything to the commune cadres about it.
(ibid.: 110)
Thus we can see that no matter how dedicated and strict the state organizations were 
in rural areas, the state never succeeded in completely controlling the daily life of 
the peasants. Throughout the 70s, there was everywhere a “silent” revolution at the 
bottom of Chinese society. The economic reforms initiated in the early 1980s by 
Deng’s regime were simply an acceptance of the de facto structural changes of the 
rural economy. They no doubt accelerated the rate and the extent of the change. The 
legitimation of rural decollectivization, and the adoption of the production 
responsibility system after 1981 resulted in the dismantlement of more than 50,000 
communes within two years (World Bank, 1992:66). And as Elisabeth Croll put it,
the reversal of the process of collectivization was primarily a consequence 
of the contracting out of land and production quotas to the peasant 
household, which brought about the simultaneous decline of the collective 
and the emergence of the peasant household as the dominant economic,
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political and social unit in the countryside.
(1994:20)
The agricultural marketing and price reforms that accompanied land reform allowed 
the loosening of the state monopoly, and a large and growing share of agricultural 
marketing moved from the state commercial system to free markets (ibid. 1992:66- 
76).
The primitive accumulation of “socialist capital” was through the politics of 
collectivization, the confiscation of all lands from the hands of individual peasants to 
be managed under the state machine through a planned economy and its organs, the 
communes and brigades. In four decades of state socialist development, the strategy 
of the state was to extract raw material and resources from the peasantry to support 
urban industrialization (Seldon 1988, 1993; Riskin 1991). The exploitation of the 
peasantry was then in a way more camouflaged. Now the poetics of primitive 
accumulation was decollectivitization, the returning of land back to the households 
and the autonomy of peasant life. Besides raw material and resources, labour should 
be not only freely, but cheaply, appropriated from the rural areas to bolster the 
market mechanisms of the changing command economy and to attract international 
investment. One of the great consequences of Deng’s reforms was to release the 
surplus population from farming. China is well known for having 20% of the world’s 
population fed by 6.7% of world arable land. Of 1.1 billion of the total population, 
more than eight hundred million were peasants, living on limited land.
The rapid break up of the communes and the return of arable land to families 
suddenly produced massive underemployment among the rural working age 
population. Labour requirements in agriculture dropped greatly without there being 
adequate access to any off-farm employment opportunities There are no official 
statistics on this subject. The World Bank report of 1992 estimates labour 
requirements in crop cultivation declined by 27 million during 1982-1984, though 
labour employment in animal husbandry and agricultural sideline production 
increased (1992:69). The sharp reduction of agricultural labour actually was both a 
reflection of increased transparency of the massive underemployment previously 
hidden by the commune work point system, as well as a change of the mode of rural
91
production. Rural underdevelopment actually was a persistent problem throughout 
Mao’s China and intensified in Deng’s period. It was previously disguised by the 
commune collective structure and the work-point system; the problem became 
apparent when agricultural production was privatized on an individual household 
base. Farming activities were then organized on a family-base, leaving the household 
to absorb or take care of its surplus labour.
There are again no accurate numbers for the surplus labour. An estimate from a 
national study team of the Chinese Academy of Science was over 100 million rural 
surplus workers at the beginning of the 1990s3. A considerable amount of rural 
labour surplus therefore, became free in the family farm, thus constituting the source 
of surplus labour waiting to be subsumed by the industrial capital. Jin and many 
others were those among the large “surplus army”, which formed the huge mobile 
flow in contemporary China. Thus, when Jin said, “After schooling, I stayed at home 
and helped my mother to feed the pigs. Other than that, I got nothing to do and was 
so bored”, she aired out the problem of 100 million rural surplus workers. The 
boredom of staying at home and the desire of city life created the force of mobility. A 
national newspaper, Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), on 26 January 1994 provided a 
very vivid description of this rural to urban exodus:
A great mass of mingong (migrant workers) was pouring from the entrance 
of the railway station, non-stop. Mingong flux released from all coaches 
and buses ran to the square of the station. ... Everywhere there was luggage 
lying on the ground, and mingong were eating bread and cakes.
3 The Chinese Academy of Science (1991) Shengcun yu fa z h a n (Survival 
and Development). Hong Kong: Ke Hua Press. ppl9-22.
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The Creation o f  Historical Void
The antagonism o f  town and country can only exist as a result o f  
private property. It is the most crass expression o f  the individual 
under the division o f  labour, under a definite activity forced upon 
him— a subjection which makes one man into a restricted town- 
animal, the other into a restricted country-animal, and daily  
creates anew the conflict between their interests.
Marx and Engels, The Germ an Ideology
Here a question arises. Is it really your desire to develop heavy  
industry? ... But if  you have a strong desire to develop heavy  
industry, then you w ill pay attention to the developm ent o f  light 
industry and agriculture. This w ill result in more daily necessities, 
which in turn w ill mean more accumulation, and after a few  years 
still more funds w ill be invested in heavy industry. So this is a 
question o f  whether your desire to develop heavy industry is 
genuine or only a pretense.
O f course this question o f  whether on e’s desire to develop  
heavy industry is genuine or not does not apply to us. W ho does 
not genuinely desire to? With us, it’s m erely a question o f  whether 
our desire is strong or weak.
Mao Zedong, On the Ten G rea t R elationships
The force of mobility, the desire to move to the city was to a certain extent 
invoked by a specific historical void, created in the particular contexts of the modem 
history of China. Rural surplus labour was only a visible factor accounting for the 
migrant flow. The invisible, the hidden reason, I argue, was a historical gap produced 
by Chinese state socialist history, notably a deep social cleavage between the city and 
countryside. The social cleavage provided the signifying structure and the material 
context for individuals to live out their own desires and expectations. I let the 
following two stories illustrated the rural-urban disparity and individual desires.
93
Ying: “/  had to go before it was too late. ”
Ying was a married woman in the factory, working in the packing department as 
a packer. There were only a few who got married and still worked in Meteor; most of 
them were cooks, cleaners or packers and earned a little bit less than the single 
shopfloor girls. Ying at the beginning attracted me because of her personality and 
because of her marital status. I wanted to know how she coped with family demands 
and industrial life. Again, I found another runaway woman, this time an overt one. 
Ying, in her early thirties, was a very interesting woman; talkative, energetic and 
easy-going. Every time I met her during our leisure time, she was always making fun 
and jokes about other women workers. “This woman gave up her husband and sons, 
and is always making fools of people,” was the common remark about Ying in the 
factory.
Ying was from a village in Jiangxi, another province adjacent to Guangdong; 
the geographical nearness could easily help to expose the wealth gap between the two 
areas. Ying was a mother of two sons, one nine and one seven. They were both in 
primary school. Her husband was a village school teacher. He stayed at home and did 
all the farming work and domestic work.
“How can you leave your husband like this? Who takes care of your children? 
Do they live with their grandfather and grandmother?” I had a series of questions to 
ask her:
“No, we live on our own, but we are quite near to our grandma’s house, a few 
minutes walk. My sons can eat there,” Ying said.
“But who tills the land? Your husband has a job in the school, doesn’t he?” I 
continued to ask.
“We don’t have much land, we have four hukou, but only got three persons’ 
share. There was no more land to distribute when I gave birth to my last son. My 
husband didn't need to go to school all the time. Actually he is a min-ban teacher (a 
village-organized job, not supported by the township government finance). His 
earnings are so meagre, so little, only twenty yuan each month. He is one of the few 
educated persons in the village, but I often tease him. I asked him, ‘what is the use of
94
your knowledge? What can twenty yuan be for ? A dagongmei can earn twenty times 
more than you!’” She spoke in a high pitched voice.
“Was your husband angry with you? How could you bully him like this?” I was 
sympathetic to her husband.
“Oh, he seems to have no temper and always keeps quiet. He is really a boring 
person, I tell you,” She kept on complaining and laughing.
“Because he is a nice person, then you are so liberated?” I found myself still on 
the side of her husband.
“Ha, ha, who said so? I told my husband I have given my ten years time to Li jia  
(the husband’s family), helping them farming, doing all the household chores and 
giving birth to two sons. What did they give me? A poor family.”
Ying married into her husband’s village in 1985 when she was twenty-one. 
During her marriage, the trend peaked for young girls moving out of the village and 
exploring a new life in the city. Ying instead was bound by the marriage; she gave 
birth to her first son one year after marrying. Then the second son came two years 
later and for the following years she was completely tied by family burdens. She had 
no chance to leave the village, but saw most of the young women moving in and out. 
She never enjoyed freedom, and she never earned money.
“I was fed up with village life. I told myself to wait until my sons went to 
school. I waited for ten years, and on that day, the first day of my child’s schooling, 
when my last son went to the school with his father, I was so happy and found myself 
free. It’s my turn, I told myself. I had to go before it was too late and I was too old.” 
Ying planned to leave. “When my husband came back home, I told him I was 
going to the city to find a job. He was too shocked to believe my decision. I told him 
I would keep writing letters back home and probably would be back home in a few 
months. ... I told him if he was too busy to till the land, just give up the vegetable 
field, I would earn back the money from the factory,” she said in a low voice.
At the time of our talk, Ying actually was struggling to go back home. She had 
been working in Meteor for more than five months. She missed her sons, if not her 
husband, too much to continue her work in the factory. “I’ve earned one thousand 
and five hundred yuan within five months, and now I can save about one thousand
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yuan. I would like to buy two sets of new clothes for my sons, one rice cooker and 
probably one washing machine...” Ying smiled with self-esteem.
Dong: “It's not the first time I  go out working. ”
wai chu yi ge ren, dai dong yi tiao cun (A person 
moving out will make the whole village flow).
A local slogan in Dong’s hometown
If we found Jin and Ying’s life experiences too idiosyncratic, Dong’s story may 
be more typical and more similar to the women workers of her generation. At the age 
of 23, she was an experienced dagongmei and had been working in Guangdong for 
more than four years when I met her at the Meteor. Every year she changed her 
workplace at least once. She had worked in garment and plastic plants before she 
went to the Meteor. She worked in the QC Department and stayed in the room next 
to me. She often invited me for supper and asked me to buy entertainment magazines 
from Hong Kong, so we became good friends in the factory. In return, she provided 
me with the most detailed of life stories, including an account of her childhood, her 
family and her natal village. Compared with other women workers, she knew more 
about the functioning of her family economy. What surprised me in the factory was 
that most of the factory girls could not say how much land their families owned or 
the average income of their household. The sibling order might be one of the possible 
explanation, as Dong was the eldest daughter in her family, and the order required 
her to take up the family burden when she was still young. The least information we 
have is from girls who had elder brothers in their families.
Dong was born in a poor village in Hunan. She grew up along with the course of 
rapid economic development in China of the past fifteen years. In 1981, when she 
was eight, the age of entering primary school, land reform was launched in her 
village. The family had about 3.5 acres of arable land, and 2 acres of mountainous 
and forest land for five members. Besides her parents, Dong had one younger brother 
and one younger sister. Without other alternatives, the family depended on these 
lands for everyday survival. The common household strategy was intensive farming.
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Limited by natural resources and labour power, the family could never develop 
sideline production, which at the start of the 1980s helped some families become 
“ten-thousand-^warz” households.
Life was not so hard for Dong, especially during her childhood in the mid 1980s 
when the price of seeds, fertilizers and insecticides, and the state taxes still remained 
reasonable. However, the family hit hard times when all three kids went to school. 
Besides being affected by the roaring inflation in China in late 80s, the family had to 
cope with stagnant land resources and increasing educational fees for their children; 
education had been free in the collective period. Rapid economic reform in the 
coastal and urban areas and the boom in private trading accelerated the price 
inflation, which had direct effects on the peasants’ lives. What’s worse, in the late 
1980s the land reform began to show disadvantages, rather than the advantages they 
were said to have for peasant lives in the previous period. Agricultural production on 
a local level stopped increasing, with land limited by ecology and, after its division, 
fragmentary and resistant to technological innovations.
Dong was the eldest daughter, the first one to take the responsibility to alleviate 
the family burden. Her father asked her to quit her junior secondary school at the age 
of sixteen, when her younger brother got into secondary school and the family did 
not have no enough money for both. Gender inequality is particularly experienced 
when the family lacked enough resources. Dong then remained at home helping with 
farming work and domestic chores. The division of labour was simple in the family; 
the father and the mother shared all farming work such as irrigating, planting, 
fertilizing and harvesting. Her mother spent more time on poultry rearing and 
housekeeping, while her father did more planning on the household economy and 
undertook all the transactions in outside markets. Besides grain, the family produced 
peanuts, cotton, beans and several kinds of vegetables, which together with pigs, 
chickens and eggs helped the family to earn about RMB 2500 each year.
Many hopes of the family focused on Dong’s younger brother- the only son of 
the family. They dreamed the son would get in higher education, find a job in the 
town and that finally the family could build a new house for the son to bring his wife 
to when he married. Saving money was the present concern. Dong shared all those
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family expectations, so when her cousin went out to work in Shenzhen, she hoped to 
join the migration.
“I thought I could earn more money in the Special Economic Zone. I felt bored 
at home and a waste of time because my parents could take up all the farming work. 
My cousins and other friends who worked in Shenzhen often told me a lot of 
interesting stories. I knew quite well what the working conditions might be, and how 
much I could earn before I went out for work. I knew it was not easy to work in a big 
city which was a totally strange place to me. But I thought it was still worth it to try 
and it was a chance for me to look at the outside world. We often thought we were 
jing  di zhi wa (frogs living in a well know nothing about the outside world), and we 
knew little about the life outside the village.” As Dong understood it, Shenzhen was a 
world full of struggles, yet exciting and a place one could make money within a short 
time. For her, to work in Shenzhen was not only a way to face economic necessity 
and the expectations of her family, but also a chance for self-exploration and self­
development.
She went back home only almost every year. Every time she brought back about 
2000 yuan to her father, which was more than the total of her family income. The 
family was happy with her contribution and she was satisfied too. “The first time I 
saw my father and mother smile so heartedly, then I knew that there is big gap 
between urban life and rural life. My parents at first could not believe that I earned 
2000 yuan within five months.”
But for Dong, the life of the outside world became less and less interesting as 
she worked in Shenzhen for four years. “I know there is a big difference. People in 
the city earn a lot and enjoy a different kind of life. But I do feel tired. The working 
hours are too long. It’s too hard. What’s more, I could never have hoped to stay in 
the city for a long time. My hukou (the official residence registry) is in the village, I
don’t have the right or money to live in the city Last New Year, I went back
home and thought that I would not come out again. I stayed home for two months 
and I slept, slept all the day...” With her energy and health resumed, she felt bored at 
home and went out working again. She had a boyfriend living in the nearby village; 
they agreed to get married the next year. She knew that after marriage, she would 
have no chance to work in the city again. So even though industrial work was too
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arduous and exploitative for her, she still wanted to enjoy her personal “freedom” 
outside the village for a limited time more. Saving some of the money for her future 
married life is another consideration. “Life will be happy if my husband and my 
parents-in-law treat me nice. But no one knows. It’s better for me to have some 
money of my own.” Dong did not see marriage as a big change in her life, but simply 
a natural course for her life. So the individual life cycle, the women’s transitional life 
period between puberty and marriage was conjured by the social time, the transitional 
period of the market economy.
Jin, Ying and Dong and many other women in the workplace all had stories, 
struggles and expectations of their own when leaving their villages. But their 
individual desires were somewhat produced by a social void, conditioning by the 
same historical factors and existing social relations.
Jin said: “I stayed home for a whole year, seeing all my friends in the village 
going out to find jobs elsewhere. They all could earn their own money and brought 
back rice cooker, electric fan and radio recorder. ...”
Ying asked her husband: “What is the use of your knowledge? What can twenty 
yuan be for? A dagongmei can earn twenty times more than you!”
Dong told me: “The first time I saw my father and mother smile so heartedly, 
then I know that there is a big gap between urban life and rural life. My parents at 
first could not believe that I earned two thousands yuan within five months.”
All their words brought forth a clear message: a social lack, a deep rural and 
urban divide that seduced the rural generation to live out their own desires in the 
economic urban developing areas in the reform period. There were at least two 
seductions, actually one coin with sides, that we could chart out: one was the great 
disparity between the city and countryside, between the working class and the 
peasantry; the other was the consumerism of urban life featured by luxury goods and 
modern technology. In the following section we are going to see how the rural-urban 
chasm was historically formed in China.
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The Rural-Urban Chasm
The Chinese state-party machine crushed all forms of inequality embedded in 
the private ownership of property and eradicated the class divisions between landlord 
and tenant and between capitalist and worker in the course of “socialist” transition 
from the early 1950s onwards. But at the process of collectivization of private 
property, the Chinese state-party machine replaced the role of the market in capitalist 
society by producing new forms of inequality, albeit through political and 
administrative means rather the mechanisms of the “invisible hand”. As Mark Selden 
illustrates,
we observe not only the continued existence of residual sectoral and spatial 
hierarchies of wealth and power, but the emergence of new patterns of 
inequality, hierarchy, status, and domination that are the direct 
consequence of specific institutional and developmental priorities of 
socialist states.
(1993:162)
Among all forms of inequality, the hierarchy between the urban working class and 
the peasantry was the most prominent one. The priorities of the state, as seen in the 
First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), affected by the Soviet model, was the development 
of capital-intensive heavy industry focusing on urban areas. Rural regions, on the 
other hand, were left alone to provide rapid accumulation and all kinds of resources 
urgently needed for industrial development in the cities. Rapid collectivization of 
agriculture in 1956 was planned to support the nationalization of industry. It was 
believed that massive collectivization and rapid communization would accelerate 
agricultural production within a short time, and so more resources and capital could 
be drawn to support the urban development. Chinese development from the very 
beginning built its imagination on a utopia of highly industrialized western nation. 
To achieve it, there was the belief that it should depend heavily on the growth of 
heavy industry. Light industry should be suppressed in the transition period in order 
to curb the rate of consumption and save resources and energy to build a basic
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infrastructure for heavy industry. Agriculture, on the other hand, was to be highly 
developed to provide the original accumulation for the industrial growth. Collectives 
and communes were highly politically organized units that not only confiscated land 
from individual households, but also planned and dictated production schemes, 
division of labour and distribution of products, hoping that administrative means 
could maximize all agricultural production. The rural society was organized by an 
unitary hierarchy- commune, brigade, and production teams, ranging from several 
thousand people to several hundred. These units were expected not only to feed their 
own population, but also to provide high production output for industrialization and 
urbanization. Sacrificing rural benefits to support urban industrial development 
constituted the main element of the socioeconomic structure of state socialist China, 
and created a bifurcated social order between urban-rural and state-collective 
divisions for the next three decades.
Mao Zedong, by birth a peasant, did try from time and time to lessen the gap 
between the rural and the urban areas. His words revealed the contradictions among 
the people themselves. In his speech “On the Ten Great Relationships” in April 1956, 
he stressed:4
The peasants’ collective economic organizations are just like factories.
They are also units of production. Within these collective economic units 
the relationship between the collective and the individual must be properly 
regulated and properly managed. If we do not manage this relationship 
properly and do not pay attention to the peasants’ welfare, then the 
collective economy cannot be properly run. ... The collective needs 
accumulation, but we must be careful not to make too great demands on the 
peasants. We should not give them too hard a time. Except where we meet 
with unavoidable natural disasters, we should enable the peasants’ income 
to increase year by year on the basis of increased agricultural production.
Stuart Schram (ed. ) 1974, Chairman Mao T a lk s  t o  t h e  P e o p l e :  T a lk s
and L e t t e r s  1 9 5 6 -1 9 7 1 .  New York: Pantheon Books . P.70.
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Yet all his concern about the peasants’ livelihood merely resulted in verbal promises. 
The desire of the state-party to develop heavy industry was simply too powerful, and 
it had no other method than to extract raw materials and resources from the rural 
collectives faster and faster through the Great Leap Forward and the early 1960s. 
Mao’s developmental vision could only result in half-hearted sympathy with the 
peasantry. His prioritizing the position of the working class and the cities as the 
future of socialist China was well revealed in his talk in 1957:5
The number (12 million urban workers out of 6 billion population) is so 
small, but only they have a future. All other classes are transitional classes.
  The peasants in the future will become mechanized and will be
transformed into agricultural workers. ... Right now there is the system of 
ownership by peasant co-operatives. In the future, in a few decades, they 
will be changed to be like factories; they will become agricultural factories.
In this factory, you plant maize, millet, rice, sweet potatoes, peanuts and 
soybeans. ... The several hundred million peasant and handicraft workers 
have now already become collective farmers; in the future they will 
become state farmers, agricultural workers using machinery.
Mao’s promise never came true. The collective farmers never became state workers, 
and for over three decades they were segregated into different life world, entitled to 
different rights, interests and living standards. As Judith Banister put it: “urban areas 
are essentially owned and administered by the state, and their residents are the state’s 
direct responsibility. The state budget must supply urban areas with employment, 
housing, food, water, sewage disposal, transportation, medical facilities, police 
protection, schools, and other essentials and amenities of life “(1987:328). The 
opposite of the story was that the state provided none of these services for the rural 
areas. Nor would it provide rural people with any of the other social services and 
welfare that were routinely provided to urban residents, particularly to state sector 
employees (Selden 1993; Cheng and Selden 1994:644; Solinger 1993).
J Michael Kau and John Leung (eds) 1986, The W r i t i n g s  o f  Mao Zedong,
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It was actually a caste system, sanctioned not by cultural or religious factors, but 
by political force. The two-caste system, between rural collective agricultural 
producers and urban state workers, was planned and made rigid to achieve one goal: 
the systematic siphoning of resources from the rural collective sector to finance the 
urban heavy industry and to support a growing administrative apparatus and urban 
population. In the years 1953-56 the transformation from private and capitalist 
ownership to state and collective ownership of agriculture, industry, handicrafts and 
commerce was basically completed. By the end of 1956, 97% of rural households 
had joined co-operatives, including 88% in large collectives (Seldon 1993). Peasant 
life was no longer regulated by small household economy based on plots of their own 
land or supplemented with various forms tenancy. Parallel with the collectivization 
of agricultural land and the destruction of the peasant household economy, private 
marketing activities and sideline production were further curbed. In December 1953, 
The Regulation of “Unified purchase and marketing of grain” was issued to prohibit 
individual exchanges of grain. It established compulsory sales to the state of 
specified amounts of grain at low state prices. The dual purpose was to assure ample 
cheap food for urban residents and to channel the agricultural surplus from the 
countryside towards industry and the cities. “Unified purchase and marketing” was 
quickly extended from grain to cotton and oil crops, and within two to three years to 
all major foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials (Cheng and Selden, 1994:657). 
The compulsory marketing of crops at low prices, high crop-sale quotas, low state 
investment in agriculture, and the curbing of private markets all contributed to a low 
level of consumption, or even none, in the rural areas. The state established further 
administrative mechanisms to control labour mobility, which had been one possible 
means for peasants to alleviate their burden by finding temporary jobs during the 
slack seasons. Thus the rural population was strictly bound to the rural collectives.
Peasant values and cultures were also frequently attacked as residues of 
feudalism, or sometimes capitalism. In the process of transition to co-operatives and 
collectives, though there was no large organized opposition among peasants, small- 
scale resistance and reluctance to join the co-ops were widespread, especially in
1 9 4 9 -1 9 7 6 ,  Vol 1. Armonk: M. E. Sharp, p.426.
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south China among well-to-do peasants. These phenomena were often accounted for 
by the selfishness and insularity of petty-peasant consciousness that affected 
peasants’ enthusiasm for participating in the collectivization movement. "Sweeping 
snow off one’s house door” was interpreted as “class struggle” since Mao believed 
that most of the resistance to the collective movement was from the upper and middle 
peasants. As Mao said,
Political work is the lifeblood of all economic work. This is particularly 
true at a time when the social and economic system is undergoing 
fundamental change. From the start, the agricultural cooperative movement 
has been a severe ideological and political struggle. Before a new social 
system can be built on the site of the old, the site must be swept clean. 
Remnant old ideas reflecting the old system invariably persist in people’s 
minds for a long time, and they do not easily give way.6
In 1960s and 1970s the party continued to press rural “class struggle” to curb 
household marketing, private and sideline production. As a result of collectivization 
and the restriction of private markets and freedom of mobility, the Chinese 
agricultural producers as a whole experienced extensive deprivation of their 
ownership of their own product, their land and their labour, that is, their own means 
of production. But of course, total and encompassing control of peasant life was 
impossible, given the fact that peasants were granted the right to cultivate small 
household plots limited to about five percent of village land. As we have noted, 
private though “illegal” marketing activities never stopped during the socialist 
transition period. Scholars were surprised by the small amount of conflict between 
state and society in rural areas during the Mao period. But though we lack detailed 
documentary evidence, we can believe that the Chinese peasants took the forms of 
quiet and informal resistance with no manifestos or organization, and thus the violent
” Mao Zedong, "Notes from Socialist Upsurge in China's Countryside'', 
in Selected Works of Mao Tsetung, Vol. V, Peking: Foreign Language 
Press. 1977. p.260.
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confrontations seen in Soviet collectivization were rare (Selden, 1993:163).
The consequences of the skewed development of heavy industry and the lack of 
rewards for rural to urban resource transfer, combined with strict administrative 
controls on population movement, constituted the heart of China’s socialist 
accumulation policy and the crystallization of rural-urban hierarchy. So a social 
chasm formed between the working class and peasantry. From the mid-1950s 
forward the gap in income and benefits grew significantly in favour of the state over 
the collective sector, and the city over the countryside. The World Bank (1983) 
estimated the 1979 urban-rural income gap at 2.2 to 1. Thomas Rawski calculated the 
gap at 3.4 to 1, excluding subsidies, and as high as 5.9 to 1 with subsidies included 
(1982:12-26). Dwight Perkins and Shahid Yusuf reported that the income gap 
increased from 3.9:1 in 1957 to 4.9 to 1 in 1979 (1984:125-127). Selden estimated 
subsidies to the state sector, were in the range of 4 to 5:1 throughout the two decades 
(1993:170). Many rural households also experienced a significant loss of income 
from handicrafts, sidelines, and commercial crops as a result of the state policies 
prohibiting these supplementary economic activities.
Besides the income gap, state workers enjoyed a considerable amount of social 
welfare and fringe benefits that were beyond the dreams of rural peasants. State 
workers won lifetime employment, retirement pensions, free health care, and heavily 
subsidized housing and food. These extraordinary subsidies for state-sector workers 
were made possible by the appropriation of rural resources and state priorities 
favoring investment on the state sector over the collective countryside. Collectivized 
rural producers, on the other hand, enjoyed none of these benefits and were 
dependent on self-financed village welfare programs, and left subject to the 
constraints of ecology and natural disasters. The character and size of the subsidies 
provided only to state-sector workers and their families illustrated well the rural- 
urban differentiation. By 1978 these subsidies averaged 526 yuan per state worker, 
82% of the average nominal wage, and accounted for 13% of national income. The 
most important subsidy, which kept urban food prices low while state purchasing 
prices increased, was for grain and edible oil. In 1978 this subsidy alone averaged 
180 yuan per worker. There were also substantial state subsidies for housing, 
pension, health care, education and transportation (Selden 1993:168). For the
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collective peasantry, Nicholas Lardy (1983) estimated that the total package of price 
subsidies and fringe benefits was less than 10 yuan per person.
The income gap was further illustrated by the fixed assets that urban workers 
and rural peasants owned. Between 1952 and the late 1970s, fixed assets per 
industrial worker rose from 3,000 yuan for five million workers to nearly 9,000 yuan 
for fifty million workers. By contrast, in the late 1970s, there were just 30 yuan of 
fixed assets per rural worker, one thirtieth of those for industrial workers (Yang and 
Li 1980:207; Perkins and Yusuf 1984:16). Thus, with low marginal productivity and 
high disguised unemployment, rigorous controls on grain distribution and 
consumption, high rates of accumulation and state extraction of the rural surplus, 
rural per capita income and consumption stagnated over the entire collective era. In 
some poorer rural units from the Great Leap Forward and continuing for two decades 
thereafter, cash virtually disappeared, forcing people to live almost entirely on 
income in kind derived from collective production (Selden 1993:169).
In addition to the income gap and consumption disparity, the rural areas 
experienced a long-term decline of food consumption from the mid 1950s to the late 
1970s. From 1954 onward the compulsory sale system required each brigade or 
production team to sell a substantial amount of output to the state at a low fixed 
price, leaving only a small part for individual consumption. This small part averaged 
154 to 200 kg of grain per capita, less than the quota provided to the urban residents 
(184-212 kg of flour, rice or other grain (Selden, 1993:19-20). The World Bank 
(1984:164) reported that rural per capita caloric consumption, which averaged 2,049 
calories in the years 1956-58, did not recover to that level until the late 1970s. Wang 
Haibo estimated that per capita grain consumption in the rural areas decreased from 
197.1 kilograms in the years 1953-57 to 188.7 kilograms in the years 1976-78. Edible 
oil consumption also fell from 2.3 to 1.6 kilograms in the same period (1985:416). 
The rural communities suffered the most in the time of famine in 1960 and at the 
height of Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s when grain output again stagnated 
and oil and pork consumption further declined from already low levels (Selden 
1993:21-22). In the eyes of the rural people, the guaranteed, subsidized rations of 
food supplied to the urban residents were a distant dream and a reminder of the gulf 
that separated the urban and the rural areas. As Cheng and Selden put it, “Rural
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people called it ‘guaranteed harvest regardless of drought or flood’ {hanlao 
baoshou), something of which they could only dream.” (1994:660)
Thus, the collectivization rapidly launched in the mid 1950s, with state 
compulsory sale, grain procurement, prohibition of private marketing, sideline 
production and restraining of consumption, contributed to the sense of extreme loss 
and alienation experienced by the Chinese peasantry. Anomie deepened when the 
differentials between the urban life and rural life were walled up by administrative 
and political means, notably the hukoa system which in fact was backed up by 
military and public security forces. There was no choice for anybody, leaving the 
origin of one’s birth to determine one’s fate as rural peasant or urban worker. A 
particularly striking example of control on the rural society was the fact that in times 
of famine, such as the early 1960s, peasants were barred from fleeing famine areas 
and even required to obtain a document from local cadres in order to leave their 
villages to go begging (Selden, 1993:23). The sense of loss and lack thus was 
inevitably rooted in the course of socialist transformation. Chinese peasants were 
forced to endure and to live up to the unbearable gap that saw no hope of closure 
after three decades of state socialist struggling.
Hukoii system: a Hybrid Creation o f Statism and Socialism
For over the three decades of socialist construction, the Chinese peasantry was 
then tied to the land and fettered by the political-economic collective structures. A 
prohibited space between the rural and the urban was created. The most 
conspicuously was the socio-demographic hnkou system. If we said collective 
structuring was the production-machine which codified and reified the desire of the 
socialist utopia, then the hukou system was a desiring machine more typical of 
statism than socialism. It not only codified, but managed to perpetuate a social 
chasm, and thus a prohibited space by administrative means including control of 
population mobility and food and daily necessities. Before the generation of Jin, 
Ying nor Dong, few of the Chinese peasants had the chance to move to the city, 
leaving the rural-urban divide to increasingly widen. A historical void, a social lack 
was inevitably produced; the Chinese peasants for a long time were enticed to fill up
107
the lack by moving to the urban space, and given the chance by Deng’s regime 
conjuring a desire for industrial capitalism.
The following were some anecdotes recorded by a mainland Chinese scholar, 
illustrating how ordinary people struggled to cope with the social lack:
He, a doctor of some repute, spent much energy and all of his savings 
on the “rural-to-urban transfer” of registration for his wife, who was 
teaching in the countryside, and their three children. In 1987, after he had 
paid up the 8,400 yuan urban registration increase fee and obtained urban 
registrations for the four of them, he solemnly said to his entire family: “I 
cannot leave you another inheritance in this life, I can only give you this 
urban registration.”
In Zhengzhou, an old police officer who had been engaged in 
registration work for many years said to this reporter with a hoarse throat: 
“There is not a single registration officer whose throat is not hoarse.” There 
are really too many people demanding a solution to their registration 
problem, and you have to talk and explain to every one of them, but who 
believes these explanations? Some people kneel and kowtow to the 
registration officer as soon as they enter the door, begging and pleading in 
tears, and others even bring a rope and say that if they don’t get the 
registration they will hang themselves.
(Ren, 1996:15-16)
The hnkou system was a hybrid creation of developmental statism and 
collectivism. It put the whole civil society under the state control in order to steer 
towards socialist construction. Its result was a spatial hierarchy between the rural and 
the urban, and a status hierarchy between the Chinese working class and the 
peasantry. In 1950s. for the first time in the Chinese history a social cleft was 
politically and administratively created, not by feudal states in dynastic periods, but 
by a state which claimed to emancipate its people from feudalism and imperialism. In 
this sense, state socialism was nothing other than an authoritarian project; it had no 
other method but to plan, calculate and determine all aspects of its subjects’ lives and
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to subsume them under gigantic economic plans. As Foucault (1981) might have 
said, people were turned to population, lives becoming codes, data and numbers; it 
was where power functioned and the process of subjectivization started. The hukon 
system entailed the whole secret of the statist project in Chinese socialist history. The 
origins of the Chinese statism derived not only from the Russian models that China 
followed in the process of the early socialist construction, but also the nationalism 
and paternalism that engulfed the party-state machine over the whole course of 
socialist development.
Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden (1994) provided the most comprehensive study 
of the origins and the social consequences of China’s hukon system. They rightly say 
the hukou system which emerged in 1950s, “was integral to the collective 
transformation of the countryside, to a demographic strategy that restricted 
urbanization, and to the redefinition of city-countryside and state-society relations.” 
(1994:644) The hukou registration not only provided the principal basis for 
establishing identity, citizenship and proof of official status, it was essential for every 
aspect of daily life. Without a hukou, one could not officially be eligible for food, 
clothing or shelter, one could not obtain employment, go to school, marry or enlist in 
the army (ibid. 1994:644). The consequences of the implementation of the hukou 
system was a bifurcated social order, a rural-urban prohibited space that was going to 
affect the peasant life in the post-Mao reforms.
Thus, as Cheng and Seldon said,
The hukou system decisively shaped China’s collectivist socialism by 
creating a spatial hierarchy of urban places and prioritizing the city over the 
countryside; by controlling population movement up and down the 
spatially defined status hierarchy, preventing population flow to the largest 
cities, enforcing the permanent exile of urban residents to the countryside, 
and binding people to the village or city of their birth; and by transferring 
the locus of decision-making with respect to population mobility and work 
from the transformed household to the work unit or danwei, specifically, in 
the countryside, to the lowest unit of the collective. Over more than three 
decades, the hukou system structured the differential opportunities offered
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urban and rural people in general, and state employees and the tillers of the 
soil in particular.
(1994: 645)
The Hukou System and its Loopholes
Measures to control population mobility started immediately after the setting up 
of the People’s Republic in 1949. But it was not until 1958 that the hukou system 
was formally launched. On 9th January 1958, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress promulgated “Regulations on Plousehold Registration in 
the People’s Republic of China”. The 1958 Regulations, often regarded as the birth 
of the full-fledged hukou system, provided the most detailed regulations of residence 
registration. It also gave clear instructions concerning registration of temporary 
residence among the floating population. Article 15 of the Registration Regulations 
stipulated:
Citizens who temporarily live for more than three days outside the county 
or city of permanent residence need to be reported to the household 
registration organs for registration of temporary residence by the head of 
the household at the place of temporary residence or by themselves, within 
three days, and report for cancellation before departure.7
Article 16 of the Registration Regulations also stipulated the time of residence 
in cities of the floating population:
When citizens leave their place of permanent residence for private matters 
and the period of temporary residence exceeds three months, they must 
apply to the household registration organs for extension of the period or go 
through the procedures for migration; if they neither have reason for
Shi Songjiu, "Strengthen Management of the Floating Population", 
in C h in e s e  S o c i o l o g y  and A n t h r o p o l o g y , Fall 1996, Vol 29, P29-30.
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extending the period nor the conditions for migration, they should return to
their place of permanent residence.8
From 1958 the hukou system was completely established, providing an 
institutional guardian of the deep urban-rural divide that had structured Chinese 
society since the mid-1950s. A historical scar was reified, inscribing the sense of 
loss, alienation and inferiority on the Chinese peasantry as detailed as the record of 
individual information on the hukou card. As Cheng and Selden rightly say, 
throughout the collective era, the hukou made it possible to bind China’s rural 
population in a subaltern position on land it did not own and could not leave 
(1994:668). An urban and rural gap thereafter existed, leaving its historical legacy 
which continues to construe people’s lives in the reform period.
The hukou system, in a Foucauldian sense, was a product of governmentality 
for technologizing the people. With its minute calculation, deliberate planning and 
encompassing extent, the hukou system was nothing but a “wonderful” creation of 
the Chinese state by which to control its citizenry. Rural people were taken as objects 
of “unified procurement”, while urban people as objects of “unified distribution”. But 
since thorough control of the country was only an ideal and imagined project of the 
state machine, it could never succeed in totalizing the society. For no matter how 
strict the restrictions and regulations were, the hukou system was never impermeable. 
Population movement from countryside to city continued throughout the 1950s, 
though on a rather small scale. Sudden and rapid movements in the urban areas, 
especially the Great Leap Forward provided opportunities for the rural to urban 
migrants, since urban enterprises were facing great pressure to raise production 
rapidly, and thus required abundant temporary labour from rural areas. An article in 
People’s Daily (27 November 1957) reported that from 1950 to the end of 1956, 
about 150,000 rural people came to Beijing to look for employment, and the original 
workers and residents brought about another 200,000 dependents to the city (Cheng 
and Seldon 1994:661).
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Rural to urban mobility reached a peak at the height of the Great Leap Forward. 
The tough new restrictions just set up in 1958 were simply swept aside as urban 
enterprises recruited cheap workers from the rural areas. As Cheng and Selden say,
at the very moment when new Hukou regulation expanded the reach of the 
state, the decentralization and chaos of the Leap produced a general 
breakdown of administrative control. The influx of millions of people into 
the cities in the years 1958-60, in response to the sudden explosion of 
urban industrial and construction jobs, constituted the most rapid burst of 
urbanization in the first three decades of the People’s Republic.
(1994:665)
With the collapse of fiscal and administrative controls, and with all enterprises facing 
intense pressure to boost output, the industrial labour* force increased at 
unprecedented rates. Accelerated capital construction everywhere produced acute 
shortages of labour in urban industry. Rural people who had recently experienced a 
loss of access to urban jobs responded to new job opportunities and mobilization 
campaigns that promised boundless prosperity. In autumn 1958, 38 million people 
were reportedly mobilized to leave their villages, taking with them tools and draught 
animals to join the campaign for indigenous iron and steel production. The number of 
workers and staff on the state payroll also dramatically increased at this time. In 1958 
alone the state sector employed 21 million more people including many middle 
school graduates and educated youth from rural areas, with large numbers of women 
among them. This represented an increase in state sector employees of 67.5% over 
1957 (Liu and Wu 1986:231; Cheng and Selden 1994:665). It is ironical that from 
1958, as the state tried to enforce rigorous measures to bind rural people to the land 
and block movement to the cities, the number of migrants greatly increased. It was 
not until 1962 that the state launched rigorous measures to clear the rural migrants in 
the cities. About a million workers were laid off and sent back to the countryside. 
During the period 1967-77, the state rusticated about 18 million urban young people 
in order to reduce the pressures upon urban employment and the consumption of 
commodity grain (Wu 1994:680). All these measures made it more and more
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difficult before the late 1970s for the people with rural hukou status to live 
permanently in urban places, and even applying for temporary hukou status in cities 
was narrowly restricted.
According to the 1982 Population Census, out of the total 1.002 billion 
population, 11.1 million, or 1.1%, had been permanently living in places that were 
not where they had registered their hukou. Of the 11 million people, 6.3 million had 
not lived in their official place of residence for a year or more, and 4.8 million had no 
hukou at all (Wu 1994).
Tight state control started to relax in the late 70s when millions of “rusticated” 
young people who had been sent to the rural and border areas during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76) were allowed to return to cities. In 1983 the state allowed 
temporary migration from villages to townships for people to find jobs while still 
retaining their rural household registration. In 1984, limited permanent migration 
from villages to towns or cities was approved, though the urban government would 
not provide a food ration. In 1986, grain sales at market prices to migrant labourers in 
urban areas were legalized, though private markets had been prosperous since early 
80s (World Bank 1992:58). The regulations of hukou registration, on the other hand, 
were little modified throughout the 70s. The state was not forced to issue new rules 
until 1985.
In July 1985, the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Temporary Regulations 
on Management of the Temporary Population in Cities and Towns”, which restated 
the methods for registration of the urban temporary population. With regard to people 
aged 16 and over entering cities and staying temporarily for over three months, it 
stipulated that they should apply for a temporary residence permit. People coming 
from elsewhere to run shops or factories, engaged in construction or working in the 
transport or services sector, with a rather long period of temporary residence, were to 
be registered as an “attached” population by the police substation at the place of 
actual residence (Shi 1996:31). Throughout the 1980s, the state lost control of rural- 
urban migration due to rapid economic development. This started in the coastal areas 
from early 1980s and in the big cities all over the country after the mid 1980s. The 
1985 regulations were a remedy to deal with problems that were out of central 
administrative control. Local cities, on the other hand, developed regional measures,
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or even used public security forces to drive out the influx of rural migrants. From 
time to time urban governments called for “extermination” of the mingong wave, 
especially during the Chinese New Year period.
The following story was told by a male worker in the Meteor who experienced 
an extermination action against the migrant influx in Guangzhou train station in 
December 1994:
At about ten o’clock at night, my tongxiang (co-villagers) and I just 
wanted to settle down in a place under the bridge near the train station. We 
had been looking for an empty place for ages before we could settle down. 
There were clusters of people wandering around the square in front of the 
train station, searching for places to pass the night time and waiting for the 
next morning to hunt for jobs. Suddenly, a lot of government cars came 
and public security guards jumped down from the cars. They used sticks 
and water pipes to clear the people on the square. Masses were driven to 
one of the corners of the square; some wanted to run away and were 
beaten. It was such a horrible scene, it seemed that we were all criminals 
and would be arrested. We were asked for, and separated by, our place of 
origin- people from Sichuan were grouped in one place, while people from 
Hunan and Hubei in others. Then we were sent on a large bus, people from 
different places were sent on different buses. The bus took us outside the 
city of Guangzhou and we were charged five yuan each person. Those who 
did not have money were scolded and beaten. ...
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Desire and social lack
Lack (manque) is created, planned, and organized in and through 
social production. It is counterproduced as a result o f  the pressure 
o f  antiproduction; the latter falls back on (se ra b a t sur) the forces 
o f  production and appropriates them. It is never primary; 
production is never organized on the basis o f  a pre-existing need 
or lack {manque). It is that it infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces 
or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the 
organization o f  an already existing organization o f  production. 
The deliberate creation o f  lack as a function o f  market econom y is 
the art o f  a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing 
wants and needs {manque) amid an abundance o f  production; 
making all o f  desire teeter and fall victim  to the great fear o f  not 
having on e’s needs satisfied; and making the object dependent 
upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire, w hile  
at the same time the production o f  desire is categorized as fantasy 
and nothing but fantasy.
D eleuze & Guattari, A nti-O edipus: C apitalism  an d  Schizophrenia
Marx, quoted in the last section, was wrong to say that the antagonism of town 
and country could only exist in a society of private property. The history of the 
Chinese state socialism witnessed the process of confiscation of private property in 
1950s, but at the same time, the creation of a huge urban and rural chasm in Chinese
society. It was not “feudalism”, nor the “petty-capitalism” of past Chinese history,
that turned human beings into prohibited town or country animals, but socialist 
development dictated under the Chinese Communist Party that claimed to liberate all 
countrymen from oppression. It was not fair to say that the Chinese state particularly 
aimed at creating hierarchies among the people, especially a deep divide between the 
working class and the peasantry. But it is correct to say that it was the by-product of 
developmentalism and statism inherent in the nature of the Chinese socialism. Class 
and status divisions among people were not produced by the capitalist machine, 
based on the market logic- “inequality but justice” of the distribution of private 
property among individuals through the exchange mechanism. Rather, divisions and 
hierarchies were created by a state-party machine which confiscated and turned
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private property into “state property” and then arranged, distributed and sanctioned 
different sectors of people according to its logic of planned economy.
It was not my original aim in this chapter to describe a genealogy of social lack 
and then blame the past history of Chinese state socialist experience. Rather, my 
concern was to account for the present desire of a mobile society, steered, though 
teetering, toward industrial capitalism by a “socialist” state and a mainly agrarian 
population. The void, the lack created by the Chinese statist socialism in Mao’s 
period, I argue, was filled up by a hybrid “socialist market economy”, that is, a 
hybrid mixture of “state socialism and global capitalism”. The opening-up of the 
command economy did not shrink the lack. Rather as Deng Xiaoping had advocated, 
“let some quarters of people get rich first”, so it further enlarged the gap, especially 
between the city and the countryside and between the eastern coastal areas and the 
western interior9.
The flow of population from the rural areas to the cities, as a “social 
phenomenon” reflects the fusing and struggling of individual and collective desires 
to fill the social lack. People become agents of the common “passion” of society, as 
though society had its own passions and forces. This complete social conditioning is
9 (Rural per capita incom e grew at an average annual rate o f  15% in real terms during 1978-1984, 
but then the econom ic growth in terms o f  agricultural productivity and rural incom e became stagnant 
in the second half o f  1980s and early 1990s. The gap between urban and rural incom e were further 
widening when the rural income per capita increased less than three percentage during 1985-1990  
(World Bank, 1992; Selden 1993). A World Bank report (1992) provided the follow ing account for 
the stagnation o f  poverty after mid 1980s in the rural areas. It came from 1) sharply increased prices 
for grain an other subsistence goods adversely affected the real incom es o f  the majority o f  the rural 
poor; 2) the rapid growth o f  the working age population which exceeded the expansion o f  
em ploym ent opportunities, contributing to a worsening o f  rural underemployment; and 3) econom ic  
growth which was greater in higher income coastal provinces than in the lower incom e inland 
northwestern and southwestern provinces. Fiscal decentralization passed an increasing share o f  the 
costs o f  rural social and relief services to the local governments, w hich w ere unable to support either 
adequate social services or econom ic growth (1992: xi). Unequal developm ent, far more serious in 
D eng’s reform China further deepened the social lack, though the opportunities given  to the rural 
population to get rich seem ed higher.
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unconscious; for while individuals act on the basis of their own desires and passions, 
these desires have been formed by the experiences and nature of the socius 
throughout the course of history (Goodchild, 1996:27). In this way, desires are not 
“repressed”, but produced, and power emerges at the time when the desiring 
machines encounter each other. Power then acts on desires, produces desires, and 
constructs them in such a way as to preserve a part of itself, so that it prevents new 
encounters, new relations that will transform its “essence”. And if we say socialism 
in Mao’s era was a collective desire of the state, imposed abruptly on the Chinese 
people, then capitalist developmentalism in Deng’s China was a collective passion 
of the whole society, that even the most conscientious political dissidents or 
intellectuals would not disagree with. Turning China, the whole country, into a 
market, on the other hand, was another collective dream, this time of international 
capital. Thus, our contemporary Chinese subjects needed not only to be turned into 
efficient industrial producers, but themselves desired to be agents of capitalist 
consumption. A young Baudrillard was still lovable when he said the mirror of 
production was consumption. And if as Marx said, the production process is an 
alienating process, in which women and men turned themselves into objects and 
confront themselves as something hostile and alien, then in the process of 
consumption, women and men seem to redeem their alienation and achieve a sense of 
satisfaction by recovering themselves from the sacrifice as alienated labour. The 
harder one works, the more one wants to spend. And the more one desires to spend, 
the harder one needs to work, mirroring the tricky relationship between production 
and consumption. The desire to get rid of poverty met the desire to consume 
commodities. Young female workers In the factory were seduced by the common 
passion to consume electric rice cookers, radio recorders, colour TV sets, as well as 
modern fashions and cosmetics.
The desire of capital, producing the desire of consumption, penetrates into the 
void of Chinese contemporary history, brings ecstasy and gives birth to hybrid 
creation of new Chinese subjects. And Chinese state socialism was happy to lose its 
virginity.
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Chapter IV Social Body, the Art of Discipline and Resistance
This political investment o f  the body is bound up, in accordance 
with com plex reciprocal relations, with its econom ic use; it is 
largely as a force o f  production that the body is invested with 
relations o f  power and domination; but, on the other hand, its 
constitution as labour power is possible only if  it is caught up in a 
system o f  subjection (in which need is also a political instrument 
m eticulously prepared, calculated, and used); the body becom es a 
useful force only if  it is both a productive body and a subjected  
body.
M. Foucault, D iscipline and  Punish
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position o f  exteriority in 
relation to power.
M. Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality Vol. I.
Hidden transcript -
Here, offstage, where subordinates m ay gather outside the 
intimidating gaze o f  power, a sharply dissonant political culture is 
possible.
J. Scott, D om ination an d  the A rts o f  R esistance
In this chapter I will discuss the imperatives and techniques of the production 
machine for producing a social body: a docile and disciplined dagongmei in China. 
Turning a young, nomadic and rural body into an industrialized, efficient and 
productive body is the fundamental work of the production machine under the dictate 
of capital’s logic. Foucault called these kinds of disciplinary techniques over the 
body the political technology o f  the body or microphysics ofpower (1977:26). 1 will 
look at the processes of the political technologizing of the body, and those techniques 
of disciplinary power deployed in the Meteor workplace. The body, especially, the 
female body, is important to international capital in China because it is where the 
production machine extracts labour power. What capital wants is surely not a docile
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and submissive body as most labour process theories presuppose, but a productive 
and functional social body. The study of body is crucial here not only because we can 
see vividly how forces of production machine work arbitrarily and violently on the 
body, but exactly because the body is the spring, the centre that not only produces 
desires, emits signs and marks identity, but most importantly contributes labour 
power.
Extracting labour power from a female body through a microphysics of power in 
the workplace is the cardinal concern in this chapter. With insights from Michel 
Foucault, I will focus on particular practices in a Chinese workplace, rather than 
study universal disciplines in prison, military camp or school. Disciplinary 
techniques in the Meteor involved both institutional and discursive practices. Besides 
a series of consistent maneuvers and disciplines deployed on the body, the production 
machine manipulates a politics of discourses on body as well. Its specificity, its 
modality of power and language can only be found in China, and only in the 
contemporary reform period. Only by looking into the local politics of discourse and 
practice, can we understand the specific factory regime produced in China and those 
particular strategies and disciplines used.
Inasmuch as the relation of power and domination over the female workers is 
great, dagongmei, as a specific embodied Chinese subaltern group, is never totally 
dominated and muted. Insights from Paul Willis’s “work culture”, and “subaltern 
studies”, tell us that neither submission nor defiance exhausts the behaviour of 
subalterns. Subordination or domination as a process, is seldom complete, and 
marked by various forms of collaboration and resistance which together merge to 
make up complex and heterogeneous subjects (Willis 1977; Guha and Spivak 1988). 
James Scott’s concept of “hidden transcript” and Michel de Certeau’s notion of 
“everyday life practices” also help us to stand on the side of the oppressed and see 
how the subjugated subjects react, resist and participate in the process of domination. 
The common view here is that where there is power, there is resistance. Human 
subjects, as historical agents are seen as practical, active and tactical in living up to a 
system of domination. In supplementing to Foucault’s theory of surveillance, de 
Certeau says,
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If it is true that the grid of “discipline” is everywhere becoming clearer and 
more extensive, it is all the more urgent to discover how an entire society 
resists being reduced to it, what popular procedures (also “minuscule” and 
quotidian) manipulate the mechanisms of discipline and conform to them 
only in order to evade them, and finally, what "ways of operating” form the 
counterpart, on the consumer’s (or “dominee’s”?) side, of the mute 
processes that organize the establishment of socioeconomic order.
(1984:xiv)
James Scott, on the other hand, understands these popular procedures or “ways of 
operating” by the dominated as hidden transcripts. He contrasts these to public 
transcripts, which are hegemonic discourses and practices representing the systems 
of domination from the official point of view, from above. He says,
By definition, the hidden transcript represents discourse- gesture, speech, 
practices- that is ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of 
subordinates by the exercise of power. The practice of domination, then, 
creates the hidden transcript. If the domination is particularly severe, it is 
likely to produce a hidden transcript of corresponding richness.
(1990:27)
In short, besides paying attention to the relations of domination and the 
microphysics of power over female body, I will look at the relations of resistance and 
the practices of hidden transcripts in the workplace as well. The female body I study, 
then, will not be the “docile body”, but the “tactical body”. To survive these female 
bodies manipulate the situational opportunities and even the hegemonic discourse to 
protect themselves. They prevent the large power from reifying a unitary image of 
their bodies, and they formulate their struggles in everyday life. The image of 
“Chinese women” is often inscribed by capital with a homogenous and orientalistic 
construction: a slim body, sharp eyes, nimbler fingers, beautiful, shy, passive and 
hard working. Far from a unitary imagination, I find that the women’s experiences, 
practices and forms of struggle, both overt and covert, were extremely diverse in
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both individual and collective ways. Previous feminist studies have already shown 
that working class women are not passive acceptors of their situation, but active 
agents in improving their working conditions and protecting their own rights 
(Lamphere 1987; Pollert 1981; Westood 1984; Rosen 1987). A new interpretation of 
women’s struggle in the workplace is slowly being developed in the past decade, 
which stresses the emergence of a “women’s work culture”. This culture is creative; 
women try to develop everyday life tactics, and assert informal controls over the 
work process. They challenge strict disciplines with an informal code of resistance to 
boredom, to humiliation, and to the process which would make them into machines 
(Pollert, 1981:130).
Chinese workers, "Socialist” beings
To homogenize a disciplined and productive social body the production 
machine in the workplace used the politics of language and value'. Young girls and 
boys from the countryside were portrayed by the hegemonic discourses as 
uneducated, “uncivilized” and thus undisciplined. They were ready to spit on the 
floor, to leave their work position at will and to destroy the production machine. 
Floods of rural people into the city were called mangliu, blind migrants who were 
ready to destroy the order and stability of the city, potential criminals and potential 
prostitutes. Public discourses, as revealed in the various articles of newspapers, 
emphasized the blind nature of the migrant workers. They did not know where to go; 
they had no plans, no aims at all. If this flood of blind migrants could not be properly 
regulated, they would tear down the “achievement” of the economic reforms. Capital 
in China knew too well that it was from these blind migrants, cheap but hard to 
control, that they were going to extract the labour power. Since they were so cheap, 
so abundant, it was worth wasting time and energy to design a panoptic snrveiller on 
these nomadic bodies. But to transform individual undesirable migrants into useful 
workers involved strict disciplines that work on body and mind, behaviours and 
beliefs, gestures and habits, attitudes and aptitudes. We will now look at the details.
1 I return to this discussion in the next chapter.
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If there is a universal rule that peasant life, the human nature of peasantness, 
was commonly distrusted by industrial capital (Marx 1867; Foucault 1977:135), we 
are not sure if such a belief, such a discursive politics, was deployed for the sake of 
cheapening the labour cost or for something else. Capital in contemporary China 
found itself caught up in another mode of unbelief. It could not trust those who were 
bom in rural areas, but also raised in the “socialist” system in China. What could 
capital expect? Uncivilized peasantness plus impractical collectivism could only 
nurture lazy and unruly labour. Mr. Chou, the Director of the Meteor said,
Labour in China is very lazy, their socialist history teaches them not to 
work in a competitive way. No matter what they do, willing or not, the 
wage over thirty years is RMB 36. Those practices of the common rice 
bowl absolutely could only produce lazy people. We need ten times more 
efforts to control and educate them.
In Mao’s era socialist workers, ideologically if not in practice, were the avant garde 
of the proletariat and the leadership of the revolution. Now in Deng’s period a worker 
is a symbol of laziness, unable to conform to the rhythms of industrial capitalism, 
carrying with him or her the evil of the past socialist history. What the capitalists 
depict is a stereotyped image of Chinese worker. This shouldn’t surprise us. What 
amazed us was that the western academic sometimes helped to invent the same 
image. For instance, Lisa Rofel, an American anthropologist, based on her study in a 
state-owned silk factory in Hanzhou in mid 1980s, gave us this picture of Chinese 
workers :
Throughout the factory, I found prep workers sitting off the shop floor 
chatting, young men leaving their looms to have long, leisurely 
cigarette breaks, and inspection workers who would sit outside during 
their shift and relax in the sun. Western tourists who visit similar 
factories often comment on the lack of “industriousness” of Chinese 
workers. There is not a little irony in this characterization, given the
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orientalist notion of Asians as hardworking.
(1992:96)
The reason she provided was this: China’s party-state strove to introduce capitalist 
features and adopt Western scientific management techniques for producing 
disciplined workers. But these practices of modernity, she said, were countered by 
the specific history of China, especially the Cultural Revolution, which produced 
ardent political subjects rather than productive bodies. She argues:
In the seemingly distant past of the Maoist era, workers, through various 
political campaigns, were periodically encouraged to leave their work 
positions to focus on other concerns, namely their political consciousness.
In the initial years, virtually all workers left their work posts to reinvigorate 
that consciousness through factory-wide meetings in which they forced 
managers to confess crimes of following the capitalist road. The more 
radical workers, mainly from the younger generation, left the shop floor in 
pursuit of political rights; they challenged managerial authority by 
dragging managers out of their offices and forcing them to do manual 
labour on the shop floor. Workers continuously moved on and off the shop 
floor, one moment weaving some cloth or spinning thread, the next 
moment participating in a political meeting.
(1992:97)
With an oriental and hegemonic construal of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), she 
continued to beautify the Chinese socialist history,
Workers during the Cultural Revolution thus challenged the meaning of 
their place, both physically and in terms of social divisions of authority and 
power. Walking away from one’s work position to engage in politics put 
one at the forefront of the radical faction. Even after 1973, when managers 
returned to their place in the offices, they did not punish or pressure 
workers to produce more silk goods. For them, too, the most important
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product to come off from the shop floor was supposed to be political 
consciousness.
(1992:97)
Thus in Rofel’s eyes, the Chinese workers, imprinted with their specific and 
glorious history (which she imagined as specifically Chinese), were political, “red” 
and resistant, not only in the Cultural Revolution but in the contemporary period as 
well. Thus, even modern micro-techniques of disciplinary power would not be 
effective to regulate them. Socialist habitus was as solid as iron, so though the 
Chinese managers’ mentality could change, the workers could not. However, the 
younger generation, especially those from the rural areas, was seen as historically 
endowed subversive subjects, and thus harder to incorporate into modern production. 
She says,
These women, in their late teens and early twenties, were newly arrived 
from the countryside and had just begun to enter the factories in the 
previous year. Subject(ed) bodies, they nonetheless refused to remain 
spatially rooted in one place or move in the prescribed circuits. There was a 
steady stream of back-and-forth visiting. Their bodily movements did not 
mimic new standards of rationality. They did not work quickly enough.
They made mistakes in the tension of the thread. They did not look 
carefully to the left or to the right; they did not check, link, or make clear 
markings. They did not use their hands, eyes, and ears to inspect for 
quality....
(1992:103)
What an astonishing picture of Chinese workplace and Chinese women workers! In 
order to articulate an alternative mode of modernity, a purely academic project in 
Rofel’s mind, she depicted the Chinese workers as obsessed with transgression, 
subversive to the disciplinary regime of space, that symbol of western modernity. 
The Chinese workers, as socialist beings, were imagined and invented to contrast 
with the hidden but essentialized Western workers, who as capitalist subjects were
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disciplined, productive and profit-minded, and possessed rational economic sense 
rather than political consciousness. Though outside of her intention, Rofel’s study, if 
not making her an accomplice to capital, at least resonates with the current project of 
international capital in creating a denigrating image of Chinese workers. Socialist 
beings thus were inferior to capitalist beings who were bom  imaginatively to be 
individualistic, competitive, hard working and most important of all achievement- 
oriented and therefore self-disciplined.
I will soon examine the disciplining of the rural and socialist body on the 
Meteor shop floor. But before I go to my own ethnography, I would like to look at an 
interesting study comparing a Hong Kong workplace with one in China. Ching-kwan 
Lee provides us with vivid pictures of how different kinds o f  beings can be organized 
and controlled:
Localistic despotic factory regime in China -
Like other large factories in Shenzhen, Liton was fenced on four sides by 
high concrete walls and a 24 hour guarded main entrance gate. Equipped 
with batons on their belts, security guards check the bags that workers 
brought with when leaving the factory premise. Since visitors were not 
allowed in, security guards paged workers to come down from the 
dormitory to meet their visitors outside the main entrance. On each shop 
floor, a security guard held an electronic detector bat to be randomly 
applied on workers at the end of every shift. He also oversaw that 
workers did not punch in the time cards for other workers, and that every 
time workers went to the bathroom, and they had gotten the “leave seat 
permit” from their line leader. Mottos were painted in red large Chinese 
characters, saying “Ask Your Superiors When You Have Problems”, 
“Quality Comes First”, “Raise Productivity”, “No Spitting”, “No 
Littering” etc. Some of the factory regulations were written on large 
sheets of paper, framed and hung on the wall. Notice boards on the 
entrance of each shopfloor detailed the hourly production target and the 
actual hourly output; the scoring of each line worker’s performance 
assessed by their line leaders; the names of the “best” and the “worst”
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worker of the week; the daily scores of cleanliness of each production 
line evaluated by the floor supervisor. These visible inscriptions of rules 
into the physical factory setting showed only the tip of the regimental 
iceberg. New recruits were asked to read a 10-page handbook of 
elaborate factory regulations governing everyday demeanors at work and 
in the dormitory. These despotic rules were strikingly similar to those 
Karl Marx described for the prototypical factory of his time.
(forthcoming 1997:137-138)
Familial hegemonic factory regime in Hong Kong - 
It was like a passage from hell to heaven when I left the plant in 
Shenzhen for that in Hong Kong. The smell of human perspiration and 
the dizzying shadows of overhead fans were gone. The air-conditioned 
and brightly lit shopfloor greeted my entry into a different world of 
labour in Hong Kong. The physical setting aside, life in Hong Kong plant 
turned out to be much more relaxed, even playful, than in Shenzhen, 
despite the much more advanced age of Hong Kong women workers. 
Hegemonic managerial domination replaced Shenzhen’s despotism, in
which control was visible, overtly imposed and punishment-oriented.......
Factory life in Liton’s Hong Kong plant was remarkable for the 
invisibility of codified rules. An orderly autonomy prevailed among 
workers whose attire and demeanor on the shopfloor reflected a more 
liberal regime of production. Work began daily with breakfast rituals that 
were workers’ spontaneous creation, rather than the canteen routine
imposed by management, as was the case in Shenzhen Entering the
air-conditioned shopfloor, workers punched in their time cards, while the 
security guard smiled and exchanged morning greetings with the 
workers. Workers went to their individual lockers, put down their purses, 
and some would take their uniforms out, in case the air-conditioning got 
too cold. Most women just wore their own clothes, no headscarves, no 
colored shoulder stripe. For those who brought their own lunch boxes - 
tin containers carrying steamed rice and some meat or fish on top - they
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would keep them warm in a large oven beside the water boiler in the 
pantry.
(ibid.: 169-171)
Lee’s work, of course, reifies workers’ experiences and subjectivity by simply 
classifying factory life in China as localistic despotism, and factory life in Hong 
Kong as familial hegemony. Now it is time to go back to the Meteor shopfloor. We 
already have a glimpse of how the politics of discursive practices worked to produce 
a socialist being unfit for capitalist production, and how the socialist being was 
regulated in a substantially different way from the capitalist being in the workplace. 
Now we will go on to see the workings of the rituals and techniques of the 
production machine, those processes for transforming specific socialist beings - the 
rural women workers - into dagongmei. We will look at the specificity of the local 
Chinese culture, especially the specific Chinese gender trope and practices, and how 
they were insinuated into the modem disciplinary power. The capitalist machine, 
once plugged into the state socialist machine, kept moving further and further toward 
deterritorialization, with unbearable force (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). The 
infiltration of international capital into Chinese society met less resistance than 
cooperation from the dominant hegemonic power in contemporary China. Western 
academics, on the other hand, often ended up essentializing either Chinese subjects 
or Western subjects, which are often an aporia.
The Art o f  Spacing: Positioning on the Line
Once entering the factory gate, a qualified worker or not, the factory machine 
immediately fixed you into a specific position. You found yourself nailed down into 
a grid of power and disciplines, Lisa Rofel was still right to say, “Factory spatial 
relations are not just the setting for disciplinary actions, but are themselves part of the 
same mode of power and authority.” (1992:103) The production section in the 
Meteor workplace was arranged into ten production assembly lines and four QC 
lines. On each line, there was a range of people: 20 to 25 on assembly lines and 15 to 
20 on QC lines. Placing a body on the line was the first step by which the techniques
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of disciplinary machine could work on the individual. It was also for her the first step 
in accommodating her own body to the whole production machine. A cog in a 
machine; the body was pinned down to its own specific position, functional and 
productive.
Mei-fang sat right opposite me on production line B. We had a specific 
relationship that would not develop in another place or with other people. My 
presence as an anthropologist in that particular work position and the demands of the 
production logic of our factory jointly shaped our relationship. Our relation seemed 
to further verify the Marxist axiom that production relations are by nature social 
relations.
Mei-fang was a fresh hand, hired two days after me to work on the assembly 
line. Rounded faced, she still looked rustic. At eighteen this was her first work 
outside the village in a modem company. After keeping quiet on the line for two 
weeks, she started to chat to me. Talking was not permitted on the shop floor, but it 
often spontaneously sparkled in the afternoon and at night when we thought that 
disciplinary control was eased.
“Why do you work here?” Mei-fang uttered in a small voice.
Guessing that she knew me as a student from Hong Kong, I replied, “I want to 
learn the work process, the factory system and the lives of women workers here.”
“Do you like to work here?” She asked me instead of my querying her.
“Yes, because I can make a lot of friends here.” I responded without any 
preparation to her question.
“Hm,” she answered and was silent again. I wondered if  my reply made any 
sense to her.
We were both placed on the screwing positions on Line B. There were 22 
workers on the line. We had one line foreman, one line leader and one line assistant. 
The model produced on the line was an MB201 route-finder, a famous European 
brand produced for a big name car company in Europe. It was a kind of electronic 
road map for drivers. The products came to our line at nearly the final stage of the 
production process. We assembled the main board, the LC Display and the plastic 
case around the whole product. With work divided into twelve processes, normally 
there were about two to three people with responsibility for one process. My process
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was taken by three people: Mei-fang, me and Ching hua. To this day I believe that 
Mei-fang was hired to accelerate the pace on the line because of my slow speed. I 
guess upper management did not want me to take up too much pressure.
Each work position in the line was a procedure o f knowledge and power. It was 
stated in clear and minute detail what position the body should take in each process2. 
Workers were trained as specialists in just one process. Only the workers who had 
been working there for more than two or three years had the chance to leam more 
than one work process. The work process was seldom changed, unless a change to a 
new model required a new arrangement of work positions. In front of every seat, 
there was a layout hung on the shelf, demonstrating meticulously with pictures and 
graphics each step the worker should follow. Work characterization was minute, 
specified and systematic. What the individual could and should do was to follow it 
with exact accuracy. If one was attentive and disciplined enough, one needed only 
repeat these bodily movements without bothering the mind. The following is one 
example of one work position on the QC line. In front of Da-mei, a quality controller 
on QC Line A, the layout stated:
Work Process of Functional Test (III)
Model Route Finder Quality
Controller:
Work Number:
Facilitators Car Kit I2V, JIG short line, 2A 1.5V  
Battery, ROM Card
Speed
Work Process COMMS Functional Test
Content:
1. Put on battery, insert COMMS card, and the switch the power On. LCD glass 
plane demonstrates the following:
“ See Foucault, 1977:149.
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2. At the same time press “ ft” + “T” button. The picture plane will be changed to:
Then press “4 '” button, move to the position of “COMMS TEST” and then 
press “— ” button on the right hand side. The picture plane will show the 
following:
3. Press ” on the right hand side, the plane will show: “PRESS ANY KEY TO 
SEND LOOPBACK Q TO QUIT”, then continuously press “W” twice, LCD plane 
will also show the word “W”
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4, At the state of stage 3, press “P, I, M” letter keys one by one to do the test.
5. At the state of stage 3, press “Q” key, the plane will show back stage 2, then 
press “V”, move to the position of “QUIT COMMS TEST”, and then press 
“— ” button on the right side, the plane will resume the following picture:
Then press “V” key and move button to the position of “QUIT”, then press 
“— ” key on the right side, and the plane will return to stage 1.
6. Switch off and the take out the ROM CARD and battery. Check whether there is 
any defect in the LCD glass.
We can see clearly how each step of each work process was meticulously 
demonstrated. The job of quality controlling Route Finder products was divided into 
five work processes and each process was further dissected into five to seven steps. 
Each individual occupied only one work position and was adept at one work process. 
Da-mei knew no other work processes but her own. Of her own process, she knew 
neither the meaning of those words shown on the LCD plane, nor what the product 
she worked on was for. But that did not matter. She simply followed the instructions 
of the layout and forced herself to recognize those English letters and words. Then 
those arrows, graphics and alphabets would automatically be stored in her mind. 
Once she saw them, she reacted instinctively without hesitation and pressed the right 
keys and buttons. Her memory, eyes and hands were so well coordinated that there 
seemed no possibility of failure. One day I had a chance to talk to Da-mei:
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“Do you think the layout is useful for you?”
“It was useful at the very beginning. You know the line leader will only show 
you one time how to do it and you never dare to ask a second time. The first time I 
saw those insects (English letters), I was scared to death. I couldn’t recognize them, 
so I copied them down and recited them at night. On the second morning, they were 
all in my mind and I didn’t need to see the layout anymore,”
But what the disciplinary machine actually wanted was to produce a body 
without mind, a mindless body. “I don’t need to use my mind anymore. I’ve been 
doing the same thing for two years. Things come and go, repeating every second and 
minute. I can do it with my eyes,” Da-mei told me. And since the body was mindless, 
it was replaceable. Every body should be trained to be a mindless body. That was the 
strategy of the production machine to safeguard its power and prevent any possibility 
of the producing body taking charge. The Chinese producers, as I have said, were 
always seen as distrustful workers who would leave the factory any time they liked. 
The situation is often exaggerated, but the turnover rate was particularly high during 
the Chinese New Year period. Every year, the company estimates, one-sixth of the 
work force leave for good and never come back. Thus for the producing body to be 
changeable, it should be further individualized. One only took responsibility for 
one’s own duty, became an expert in one’s own position. Everybody was useful, but 
not crucial. No one individual could know and affect the operation of the whole 
work. Individualizing the body was the principle of the economy o f the production 
machine to assure the running of the whole machine, the totality. To gain collective 
labour, to ensure the function of the totality, the working body had to be dissected 
and individualized, and thus could be replaced. The dialectic of individuality and 
totality was well mastered by the art of spacing, the art of positioning the social body 
in the workplace. The principle of positioning was the principle of individualized 
partitioning, as Foucault puts it,
It was a question of distributing individuals in a space in which one might 
isolate them and map them; but also of articulating this distribution on a 
production machinery that had its own requirements. The distribution of
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bodies, the spatial arrangement of production machinery and the different 
forms of activity in the distribution of “posts” had to be linked together.
(1977:144-145)
A Technique o f Power: the Assembly Line
If we say the disciplinary spacing of the body results in individualizing and 
fragmenting labour power, the assembly line devised in modem industry is a 
technique of power to reunite the individualized bodies into a concerted action. All 
the six assembly lines in the Meteor were equipped by moving conveyor belts; the 
moving of the belt was simply the moving of power. Like a chain, it buckled an 
individualized body into a specific position, but at the same time they linked up to 
form a collective social body devoted to the sole aim of maximizing production.
The operation of the moving belt was not only co-operative and productive but 
also symbolic. The flashing light set at the head of the belt signaled its function, 
dictated all actions of each body, composed individual energy into a collective labour 
force, and thus showed its power to magnify. Like a conductor directing the 
orchestra, every individual act, every piece of music formed a symphony. The light 
flashed once every two to two and a half minutes, telling us of the running of a new 
set, controlling the speed, the time and the bodily movement. The working body was 
individualized, but not one of them could be idiosyncratic. Ultimately it was the 
concerted action, the collective labour and the co-operation of the team, of the line, 
that mattered. It was ritual, rhythmic and totalizing; the beauty of directing, the art of 
disciplining. Foucault puts it clearly,
disciplinary tactics is situated on the axis that links the singular and the 
multiple. It allows both the characterization of the individual as individual 
and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It is the first condition for the 
control and use of an ensemble of distinct elements: the base for the control
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and use of an ensemble of distinct elements: the base for a micro-physics of 
what might be called a “cellular” power.
(1977:149)
Unlike musicians in an orchestra, there was no need for rural girls to be trained 
for a long time before they were put on the assembly line. Taylorist methods of 
production were still deployed on the Meteor shopfloor, so though skill was 
involved, it was retained at the minimum level. The principle of dividing was still the 
first principle in determining the organization of work. Work was dissected into tasks 
as minute as possible, and every piece of work was precisely studied and carefully 
devised. The art of timing was shown as the following:
Work process: bonding
Model: MWD-440
No. of bonding line per piece: 363
502 Machine: 2 lines/sec time/pcs: 3’05”
509 Machine: 1.5 lines/sec time/pcs: 4 ’04”
Work process: bonding 
Model: SA-95
No. of bonding line per piece: 130
502 Machine: 2 lines/sec time/pcs: 1’05”
509 Machine: 1.5 lines/sec time/pcs: 1 ’44”
Work process: brushing soldering liquid
Model: MWD-440 
Time: one minute 
Quantity: 7
Sec/pcs: 8”57 7”5
Average sec/pcs: 8”
8
6
10
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Work process: brushing soldering liquid
Model: ROF-CPU
Time: one minute
Quantity: 10 7 12 12
Sec/pcs: 6” 8”57 5” 5”
Average sec/pcs: 6.12”
Work process: fixing IC die
Model: ROF-CPU
Quantity: 2 dies
Sec/pcs: 14” 9” 7” 11”
Average sec/pcs: 11”
Work process: soldering contact pin
Model: ROF-CPU
Quantity: 6 points
Sec/pcs: 23” 43” 23” 39”
Average sec/pcs: 32”
Besides the personnel staff, the staff the workers disliked most in the Company 
were the time analysts. Time and time again they came out from the Engineering 
Department, holding a timing calculator, stood behind the back of the workers, and 
started measuring the time. Suggestions were made, orders would then be sent and 
the bodies were going to catch up the pace again. These time analysts actually 
studied not only the amount of time the work required, but also the bodily acts, the 
gestures and the gaps between the bodily movements. No time was wasted. Every 
bodily act had to be accurate and correct. The distance between each body, the 
distance between the body and the conveyor belt, the height of the chair, the table 
and the shelf were all carefully measured and planned. Time and space must all be 
saved; no waste of surplus bodily acts and no waste of surplus labour force. This was 
at least the dream of the production machine.
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On our Line B, the work of assembling ROF, the final processing product, was 
divided into 12 processes. Once there were new lots on the line, the time analysts 
would count our work pace again. Putting all the data from everyone’s results into 
the computer, they would figure out the target for daily production, the speed of the 
whole moving belt and the work pace of each individual body. Work speed was 
reviewed on a weekly base. They put pressure not only on the individuals, but on the 
line as a whole. Comparisons were made between the lines and if the gap was too 
large, Mr. Yeung, the chief of the timing analysts section from the Engineering 
Department would come out to give a warning time and time. The foreperson and the 
line leader who were responsible for keeping the operation of the line would also 
share the same pressure. They were assigned to train the workers, keep discipline and 
arrange work positions and raw materials. But they also had to keep the line working 
smoothly by eliminating or controlling such human factors as slow down, sickness, 
temporary leave to washroom, and whatever unpredictable human elements might 
escape the dictates of the moving line.
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JOBS ON LINE B
THE LINE->
Pui-xi 
20pcs/min
1 2
CHECKING CHECKING
MATERIALS MATERIALS
Lan-di MOULDING 3 4 MOULDING
RUBBER RUBBER
35pcs/min BUTTON BUTTON
Choi-ping
lpcs/min
Nan-nan
3pcs/min
FIXING b 6 FIXING
CHARACTERS, CHARACTERS,
CUSHION AND CUSHION AND
PLASTIC LEGS PLASTIC LEGS
MOULDING
SWITCH
BUTTON
Fu-xing 
1.5pcs/min
Xi-ling
2pcs/min
Fu-hui 
0.2pcs/sec
Ping-ping 
lpcs/min
Mei-lan 
0.3pcs/min
19
ASSEMBLING 9 10 ASSEMBLING
LCD WITH LCD WITH
TOP CASE TOP CASE
SCREWING 11 12 SCREWING
LCD PLATE LCD PLATE
Dong-j in CHECKING 13 14 FUNCTIONAL
LCD SEMI­ TEST LCD
lpcs/sec PRODUCT SEMIPRODUCT
ASSEMBLING lb 16 SCREWING
BOTTOM CASE ROF PRODUCT
Pun SCREWING 
ROF PRODUCT
17 18 SCREWING 
ROF PRODUCT
1.5pcs/min
FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL
TESTING TESTING
PRODUCT PRODUCT
21 22
REPAIRING
O FLASHING LIGHT 
Ling-yue 
20pcs/min
ASSEMBLING 
LCD WITH 
TOP CASE
20
FUNCTIONAL
TESTING
PRODUCT
Gan-zhu
35pcs/min
Lu-fang 
lpcs/min
Dai-wu 
1.5pcs/min
Jia-fai 
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Every day we complained about the work speed and the unequal arrangement of 
job and time. Though every work process was “scientifically” studied and carefully 
measured, the ordering of a multitude of individualized bodies at the same time was 
still not an easy task. Despite the fact that each job was dissected as minutely as 
possible, it was still impossible to keep each work process to a similar amount of 
time. Somebody was forced to work faster than others, while some people were 
required to hold down a harder work position than others. The assembly line simply 
flew on its own way, neglecting all the work and human differences. Individual 
bodies were required to accommodate to the line, rather than the line to the body. 
Time and time again it was impossible to avoid “piling up jobs” in front of our table. 
Shu-tong, nick-named “Fat Guy” sat above Mei-fang and shared the same work 
process with us.
One day she complained: “People can’t work at this sort of killing speed. The 
line should not run so fast. You ought to know screwing needs more time. I am 
already selling my body.”
Bai-lan, our line leader quickly came and hushed her. “Don’t shout. The line is 
not under our control.”
It was true; the running of the line had nothing to do with the producers, not 
even the line leader or the foreman. As a technique of power, the assembly line was 
completely autocratic; the moving rate followed its own will once the line was set up 
by the Engineering Department.
Maximum bodily force could be extracted if the moving machine was organized 
on the principle of autonomy. Work was repetitive and monotonous, and once you 
got addicted to it, your hands, eyes and your bodily force would autonomously react 
and perfectly fit the rhythm of work. It seemed that the more time you devoted to 
your work, the more free you were. No matter how many grievances the body might 
have, at the end the body could and did find its way out. Because the more one 
worked, the more efficient one became, and the “up to the wall” job would be 
finished and one would be feel free again. Work was repeated in a cyclical interval of 
seconds and minutes. It ran and ran without requiring anybody’s mind and intention. 
But without mind and intention, it seemed you were free to move your body, totally 
free since there was no obstacle, no possible obstacle in the mind since it was
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mindless. The moving line wanted to produce not only an autonomous body but also 
a free body - a body free to live up to the force. It was a paradox, but a perfect one, 
another dialect of discipline and freedom. The principle of autonomy was not only 
the principle of the autocracy of the power, but also the praxis o f the freedom of the 
body. It was a wonderful creation of the production machine. My experience in a 
Chinese workplace reminded me of the Hungarian writer and dissident, Miklos 
Haraszti, who worked in the Red Star Tractor Factory in 1971 and wrote the famous 
book, A Worker in a Worker's State. He said,
In the end, the only way out is to become a machine myself. The best 
workers are very good at this. It is as if an immovable mask was glued to 
their faces, whatever the type of work they are doing. Their eyes seem 
veiled, yet they never miss a thing. Their movements don’t seem to require 
any effort. They follow predetermined trajectories, like inert objects under 
magnetic control. Throughout the whole day, they keep a fast even pace.
Just like the machines, they don’t rush into things when they are feeling 
fresh, nor do they slow up when they’re tire. They give way to ‘nerves’ 
only when the proportion of ‘good’ work to ‘bad’ is really grim. Otherwise, 
their behaviour reflects reality: ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs, ‘paid’ and ‘unpaid’ 
work, run together in the course of a day. The benefits they squeeze out of 
them and the wages which come from them are equally indifferent to such 
distinctions.
(1978:54)
Speed\ Control and Resistance
But where there was power, where there was resistance. Fat guy was a hot 
person and usually the first one to react to power. The moving line was set to produce 
a homogeneity of work pace. But the work itself was heterogeneous and variable. It 
was nearly impossible to unify the speed of each process. The process relied on 
human elements to create the homogenization, and the process was thus subjected to 
uncontrollable human differences. No matter how despotic and powerful the
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Taylorist methods in the workplace, the production machine nevertheless was not 
omnipotent in the control of the working bodies. Rush orders and frequent changes in 
production models were the characteristic of the subcontracting factory. So the 
management had to rely on the women’s cooperation and willingness not only to 
work overtime, but to finish the work on time. Women thus held a certain power, 
albeit interstitial rather than formal (Grieco and Whipp 1986). Formal power 
generated formal organization and control, while interstitial power created the hidden 
subversions and informal ties that are my concern.
Tactics of resistance often targeted the work speed. The production machine 
tried in every way to turn the human body into a working machine. But the girls on 
the line learned very quickly that the moving line was an electric despot, binding 
their bodies to work as fast as possible for the least amount of money. Fu-hui, a girl 
sitting in front of me, talked to me in a drowsy afternoon, “I really dream about the 
line suddenly stopping for a while. I simply can’t take a breath. It drags us to work 
faster and faster. But the more we work, the more the boss earns. They give the 
workers a little more, yet they make big money.” Class consciousness was articulated 
in the workplace from time to time, though often in an individual and momentary 
way. The pressures of the assembly line and the work tensions it produced led the 
women to confront their own exploitation each day in a very immediate way.
Though the work speed was determined by the upper management, the women 
nevertheless could exert a certain influence on the work pace at certain moments. 
Sometimes, especially at night, when the work speed was unbearable to over-stressed 
bodies, or when a new speed was set for new products, and the girls on the line had 
not yet gotten used to it, the women on the whole line would suddenly slow down at 
the same time, demonstrating a silent collective resistance to the line leader and the 
foreman. Nobody would utter a word. They simply let the jobs pile up like hills and 
somebody was left with empty hands. They let the line alone to run itself and made it 
like a “paper tiger”. The foreman then would speak a lot of “good words” to persuade 
the women to be tolerant and catch up on the work. He would say, “girls, the more 
you work, the more bonus you get. So why don’t you catch up yourselves”. Or, 
“Have some patience, you are all girls. The more you work, the more you’ll feel 
easy.” But if these “good words” were not “heard”, and the slow-down persisted,
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then what he could do was to report to the supervisor and have the time analysts 
readjust the pace. The women would view these moments as victories. They knew 
the rush seasons were the most appropriate moments to exert their bodily power by 
simply letting their bodies relax and earn time to breathe. Rush periods were the time 
that the new pace of work and amount of bonus were often bargained over and fought 
for. Sometimes other working and living conditions were challenged as well. 
However, once the busy period was over, the women’s bargaining power was 
dramatically weakened. The workers knew too well that their bargaining power was 
temporary, ephemeral but recurrent. They had to catch the right moments or it would 
be gone.
Controlling pace was an effective strategy to prevent the overwhelming 
domination of disciplinary power in the workplace. In the place at the Meteor where 
the workers were not working on the automatic moving line, such as in Bonding 
Room or Functional Testing Room, they had more power to “hustle and idle” the 
work speed according to their own interests.
Hua, the foreman of the Bonding Room, told me one day, “If there is a moody 
hour, the girls will assemble the component slowly and then pass the work to the next 
slowly. They worked as slow as tortoises. If you force them to do it quicker, they can 
sometimes make it all wrong and you need to redo it. Or they can all pretend to be 
ill.”
Collective illness was common if the speed was set too fast and the bonus rate 
was too harsh.3 The bonus rate was an incentive mechanism that supplemented the 
fixed hourly rate paid to all the shopfloor workers. Every worker in the workplace 
knew that the bonus system was to induce them to work as fast as possible. So when 
the rate of pay was good, they worked faster; if not, they simply slowed down. Thus, 
in certain ways, the workers were able to find out interstitial power to exert some 
control on the work pace and maximize their own interests. Hidden transgressions 
were everywhere. But these transgressions, I believe, were somehow perceived and 
anticipated by the management. When there was a slack season and the Meteor did
3 Further discussion of pain and illness into the female body will 
be found in Chapter seven.
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not have enough work, the bonus would be set lower, so that the workers would 
automatically slow down their work pace and the factory did not need to stop 
production. Resistance and incorporation seemed to be two opposite strategies 
continuously enacted in the workplace in every corner and every moment.
Programming the Work Habit: One Day's Time-table
The basic technique of the disciplining power was regulation of the body by 
placing it in a disciplinary space, measuring it and analyzing it. But it was not 
enough to produce a disciplinary space. The management of time was far more 
important. An autonomous body, a body-machine, was not the sole aim. What the 
production machine needed was not a docile body, but a productive and efficient 
body, a body of praxis. That was far more complicated. Rural country girls, the 
disciplinary power imagined, were free to breathe the fresh air, wandering in the 
mountainous land, with nothing to do, and thus no sense o f  time in their hometown. 
They were fresh, young and wild. How to install a program o f disciplinary time into 
their mind, their psyche and their unconsciousness in order to comport them into the 
rhythms of strict industrial life? Despotic and primitive methods were used.4 A time­
table, a basic technique, was simply deployed to manage and then change everyday 
life practices. Programming a new factory life, building-up a work habit, self- 
technologizing the body, the mind, and the habitus were all the effects of practicing a 
time-table.
' Foucault said that the time-table as a strict model was inherited 
from the old practices of the monastry in the Middle Age. (1977:149)
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The Time-Table
7:50 A M -8:00 AM
7:30 AM- 7:50 AM
7:00 A M -7:30 AM
6:30 AM- 7:00 AM Wake-up 
Go to the factoiy 
Breakfast time 
Punch time card
8:00 AM- 12:00 AM At work
12:00 AM-12:50 PM Lunch time and rest hour
12:50 PM- 1:00 PM Punch time card
1:00 P M -5:00 PM At work
5:00 P M -5:50 PM Dinner time
5:50 P M -6:00 PM Punch time card
6:00 PM - 9:00 PM or 10:00 PM Overtime work
This was a normal time-table for the day shift workers in Meteor. The usual 
working day was eleven or twelve hours a day. If there was a rush order we were 
required to work until eleven or twelve o’clock midnight. The night shift workers 
started work at 8:00 PM and finished at 8 o’clock in the morning, with one rest hour 
between 3:00 AM and 4:00 AM. Overtime work was considered part of normal 
working hours, directly violating the Labour Law (1985), and the Regulation of 
Labour Contract of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (1995). In these documents 
there are the following statements:
1) The working hours of the worker should not be over eight hours per day; 
the weekly average working hour should not over forty-four hours.
2) The worker should have one rest day per week.
3) The normal overtime work should not be extended over one hour; for 
some special reason and with consideration of the worker health condition, 
the prolonging of working hours should not be over three hours each day.
4) The total overtime work per month should not be over thirty-six hours.
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No factory in Shenzhen took these regulations seriously. Nor our company. Every 
night we had three hours overtime work. While it was called overtime work, the 
company planned it as normal working hours.
Daily life was rigorously regulated by the time-table and everybody struggled to 
live up to the strict schedule. The following is from my field notes. It is one of my 
many attempts to describe a working day in the workplace:
The sense of time 19th January, 1995
It was a cold and windy winter day. The sun was still sleeping, and the sky was 
dark, but we had to wake up. The alarms of clocks in my room sounded at 6:30 AM, 
some a few seconds faster or slower. Six people, six clocks, and I was definitely sure 
that with only my own alarm I could never have gotten up. Yun-ling, Fang, Yue, 
Hua-hong and Mei were my room-mates. Yun-ling slept above me on the upper 
bunk. She was usually the last one to get up. She murmured in a sleepy voice: “Gosh! 
What kind of life is this! Wake up at half past six. In winter I thought I’d never “eat” 
this kind of bitterness. Only my mum in the village would do it. She’s great, getting 
up to feed us and the pigs.” We all laughed and told her it was better to act than talk.
Waking up around past half six, we rushed for the toilet, brushed our teeth, 
washed our faces and changed our clothes. We compromised among ourselves, since 
there was only one toilet and one washroom. “Hurry up, hurry up”; there was 
shouting everywhere in the room, but no arguments such as occurred often in other 
rooms, especially when someone lost their temper. In our room, the situation was still 
bearable and we ail learned to keep our patience with one another. Time was pressing 
and we could not afford to waste a minute. So if somebody was in the toilet, some 
would wash themselves in the washroom, while some would change their overalls on 
the bed or comb their hair. Turns were arranged silently and we lived on consent 
rather than written orders. To make life easier, self-disciplining was nurtured from 
the moment we woke up.
About 6:45 PM to 7:00 PM we began to leave the dormitory. We could reserve 
fifteen minutes for breakfast if we could spend less than twenty minutes walking to
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the Company. I often walked with Yun-ling and Mei, two Cantonese from rural 
Guangdong.
Yun-ling complained of the harsh life in the village: “At home, I got up when 
the sun rose and it was time to be hungry for breakfast.”
“Don’t you need to help your mum cook or feed pigs in the morning?” I asked.
“Sometimes, but I was not the one supposed to do so.” Yun-ling had two elder 
sisters and one sister-in-law who helped the family do domestic chores and farming 
work. She was the free hand at home, which was why she searched for factory work 
in Shenzhen. No clock alarm was needed in the village life, which was centered more 
on natural time rather than disciplinary time. The Chinese axiom told the habitus of 
the rural life: “When the sun comes out, it’s time to work; when the sun is gone, it’s 
time to rest.” The social clock did exist - 1 do not want to beautify village life - but it 
was at least more in harmony with the biological clock, though the two were 
interdependent and regulated with each other. There were specific times for sowing, 
fertilizing, and harvesting, and they were recorded in detail in the Chinese lunar 
calendar. But there was no strict disciplinary machine to guide everyday life. The 
working time of individuals varied, according to the family economy, the sibling 
order and gender which allotted different household duties, and the local practices. 
Pressures were felt, especially by the mother or eldest daughter. She was required to 
manage the daily food for the whole family and often had to get up at a very early 
hour. But we rarely heard somebody complain of not enough sleep in the village. In 
the workplace, too little sleep was a serious problem; every day we slept about six 
hours or less. Not enough sleep, plus a long harsh working day, made the disciplinary 
time external and alien to us. The body was dragged to meet the time-table imposed 
from the outside. There seemed no way to escape once one was placed in the 
industrial world.
Ten minutes before 8 AM we had to queue up, enter the factory gate and punch 
our time cards. Security guards stood at the big gate, carefully checking workers with 
company permits which had to be pinned to the chest pocket of the overall. If you 
forgot to bring the permit you would not be allowed in, even if the security guards 
recognized you as a company worker. You had to go back to the dormitory and find 
the permit, and would definitely be late to work. A fine and condemnation followed.
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Five minutes late would be counted as one hour late and wage would be deducted for 
two hours; about five yuan. Such serious punishment seemed to say that every 
minute of labour was crucial to the functioning of the whole production machine. 
The disciplinary machine believed that “time is money”. It was a basic ideology of 
industrialism, and the machine was eager to inculcate it to the rural workers. Losing 
time was losing you money and losing the company profit. Time therefore should be 
deliberately planned and strictly controlled, not by the producers, but by the 
production machine. With our overall, cap and gloves we were more or less dressed, 
and with our work tools and materials well prepared, the factory clock rang at exactly 
8 o’clock. The light flashed and the line started running. Our morning work began. 
Music, popular Cantonese song, was on for fifteen minutes, to freshen our minds to 
work more efficiently. It was said that the workers could work faster in the morning 
with energy refreshed by a few hours sleep. So in the morning discipline was often 
strictly kept, and it was more difficult to find a chance to talk or joke. There was a 
common understanding on the line that the higher management were in a mood to 
keep things straight in the morning hours. Talk and laughter often could not be 
tolerated when caught by the foreman or supervisor on the spot. Silence, fast moving 
lines and the running of time out of control; this was the feel of morning work.
Five minutes before the lunch time at twelve, the line would stop and we started 
to finish up our jobs. Talking immediately mounted and all kind of noises filled the 
silence. We had kept quiet for all the whole morning, and it seemed that nobody 
could wait to talk. We were not permitted to leave the shopfloor all at once. Each line 
took turns to leave first, because there was only one stair for the shopfloor workers. 
Rushing to lunch for fifteen minutes, we would come back to our seat and sleep. All 
lights were switched off. The bright workshop turned to a dark world. Since we were 
too exhausted every day, all of us would fall into sleep. An afternoon nap is a habit in 
China, in both rural and urban areas. In Mao’s period industrial enterprises would 
close in the afternoon and re-open at 3:00 PM, so that workers at least could have 
two hours sleep after lunch. The habit was altered in urban China in the past decade, 
when the mode of economic life was dictated by private capitalist practices rather 
than state management. In the eyes of Western capitalists, it was unbelievable that 
workers in China could have such a leisure life that they themselves could not enjoy
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or even dream of. “Time is money” was not a false consciousness tailored to cheat 
the workers, but they themselves, as the bearers of the axiom, had to live up to too.
At 12:50 PM, the lights were turned on and we were wakened to punch our time 
cards. At one, the clock rang, music was on and the line ran again. Work was 
repeating, repeating and never ending. A closed environment with all windows sealed 
and covered by a plastic curtain, curbed the eye contact of the workers with the 
outside world. We could not judge the time by seeing the rising and setting of the 
sun, nor could we breathe natural air. The workplace air was regulated 24 hours by 
the central air conditioning. The temperature was kept at 20°C throughout the whole 
year, low enough not only to cool the electronic parts, but also to wake up drowsy 
eyes. Talking, gossiping, joking and secret snacks were sometimes allowed in the 
afternoon work, on the condition that they would not affect the speed and running of 
the line. And it seemed that noise and laughter were an effective way to keep the 
workers awake. What the girls complained about most was not the minimal wage or 
harsh work load, but inadequate sleep through months and years.
Choi-ping, a girl of eighteen said, “Everyday I can only sleep for five or six 
hours. It doesn’t drive me mad, but makes me like a sleeping pig. Whenever there’s 
chance. I fall asleep. I can’t help but be drowsy.”
What the girls could do was wake up and cheer themselves up. Every chance of 
making fun and sharing snacks was found, each little moment important to keep the 
spirits up. Another way of killing drowsiness was taking a short break to the 
washroom. But you could not leave the work seat unless granted the out-of-position 
permit by the assistant line leader. There was always a long queue waiting for the 
permit. For each line there was only one permit, and in each work section you had to 
leave the line one at a time. You hung up a yellow card at the desk as a signal to the 
assistant line leader. She then gave you a permit and replaced you with another 
worker in your seat, so the jobs would flow without interruption. She kept a notebook 
and a time recorder, and wrote down how many minutes and seconds each worker 
left the seat. Five minutes was the maximum allowed. Workers often complained of 
the time limit, especially when they were menstruating.
Drowsiness was the contagious virus the disciplinary machine found it most 
thorny to deal with. Work pace would slow down and jobs pile on the line. Some
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workers would get hurt by the soldering gun or the molding machine due to 
drowsiness. The line leaders would “keep one eye open and one eye closed” on 
spotting workers’ talking. Accidents such as cutting a finger or fainting often 
occurred in late afternoon or at night, when workers did not have enough energy and 
concentration to work. When somebody suffered such bodily pain and was sent to the 
hospital, the others on the shopfloor would suddenly raise their spirits 011 the job. 
Dragging to five, we could all hear the sound of our stomachs and were eager for 
dinner.
Work started again at 6:00 PM; the time card was punched again. We were told 
at the beginning what time we could end our work that night. If it was at nine, we 
thought we had a lucky day. Normally we stopped work at ten, and sometimes the 
shift extended to eleven or twelve if the production order was a rush. Night work was 
comparatively more relaxing, with a radio turned on for the whole section. Here the 
workers listened to the Hong Kong channels which they found more interesting than 
the Shenzhen or Guangzhou channels. Chatting about popular film stars and favorite 
singers helped to pass time quickly. “Nightdreaming” of romance provoked by the 
love songs or stories from the radio, helped to kill time in the extreme exhaustion and 
boredom of night work.
Inspections by the Personnel Department or higher management in the 
Production Department seldom occurred in the night time. “The white-collared staff, 
with good fate, need more time to take care of their bodies; they don’t have time to 
inspect us,” Fat Guy explained to me on the line. Off work at nine or ten o’clock, we 
dashed back to our dormitory, queuing up for hot water to bathe. After bathing, we 
still needed to wash our clothes, and somebody with a free hand would cook some 
snack since we all felt hungry after working another three to four hours. Eating and 
talking took another hour. After twelve we all went to bed. A hectic day, with every 
minute and second fiilly utilized and organized, definitely differed from the rhythms 
of rustic life in the village. There was six hours sleep, and nobody got enough, but 
day after day we all got used to it. At the very beginning of my working in the 
factory, I thought it was impossible for me to stand it for more than a week. But then 
after one week, a cycle of repetition, a constant regularity, a well written rhythm of 
life and work, all these forces penetrated not only into my body, but my soul, my
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psyche, and I found myself fairly adapt at it. Life was manageable only by a strict 
time-table.
The time-card was extraordinarily important to our life. It recorded not only our 
timing behaviours, but also our wage that was calculated according to it. Every 
worker was given a time card on the first day at the factory. We clocked in three 
times a day; we had to be on time before 8:00 AM, 1:00 PM and 6:00 PM. The 
electronic clock was automatically set. If one was on time, the card would be marked 
with the date, hour and minute in blue; if not, the colour was in red. Time was related 
to reward and punishment; the card signified the politics of writing, recording all the 
details of what everybody did every day with exact precision. There was no excuse 
for one second late; the marker of the clock would automatically change its colour to 
red and your time card would be “stigmatized”. It was not the deduction of wage that 
mattered, but the stigma of the record. It counted badly for your year-end bonus and 
the chance of promotion.
“It is mianzi (face) that hurts,” Shui-bin told me one day when we rushed 
together to the factory in the morning. “I don’t want to have a red mark in my card, it 
is such a shame.”
Mianzi, face, is a local moral concept, commonly used in the language of 
everyday life. In the Chinese cultural context mianzi means a personal dignity and 
reputation that everybody has to hold if to maintain a basic standard of decent life. 
Losing mianzi is the result if one cannot live up to the social ethics in any moment or 
situation, particularly when one’s life is related to others in the family, workplace or 
community. Mianzi wenti, the problem of face, helps to generate a sense of self- 
discipline and self-technologized subjects. As a doxa of Chinese society, the belief of 
mianzi works to control everyday life in minute ways. Disciplinary techniques in the 
workplace incorporated these symbolic and cultural territories to heighten their 
controlling power. There were only three minutes left when we dashed down the 
street to factory. Time, reward and self-subjectivizing were all worked into our lives.
In the Meteor it was clear that a capitalist mode of construction of temporality 
oveiTode the peasant’s time in regulating daily life. The relation between human life 
and time thus became one of aggression and conquest. A system of homogeneous 
uniform time in measurable units it nevertheless created cracks, fissures and tensions
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in the human life. Life, or the essence of Dazein, as Heideggar puts it, was a mode of 
temporality itself. But in capitalist practice, life and time became an alienating 
relationship, in which life was forced to catch up to time as if it were an external 
object to possess, and to conquer. The time-table, with its ethos and practices, was 
undoubtedly the essence of the capitalist mode of temporality. It provided a new 
frame of timing for the individuals to programmize a new pattern of life, which had 
to take “time is money” into its very heart. Life itself thus became a total alien flow 
of fragmentary time; the working day was disguised minute by minute by the 
renewed effort of will the workers incessantly squeezed from themselves (Haraszti 
1978:57). But with the uncompromising, severe and demanding nature of time, 
workers found it easy to notice its despotic power imposing on their bodies, their 
movements and their everyday life.
The time-table was a contested terrain, the acute point of labour 
subconsciousness before the work habit. The new sense of disciplinary time 
transgressed into the unconsciousness. The time-table was so strict, so rigorous that 
everybody could feel it, could know and experience it. The timing and rhythms of 
everyday life in the factory were completely different from the peasant’s way o f life 
in the village. Here life was dissected into a series of timed behaviors, rigidly 
patterned and stored into the body and mind of each worker. But it was precisely in 
the body that the transaction between the disciplining power and the workers was 
made; submission was approved, recognized and justified. The crux, of course, was 
not only the wage, but a different style of life: the capitalist mode of life. To acquire 
a distinct life style from the village, one needed to follow at least the basic rule, to 
help oneself to establish the new rhythms, to cultivate the work habit, and to repeat 
them everyday in order to ensure its form o f  life.
The Factory Regulations
If the time-table was the heart of the disciplinary power regulating a factory life, 
then the factory regulations were the heart of time-table propelling its functioning. A 
strict time-table needed a severe prosecutor to carry out the execution. The modality 
of power itself no doubt was extremely despotic, but it was justified by the nature
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and the massive number of the workers they had to govern. Over five hundred 
workers, from diverse places of origin, speaking different dialects, having different 
habits of life, and different behavior codes and standards. To order these blind 
migrants into one standardized set of behaviours and mold the confused mind into a 
well disciplined psyche, the disciplinary machine needed ingrained techniques of 
power. It also needed an impartial and equitable legislator-machine which could set 
unbiased codes and state clearly how to punish and reward. A punishing and 
rewarding universe was established, in which everybody knew what to do and how 
to do it.
New workers were asked to read the Factory Regulation Handbook before they 
could start work on the shopfloor. But in our weekly precept time on Wednesday 
afternoon at 4:30;>, factory regulations were frequently repeated, and warnings were 
given from time to time. On the turns of the staircases and in the canteen, important 
factory regulations were framed under glass on the wall. Nobody could escape seeing 
them, six times a day. Of course, one could see without looking and hear without 
listening. But day in and day out, they would simply instill into one’s 
unconsciousness; no matter how much one found them disgusting, or thought they 
had no effect on one’s mind at all.
At the landing turn of the second floor staircase, everyday we could see:
r’ More discussion of precept time will be found in the next chapter.
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Production Regulations
1. Workers should do all preparations such as wearing work cap, electronic- 
prevention belt, g loves and others five minutes before the on-work time. To prevent 
any dirt on the products, nobody is allowed to comb hair or do anything that may 
cause dust or dirt. Violation is fined tw o yuan  each time.
2. A ll workers should obey the production arrangements o f  the higher authorities. If 
one has any different opinions, complete the job first before going to a higher level to 
reflect.
3. N o allowance to leave work position and change work position during work time 
unless approval by the supervisors. Leaving the work position for personal reasons 
such as going to toilet you must apply for a out-of-position perm it. V iolation is fined 
tw o yuan  each time.
3. N o one w ill be allowed to leave the factory unless there is com pany ex it perm it 
signed by the affiliated Department manager and the Personnel Department, and 
examined by the Security Guard before leaving the factory. Leaving the factory 
without permission w ill be seriously punished and fined fifty yuan  per time.
4. Punching a time card for others or asking another person to punch a time card for 
you is prohibited. The first time o f  violation will be given serious warning and fined 
twenty yuan', the second time w ill be fined one hundred yuan  and dism issed at once.
5. There should be no lateness to work. Late for over five minutes w ill be counted as 
late for one hour, w hile w age w ill be deduced at two hours rate.
At the third floor and in the canteen, the following framed rules were on the wall
Daily Behaviours Regulations
1. N o talking, eating, playing, chasing, and fighting is allowed on the shopfloor.
2. N o  permission to throw waste. N o spitting. Violation is fined Five yu an  each time.
3. R eceiving or making personal phone calls is not allowed. I f  discovered, no matter 
how long one uses the phone, the worker will be immediately dism issed and all wage 
deducted.
4. For stealing o f  factory property one will be dismissed at once and fined fifty to five 
hundreds dollar. If the case is serious, the offender w ill be sent to the Public Security 
Bureau.
5. The normal period o f  wear for an overall is one year. If one requires a new overall, 
there should be a reasonable explanation; otherwise, fifty yu an  w ill be deducted from 
the wage.
6. The normal period o f  wear for a pair o f  work shoes is eight months. If there is 
unreasonable damage, twelve yuan  w ill be deducted from the wage.
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Job L eave and R esignation R egulations
1. N o job leave unless there is permission from line leader, foreman, and Department 
manager. Leave permit should be signed by all o f  them, and sent to the Personnel 
Department for approval. Then the leave permit should be signed by the applicant to 
make it efficient. Otherwise, all leave will be considered as absence.
2. For those sick or on personal leave who can not attend the overtim e work, prior 
permission should be gained and proper procedures completed. Otherwise, all w ill be 
considered as absence. Absence for one night o f  overtime work w ill be deducted half 
a day’s wage, absence for one day deducted three days wage.
3. Absence for two days w ill be deducted six days wage. Continuous absence for 
three days w ill be considered as voluntary leave and all salary voluntarily given up.
4. Resignation o f  basic workers should be noticed fifteen days before actual leaving, 
staff should give one month’s notice. Otherwise, wages w ill be deducted for fifteen  
days.
5. For those new workers and staff who have not completed two months work and 
resign, seven days w age will be deducted for training costs.
These frames, these codes, of course, did not have the dramatic effect of altering 
the actual factory life. We felt their existence only when we were on the verge of 
violating them, or really violating them. Like any law from above, there were a lot of 
ways to find loopholes. No talking, eating and playing in the workplace was among 
the first regulations But as I have described above, talking, eating snacks, making 
jokes and teasing were overtly found in the late afternoon and on night work. 
Workers simply could not help but violate the regulation if they wanted to kill the 
boredom and drowsiness. Individual defiance like screwing up the job, speaking 
loudly, making fun, or leaving the work seat without waiting for the permit happened 
from time to time as well. Passing jokes on the line, sometimes overtly, sometimes 
covertly, could be seen as resistance to the inhuman work conditions and a chance to 
refresh the empty mind. Sexual innuendoes to the male technicians or supervisors 
were the funniest time on the line. Small pieces of paper on which were written dirty 
jokes were passed from seat to seat, stirring up laughter all down the line. When and 
who forgot to close the zipper of his trousers, or who had a new hair-cut, or wore 
new clothes - all were the “raw materials” for assembling jokes. Defiance and 
transgressions were tolerated only if they did not seriously affect production.
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Forepersons and line leaders kept “half their eyes open” because they knew that the 
actual daily operation of the line could never be guided by factory regulations which 
were too adamant and relentless. The willingness to give labour power and the 
cooperation of the workers had to be taken into consideration. Bai-lan, the leader of 
my line, told me, “It’s no use being too harsh. We need to understand the workers’ 
situation and individual problems. I would prefer to ask the worker to leave her seat 
to wash her face with cold water than see her yawning all the time.... Sometimes I 
don’t prevent them talking or daydreaming, you know, it is the only way to keep the 
work moving.” Even to the line manager, stringent disciplinary techniques seemed 
despotic, external and impractical in regulating a human world of real action, agency 
and limitation.
There were also other clever and lovely tactics, often invisible and unrecorded, 
that girls in the workplace developed to cope with the work pressure and “humanize” 
the harsh conditions. While some preferred daydreaming, some passed around sweets 
and snacks, and some liked to enjoy tapes and radio broadcasting. Some girls also 
brought photos or pictures of favourites, sticking them on their work desks. They 
were interested in asking me about Hong Kong singers and film stars. The frequent 
question was: “Have you ever seen the stars on the streets in Hong Kong?” Every 
time I said “No”, they all felt disappointed. Some told me they liked Leon Lai, while 
some liked Andy Lau. Juan, the leader of QC line, aged 23, was a fan of Andy Lau; 
under the glass of her work desk, there were over ten different pictures of Andy Lau. 
She told me she liked him so much that she would save all her money to buy his 
current albums. The reason for liking one particular male star was that often that the 
idol was special, handsome, with dazzling eyes and an irresistible manhood. Juan 
said, “Singing is my favorite pastime. I dreamed of becoming a singer when I was 
very young. But I know I can never be a singer. I am only a peasant girl, my family is 
poor. I will never have that chance.” The line girls and the line leaders showed a 
longing for favourite singers and for daydreams. This access to psychological escape 
helped to alleviate the pressure, tension and boredom of repetitive work day after 
day.
Though there was no strict regulation which stated that the workers could not 
listen to the radio during work time, the practice was that they only could have music
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for fifteen minutes as they started work in the morning and afternoon. For the 
overtime work at night, the radio was often on for the whole session; but it was a 
habitus, a common consensus and expectation rather than a rule. The workers had to 
struggle to keep it as a rule and a right. Since the radio was a crucial entertainment to 
curb the harsh working life, and despite the fact that indulging in music was an 
individual strategy to cope with everyday work pressure and tension, any opposition 
to these individual acts could develop into a collective resistance. Resistance in this 
vein is a good example to show that workplace resistance is not always oriented 
towards economic interests, as some mistaken interpretations hold. It is not always 
about “bread and dignity”, but “pleasure and work” as well.
One interesting struggle I observed in the Meteor was the struggle over the 
radio. Since different lines were loyal to different channels, sometimes the flows of 
sound were fought with each other, as the volume of the radios were often turned to 
the maximum. The forepersons or line leaders often needed to shout when they 
talked to the workers, which to some extent caused interrupted. Sometimes the 
volume would be turned to a lower level by the line leader, but very quickly the 
workers would turn it up again, since nobody could hear if the sound was not louder 
than the adjacent line and higher than the machines. The situation was noticed by 
Tin, the assistant manager of Production Department; one night he suddenly ordered 
the line leaders to switch off all the radios without informing the workers. It was at 
8:15 PM. The workplace resumed its silence, but a queer atmosphere of silence at 
night, which was too great a contrast from the other nights. An extraordinary mood 
prevailed on the shop floor; grumbling and discontent were intense and widespread. 
All the workers spontaneously slowed down their pace at the same time. Moving 
lines were forced to stop; people started chatting and laughing as they did in the 
leisure time. At first some new workers did not dare to stop working, but when they 
looked at other workers who were all idling and chatting, so they dared not to work 
too. Following others quietly, all the workers on the lines joined in the slowdown. 
Forepersons and line leaders knew that there would be no use in uttering a word. 
None of them tried to persuade the workers to work. I was shocked by the situation 
and excited to see how the struggle would go on. Nothing happened; the workers 
continued talking and joking, with some singing in low voices. The forepersons were
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called in to the office of Production Department to discuss with Tin how to deal with 
the situation. Tin was definitely not willing to give up and allow the radio on again. It 
was too great a challenge to his authority and his mianzi. But Tin could not order 
production stopped, since only Mr. Wu, the manager of the Production Department, 
had the power to do so, and he was not in the factory at the moment. The impasse 
persisted, and it seemed that all the laughing and joking were mocking at Tin’s 
authority. At nine, we were asked to leave the workplace. On the way back to the 
dormitory, the workers were excited, talking loudly and freely on the street. Nobody 
mentioned the event directly; though everybody knew it was an open confrontation 
with the despotic production machine. Conversations mainly focused on their 
favourite stars, and once the talk centered on their idols, you could not stop the girls 
talking for another hour. Working life seemed too pale without handsome male 
singers to console these young hearts. Next night the radios were on and production 
relapsed into normality.
The case showed that the workers would act militantly not for economic 
reasons, but for cultural activities which they saw as an important part of their daily 
life. Love songs and stories, full of romance and fascination, were the most fertile 
soil for daydreaming, alleviating work pressure and lessening nostalgia. Alienation of 
labour seemed lessened by popular songs and singers. The radio provided not only 
entertainment for enduring long working hours and harsh working conditions, but 
also opportunities to contact a wide outside world, the only way to unfetter their 
bodily imprisonment in the workplace. Strictly bound by the factory regulation, the 
workers nevertheless were free in their daydreams and imagination. The self­
assertiveness and pride of the women workers were not merely built from the work 
skills they gained in the workplace, but also from the life experiences they were 
exposed to and dreamed of. Stopping radio meant intervening into their private lives, 
and thus into their rights, on which they would not compromise. In this event, even 
the forepersons and the line leaders were on the side of workers. Bai-lan said, “The 
radio program provided the spiritual food  to stimulate the girls to work fast. I am 
sure without the radio, I can’t get them work.”
Victory was one-sided; the factory regulations were still too detailed, too 
stringent and penetrating into our daily life. We could ignore their existence and
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control only by obeying and coping ourselves with the codes. The more naturally you 
could cope, the less control you could feel, and the more freedom you had. As 
Miklos Haraszti sarcastically said,
The norm dreams of me as a perfect being made up of a few regulations, 
who works on immaterial matter, and is interchangeable with any other 
perfect being without loss of efficiency. The norm recognizes no problem, 
no chance event, no complication in men or materials. The norm knows 
men who are ill and healthy, but it ignores the cough which forces me to 
put my hand in front of my mouth and which thereby prevents me from 
raising the piece at the required moment; it ignores sore feet which make 
me walk slowly; it knows no slackening of concentration, no broken finger­
nails, no unpleasant sweating, no satisfaction at having eaten well. ... In 
fact, the norm knows absolutely nothing; despite this I must do what it says, 
because if I don’t it threatens me with punitive sanctions.
(1978:101)
The residence and living regulations, another ten codes, were written on the wall 
on every floor of the dormitory. Again: no spitting, no fighting, no gambling, no 
drinking, no faction gangs, no change of beds, no talking and laughing after 
midnight, no visiting after twelve, no visitor staying overnight, no use of cooker,
heater, personal fan  There were another one hundred nos regulating our life.
Fines were five yuan, ten yuan, fifty yuan, one hundred yuan - up to five hundred 
yuan. Nevertheless, there were more violations of regulations in the dormitory than 
in the workplace. Workers simply changed beds among themselves to form kin and 
ethnic clusters. Workers coming from the same hometown found it easier to cope 
with each other. It was impossible to stop cooking in the room, since we all felt 
hungry at night after overtime work. Visitors from the same villages often stayed 
overnight until they could find jobs elsewhere. Sometimes a man was found in a 
woman’s bed. If reported, the workers would be dismissed at once. Gambling and 
drinking, albeit less found in the women’s rooms, were common in men’s dorm. 
Arguing and fighting occurred frequently everywhere. Daily life transgressions were
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innumerable, although the workers did not seriously threaten the order of dormitory 
life.
The Electronic eye: the Principle o f Panopticism
Now we come to the end of this chapter. Homogenizing the social body 
involved all kinds of techniques of power including the most scientific and 
sophisticated, and the most despotic and primitive. At first, we saw how the 
technique of strict spatial positioning fixed the distrusted nomadic bodies in clearly 
delimited seats on the shopfloor. Detailed study and analysis of each work process, of 
each individual body, aimed to maximize the labour time resulted in the 
fragmentation of labour power. Then the assembly line, with its moving and 
consistent exercise power, linked up a multitude of individualized bodies into one 
collective automatic function. The time-table and the factory codes simultaneously 
worked hard to install a new software of factory daily life into workers’ psyche, and 
to help us to acquire a new habitus of everyday life. It was some sort of new 
humanity the disciplinary machine wanted to create. The art of spacing, the art of 
timing, the art of dissecting individual bodies and the art of composing collective 
energies, all functioned to produce a new social body- dagongmei or mingong. 
Extracting and maximizing labour force was the sole aim, the sole economy of the 
production disciplinary machine.
Yet in the end, the production machine still could not find itself safe and certain 
in the techniques of power. Nomadic beings were not easy to deal with. A supreme 
power with more encompassing and penetrating force was needed. That should not 
be a human being, nor be present. What could it be? An electronic eye. The moving 
line, the time-table and the factory codes were the most visible and conspicuous 
forms of power at work on the body. But finally we come to the invisible and 
untouchable. The factory codes were always visible and we always knew where the 
power was and where we could escape. But the power of the electronic eye was 
always obscured, hidden in the General Office. We could not see it, we could not 
touch it, but we all knew it existed, always gazing at us. It was somewhere, 
everywhere and very powerful.
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None of the shopfloor workers had the chance to see it actually work. But there 
were stories, rumors among the workers of how it was working. One day, Fat Guy 
told me, thinking that I did not know of its existence, “There’s an electronic eye 
hanging on the wall, always checking our behaviour. The Director doesn’t need to 
keep a watch on the line. He just sits there but he can watch every one of us. The 
pictures are flowing before his eyes and he can control the computer and have the 
picture focused on anybody.” She kept her voice as small as possible and it seemed 
that the eye was already gazing at her. The presence of the unpresence, the fictitious 
image of the panoptical eye seemed more effective at controlling our behaviours. 
With the eye poking through the wall, we were forced to think and to know that we 
were all continuously under supervision. There were rumors that once the Director 
discovered who was talking or laughing on the shopfloor, s/he would be dismissed 
immediately without warning.
The highest authority needed to find a chance to demonstrate its super power. 
And this power ought to be impersonal, invisible, untouchable and even far away 
from the imagination of the workers. It was above, it was everywhere, it was very 
threatening, but it did not exist until we told ourselves that it was there. Sometimes 
we totally forgot its existence, but sometimes we kept on telling each other that it 
was there. The object of the gaze was the subject of power; at the heart o f the 
disciplinary machine, it manifested the subjection of those who were perceived as 
objects and the objectification of those who were subjected (Foucault, 1977:184- 
185). In this chapter we find ourselves completely caught up in the Foucauldian 
universe of surveiller et punir. In the next chapter I will try to and step onto another 
terrain and further analyze the making of the social body - dagongmei.
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Chapter V Becoming dagongmei: Manufacturing Identities and the
Politics of Differences
Who needs ‘identity’?
The constitution o f  a social identity is an act o f  power.
Who needs (to be) a worker?
Who needs (to be) dagongm ei?
“Who needs identity?” The answer is simply power. “Who needs (to be) a 
worker?” The answer is more direct: capital. “Who needs (to be) dagongmei?'1 The 
answer then is more specific, capital in Deng’s China. Dagongmei is a new embodied 
social identity emerging in contemporary China, produced to meet the changing 
socio-economic relations of the country and the needs of the capital. A new identity 
is produced, crafted and then inscribed on young rural female bodies when they enter 
into a particular set of production relations, experiencing the process of 
proletarianization and alienation. In this chapter, I describe the process as it builds a 
social identity; I look from both the side of power and the side of the subject, and at 
regulatory and identificatory practices inside and outside the workplace.
Dagongmei is a specific cultural-symbolic artifact, produced at the particular 
moment when private and international capital emerged in Post-Mao China. As a 
condensed identity, it reveals the full story of how a state socialist system is giving 
way to the capitalist world economy and how capitalist practices depend entirely on 
the regulation of class and sexual relations. The connotations of the term are multi­
layered; da-gong, literally means “working for a boss”. It is a new concept, 
supposedly in contradiction to Chinese socialist history. Labour, alienated labour, 
supposedly emancipated for more than thirty years, is again sold to the capitalists, 
and this time under the auspices of the state machine, Mei is the female, the sister and 
the girl. Da-gong-mei means that those selling their labour to the boss are female, 
young girls. But paradoxically, the term dagongmei did not carry a negative meaning 
for those young girls from the rural areas; rather, it provided new identities, new 
senses of the self that they were going to acquire, once they worked inside a foreign 
or private factory, selling their labour. Self-subjectivization was very important to the
Stuart Hall asks:
Ernesto Lac lau answers: 
We ask:
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power, to the capital machine which needed willing labour. Manufacture consent? 
How? By manufacturing identity.
The manufacture of identity involves the politics of discourse and the politics of 
difference. Inside the workplace, we can see how the production of the identity- 
dagongmei deployed the art of metaphor, the power of language and the politics of 
othering and differentiating. At the core of the regulatory and identificatory practices, 
there was a play of differance, establishing a violent hierarchy between the rural and 
the urban, the northerner and the southerner and the male and the female. Here we are 
going to see how the regional, kin and ethnic differences were imaged to craft the 
identity in the workplace. Sexual differences will be discussed in the next chapter.
A Fumbled Identity: My First Day on the Shopfloor
Early in the morning in late autumn, I woke at six when my room mates were 
still sleeping. I was a bit excited; after reading all sorts of company archives and 
recent information in the general office for two weeks, I was going to work on the 
assembly line as a worker. In order to look like a factory girl, I bought T-shirts, jeans 
and shoes in a local market near our Company. I had my hair curled too, at the 
suggestion of Tall Ling, the Director’s secretary. Arriving a bit early at the Company,
I saw Jun from the Personnel Department swallowing her breakfast at a small food 
shop just opposite our factory building. “You don’t need to hurry. I know you are 
going to work on the shopfloor today.” Jun smiled at me and said that today I was 
really dressed like a factory worker. “Without your glasses, you are just our double.”
She led me to the Department of General Affairs. I was asked to sign a form and 
then a set of factory overalls were provided; two blue suits, one blue cap, a pair of 
white gloves, and one pair of slippers. Blue was the colour for the production 
department. Before I went upstairs to the shop floor, I changed my clothes in the 
washroom. Jun was still with me and laughed at my appearance. I somehow felt that 
though I had changed overalls, my image was awkward and my newly assumed 
identity still not crystallized. Jun brought me to assembly line B on the fourth floor. 
It was about 8 o‘clock in the morning. Except for some echoes of machine sounds, 
silence reigned on the whole shopfloor. I was shocked again, not by the silence, but
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by the stares of the workers. Everybody looked at me queerly at the very moment I 
appeared 011 the shop floor. Did my appearance in an operator’s overalls look 
bizarre? Didn‘t I look like a dagongmei? Or was I not expected to work on the 
shopfloor? I was wondering, with my heart throbbing. He-chuan, the foreman of line 
B, looked at me as if he expected me, and was the only one to welcome me. He led 
me to my seat on the middle of the line, a position on the screwing station, and asked 
me to sit down. I sat down, knowing that all gazes still fell on by body. A body unfit 
to an identity.
My existing identity as an anthropologist, albeit ambiguous and unstable, was 
certainly too reified for me to adapt to a new one. Time after time I wondered and 
asked myself: Was I like a factory girl? An anthropologist working on the shopfloor 
that was fairly accepted by the western academics. But how about my family, the 
local community in China, and all the staff and workers in the Company? I knew 
they could never understand, even if in the end they accepted it. It was true that my 
past identities did become diluted and ambiguous as time went on and on, and when I 
found myself totally lost in the industrial world, toiling twelve hours per day, without 
knowing what happened in the outside “civilized” world. But the question, “Was I a 
dagongmei?” still did not dare to daunt my mind. People treated me differently on 
the shopfloor and at the same time reminded me of my past identities. Neither I, nor 
the capital nor the workers were able to inscribe on me a proper identity: dagongmei. 
The production machine from the beginning had no interest in incorporating me. I 
was left alone.
Different fate, different identity: Mei-fang's coming
The fate of Mei-fang showed a great contrast to me. The production machine 
bore a strong anxiety to turn Mei-fang to be a dagongmei, a modern female worker. 
So did Mei-fang herself. We were not born to be workers, especially those like Mei- 
fang who were “born to be peasants”. Granting oneself an identity that could find no 
residue, 110 cause-and-effect, no justification in biological factors or any bom-to-be 
attributes, involved particularly sophisticated techniques and strategies of power.
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Internalization, on the other hand, required further meandering, painful and even 
perverted ways of technologizing the self.
Mei-fang came on Wednesday, the day we had a precept for fifteen minutes 
every week. Bai-lan, our line leader brought her to a seat opposite me. Unlike me, 
she was given serious warnings and strict training before she could start working. 
Bai-lan first checked her overalls, her cap and her gloves, and then told her to have 
her hair neatly tied and completely covered inside the work cap.
“Make sure not a string of hair drops down on the desk, on the chair or on the 
floor. Short hair will be easily dropped in the product and can’t be easily noticed. 
Your fingernails should be cut plain; otherwise the gloves will tear and you will 
cause flecks on the stuff you do,” Bai-lan said.
Then Mei-fang was instructed to wear a static electricity belt on her hand to 
prevent body electricity attacking the electronic products. She was given a metal 
recorder and told to tap it before she put the product onto the conveyor belt.
“You should never forget to tap it. The recorder not only counts how much work 
you do, but also the number our whole line produces. All the numbers from each 
recorder should be the same at the end. You should not make any mistake,” Bai-lan 
said and then started to teach Mei-fang how to do screwing.
I noticed immediately a basic difference between Mei-fang and me in the way 
the management treated us. He-chuan told me to take care of my fingers and not to be 
hurt by the screwing driver, whereas Bai-lan told Mei-fang to take care of the driver 
and not let it get worn. Yet it took me a week to understand that Mei-fang was hired 
to supplement my work since the upper management thought I could not keep up 
with the work pace, and I might take casual leave for other reasons.
Mei-fang was given on the job training for a three month probation period, the 
practice for all newcomers. Screwing, in fact, was not as difficult as I thought at first. 
In our work process, four mini screws and two even smaller ones were used to fix the 
main board to two outer cases. Picking up screws from the box and putting them in 
the appropriate positions required nimble fingers and a quick hand; otherwise, the 
screws would be easily lost or one might pick up more than one screw at the same 
time since screws easily stuck to the fingers. But these were not the hard bits. The 
most skillful elment was handling the electric screw driver. How much force you put
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to it mattered most. Different sizes of screws or the same sizes in different positions 
involved different amounts of force. Too much force and you would produce small 
breaks on the case; too little force and the screw might be tilted and you had to fix it 
again. It took me three days to become adept at the work process, and so Mei-fang 
almost the same amount of time.
Actually, for Mei-fang learning the work process, grasping the skill, was not a 
problem. After three or four days she could work much faster than me. But she was 
silent all the time. Working two weeks in the Company, she sometimes just nodded 
and smiled to me and then kept on screwing.
“She seems not happy. She doesn’t utter a word for a whole day. How odd!” Fat 
Guy from our line gossiped to me at lunch one day.
What kept Mei-fang quiet? What worried her, when other workers fell into 
chuckles from time to time? A fairly fit body to job was not good enough? Yes, it 
was unsatisfactory to both the production machine and the workers themselves. A 
fairly fit body was not complete. For survival in a modern factory one needed 
something more, something fundamental to one’s sense of self. Mei-fang was 
unhappy and I was uncomfortable. There was something we felt lacking and this lack 
was inarticulate. We both were pretty fit to the work, no problem with our skill; but 
the fact was that we were still not well equipped to be a worker, a dagongmei, who 
had to live in a modem industrial space.
If Deleuze and Guattari are right to say that the creation of lack is a function of 
the market economy, the art of the dominant class; that it is deliberately created, 
organized and produced in and through social production (1984:28), then we need to 
know how this primary fear of lack among Mei-fang and other rural girls is produced 
and how they are induced to live with it. Dagongmei, as a hegemonic identity, as a 
cultural-symbolic artifact contains a set of reactive forces. These forces will try to 
homogenize human activities and senses of self that are inherently plural, fluid and 
uncontrollable. The process of homogenization is the process of exclusion and 
displacement, which produce of anxiety, inflicts pain on individuals, and drives them 
to integrate into the collective will and goals of the hegemonic construct.
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To be a worker: the politics o f  urban-rural difference
The politics of labour identity in China was linked not only to the project of 
industrialization but also to a project of spacing. As shown in Chapter three, the rural 
space could only nurture peasants and the urban space workers. Three decades of 
Chinese socialist history did not imagine a modernization project in the air, but in an 
curtain between rural and urban, and thus between peasants and workers. Chinese 
socialist beings were bom to have an identity not from biology but from locality, but 
by their locality, the urban or the rural. Mao’s industrialization required an extraction 
of rural resources to support the urban establishment, a strict planning of rural and 
urban development, and thus a strict control on individuals’ status and identity. The 
art of naming and classification was central to Mao’s politics. Deng’s industrial 
development and ways of realizing the market economy, on the other hand, 
demanded not only raw material but human power from the rural areas as well. That 
is why Mei-fang and the millions of rural girls were needed as dagongmei.
These rural girls were born in villages, they were not workers, they had already 
been named as peasants. Yet they were needed. This time the state socialist machine, 
burdened by its past history, was powerless to gear its naming motor; it gave way to 
the capitalist machine. The identity of dagongmei echoed a relationship to the urban, 
to capital, but not to the state. There was, and there had to be, new models of workers 
in new era. The machine of capital now felt free to reterritorize the urban-rural 
boundaries and to mimic the politics of naming and exclusion.
At first newcomers like Mei-fang were not considered as qualified workers, but 
"workers-to-be” in the Meteor. Even after they had worked a few months in the 
factory, young girls, especially fresh graduates from rural origins, were often taken to 
be country girls rather than factory girls. Judged not by her work pace or skill, but on 
her appearance, and her appropriate behaviors in the industrial space, Mei-fang 
looked fresh, quiet and permissive. She was too rustic. She wore T-shirt and jeans 
but no face powder and lipstick. And her jeans were a little bit old-fashioned, and 
thus still rural. Her pastime - knitting - coated her more in a country image.
For Mei-fang this was the first time she experienced the rural-urban disparity so 
poignantly. The sense of difference was no longer abstractly realized in her mind in
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the village, but was daily lived on the shopfloor. The workplace here was not to be 
conceived as a microcosm of the society at large, but as a process of production and 
reproduction of the larger society. It is through the image of such a socius-workplace 
that we can understand the practices of identification by which the production 
machine was to technologize the self. The production machine, in making use of the 
existing social relations, simply reproduced itself as one part of the system and at the 
same time built the system. The factory regime itself was not a pyramid of power 
hierarchies, but a kaleidoscope of power and hierarchies, created by weaving 
identities of gender, kinship, ethnicity and rural-urban disparity.
The Urban-Rural Metaphor and the Abject Subject
I always kept my work pace as slow as possible to ensure that every piece I 
produced was of good quality. I was afraid that any defect for which I was 
responsible would cause my co-workers, especially Mei-fang, to be reproached. But 
it still could not avoid. It was on the fifth day after Mei-fang come, still within her 
training period. In late afternoon I was very drowsy and waited for somebody to start 
talking. He-chuan, our line foreman, holding a route-finder, suddenly showed up in 
front of Mei-fang and yelled, “What are you doing? You are going to spoil this case. 
Such a big scar here (He pointed to the case of the route-finder). Did you learn 
something by heart? You know you are not using an ax ploughing a furrow, don’t 
you? These products are very expensive, you can’t pay for it by farming for a year. 
cushou cujiao (Rough hand, rough foot)!”
He stopped talking. Then he turned his eyes to me, and showing a sense of 
embarrassment, added,
“These village girls are always like that, difficult to teach.”
He-chuan left. I saw Mei-fang‘s face blush and eyes fill with tears. I was really 
angry at such a sudden and irresponsible reproach. He never looked for who caused 
the scar! But I understood instantly that he actually could never know. He just came 
to the most likely target, shouting. Then all of us on the same work process could 
hear and take responsibility for each other.
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The discourse of the reproach itself seemed unimportant; it just gave a simple 
message: somebody in our work process made a low quality product, but the 
disciplinary machine could never know who. In shouting, in expressing his authority, 
He-chuan was also defeating himself, showing he could not control the labour 
process. But the discourse had another function. It produced a surplus value of 
language that the disciplinary machine did not expect: helping to craft the identity of 
dagongmei. If Mei-fang or anybody else had difficulty changing themselves, the 
machine would come to help. If putting you on the line and getting you adept at the 
work was not enough, then the discursive magic showed its power.
The ploy of metaphors was seen everywhere on the shopfloor; leaving a scar on 
the case was like leaving a furrow on the land. You were a peasant. You were not a 
worker. But you should be a worker, and though you were still a peasant at least you 
should behave like a worker. In the metaphor that He-chuan created in his reproach, 
he never expected to say that working in the factory was like farming on the land, but 
he could not escape the mimic paradox. Working was not farming, but in some sense 
it might be still like farming. Otherwise how could the metaphor be effective? 
Invoking the metaphor did show the contradictory nature of the discourse, but it 
never wasted energy. Only by juxtaposing farming and working, only by 
differentiating farming from working, could working show its priority and privileges. 
To declare a gap was to depreciate the value of farming. Then a hierarchy of values 
was created, in which working occupied a higher rank. A gap was produced, a void 
which allowed power to produce abject subjects. Mei-fang was not the only girl 
subject to these kinds of reproach and the power of language. Everyday on the 
shopfloor I heard discriminatory language to line girls, whether in covert or overt 
ways. A Cantonese term xiangxiamei, village girl, was often used to depreciate the 
status of the women workers from rural areas. Phrases like “xiangxiamei, you know 
nothing except farming”, “xiangxiamei, what else can you understand? Learn the 
rules and behave civilized”, “xiangxiamei is always like a xiangxiamei, cushou cujiao 
(rough hand, rough leg)”, or “xiangxiamei can never be taught! Foolish and stupid” 
were frequently heard in the workplace, especially when the male foreman or 
lineleader came to criticize or scold the workers. The metaphorical meanings hidden 
in these daily usages were the great contrasts between the body and the space: unfit
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xiangxiamei living in the modern industrial world. On the one hand, there were 
stupid, uneducated and uncivilized rustic girls, whose labour was cheap and 
despised. On the other hand, there was a modern high technology of factory, whose 
products were valuable and exported. Intense anxiety was aroused, making 
individuals feel “lacking”, “unfit” or most often “not properly suited” to the place 
they lived and worked. Girls like Mei-fang felt frustrated for not living up to the 
demands of a modern world and for not themselves being modern beings.
It was awkward for me, I was often portrayed as a modern, highly educated 
person with a wide knowledge of the outside world and technology, and thus a model 
for all the female workers. Though I was unfit for the identity of dagongmei and for 
working on the shopfloor, I was imagined as a modem professional who was very 
suitable for living in a modern space. In spite of my efforts to avoid eulogies, I often 
heard snippets of conversations like “learning this or that from Miss Pun”. 
Sometimes I was asked for the meaning of English words, sometimes to translate 
some documents, sometimes to demonstrate the format for taking minutes at 
meetings or the word processing program on the computer in the Production 
Department. In the Department office, where I usually went to chat at lunch time 
after the meal, the supervisors, the forepersons and the clerks would circle around me 
and start to ask me about things in Hong Kong or UK. Admiration would sometimes 
surface inversely: “We are from the rural areas, like frogs in the well, and know 
nothing about the outside world.”
Actually some of supervisors and the forepersons were from a city or big town, 
but in front of me, they still liked to contrast themselves as village people. So despite 
my effort to turn myself into a line girl, the production machine instead took an 
interest in marking me out as someone coming from big city, knowledgeable, urbane 
and superior to the female workers from rural areas.
Daily language, shopfloor conversations, arguments and reproaches in the 
workplace always tried to remind Mei-fang and other fresh workers of their past 
identity as peasants. “Cushou cujiao” was the physical stigma of the person as a 
peasant, whereas xiangxiamei was the abject identity that must be polished and 
upgraded. I took quite a long time to understand why Mei-fang was not happy. If one
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did not want to be discriminated against or depreciated, one had to try hard to change 
oneself.
A basic differentiation among the workers was between the old workers and the 
new workers. The old workers, by virtue of their their appearance, their speech, the 
dialect they spoke (often Cantonese) and the work pace and skill they possessed, 
were nearer the ideal model of a modern worker. The new workers on the other hand, 
were waiting to be installed and inscribed with a new body, a new identity and a new 
soul. The production machine wanted complete new beings. To declare a gap, to 
make war with one’s past identity was for the sake of founding a new identity. The 
magic of the metaphor and language would not end at depreciating one’s past 
identity. Reminding and invoking one’s past identity was to cut the umbilical cord of 
one’s past life, to clear a base for building up a new self. Industrial work was desired, 
not only because of the higher wage that it provided, but the new identity, the new 
sense of life that it created. Peasantness imaged as “cushou cujiao” was the 
constitutive outside of the new identity. Without mirroring and then negating one’s 
past identity, one found no way to shore up one’s new life.
Frantz Fanon said, the black man’s soul was the white man’s artifact.
We have said, the dagongmeV s soul was the production of the production 
machine.
But there was defiance, if not resistance, to the production of machine.
I recorded one occasion:
March 28, 1996 At evening
We still have to work at night. The radio is on. There is no mood for work, we 
expect and dream. Tomorrow is payday. The girls on our line are talking about where 
to go and what to buy. While Fat Guy suggests buying new jeans, Fu-hui, a girl 
sitting in front of me, thinks of buying lipstick. She asks me to suggest some brand 
names of high quality and reasonable price. I am at sea and wondering. Suddenly I 
hear a shouting from the adjacent line, Line A. A line girl bursts into anger and 
shouts at her lineleader, “Don’t take me as a xiangxiamei, and think I know nothing, 
so you can bully me. You never ask the others to move to work on the other line. But 
always me. It’s me every time. What’s the difference between me and the others?
1 6 9
Why me every time? Why always give me the bad job and move me?” The girl is 
refusing to be lent to the Line C. When a rush job lacks hands, girls are frequently 
borrowed from another line. But most of the time the workers are unwilling to be 
lent; they feel the job on the other line is not their own.
At Precept Time
Our line had “precept” time on every Wednesday at half past four. A few 
minutes before it started, Bai-lan, the line leader would stop the line and prepare for 
the staff coming from the Personnel Department and the Production Department. Tin, 
our Department assistant managers, always came. If  there there were serious 
production problems, our Department manager, Mr Wu, would show up. If Mr. Wu 
came, Tin stood beside him and behaved like an inferior. In his early thirties, Tin was 
an university graduate and had worked at the Meteor for over four year's. In the eyes 
of line girls, he was a sharp and capable figure. We sometimes thought he was quite 
attractive if he was not out of temper. He was urbane and educated; in a world of few 
men, he was often a target of fantasy.
It was the first day that Mei-fang came to work in Meteor. She and I were asking 
what would happen at precept time. At 4:30 PM Ying, Tin, He-chuan and Bai-lan 
appeared and all the line girls, except me, were asked to queue up in front of the line.
I was told to stay in my seat. Again I felt myself an outsider - time and time again the 
production machine had no intention to discipline me. I moved my seat to the front in 
order to hear what they were saying. Today Ying wore a three-piece skirt set and 
looked like an urban career woman. Though sometimes she would say she was a 
dagongmei as well, in our Company she was classified as clerical staff. Her status, 
wage, fringe benefits and living conditions were all different from the line operators. 
In a managerial tone, as her position required, she said,
This week a worker was caught helping another punch the time card.
It was a serious violation and we reserved the right to dismiss her at once.
There is no excuse for anybody to clock on for best friends or co-villagers.
The helper will be punished more seriously than the one who asked for
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help. In the factory one should be responsible for oneself only. If you are so 
used to helping each other in the village, remember, remember that now 
you are in the factory....
The company inspected the workers’ dormitory on Monday. 
Production tools, such as scissors and adhesive tape, were found in two 
workers’ bunks. Though they were not expensive things, the acts were 
considered acts of theft. According to the Factory Regulations, these two 
workers were each fined fifty yuan. Again, we considered these serious 
offenses. Next time, if they violate the rule again, these two workers will be 
dismissed immediately.
During the inspection, I found it was quite common that cartons were 
brought out by the workers to make benches in their rooms. I emphasize 
that workers are not permitted to bring any production materials out the 
factory gate, even if they are waste. Waste materials are not your property, 
they belong to the Company. You have no right to use them. To put it 
seriously, I can treat that as stealing too. Your habit of taking useless stuff 
back home should be changed. Let me repeat it again, you are working now 
in the factory, the bad habits you bring from the country should be given 
up. No spitting on the floor and keep your bunk and room clean. ...
Ying’s speech did not surprise anybody. It was the usual stuff. My co-workers 
simply stood still and kept quiet, some showing no interest in hearing her. 
Information circulated among workers through chat, gossip, and rumours, not 
through this kind of formal address. We all knew who was caught clocking on for 
another and who was fined for keeping company materials. The common feeling 
towards the workers who were caught was that they were “unlucky”. Mei-fang kept 
her head low and did not look at Ying. But Ying’s words were not without function. 
If in the end she could not safeguard the factory regulations and impose them on the 
workers. She could put into words the nature o f  peasantness, a nature that of course 
was imagined and created. Huxiang bangzhu, mutual help and close relationships, 
were seen as attributes of village life and that had to be given up to live in an 
industrial world. Everyone should be responsible for themselves alone. The capitalist
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machine wanted only individualistic persons. Industrial wo/man should learn to 
compete with each other but not to help each other. Helping others to clock on was 
quite a frequent practice in the workplace; sometimes people wanted to gain time to 
go to toilet or to send money back home. The post office was only open during the 
day and most of the workers had to sacrifice their lunch time to go there. Long 
queues were expected at lunch time so they got back to the factory late. Other 
workers would help if they saw their kin and co-villagers were not back in time.
Stealing, again, was often taken as a bad habit of country people. Ying and other 
staff of urban origin often warned me not to leave valuable things in the dormitory. 
Workers were not allowed to bring bags into the workplace. They were inspected 
going in or out the gate. Every worker was thought of as a potential thief. Again this 
kind of bad human nature was nurtured in the rural area. Making use of waste in 
daily life was a natural village way. Resources belonged to nature, didn’t they? The 
notion of private property was a serious problem to these peasant-workers. They 
were told to give up their practical reasons for sharing natural resources and even 
taught to despise it. Sharing then connected to the notion of stealing. The logic of 
capitalist practice needed to win over any non-capitalist reasoning in order to assert 
its hegemony. To gain the power, to win the battle, the opponent, the other life styles 
had to be evoked and then detroyed.
Tin’s speech focused more on the production target and work discipline on the 
line. He said that our line had more rejects than the other lines which affected 
production speed. He reminded us not to talk while working and said everybody 
should be more attentive. Next Monday western customers from Europe would visit 
our company and he told us to behave ourselves. “Everybody should wash their 
overalls at the weekend. We don’t want the customers to see a speck of dirt on your 
body or in the workplace. No one is allowed to leave their work seat until the end of 
the tour. Materials and cartons should be well allocated and labeled. Company policy 
is to show we have a completely modern and well-trained work force and an 
advanced technological factory.” Workers were asked for cooperation. It seemed that 
a sense of belonging to the Company and a sense of self-esteem as a modern worker 
would be articulated in front of the foreign customers.
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At dinner time the girls on our line discussed the speeches. They accepted much 
of what Tin said, but they laughed at Ying. She had at least than ten nicknames, such 
as “Miss Canton”, “tall mei ”, “bossy cat” and “chicken”. Posing as a “modern lady”, 
she was less an admired figure than a target of jeers and innuendoes. She was often 
mocked behind her back. Her tone and attitudes were often mimicked and made fun 
of. Immediately after her sudden inspection of the shopfloor, laughter would erupt. 
Rough language would spread down the line. “The bossy cat dresses up so nice. 
Woo, what is she going to do tonight? Flirt with men?” Or “Miss Canton really 
thinks she is Miss Canton. I can’t stand the way she walks.” A figure who stood for 
modernity and urbanity, Ying was seen to be on the side of management and capital. 
It was a negative image, not one the women workers wanted to imitate.
Becoming a Dagongmei
One night about a fortnight after she started working at the Meteor, I had a 
chance to talk to Mei-fang. At first she was still timid and kept her head low all the 
time. I tried hard to start conversation by asking where she was from, how old she 
was and how many siblings she had. She told me she was from a village in the north 
of Hunan Province, and something of her family situation, and then she started 
crying. I was upset by seeing tears flowing down her face. She said,
“Jie1,1 want to go back home.”
“Why? You worked so well in the factory.”
“I don’t know, I miss my home. I feel that I don’t fit in the workplace.”
“But why? You are not working slower than the other people.”
“I don’t know why. I just feel I don’t fit here. I feel I’m too different from the 
others. Next month after I get my wage, I’ll leave.”
One month passed and Mei-fang did not leave.
“Life is hard here, but if others can stand it, why not me?” she said to me.
1 I was called by the women workers in the factory as "jie", a 
Chinese term meaning elder sister, because most of the them were 
younger than me. "jie" showed a kind of familial familiarity.
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Mei-fang started to go out with other workers on holidays. At night she listened 
to Cantonese popular music with them. She bought more current fashions and wore 
lipstick. She asked me to help her buy hair shampoo, facial cleaner and a lipstick pen 
from Hong Kong as other women workers often did. All these helped them to shake 
off their rustic image and turn them into a modem dagongmei. Buying cosmetics was 
one of the ways I did favours for my co-workers, though not without a sense of guilt 
in introducing more and more commodified goods to “pollute” them.
Discriminations continued’....
If self-intemalization was one way to solve the identity crisis temporarily, 
discriminations against rural people did not stop there. Rural factory girls 
experienced the sense of an abject self not merely on the factory premises, but more 
severely in daily life outside the factory. Shopping in downtown Shenzhen was one 
of our favourite pastimes on holidays. Each month we had a rest day on the Sunday 
following pay day. Quite often I would go with my co-workers to Dang Fang Market, 
where we could find Hong Kong products at a relatively cheap price. Fashion shops, 
department stores, supermarkets, fast-food stores and cafes, all owned by local 
people, clustered around the two sides of the street. They were always full of people 
at night or on Sundays. Boutiques, supermarkets, fast-food stores and cafes were all 
symbols of the “western wind”, allowing people to “taste” the new way of life, and 
more importantly to affirm dagongmei with a modem self. One Sunday five Sichuan 
girls, Yue, Ling, Hong, Qin and Ping, invited me to go out with them. We decided to 
go to Dang Fang Market and I suggested that I treat them to a coffee in a cafe there.
From getting on the mini bus, to every fashion shop we went into, I could feel a 
strong sense of discrimination against us. Because we were speaking Mandarin and 
my co-workers had a strong village accent, we were told to hurry up onto the bus in a 
very impolite way. Because we were not dressed up in modern urban styles, 
salesgirls in the boutiques showed indifference to our interest in their fashions. They 
did not bother with us even if we asked the price. Their attitudes seemed to say that 
we were too poor to buy their products. Ping asked me to speak to the salesgirls in 
Cantonese when we headed for the next shop. I said, “If you want to buy something,
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then I’ll help you ask them in Cantonese. If not, I don’t want to speak to them. We 
should despise them far more than they despise us.” All the girls laughed, it seemed I 
was more annoyed than them. Ping comforted me, “Jie, you don’t need to be too 
serious. We are getting used to the local people’s discrimination. They think they are 
richer, don’t they?”2
We hung around the open market and then went into a supermarket. The 
supermarket has only become popular in recent years. To show its difference from 
local family-owned groceries, the supermarket provided a variety of foreign goods, 
stressed its concern for high quality foods, and the peculiar way it was managed. It 
puzzled us that security was as strict as on the factory premises. More than four 
security guards stood in front of the gate. We had to leave our handbags at the 
counter before we entered the gate. And because we looked like poor rural girls from 
Guangdong, a security guard followed us everywhere we went. But there was real 
reason to take us as potential thieves; the prices in the supermarket were 
unreasonably high. One cup of Japanese instant noodles cost eleven yuan , our salary 
for one day. We discussed, muttered, and chuckled, but never bought. Ping asked me 
how much the local people earned that they could afford to buy such expensive stuff.
I told them I had no idea and probably those stuff could never be sold. Hoping that 
my friends would not be subjected to a feeling of inferiority by simply introducing 
them to those expensive foreign commodities, I suggested we’d better go to a cafe.
I had not expected it, or I was careless, but it was the first time my Sichuan 
sisters had gone to a cafe. I felt guilty again for bringing them to experience a style of 
life that was not their own. They all had no idea what to order and the prices of the 
drinks were unacceptable to them, so they persuaded me to leave. But it was too late. 
A waitress was already standing at our table, looking us with a strange smile.
Yue said, “A coke for eight yuan?''
Hong echoed, “A tea for ten yuan). For ten yuan I can make one hundred cups.”
Ping whispered, “What is a drink for? Just water. It can’t make the stomach full. 
Should we go, should we go?”
■ Lee, Ching Kwan (forthcoming) in her ethnography of a Shenzhen 
workplace had similar experiences to me.
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Feeling embarrassed, I tried to calm them down and ordered drinks for them. 
Two coffees, two lemon teas and two soft drinks. The waitress finally left our table 
and I noticed that the people at the other tables all looked at us. I felt I had been 
unforgivably foolish to put my friends in such an awkward situation. Insults then 
followed. A few minutes later, a waiter brought us one cup of drink. It didn’t look 
like anything we ordered. I called back the waiter and he took it to the table in front 
of us. A man was sitting there. He shouted,
“Their hands have touched the drink. Bring me another one. You don’t know 
how dirty their hands are, those waixing meil (girls from foreign provinces)” Waixing 
mei was an abject term for girls from foreign provinces, that is, outside Guangdong 
Province. I felt so angry and burst out in Cantonese, “What’s wrong with waixing 
mei. A dog’s eyes always despise a human being!” He didn’t expect my sudden 
reproach, stood up and left the cafe, still with a disdaining gaze. In Chinese proverbs, 
a good man never fights with a woman. Maybe that was the reason he left without a 
word. We all laughed, and during the drink we continued to make jokes about this 
particular local man.
Back at the dormitory, I could not fall asleep that night. That disgusting man’s 
image was always in my mind. I knew too well that the term waixing mei coated a 
double discrimination of gender and rural-urban disparity. But probably it was the 
first time I had shared the same discrimination with my co-workers as lived 
experiences. The silence of the man might hide another layer of discrimination 
towards female subjects, though we enjoyed an instant win at that moment. Women 
were not worth arguing with; that was what the Chinese proverb meant. I headed 
over to Yue’s bunk and found she was still awake and writing a letter to her 
boyfriend, a recruit in the Beijing army. She wrote,
It was exciting today. We went out to Dang Fang market and had a drink 
in a modern and expensive cafe. An ugly local guy bullied us but we 
fought back. ... Shen, why are we so poor? Why do the local people 
always treat us as if we weren’t human beings? Do you remember when 
we were young in school, the textbook told us that people in a socialist 
country are all equals? But when I go out to the outside world, I find
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myself one hundred times more worthless than in the village. How do 
people treat you in Beijing? It’s our country’s capital. People there must 
be nicer. ...
Inventing Local, Kin-ethnic Identity and Inequality
Ethnic categories are broad classifications o f  people; they are 
frequently mapped according to a series o f  binary discriminations 
which oppose an ‘us’ to a ‘them ’.
R. Cohen, 1978, “Ethnicity: problem and focus in anthropology”.
The politics of difference and othering in producing subjects is further 
complicated by an intertwining of local, kin and ethnic relations in the workplace. 
Women workers in the workplace are not merely identified and classified as urban or 
rural people, but also more specifically by region and ethnic group. Girls from the 
north are dubbed with local names: Sichuan mei, Hunan mei, Hubei mei or simply 
Bei mei. Whereas Chaozhou mei, Canton mei, and Hakka mei are ethnic identities 
that tell of a woman’s local culture and dialect they speak. These are all common 
terms used in the workplace to identify individuals, especially in daily language 
when workers address each other. Identification of persons according to the principle 
of locality or ethnicity is political as well, since it embodies a sense of spatial 
inequality far more delicate than rural-urban disparity. Where you are from and 
which dialect you speak foretells your status and wealth, and thus your bargaining 
power and your position in the workplace hierarchy. Rural-urban disparity, as a 
bedrock for nurturing differences, is divided into minute hierarchies by intersecting 
with the elements of locality, and kin-ethnic identities.
There is an epistemological problem with the concepts of locality and ethnicity.
I take them not as fixed, inclusive categories in a structural-functional sense, but as 
performative cultural artifacts and practical relationships. These relationships are 
produced at instantaneous moments in specific situations. Thus they are all fluid, 
changeable, invented and re-invented. As Richard Fardon puts it,
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Precisely because ethnic terms serve and inform practical significance, 
which are liable to change, they share with Nietzsche’s pocket the 
characteristic of sometimes containing this, sometimes that, and sometimes 
several things at once. Contents tend to reflect the habits of the user, subject 
only to the broad constraint of the design of the pocket. Like pockets, ethnic 
terms have complex histories of use.
(1987:170)
The boundaries of local and kin-ethnic groups in the workplace are resilient and 
changing, definitely not hung up on geo-political definitions. Individuals negotiated 
or identified themselves to a group of fellows according to situational needs in 
determinate settings. The construction of local or ethnic identities was situational, 
performative, and variant. A local term like Sichuan mei or an ethnic term like 
Chaozhou mei could be expanded to include people from very different backgrounds, 
or narrowed to exclude quite similar individuals. Ethnic boundaries were between 
whoever people thought they were between (Fardon 1987:176). Moreover, local 
groups often overlapped with kin-ethnic groups. Geographical, genealogical and 
cultural elements all worked together to weave group identity and classify 
individuals.
“A7 shi shen me di-fang ren?”, literally “a person of what di-fang are you?”, 
was the most common question in the workplace. It was used to start a conversation 
or make friends with strangers. Difficult to paraphrase, it embeds much more 
meaning than the English phrase “where are you from?” Di means the place, the 
locality, while fang  embodies a cultural meaning of di, connoting specific kin and 
ethnic relationships. Thus “w shi shen me di-fang ren?” not only asks where you are 
from, but also what your kin-ethnic identity is and which local dialect you use. It was 
nearly equal to the question of “who you are?” in a more specific spatio-cultural 
sense. In daily conversations, to know “ni shi shen me di-fang ren” was far more 
important than to know “what is your name”, or “how old you are”. Workers in the 
Meteor seldom directly asked each other their names, but rather they asked their 
affiliation to localistic and kin-ethnic groups.
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Workers in the workplace were grouped into different local or kin-ethnic 
enclaves, and enmeshed into different networks of consolidation, obligation and 
authority. Local and kin-ethnic networks were not only developed by the workers 
themselves to facilitate migration and finding jobs, but also manipulated by the 
production machine to create a division of labour and job hierarchies. In the Meteor, 
all the important and supervisory positions were to some extent affected by localistic 
and kin-ethnic power. A line leader was chosen not only on her work capabilities, but 
also for her network and prestige among the workers.
Siu Wah, the line leader of Line C, chatted to me one day. She said the control 
of everyday operation on the shopfloor was not as easy as others reckoned. It 
involved the cooperation and consent of every worker in each seat. For a rush order, 
you had to be able to speed up the work pace, which required the girls’ cooperation. 
So, the most reliable persons were from you own kin and area, and what you could 
do was to enlarge your own group. Enlargement of one’s own local or kin-ethnic 
group in the workplace became the most important political way for dominant groups 
to maintain their status, or for weaker groups to struggle for enhancement. The 
weakest groups were the outsiders to the province, especially those from the North 
China, who were often called waixing mei or bei mei. They were forced to take jobs 
packing or soldering, the drudge work. Competition for “good jobs” was frequent 
and occurred everyday on the shopfloor. Workers thus relied on local or kin-ethnic 
power for daily negotiations.
The management skillfully made use of local and kin-ethnic relations to 
facilitate production efficiency and profit maximization and to facilitate everyday 
control of workers in the workplace. Locals and kin were considered responsible for 
each other’s performance. Where unskilled new workers were hired on a relative’s 
recommendation, they were often taught by their relatives. This saved the 
management time and money. Sometimes kin were made to take responsibility for 
those new comers who did not conform to factory disciplines or violated some of the 
basic rule of workers’ behaviours (Hareven 1982). The workers were afraid that if 
their recommendation proved bad or unsuitable, they would not have another chance 
to introduce a friend, and their reputation would be affected as well. This self-
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disciplining within local and kin-ethnic circles heightened the efficiency of labour 
control, and to a certain extent enforced the submissiveness of the female workers.
Local and kin-ethnic differences among workers were further exaggerated, 
invented and manipulated to divide and rank the work force. A work hierarchy was 
developed along the lines of the imagined cultural traits of each individual. Mr Chou, 
the Director, said that in ten years work experience in Shenzhen, he had developed a 
particular idea about each kin-ethnic and local group. He believed that different 
groups had different kind of personalities and possessed different natural work 
capacities, suiting them different kind of jobs. His imagination, or invention, of their 
peculiarities shaped the hierarchy of the labour force inside the factory. He saw the 
Chaozhou mei as submissive, attentive but clever, and thus suitable for accounting 
and personnel. The Hakka mei were shy, reticent but industrious girls, so after 
training they were fit for mid-level management such as foreperson or line leader. 
They were good listeners and good followers, so once given a chance you could rely 
on them. Chou said the Hakka girls were often viewed as the second best to the 
Cantonese, and other employers in Shenzhen liked to appoint Cantonese rather than 
Hakkas as supervisors. But he regarded Hakkas as better than Cantonese, because the 
Cantonese had more choices of upward mobility and were not as loyal as Hakkas. 
Those waixingmei, girls from foreign provinces outside Guangdong, were eager to 
show off their capabilities. Chou said they were oppressed by the Guangdong people. 
Local government and local people discriminated against them in job seeking, job 
mobility and the right of residence. Thus in the opinion of management, some of 
them were good and some bad. Chou thought the Hubei mei were better than the 
Hunan m e i , and the Hunan mei better than Sichuan mei, since the poorer the region, 
the harder working the workers. Hubei mei were considered as good operatives, more 
dexterous and more willing to toil hard. They had less bargaining power, especially 
when they were only a small group in the workplace.
1 8 0
Table 4 Imagined localistic and kin-ethnic peculiarities and Job hierarchization in 
the Meteor
Localistic and kin- 
ethnic origin
Imagined Character Job Position
Cantonese capable, astute, sociable secretary, supervisor
Chaozhou ren submissive, attentive, clever accountant, clerk
Hakka shy, reticent, industrious, reliable foreperson, line leader
Hubei ren, 
Guangxi ren 
Guizhou ren
timid, alert, dexterous, submissive quality controller, 
operator
Hunnan ren 
Sichuan ren
talkative, confident, hardworking operator, handyperson, 
maid
Thus, in the Meteor, different local and kin-ethnic circles were allocated to 
different positions by such stereotypical perception. The personnel department was 
occupied by Cantonese and Chaozhou secretaries, accountants and clerks. The 
forepersons and lineleaders were often chosen from the Chaozhou or Hakkas, while 
the operators were full of provincial outsiders. The job allocation was full of ethnic 
bias and discrimination, especially towards those provincial outsiders. No doubt there 
were heterogeneous views towards local and kin-ethnic peculiarities among different 
employers in Shenzhen, and it is always dangerous to draw any generalization. But 
the study in the Meteor told a valuable story; how the local and kin-ethnic cultural 
traits were imagined, articulated and then lived out in a specific workplace had a 
great impact on the job positions and job mobility of workers.
The manipulation of kin-ethnic groups was further tangled by the production 
machine’s use of them against each other to prevent labour resistance. Mr Wu, the 
Production Manager, said though local groups seemed to dominate in certain 
positions, he would not let them totally control any part of the work processes. On 
the lines, local groups placed on the same line were easier to control and train, but he 
would insert somebody from another group as a counter weight. Wu said he did not 
trust these groups. They had so many tricks and they could resist at any time by
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collective illness and slowdown. In Line B, where I worked, there were twenty-two 
workers; among them, eight Chaozhou ren, five Hakka, three Sichuan ren, three 
Hunan ren and one Guizhou ren. Our lineleader, Bai-lan was a Chaozhou ren. 
Coincidentally, I was a Chaozhou ren too. Bai-lan tried to keep a balance among 
each group and rarely showed preferences to any particular group, but in times of 
difficulty or rush orders, she still needed to rely on her own locals, the Chaozhou 
mei, to help her. On usual occasions and daily conversations, Cantonese and 
Mandarin were the two dialects most often used among our line and in the whole 
workplace as official languages. But it was easily noticed that when Bai-lan asked 
help from her locals, she would turn to the Chaozhou dialect. Distrust among groups 
was serious. Communication was not only blocked by different dialects, but also the 
constructed bias and discrimination from the production machine. A divided work 
force was created as local and kin-ethnic relations were mapped out to shape the job 
hierarchization and facilitate the labour control.
Daily Prejudice and Accommodation
As we have shown, individuals entering the factory were pre-inscribed with a 
localistic or ethnic identity, then a set of invented cultural traits and a pre-determined 
work capability. Cultural traits were manipulated and mixed up with economic 
interests, and so individual workers were snared into a hierarchy and then a conflict 
among themselves. Privileged groups such as Cantonese and Chaozhou ren self­
internalized themselves by mirroring a model image and living up to that invention. 
The abject groups, especially the waixing ren, resisted the derogatory images in 
either positive or negative ways. I had no moral judgment here. Positive ways mean 
that the workers tried hard to change their abject image by sticking to the capitalist 
work ethics, working hard to show their industriousness and looking for chances to 
show their capabilities. Negative ways mean that the workers simply followed the 
abject construction and acted according to it. Everyday life tactics again were fluid 
and strategic, and in different occasions individuals would react differently. The 
following is a part of my field notes recording a complaint by a Sichuan worker:
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10th April 1996 Li Ting’s anger
It’s about 11 PM. I’ve finished taking a bath and looked around to join in some 
women’s chat before going to bed. I passed Li Ting’s room, noticing she was angry 
with her room mate Yue, a Cantonese girl. On fire, Li Ting shouted,
“Don’t think yourself extraordinary as a Cantonese! Always you bully people. 
Always you bully people.”
Yue didn’t argue back but ran away to the other room. I calmed down Li Ting and 
asked her what happened. She said, still angry,
“This woman always runs wild and does whatever she wants to do. Never 
considers others and looks down on people. I can no longer stand up her. She is a 
Cantonese, she thinks she is big. She broke my bowl, and never intended to buy me 
to replace it. Instead she said my stuff blocked her way.... She never cleans the room 
but always criticizes others for making the room dirty and always thinks that waixing 
ren are much dirtier than any other species. ...”
Different local or ethnic groups in the workplace seldom talked to each other, let 
along made friends across their boundaries. Distrust was worsened by lack of spare 
time to communicate with each other. Daily conflicts escalated due to tight space and 
rush time and space. What’s worse, mutual creation of negative images toward each 
other further damaged the possibility of friendship or sisterhood. In the eyes of 
Cantonese or Chaozhou groups, waixing mei were often portrayed as uncivilized 
persons, much lazier and dirtier. Waixing mei, who though poorer were often better 
educated than the Guangdong people, viewed the Cantonese as rude, proud, astute, 
and never to be trusted. “These are the people who tread on my feet and remind me 
daily that I am a lesser human,” was the common feeling of waixing mei towards 
Cantonese. At work, waixing mei were discriminated against and allocated work at 
the bottom of the job hierarchy. In daily life they were excluded and bullied. Mutual 
exclusion, based on a construal of localistic and ethnic elements into a “personhood”, 
was arbitrary and no doubt violent.
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Nevertheless, the more mutual exclusion in the workplace, the more factory 
daughters needed to develop informal ties and forms of strategies to cope with the 
everyday life pressures. These ties of assistance and resistance in the workplace were 
tied into local and kin-ethnic relations. Locality and ethnicity can be manipulated for 
recruiting laborers and controlling the work force. But on the other hand, it also 
provides an arena for bloc formation in the workplace. By placing their own kin 
members in the same work division or same assembling line, the women could exert 
some control on the work process, though with strict limitations. The line leaders in 
the Meteor would place their own kin members on their line so as to extend the 
influence over the labour process, while the forepersons would train their relatives as 
the line leaders to facilitate control and accumulate power to fight over the speed and 
the rates of pay. For the line girls, having their kin or locals on the supervisory 
positions was the only possible way to guarantee their job security. More kin or
locals in the workplace also helped one get a “good job”. In times of sickness and
absence, the kin or locals would help to finish the remaining work so the woman 
would not be criticized. Factory rules stated clearly that nobody could help others to 
punch the time card, but helping kin to punch the time card was common. Women 
continued to protect their family members or co-villagers even by confronting the 
rules.
Language and Identity: Cantonization o f  the Workplace
The social uses o f  language ow e their specifically  social value to 
the fact that they tend to be organized in system s o f  differences 
which reproduce, in the sym bolic order o f  differential deviations, 
the system o f  social differences.
Pierre Bourdieu, Language an d  Sym bolic P ow er
The struggle over regional (rural or urban), local or ethnic identities leads us 
finally to the investigation of struggle over languages, specifically the politics of
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dialects in the workplace. Language is a system of differences3, produced and 
reproduced in a spider web of social differences, hierarchies and distinctions which 
construe the social reality. Struggle over legitimate language is highly political, as 
Bourdieu said, as it brings together the struggle over identity, status and power 
(1991:52-54). The politics of identity is enmeshed in a politics of language. It matters 
what dialect one speaks and what accent one holds. A hierarchy of dialects in the 
workplace was violently deployed in a war linked to the struggle over work position, 
resources and power.
The war of language in the workplace was launched in different directions, 
aimed at different goals. First, it was the rivalry between Mandarin and Cantonese. 
Mandarin was the official language in China, and politically superior. But it has lost 
its legitimacy to Cantonese, which has emerged as the victorious language not only 
in one Shenzhen workplace but in the whole of South China. The subordination of 
the national official language, Mandarin, to a local dialect, Cantonese, discloses that 
the importance of state power in regulating social life has given way to market forces 
in contemporary China. The war between the two languages does not merely reflect 
the intense combat between the state and the market machines in regulating social 
life, but makes it and shapes it. In the workplace Mandarin is still commonly used, 
but no longer endowed with power, superiority or a hegemonic position. Cantonese, 
on the other hand, has emerged as a commercial language versus the political 
language, and has got the upper hand in shaping the workplace hierarchy. The upper 
management were Hong Kong people, while the middle management were mostly 
urban Cantonese. The managerial language, therefore, was Cantonese. Managerial 
meetings, orders passed from a higher level to a lower level, and daily encounters 
among managers, supervisors, forepersons and line leaders were conducted mainly in 
Cantonese. Command of Cantonese then became a must for climbing the hierarchical 
ladder. One got a better chance of promotion not only because one could have a 
better understanding with the superiors, but also possessed the same habitus, the
3 I will not discuss Saussurian perspective to view language as an 
internal linguistic structure based on a system of difference here. 
But rather follow Bourdieu's line to the take the difference solely 
as social.
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same expressive style and was assimilated into the same managerial culture. Mr. 
Chou, the director and the four Hong Kong managers never uttered a word in 
Mandarin. Even when they knew the other person had poor Cantonese, they still 
insisted on talking in Cantonese. For them Cantonese was a cultural capital. It was a 
symbol of superior status and identity, helping them to exercise their authority more 
effectively. Language power was not invisible nor silently exerted on individuals, but 
rather explicitly demonstrated. Subordinates who were not native speakers, but could 
speak Cantonese fluently were appreciated and got more chance of promotion. Those 
who did not know Cantonese had to bear their own cost in misunderstanding or mis- 
communicating with the superiors or others. Anxiety was created among the non- 
Cantonese speakers. If one did not want to remain at the bottom of the work 
hierarchy, one was self-induced to learn Cantonese, or at least to understand enough 
to survive in the workplace.
Though there was a landslide to the commercial language, Cantonese, defiance 
and transgression happened from time and time. Tensions were particularly acute 
when a Mandarin speaker in a high position in the workplace came into contact with 
a Cantonese. Notable cases could be found in communications between the 
Engineering Department and the Production Department. The staff in the Production 
Department, both native speakers and outsiders, were totally assimilated to 
Cantonese. The engineers and technicians in the Engineering Department were 
mainly university graduates from Northern cities and showed a rather unyielding 
attitude to Cantonese. Accurate Mandarin, with Beijing toning, was still an emblem 
of their credentials, status and self-dignity. These young male professionals persisted 
in using Mandarin, even though they knew Cantonese and in fact all of them could 
understand Cantonese. Interesting encounters were found when the engineers spoke 
to the staff in Production Department. On the one side, one spoke in Mandarin, 
consciously maintaining the superiority of the national language drawn from its 
political capital. On the other side, one kept talking in Cantonese in the whole 
conversation, showing the victory of Cantonese as the only official language in the 
workplace and the industrial world. Both sides understood each other well and 
neither was willing to give in.
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Communication on the lines was more complicated, though the tensions were 
less acute. When the line leaders reported to the forepersons or supervisors, they 
usually spoke in Cantonese. But when they talked to the line girls, they were 
bilingual and preferred Mandarin when they spoke to waixing workers. Most of the 
lineleaders were not native speakers of Cantonese; some were Chaozhou, some 
Hakka. For them both Mandarin and Cantonese were foreign languages and they 
simply used them in appropriate situations. The leader of Line D, San was a Hunan 
ren: She seldom spoke in Cantonese on the line or to other line leaders. As a tough 
and capable figure in the workplace, she was promoted to the position not because 
she could assimilate herself to the managerial culture nor because of any particular 
relationship with the upper management, but solely because of her work capability 
and her rigid discipline. She was the one of the most disliked people in the 
workplace. She was never soft to the line girls and often accused them loudly in 
Mandarin. The line girls, particularly the Cantonese workers, often made fun of her. 
The Cantonese mimicked her Mandarin speech and tones to depreciate her status and 
authority by showing unmanagerial language.
Intrigued by her persistence in talking Mandarin, one day I asked her, “San, why 
do you always speak in Mandarin? You know Cantonese, don’t you?”
She replied, “I can’t help but speak Mandarin. I don’t know why. I knew 
Cantonese after I worked a year in Shenzhen. But I don’t want to speak in Cantonese 
unless I am forced to. Probably I don’t like the Cantonese. They are always too 
proud; they think they are rich, so everyone should use their dialect.”
But San was idiosyncratic; it was an exceptional case of resistance to the 
dominant language. The majority in the workplace were busy at, and induced to, the 
play of language politics.
The second dimension of the war was the internal conflicts in the dialect 
Cantonese itself. The language machine was not satisfied at creating a hierarchy 
simply based on the differentiation between Mandarin and Cantonese, but a more 
delicate differance built up on internal divisions within Cantonese itself. Cantonese 
in the workplace was further divided into different styles and accents, such as Hong 
Kong Cantonese, Guangzhou Cantonese, Hakka Cantonese (rural Cantonese) and 
Guangxi Cantonese. Accents were the embodied stigmata of cultural capital,
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inscribed with a hierarchical access not only to covert power, but also to 
institutionalized overt power. The more one could mimic Hong Kong Cantonese and 
Guangzhou Cantonese, the more one was granted with status and authority in the 
workplace. It was clearly noticed that the higher the managerial hierarchy, the more 
one was inclined to speak Hong Kong or Guangzhou Cantonese. The assistant 
managers and the supervisors could command fluent Hong Kong Cantonese because 
they were the ones who often contacted the four Hong Kong managers, and most of 
them were native Guangzhou Cantonese themselves. The forepersons and line 
leaders learnt Guangzhou Cantonese as well since they often communicated with 
their Cantonese superiors. If one stuck to one’s rural Cantonese and didn’t make an 
effort to change the accent, then one might be superior to the Mandarin or other 
dialect speakers, but one was still at the bottom of the internal hierarchy.
Yi-ping, a Guangdong Hakka, was the receptionist and phone operator when I 
started to work at the Meteor. As a friendly, young and pretty girl, she was promoted 
from the line to the counter. But within her one-month probation period she was 
moved back to the line again. “She can never pronoimce Lin and Ling accurately, nor 
can she make a distinction. She always connects the phone line to the wrong person,” 
Ling, the secretary in the general office grumbled to me angrily as I read Company 
documents there. “She is a Hakka from the rural area. She can’t speak Cantonese 
properly. You know, that is Hakka Cantonese. ... What’s more, her sensibility to 
spontaneous events is low and she doesn’t know how to handle unwelcome phone 
and calls and people....” Ling continued talking to me, showing her proper and 
beautiful Hong Kong Cantonese, despite the fact that she was a Chaozhou ren.
The sense of superiority was nurtured implicitly by juxtaposing two accents of 
Cantonese. One was Hong Kong Cantonese, distinct, elegant and authoritarian. One 
was Hakka Cantonese, rustic, low-ranked and devalued. Different accents of 
Cantonese prescribed persons with different cultural capital, and thus affected their 
bargaining power to fight for a higher work position and negotiate a new identity.
One night I found Yi-ping in the dormitory, listening to Hong Kong Cantonese 
popular songs. She was still hurt, and planned to leave for home: “I don’t want to 
work here, they made me feel inferior. If they don’t give me a chance, I will go 
elsewhere.”
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Knowing that her Hakka Cantonese accent counted against her, Yi-ping tried 
hard to change herself. She found every chance to talk to me, hoping that I could 
inculcate into her a more urbane and highly valued Cantonese. Listening to 
Cantonese songs was another favourite way to learn Cantonese, and she often sang 
loudly and openly.
Self-technologizing was complete when one dreamed, desired and determined to 
live up to the hegemonic mode of life; to acquire a modern identity as a dagongmei, 
and to command a superior dialect of Cantonese. To become a dagongmei, one had 
to change not only the “bad” habitus of one’s life style, but also one’s daily dialect. 
The cost of symbolic power was great; you had no choice but to scramble for it. 
Language was, as Nietzsche said, a hidden philosophical mythology. But it was also, 
as Bourdieu said, a hidden political mythology prophesying, coding and legitimating 
a system of social differences (Bourdieu 1991). The play of differance was political. 
The rural life was imagined as an alterity in order to be depreciated. For a rural being 
to become an urban industrial subject, he or she had to be divided from the totality of 
her or his past life, habitus, disposition, speech act, accent and identity. The rural 
world had to be imagined as a deficient reality that could not give birth to complete 
human beings or modem subjects. First the capitalist machine invented the rural 
beings as incomplete, as “lacking”. Then the rural beings thought and saw 
themselves as such. Huck Gutman, in “Rousseau’s Confessions: A Technology of the 
Self’ points out a double displacement: “deficient reality is transformed into the 
imaginary and the imaginary is superimposed upon the real in such fashion that the 
imaginary transforms, takes over, becomes, the real.”(1988:112) Deleuze and 
Guattari further illustrate this point and help us to conclude this chapter,
Capitalism institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, 
imaginary, or symbolic territorialities, thereby attempting, as best it can, to 
recode, to rechannel persons who have been defined in terms of abstract 
quantities....
The real is not impossible; it is simply more and more artificial.
(1984:34)
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Chapter VI Sexualizing Female Subjects:
Feminine Bodies and Multiple Identities
Being ‘m ale’ or being ‘fem ale’ emerges as a holistic unitary state 
under particular circumstances. In the one-is-m any mode, each  
male or fem ale form may be regarded as containing within it a 
suppressed composite identity; it is activated as androgyny 
transformed. In the dual mode, a male or fem ale can only 
encounter its opposite if  it has already discarded the reasons for its 
own internal differentiation: thus a dividual androgyne is rendered 
an individual in relation to a counterpart individual. An internal 
duality is externalized or elicited in the presence o f  a partner: what 
was ‘h a lf  a person becom es ‘one’ o f  a pair.
Marilyn Strathern, The G ender o f  the Gift
The “naming” o f  sex is an act o f  domination and com pulsion, and 
an institutionalized performative that both creates and legislates 
reality by requiring the discursive/perceptual construction o f  
bodies in accord with principles o f  sexual difference.
Judith Butler, G ender Trouble
Was Fat Guy a boy or a girl?
I was often teased by other women workers when Fat Guy held my hand as we 
walked together. “Like a real couple, or a pair of mandarin ducks” was the common 
response to our intimacy. The teasing would never happen when I went out with 
other women workers or even went to dine with a male worker. Fat Guy was a 
nickname given to Shu-tong, a girl of twenty-one, highlighting the male side of her 
appearance and her personality. With short hair, Fat Guy’s round face had big eyes, a 
straight nose and a thick-lipped mouth. Stout, energetic, and talkative, Fat Guy was 
famous for her quick disposition and her courage in confronting the upper 
management on the shopfloor. In contrast to other girls’ decorations on their beds, 
Fat Guy stuck on pictures of cars and planes instead of flowers, film stars and 
singers. She liked sporty wear. I was close to Fat Guy because we worked on the
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same line on the shopfloor and because she was much more active than the others in 
making friends with me. We often walked together to the factory or back to the 
dormitory, and had meals together as well. Friendly gossiping about our relationship 
didn’t irritate Fat Guy or me, and sometimes Fat Guy seemed to enjoy the joking that 
she could have me as a “wife”.
In the end I was disturbed by the relationship not because I was no longer 
willing to be Fat Guy’s “wife”, but because Fat Guy’s “perverted” sexual identity 
destroyed my ideal construct of dagongmei, an embodied identity of both class and 
gender. I have discussed dagongmei as a class identity in Chapter two. In this chapter 
I will begin teasing out the intricate processes of gendering on real lived bodies.
Nothing in writing this thesis has perplexed me as much as beginning this 
chapter on the sexual bodies of women workers. It should be an easy topic for me, 
with my training in feminist studies. But I hesitated a long time over how to begin. 
The topic, in fact, is very familiar for me, and xingbie, the sex/gender of one’s 
identity was so “natural”, sometimes fatally inborn and natural, for my shopfloor co­
workers, that it seemed not only difficult but also bizarre to stir up questioning, to 
keep myself distant from familiarity and to try to theorize. One belief keeps me 
insisting on challenging the familiarity, the naturalness of sex: “nothing is natural 
except nature”. The social order and the sexual order of the human world are never 
natural. The naturalness of these orders are the effects of power and the constructs of 
ideology. The deeper the power pervades, the truer the ideology creates, the more 
natural the order is and the harder it is to confront it.
From the Death o f "Subject” to Subject Positions
The difficulty in discussing sex, body and identity is set forth in the challenges 
from postmodern studies in the last decade. Where is the start of my analysis? How 
to understand dagongmei, a sexual subject in general and Fat Guy, an individual with 
conflicting identities? Searching for an appropriate unit or departure for analysis is a 
distressing, if not a disruptive, problem. Concepts such as “identity”, “subject”, 
“gender”, “sex” and “body” have become like phantoms floating in and out of my 
body/mind, and I cannot easily make up my mind which one is the best stepping
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stone for my ethnographic analysis. Commitment to feminist studies in the past few 
years has broadened my academic interest, but causes trouble when I try to formulate 
an analysis now. The challenge from postmodernism has put feminist theory into 
serious trouble. Without great courage, no one dares to speak out, since any type of 
representation will be problematic and we can no longer easily find a proper place 
from which to speak. No voice can dream of escaping the attack of postmodernist 
questioning, certainly not my own work which is framed under the discipline of 
feminism. In this chapter, I strive to look for a proper unit of analysis, some 
appropriate conceptual tools and a less problematic speaking position, which 
hopefully may provide the epistemological grounding for my ethnographic study.
Feminism, specifically western feminism, posited as a politics of identity, has 
had its epistemological grounding destabilized by the claim of “the death of the 
subject” of postmodernism. Western feminism, as a political project rooted in the 
Enlightenment ideal of justice and equity, has built up its intelligibility on a universal 
subject. It upholds an essential difference in femininity, which becomes a contentious 
locus of critique. The dialogue between postmodernism and feminism will not be 
detailed here and the diversity of various postmodemism(s) are not my interest.1 The 
questions here are: if the death of “subject” is real, can we speak of the category of 
woman, the presumed and pre-given subject of feminism? And even worse, will the 
category of gender, which was once a very powerful political and analytical tool, be 
useful anymore?
Here I am looking for a “postfeminist” position 2 and hold the view that the 
critique of an essential subject does not necessarily lead to a total abandonment of
1 For details can refer to Linda Nicholson (1990) ed. 
F em in ism /P os tm odern i sm , New York and London:Routledge; Michele 
Barrett and Anne Phillips (1992)eds. D e s t a b i l i z i n g  Theory:  
C onte m porary  F e m i n i s t  D e b a te s . UPC: Polity Press; Judith Butler and 
Joan Scott (1992) eds. F e m i n i s t s  T h e o r i z e  t h e  P o l i t i c a l .  New York 
and London: Routledge.
~ A "postfeminist" perspective should be understood as aiming at "a 
radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity 
appears to be necessary in order to formulate a representational
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historical subjects. This construction must be put under the scrutiny of a Foucauldian 
critique. For Foucault, the subjects are themselves the effects of disciplinary actions, 
fully embedded in and produced by matrixes of power and discourse. And the task of 
& feminist genealogy is to question “woman” as the proper subject of feminism and to 
trace and reveal the political operations which produce and conceal what qualifies as 
the juridical subject of feminism (Butler 1990:5). Feminist schools which tend to see 
women as a coherent and unified identity and formulate universal experience of 
women’s oppression are undoubtedly problematic. Differences between women and 
differences within women render all attempts to articulate universal experiences from 
the standpoint of women self-defeating. Feminist anthropology helps to formulate a 
notion of “dividual” self and argued that non-western subjects are often divided, 
fragmented, fluid and multiple (Cornwall and Lindisfame 1994; Moore 1994; 
Strathern 1988).
Can feminist politics theorize without resorting to an universalizing subject, or 
does it have to discard any commonalities between women? Can we still use the 
category “women” which is inherently fragmented and divided, and identities which 
are embodied as unstable and fluid? Judith Butler provides the following 
interpretation from a “postfeminist” view:
Identity categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and 
as such, exclusionary. This is not to say that the term ‘women’ ought not be 
used, or that we ought to announce the death of the category. On the 
contrary, if feminism presupposes that ‘women’ designates an 
undesignatable field of differences, one that cannot be totalized or 
summarized by a descriptive identity category, the very term becomes a 
site of permanent openness and resignifiability.
(1992:15-16)
Chantal Mouffe, from a similar stance, provides a clearer position within her 
framework of radical democratic politics. As she noted,
politics that might revive feminism on other grounds." (Butler,
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I will argue that, for those feminists who are committed to a radical 
democratic politics, the deconstruction of essential identities should be 
seen as the necessary condition for an adequate understanding of the 
variety of social relations where the principles of liberty and equality 
should apply. It is only when we discard the view of subject as an agent 
both rational and transparent to itself, and discard as well the supposed 
unity and homogeneity of the ensemble of its positions, that we are in the 
position to theorize the multiplicity of relations of subordination.... This 
does not mean, however, that we cannot retain notions like “working- 
class”, “men”, “women”, “blacks”, or other signifiers referring to collective 
subjects. However, once the existence of a common essence has been 
discarded, their status must be conceived in terms of what Wittgenstein 
designates as “family resemblances” and their unity must be seen as the 
result of the partial fixation of identities through the creation of nodal 
points.
(1992:371-3)
Subjects can be seen as the effects of power, and they are discursive constructs with 
their own possibilities, through a process of signification/resignification, 
differentiation and exclusion, and their own limitations in time and history. I would 
prefer to understand the subject of “subjects” as “subject positions”, whose 
emergence requires active political agency and articulation. Henrietta Moore helps to 
elucidate this point,
The basic premise of post-structuralist thinking on the subject is that 
discourses and discursive practices provide subject positions, and that 
individuals take up a variety of subject positions within different 
discourses.
(1994:55)
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Thus post/feminism as radical politics is possible not through constructing an 
essential gender identity of "women”, but by being grounded in various articulated 
subject positions and identities. The deconstruction of women as a coherent and 
unified identity will not put an end to feminist politics, but rather open up new spaces 
for more possibilities and alliances in specific historical situations and conjunctures.
Nevertheless, if gender identities are themselves fictive, articulated and 
constructed, what are their discursive limits, their materiality? This question moves 
me from the concern of “subject” and “identity” to “gender”, “sex” and “body”.
From Gender to Sex
If we are right in saying that gender identities are constructed through a process 
of signification, identification and exclusion of a human attribute, called “sex”, then 
the question at issue is: what is sex? Or how can we understand the relationship 
between gender and sex?
The practice of feminist anthropology has no difficulty in exploring the 
difference between women in different cultures. For many anthropologists, gender is 
a very obvious social and cultural construct. But the problem is that the discipline too 
often plunges itself into a gender/sex distinction, viewing gender as belonging to 
culture and sex to nature. Sex is often seen as a natural, biological attribute from 
which gender builds upon its symbolic signification. The relationship between sex 
and gender is very much under-theorized in most work on the anthropology of gender 
(Moore 1994:12).
Binary categories such as culture/nature, public/private, mind/body and 
gender/sex have been seriously criticized in the more recent works of feminist 
anthropology (Cornwall and Lindisfame 1994; Moore 1988, 1994; Strathem 1988). 
Various ethnographic studies on different societies show that differences of gender 
are not necessary identified by the binary sexed bodies, but can be located in all 
bodies, and the bodies are not viewed as unified wholes, but as androgynous 
composites. The greatest contribution of these studies is the finding that there is no
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one-to-one correspondence between sex, gender and sexual difference as is often 
understood in western discourse (Moore, 1994).
Ethnographic findings have contributed to challenging the gender/sex 
dichotomy of the western paradigm that tends to essentialize sex as a pre-given 
biological entity. We are then pushed to conceive of sex as culturally constructed, 
like gender. Sex, itself a gendered category, is produced as “pre-given” and 
“prediscursive” through the cultural construction designated by gender (Butler 
1990:7). Sex is then the effect, but not the origin of the “true” claim of gender. 
Michel Foucault makes this clear in The History o f Sexuality (Vol. 1):
the notion of “sex” made it possible to group together, in an artificial acts, 
sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious 
unity as a causal principle, and omnipresent meaning: sex was thus able to 
function as a unique signifier and a universal signified.
(1978:154)
In other words, sex is as fictive, articulatory and imaginary as gender. The category 
of “sex” is a discursive construct and its collusion with gender is coercive and 
compulsory. Judith Butler concludes,
The “naming” of sex is an act of domination and compulsion, and an 
institutionalized performative that both creates and legislates reality by 
requiring the discursive/perceptual construction of bodies in accord with 
principles of sexual difference.
(1990:115)
Some questions still remain: if sex is a cultural and discursive construct, itself a 
gendered category, should we retain the distinction between sex and gender? Can we 
distinguish sex from gender? Or does the concept of gender become redundant? For 
me, a feminist genealogy must not omit concepts such as gender or sex, but tear 
down their “true” claim as juridical operation, their coercive regulations in a matrix 
of power and discourse. If “gender” and “sex” are all historical constructs, what we
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do is not to throw away either or both; to deconstruct their claims to truth is to open 
up possibilities for our struggles.
The last but not the least question is: what is the materiality of sex? Here we 
come to the subject of “body”.
From Sex to Body
The return to the body, to the embodiment of the subject, is seen as the most 
revolutionary project of recent feminist theorizing. It announces the death of an 
universal, transcendental subject, and rejects a pre-given sex as the most natural way 
for a human subject to acquire a gender identity. Adrienne Rich was almost the first 
one to articulate the term “female corporeality” and to posit the “importance of the 
body to the constitution of the subject” (Rich 1976). Rosi Braidotti was more eager 
to claim the project of repossessing the body. The recognition of the embodied nature 
of the subject, and sexual identities, in particular, was a timely project. She argued 
that the body cannot be reduced to the biological, nor can it be confined to social 
conditioning (Braidotti 1991:219). The body is not the essence, but the interface, the 
threshold, between the material and the symbolic, and one’s primacy location in the 
world. She said,
In a new form of “corporeal materialism”, the body is seen as an inter-face, 
a threshold, a field of intersection of material and symbolic forces; ... The 
body is not an essence, and therefore not an anatomical destiny: it is one’s 
primary location in the world, one’s primary situation in reality. As a 
consequence, in the radical feminist philosophies of sexual difference, the 
strategy of repossessing the body aims at elaborating alternative forms of 
knowledge and representation of the subject. The embodied nature of 
subjectivity is posited so as to allow for the radical subversion of culture.
(1991:219)
The death of the “subject”, the rejection of a pre-given “sex”, leads us finally to 
the “body”. But is the “body” the final ground of any theory of a human subject?
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Nobody knows. The body is surely not a pre-social entity, but should we stop here? 
Maybe the way is to find out how the discourse of sex is created and regulated 
through the body in specific histories. Our effort to know finally draws us to 
Foucault’s knowledge of the body and power. Foucault’s approach (1978, 1979) on 
the materiality of “sex” and its link to “body” within a matrix of bio-politics, is for 
me, the most concrete one. The claim that the body is not only the inscription of our 
history, which should no longer be neglected, but also the place of departure of a 
genealogy is appealing. Judith Butler warns us that the Foucauldian body may risk 
being trapped into a “pre-social” body because it is often taken as the origin on which 
our culture and history are built (Butler 1990, 1993). However, we need to land 
somewhere to start our discourse. What’s more, the distancing of gender from sex 
and sex from body is an act of political engagement and political theorizing. If we 
want to distance the body from “somewhere”, it should be a political action, rather 
than an abstract epistemological inquiry that leads us nowhere. The body is neither 
pre-social, nor social, neither pre-given, nor determined. It is the interface where 
power can be pervasive and productive, where various hegemonic discourses can be 
most “naturally” legitimated.
For Foucault, the body is “sexed” within a discourse of sex to produce a 
monotonous modality of sexuality, which is itself an effect of a historically specific 
organization of power, discourses and pleasures (Foucault 1978). It is not because we 
have a body, that we have a sex, but rather we have a particular notion of sex, so we 
have a certain type of body. The modality of body is of course the effect, but not the 
origin of the sex, which is constructed in a specific set of social regulations and 
power relations. Foucault said,
the notion of sex brought about a fundamental reversal; it makes it possible 
to invert the representation of the relationships of power of sexuality, 
causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to 
power, but as being rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which 
power tries as best it can to dominate.
(1978:154)
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Hence, as Judith Butler has interpreted it, “sex” not only functions as a norm, but is 
part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs, that is, whose 
regulatory force is made clear as a kind of productive power, the power to produce 
the bodies it controls (1993:1). Thus, we not only need a history of sex, but a history 
of the body as well. The project of studying the body is first brought out in the essay 
“Nietzche, Genealogy, History”, where Foucault places the body as the starting point 
of the “effective history”, genealogy. The importance of a genealogy is to expose 
how the body is inscribed by history and how the process of history twists, shapes 
and destroys the body. The whole process is doubtless arbitrary, violent and imbued 
with a net of warring forces. This kind of knowledge of the body, called the political 
technology o f the body by Foucault, is what he tried to work out in Discipline and 
Punish and the History o f  Sexuality.
In short, it is this political technology of the body, sometimes called political 
anatomy, that I find provides the most insight for my own ethnography in the 
workplace. But it is not be the undifferentiated human body that interests me but a 
sexed female body. The bio-power of the factory machine is not only interested in 
modeling a general body, but a particular sexed body, a feminine body to fit the 
factory discipline. While Foucault dealt with the body and sexuality, he has been 
criticized for not paying enough attention to the gendered nature of disciplinary 
techniques on the body (McNay, 1992), or to a sexually differentiated body which is 
necessary for certain types of mechanisms or apparatuses. Thus, in this chapter, I 
will try to link up the process of politically technologizing the body, with the process 
of registering a feminine identity (gendering). I will look into language, local 
everyday practices, social discourse and institutionalized regulations. Particular 
attention will be drawn to the conflict embedded in the process of gendering, and the 
perversity, but not the homogeneity, of workings on bodies, which are conceived not 
as passive or docile, but living and resistant.
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En-sexing contemporary China
The whole nation is in a fever o f  making m oney.
The second theme o f  the epoch is: W omen. (W om en permanently 
cannot catch the first theme; this is the pity o f  sex!)
The interest in women by the society may be due to the fact that 
half o f  the great job o f  “the primitive accumulation o f  capital” is 
shared by women: prostitution. The consum ption o f  the female 
produces a greater stimulus to production and circulation than 
male consumption .
In a Chinese popular novel (1995), Tragedy o f  Sexes
It is high time to turn to the issues of sex and sexualizing the subjects in 
contemporary China. Any visitor to China in recent years will not be surprised by the 
proliferation of sex talk, discourses and consumerized images in Chinese popular 
cultures (Evans 1997). Signs of sex are everywhere, and we seem invited to a 
Baudrillardian world where female bodies are commodified and fetishized to such an 
extent that only a mass grave of signs are glorified (Baudrillard 1993). Nudes, erotica 
and all kinds of sexy, seduced female bodies, both western and Chinese, are found in 
magazines, posters, newspapers, the covers of novels, calendars and even serious 
academic books and periodicals. On every street comer advertisements on the lamp 
posts, tell the passer-by that some families have secret, local knowledge of an 
operation to heal some sexual diseases. Stories of sex and violence, uncontrollable 
sex drives and sex outside marriage are extraordinarily articulated in novels, video 
shows, TV programs and films. Painting, visual arts, and avante guard dance 
performances all focus on the theme of “feminine body”. Elisabeth Croll, after her 
numerous field trips to China in the past ten years, concludes:
The Reform period is thus marked by a new interest in the image and 
presentation of the feminine, focusing first on physical appearance and 
adornment. This is not surprising given that one of the most important 
characteristics distinguishing reform from revolution is the new interest in
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consumption, in consumer goods and in their style, colour, material and 
brand name, all of which have generated a new phenomenon - consumer
desire  the new interest in commodities and lifestyles has brought
about a new relation between people and things, so that persons have 
become classified not so much by their class background or “work” or 
occupation as previously, as by the possession of objects or their 
evaluation, so that identity has become associated with lifestyle rather 
than class label.
(1995:151)
The all-pervasive interest in female bodies in Reform China is guided by 
consumer desires, whose gazes are not only sexy, but sexualized. The consumption 
culture dominant in contemporary China is extraordinarily marked by its sexual 
appetites, especially for female bodies. Shenzhen night life — night clubs, karaoke, 
wine bars and hair salons — flourishes more than Hong Kong, since most of the 
manufacturing industries moved there in the mid 1980s. Night life around these 
places is closely related to various sorts of sexual or pornographic activities. My co­
workers in the Meteor warned me not to go to a hair salon without careful selection. 
The girls who worked in hair salons dressed in trendy fashions and were easily 
tempted to sell their bodies. Sometimes they earned double or triple the money 
factory girls made. But what puzzled me was: where should I go? There were more 
than ten hair salons near the factory. Most of them served local citizens or male 
customers, who were supposedly richer. If the density of hair salons per person was 
understood solely in term of hair services, it was unreasonably high in Shenzhen.
Hotels, especially small ones, were places for exchanging “illicit” sex. Young 
and beautiful girls from the North (the place they were from was highly emphasized), 
were told to wait in hotels and search for men alone. The phone would ring in the late 
night and ask you for “lonely heart” services. Bei-mei, the girl of the North, was a 
term with multifaceted and ambivalent meanings. Bei-mei was younger, fresher, 
more lush and virginal, so that they were more sexually aroused and desired. But 
these “good qualities” did not grant them higher pay than the ben-di-mei, local girls. 
They were cheaper even when they provided better services. In the process of sex
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trading, in the particular act of prostitution, the regional disparity between the North 
and the South was again produced and reproduced. Sex was not only inscribed with 
inequality between male and female, but marked with economic discrimination 
between the North and the South as well. Prostitutes were themselves hierarchically 
differentiated. Those who came from richer areas were worth much more those from 
poorer areas. Time after time the central government dictated anti-porn movements. 
But the local state was far more tolerance, since they saw the sex industry was 
closely linked to local economic development. One local cadre in the town told me, 
“No sex, no video shows, no clubs, no hair salons, no restaurants, no hotels, no 
money!” Sex linked up the whole chain of economic activities, just as corruption 
conjured up political life in China. No sex, no money.
Does capital have a sex?
These “sexy” scenes in open-door China make me ask: Does capital have a sex? 
Or simply, does capital need sex? It seems clear that where capital goes there is a 
proliferation of sex trade and sex discourses. Much research on women and work 
shows that the coming of multinational capital and the industrialization of developing 
countries leads to the disintegration of traditional morality and the growth of a porno 
culture ( Ong 1987; Truong 1990).
How are we going to understand this “sex boom” in Deng’s China? Is sex, as 
Jean Baudrillard says, simply dictated by the phallus exchange logic and design(at)ed 
nothing, and all female bodies are nothing but phallus simulacra? (Baudrillard 1993) 
On looking at sexual issues in China, I find myself totally at sea. I am more and more 
convinced that we are not living in one world, but many worlds at the same time. 
State socialism? Market socialism? Market capitalism? Or State capitalism? 
Perverted or hybrid forms of both or more? What are their relations to sex? How does 
sex as a political category, as Monique Wittig and Michel Foucault insisted, function 
in these meta-systems? Or should sex be taken as an economic-symbolic category 
rather than anything else? In contemporary China intangible discourses on sex, be 
they official, civil or foreign, be they at odds with one another, fight hard to grasp 
and produce the reality.
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First, civil and popular discourses put forward a repression thesis. Civil 
discourses from all ranks of society in literary works, popular stories and magazines, 
point to the fact that the state socialist regime was a machine that repressed sex and 
sexualizing identities. Nothing is better than a novel for exploring this theme. Zhang 
Xianliang, a male novelist, wrote a novel called H alf o f  Man Is Woman. It was 
published in 1985\ and triggered off a hot debate on politics and sex in China. The 
story was stirring in the way that it told us how a male political prisoner lived 
through his sexual drives and fantasies during his imprisonment during the anti-right 
campaign in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution in the mid 1960s. The writer 
directly condemned the political machine for its inhuman suppression and destruction 
of sexual life and sexual potency. The story reached its peak when the male 
protagonist, after much political suffering and sexual repression found himself 
impotent on the night of his marriage. The novel also accused the political machine 
of neutralizing sexed subjects and turning all gender identities into only one political 
subject: tongzhi, the comrade4. The outcry against the state regulation of sex was 
posited as a direct act of resistance to the dehumanization of “human nature” by the 
political machine. The state machine, with its emerging crisis of legitimacy after 
Mao’s death and the end of Cultural Revolution, was no longer justified in regulating 
sexual life and gender subjectivities -  or the entire life of society, for that matter. But 
sex and gender identities were by no means central to social life. The emergence of 
the novel in 1986 was thus a prologue to the “hot wind” of sexual liberation and the 
hidden agenda of social change in China. Repression invited liberation. Nothing 
special. What surprised us was that a transsexual subject, which Jean Baudrillard said 
would be found in late capitalist societies, emerged instead in state socialist societies
3 The English version of H a l f  o f  Man I s  Woman, translated by Martha 
Avery, was published by W. W. Norton in New York in 1986.
A The problematics of the story on gender and gender subjectivities 
were discussed Zhong Xueping, 1994, "Male Suffering and Male Desire: 
The Politics of Reading H a l f  o f  Man I s  Woman" in E n g e n d e r in g  China:  
Women, C u l t u r e ,  and t h e  S t a t e . Eds. Gilmartin, Christina, Gail 
Hershatter, Lisa Rofel and Tyrene White. Harvard University Press.
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at a much earlier time, not through the political economy of signs, but through the 
political economy of politics.
Second, official discourses still put forward at a bourgeois disease thesis. As 
Harriet Evans says, the official discourses on sexual issues in the contemporary 
period are largely a response to the changing popular beliefs and practices. Though 
no longer effective, the state has never lost its interest in regulating individual sexual 
conduct and marital behaviour (Evans 1992, 1997). She puts it,
However, the apparent autonomy of popular practices, and the emergence 
of new spaces facilitating the elaboration of discourses on sexuality 
removed from the controlling arm of state power have not eclipsed state 
interests in defining appropriate marital and sexual behaviour. For 
alongside the abundance of advice and information about sex-related 
matters, and despite the changes of modality of the official discourse of 
sexuality, it is clear that much of it is, as in the 1950s, oriented towards 
channeling individual, and particularly female, behaviour in the service of 
social and moral order.
(1997:156)
The “sex boom” of the last decade was still seen as an attack on Chinese society by 
the corruption and disease of bourgeois values, after China opened its door to 
western capital. The worn-out ideological machine from time to time repeated the 
rote formula of the revolutionary period: sex was dangerous to the rising proletariat; 
indulgence in sexual life was bourgeois. It was a phenomenon of moral decay. The 
Chinese revolution should keep its purity by distancing itself from corroded western 
values. But this time the ideological machine was a little bit depressing. Its failure to 
safeguard its virginity was all too plain. After three decades of closure, the elderly 
revolutionary leaders are leading the country to copulate with the western world and 
pollute themselves. What can they say?
The productivist logic of Marxism may perhaps help us to understand the 
attitudes of the state socialist machine towards sex and sexualizing subjects. Engels 
in “The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State” (1884) stated clearly
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that sexual exploitation was subordinate to class exploitation. Therefore the 
emancipation of women into the production field in a classless society would 
dissolve the inequality between two sexes. Production would clear the ties of 
economic dependence of female on male and raise female status. So what was 
important for human emancipation in a socialist utopia was actually production and 
technology. Who was going to lead the socialist revolution and the production 
revolution? In the orthodox Marxist terminology, it was the proletariat. But in the 
eyes of Mao, in the particular Chinese circumstances, the revolutionary agents of 
independence and liberation were most unlikely to be proletarian, but mainly 
peasants. It was first and foremost a nationalist struggle, and then a class struggle. 
After the Liberation in 1949, the owner of the country was the proletariat, or more 
accurately the producer. To build a new China, to catch up with the western “paper 
tigers”, the state machine emphasized production more than anything else. All 
countrymen were mobilized and planned to participate in the socialist construction. 
Rapid collectivization of the urban and the rural societies aimed at rapid 
accumulation and production. What the machine needed then was not sexual subjects 
as men and women, nor the sexual division of labour that mattered so much in 
capitalist societies, but tongzhi, a unified subject embodied with the “same will” as 
the state socialist production. No class, no gender. They were all redundant. What’s 
more, the myth of creating a transsexual subject - tongzhi lay not only at a 
productivist logic of the state machine, but in an absolutely pure logic of production 
without consumption. There was actually nothing called consumption, but only 
allocation in Mao’s China; food and all daily necessaries were strictly rationed, 
calculated and distributed to each person and each household. The motivation of 
production was not consumption or “market will” as in capitalist societies, but solely 
political will. An absolute transcendent political will was a complete narcissistic 
machine; it needed no other but only its own. There was no mirror for sex. If sex 
emerged, it could only be as diseases that would erode the virginity of the completely 
narcissistic machine. Can we then say that the “sex boom” foretells the breakdown of 
the narcissistic machine?
Third, foreign oriental discourses put forward a petty capitalism thesis. For 
example, we find an American expert, Hill Gates, trying to give us an explanation of
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the commoditization of women in contemporary China. She imagines a specific 
Chinese culture and a kinship and gender system that was hyper-stable for more than 
one thousand years. Then all economic activities, including the transnational capital 
pouring into Deng’s China, are forced to revolve around the kinship and gender 
system. Hill Gates tells us,
The commoditization of people must be seen as a persistent and
continuously reproduced element of Chinese culture I see as motivated
much more by a well-established indigenous petty capitalism than by the 
effects of an exogenous capitalism.
(1996b:8)
Women trafficking in China, widely reported in the Chinese press since the late 
1980s, attracted domestic as well as international attention. Women were found sold 
to be brides, prostitutes and labourers in various provinces in the last decade. What is 
to blame? What causes the commoditization of the female bodies? Here our American 
expert treated us as fated by the “dangerous persistence of the extraordinary strength 
of patriarchy”. Of course, in Chinese style even “Taiping rebels, May Fourth 
schoolgirls, half a century of Marxism - Leninism - Mao Zedong - thought, and the 
formidable counter examples of their own mothers have had little influence on the 
profound sexism of most Chinese.” (1996a:9) She said it was due to the patriarchal 
Chinese kinship and gender system that motivated patrilineal households to buy 
women as wives and labourers. Economic life centered on the patriarchal family 
turned women into commodities that could be bought and sold. So it was not capital, 
nor poverty or surplus population, but the Chinese family on their own who trampled 
on their daughters. Gates’ portrait of Chinese society seems to mirror Levi-Strauss’s 
Savage societies, in which woman, as an item of exchange, was traded to consolidate 
the bonds and ties of the kinship groups controlled by men(Strauss 1969). Chinese 
history, always exotically imagined, was thus never changing; the Chinese males 
could not help but extremely sexist and the Chinese females powerless marionettes, 
their fate dictated by the long-lived Chinese kinship and gender system. The subjects, 
the historical agents with lived experiences, never existed in Gates world views,
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which is completely at odds with my understanding of the women workers in China’s 
workplace.
Imagining Dcigongmei
Dagongmei is a hegemonic identity embodied with changing class and sexual 
relations in contemporary China. As I have mentioned in Chapter V, it is a specific 
cultural artifact/produced at the particular moment when international capital came 
to China in the post-Mao period. Dagongmei is a condensed identity; it unfolds the 
full story of how a collective state economy was opened to a privileged world 
economy and how capitalist practices in China depended entirely on the regulation of 
class and gender relations. I have discussed class in chapter two. Here I will focus on 
the sexual orientation it embeds, holds and grants. My argument here is that capitalist 
practices, as practices of hierarchy and difference, require many divisions of the 
society; so sexual difference was a major regulatory project. Dagongmei, as a term 
contrasted to gongren{a non-sexualized subject in Mao’s era), entails sexualization 
within industrial work. Mei, as I said before, means the female, the girl and the sister. 
Feminization of the labour use in Shenzhen and other economic developing zones 
illustrates clearly that the basic industrial labourers, especially cheap and unskilled 
workers, capital needs are female workers. Men, dagongzai, are not excluded, of 
course. But once they are needed, they are given different positions, as we will see 
later in the sexual division of labour in the workplace. Labour, thus, no longer taken 
as an unsexed subject, is a sexed subject exhibiting itself more as a sexual being than 
a class being in contemporary China. Sexualizing the labouring bodies is the project 
of capital, rather than the project of state. We can see this if we compare the two 
social subjects: gongren in Mao’s period and dagongmei/zai in the contemporary 
period. For gongren, sexual difference was disguised and made redundant in socialist 
labour relations. Women were introduced into the “world of men”, be it light 
industries, heavy or military industries. The system said that women upheld half the 
sky in socialist China, and could do whatever men do. In the official regulatory 
practices sexual difference was diluted and made meaningless through propaganda 
and institutionalized arrangements. With the general disillusion with socialist
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practices, the subject gongren was gone, or became an out-dated mode of everyday 
discourse. Dagongmei/zoi is a newly coined term, especially popular in South China 
and economic developing zones in the North. It exhibits its sexual orientation to the 
body of labour at first glance. The natural, disembodied world of industrial labour 
was set on the process of sexualizing; its sex was not to be veiled, but to be regulated 
and named.
In the workplace, it is not difficult to find that the regulation of a sexed body is 
now fundamental to the control of labour. Given that Meteor was a world of young 
girls who dominated in almost all the seats of the assembly operation, it was always a 
headache for the upper management, the foremen, and the line leaders, often male, to 
manage over their labour. None of the foremen, or line leaders, male or female, 
would take the dagongmei as pre-given submissive female bodies waiting for them to 
regulate at their own will. (Any foreman I talked to would complain about the girls’ 
discipline. Management needed to articulate, perform and repeat everyday the 
submissiveness of women, often with an imaginary feminine figure pinned on the 
real working bodies. Here are records of daily language from the management used 
to invoke sexualized bodies in order to facilitate labour control:
Shun (foreman of Line C): Mei, you're a girl, how can you speak to me like this? Didn't your 
parents teach you how to be a woman? Do you speak to your father like this?
Hong (assistant manager): Rough voice, rough qi (energy), don't you want to get married and 
get out? Behave yourself when you’re still a young girl.
Li (foreman of Line A): Girl, have you got ears? You never do exactly what I tell you to do. 
Where is your heart? Gone with your lover in the village?
He-chuan (foreman of Line B): Mei, don’t you know you're a girl? You should treat the work 
more tenderly. How many times do I have to remind you?
He-chuan (foreman of Line B): Look at yourself, like a nanren po (a butch girl). Can't you learn 
to be like a woman?
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Such remarks were often heard in the workplace, particularly when the workers’ 
discipline had to be tightened. What interests us is that the workers were far more 
often taken as sexual subjects than as labouring subjects. The identity as a labourer 
was less important than as a female in the eyes of management. The regulation of 
gender was invoked when labour control was at stake. The workers were often 
reminded of their femaleness- “you are a girl”. It was inscribed and coded onto the 
working bodies. One was not merely a worker, but more important to one’s life, a 
girl, and a woman in the future. As a girl in the process of becoming a woman, one 
should behave as the culture required: submissive, obedient, industrious, tender and 
so on. The underlying implications were: “You are a girl, you should be obedient 
enough to do what the management tell you to do. You are a girl, you should not be 
defiant to your superior by speaking in loud voice. You are a girl, you are going to 
marry someone, serve someone, so you better train yourself to behave properly. You 
are a girl, you should take care of the job you do as you one day will take care of 
your family. As a girl you are going to be a woman, a wife and a mother of men. ...” 
The inscription of the feminine attributes to a girl, the regulation of a girl’s behavior, 
of course did not concern her future life in general. Rather, her future life as a wife 
and as a mother was deployed for the present technologizing of bodies as docile 
labour.
But what is interesting is that maleness was posited at the same time as the 
degrading opposite, a warning to the girls’ behaviour: “You should not be like a boy, 
a boy is lazy and troublesome. You should not be like a boy, a boy is careless and 
without tenderness. You should not be like a boy, you can’t get married.” Maleness 
was articulated as an oppositional and abject sexual attribute that a girl should not 
have, if she wanted to become a good female and thus a good worker. Judith Butler 
was right to say that “the subject is constituted through the force of exclusion and 
abjection, one which produces a constitutive outside to the subject, an abject outside, 
which is, after all, “inside” the subject as its own founding repudiation.”( l 993:3) 
Despite the constant implication that maleness was supposedly contradictory to their 
self-esteem and self-identity, it always seemed that those who possessed the power to 
speak were free of gender constraint. So often when He-chuan, our foreman,
2 0 9
condemned girls for manly behaviour, he seemed to forget he himself was a man too. 
It was so naturally practiced that nobody could cast any doubt on the legitimate 
correspondence between a female gender and a supposedly good worker. Discursive 
power was not only pervasive, but also elusive. The “unnatural” could become 
“natural”, or common sense in daily life. Further, regulatory power tried hard to 
create anxieties among the subjects themselves- there would be shame if they, as 
girls, behaved like boys. “Dividual”, as Marilyn Strathern said, were often taken as 
individual whole, and one could only choose or be forced to choose, either as a 
female or as a male. No internal ambivalence or variation inside the individual was 
allowed, at least in the hegemonic sexual discourse. Femaleness and maleness were 
created as a fundamental binary opposition in human beings. Girls in the workplace 
actually cared less about being unable to get married than about not living up to the 
imaginary feminine. Girls could seldom fight back if their foremen or line leader 
attacked their sexual orientation as male. Girls were induced to fear their sexual 
ambiguity or perversity, as they were taught to behave like a female and cultivate 
their femaleness. Sex here was definitely a politics, a policing of bodies. The 
feminine was not only imagined, inscribed but also developed, installed and self­
desired. Objectifying and self-subjectivizing were the same process. Dagongmei was 
never only a subject of power, but an object of one’s own desire as well.
iSexual Division o f  Labour
Femininity was always imagined and linked up to the performance as a decent 
worker. But the women workers in Meteor knew quite well that in the pyramid of 
hierarchy inside the workplace, the female, not the male, was actually the inferior 
sex. While they might not fully understand how their femaleness was regulated and 
articulated time and again in the everyday disciplinary practices, they knew well that 
the division of labour was rigidly sex-segregated. Meteor was a world of women, but 
not for women and by women. On top of them, there were men as their foreman, as 
their manager and as their director. No matter how often they were reminded not to 
be mannish- “don’t behave like a boy”, it was the male who got the power and status, 
with a higher wage and benefits. Women workers in the workplace had to live up to
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the ambivalent realities construed by disciplinary discourses, daily language and 
institutionalized power, which were often inherently splitting and self-contradictory.
Workplaces where girls were predominant, such as garment, electronic, shoe 
and toy factories, were often called “peach orchards” in popular magazines and 
stories. They were depicted as female places of love, joy and happiness. It was 
nevertheless a male-orientated if not a sexist metaphor, creating dreams of men to 
pursue lovely sexual objects in the peach orchards. While a workplace full of girls 
might be an orchard of peaches for the male, it was definitely not a world of joy and 
happiness for the female, at least not for the women workers in Meteor. The sexual 
division of labour was as rigid in Meteor as in other Shenzhen workplaces. Of over 
six hundred workers in the workplace, about 78% were female. They were 
predominant on the assembly lines, and were placed in all kinds of work processes: 
subassembling components, screwing, air seasoning, soldering, molding, functional 
testing, quality controlling and packaging. Jobs were allocated on a hierarchical 
basis, with a sex-segregated pattern apparent.
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Sexual division of labour in Meteor Electronic Company
Electronic Engineer 
(6 male)
Electronic Technician 
(8 male)
Mechanical Technician 
(6 male)
Porter 
(9 male)
Company Director 
(1 male)
Manager 
(2 male 2 female)
Assistant Manager 
(3 male)
Supervisor 
(2 male 3 female)
Foreperson 
(4 male 8 female)
Line leader 
(28 female)
Operator 
(284 female 15 male)
Quality Controller
(72 female male)
Bonder and Functional Tester 
(46 female 6 male)
Packer 
(8 male 12 female)
Stock Handler 
(9 male 15 female)
Factory General 
(1 male)
Secretary 
(1 female)
Accountant 
(1 female)
Clerical Staff
(12 female)
Cook 
(1 male 2 female)
Cleaner 
(5 female)
(Data in March of 1996)
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The worlds of management and assembly workers were sternly stratified. The 
management were not entirely men, but male and masculinized female. In the eyes of 
the line girls the top level of management was a world of the masculine, cool, deep 
and untouchable. Though two managers and three supervisors were female, they 
were all taken as men or “as capable as men”. The director, Mr. Chou, and the four 
managers, Mr. Li of the Engineering Department, Mr. Wu of the Production 
Department, Miss Tang of the Quality Control Department and Miss Jen of the 
Material Stock Department, were all from Hong Kong. As in all the large foreign- 
owned corporations in China, the most important posts were not left to the Mainland 
Chinese. Mr. Chou was the founder of the Meteor and had worked in Shenzhen for 
ten years. He had a firm and disciplined paternalistic image. He was an untouchable 
authoritarian figure in the workplace, especially for the line girls on the shopfloor. He 
seldom appeared on shopfloor except when accompanied by “red beard, green eyes” 
white men touring the Company. If he did show up on his own, it meant a serious 
problem had occurred.
Mr. Li, over fifty, was a Hong Kong bom professional; he could not speak 
Mandarin well. He was the most easy going of the Hong Kong staff. Mr. Wu, in his 
early forties, was a new immigrant to Hong Kong in 1987. He was one of the first 
generation of university graduates when China resumed university education after the 
Cultural Revolution. He was hired for such an important position because of his 
specific background. The Production Department was the largest department in the 
Company, Mr. Wu said. They had more than three hundred and fifty workers, and 
Meteor needed somebody who was not a Mainland Chinese but knew Mainland 
Chinese workers well. “The bosses thought I was a expert in Chinese economics and 
knew how to control the workers’ psychology.” Mr. Wu said to me one day. After 
graduating from the Economics Department in Nanjing University, he first worked as 
an accountant in a state-owned enterprise in Nanjing. In 1985 he was promoted to 
secretary, the highest position in the enterprise. He chose to leave China because 
status and power could no longer satisfy him. He looked for a higher living standard 
in Hong Kong.
Miss Tang was employed as the QC Manager, probably because she looked like 
a man and was strong and authoritarian enough. Her sexual identity as a lesbian was
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top secret, but nobody could control the rumors and gossip all over the workplace. 
People called her Mr. Tang to her face and nanren tou, “Man head”, behind her back. 
Miss Jen was a stout mother. She left her husband and son in Hong Kong and worked 
in Shenzhen. As with other Hong Kong staff, she could only leave the Company and 
go home on Saturday afternoon and had to return to Shenzhen very early Monday 
morning. Mr. Chou told me he preferred to find men from Hong Kong to take up 
managerial posts in Shenzhen, because men carried less family burden. Women, even 
when they were strong enough like Miss Jen, would still take the family as their first 
concern. “But the Company doesn’t have enough budget to hire men. You know they 
will demand higher salary,” Mr. Chou explained.
The Department of Engineering and the Department of Production were 
considered the two most important departments in the Company. In the Department 
of Engineering, all positions as engineers, technicians, work study analysts and 
machinists were occupied by men. The electronic engineers were the people who 
designed the operation of assembly lines and decided how each work process on the 
line should run. The work study analysts studied and determined the time, speed and 
pay rate of the line. The technicians and machinists helped to make smooth the 
operation of each work process, and maintain and repair the conveyor belts and all 
the machines and tools. Orders and ideal designs of production were then sent to the 
Production Department, which undertook the actual daily operation of production.
Under Mr. Wu, Tin and Shen were the assistant managers in charge of the 
production lines and the bonding department respectively. These two men were 
university graduates from big cities, with qualifications that women could not dare to 
envy. On the shopfloor, it was actually Tin and Shen who held direct control of 
production and the highest authority over the line operators. It was clear that the 
whole production process was under the control of men, who gave orders and 
decided the work speed and wages for women. No one complained about male 
authority in the workplace, since gender issues were covered by the rural-urban 
disparity and educational level as well. In the eyes of line girls, Tin and Shen were 
not only male, but urban born and highly educated; it went beyond the point of 
articulating any fundamental challenge to male power.
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The assembly operators, though predominantly female, were not a homogeneous 
group. They were categorized into three grades. The basic operators concentrated on 
one job. The second grade operators were competent in at least three jobs, and the 
first grade operators knew almost all the jobs and could be moved up and down the 
line as required. Some of the first grade operators were called “flyers”; they were 
trained for all the work processes and could be called up for every position, if 
somebody was absent, sick, unable to speed up or had gone to the toilet. Most of the 
time, assistant line leaders were chosen from these “flyers” who were considered 
capable and experienced and dared to speak out. “It is difficult to find the right 
people for leaders among the line girls. Girls are so talkative when they crowd 
together. But at work, they are so timid and afraid to criticize the others,” Tin tried to 
explain when I asked why the managerial strata was dominated by males.
Men were not totally excluded from the assembly lines, but over 90% of the 
positions were occupied by women. Assembling tiny electronic components is often 
considered women’s work since patience, care, sharp eyes and nimble fingers are 
required. In the Meteor the management emphasized, a totally submissive work force 
under strict control which in reality they did not have. Mr. Chou, the Company 
Director said, “Men, especially manual workers, are potential troublemakers. They 
can’t sit still all day and work like a machine. So if there’s a choice, we would of 
course choose girls.” At the highest level of management, girls were often imagined 
to be more submissive, attentive, dexterous and thus more reliable than boys. But 
middle level management, nearer to the actual shop floor, often hold different views. 
Yet for Mr. Chou the gender-selective labour practices were so natural and taken for 
granted that any questioning became meaningless. Most of the management practices 
in Meteor were inherited from the common practices in Hong Kong, where once light 
industrialization took off in 1960s the feminization of labour use and sex-based job 
segregation were the dominant patterns. When Hong Kong capital moved to 
Mainland China in 1980s, these practices moved as well. Managers from Hong Kong 
were well imbued with these sex-stereotyping ideologies. In China, these reinforced 
sex-based job segregation. The reason for the feminization of labour use and sex 
segregation in the workplace might be a little bit different in specific locations and
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particular industries, but the pattern of gender-based job segregation was pervasive, 
at least in Shenzhen.
Due to the sexual segregation of jobs, the wage system was organized on a 
hierarchical basis, favorable to male workers, which conspicuously reinforced the 
inferiority of the female sex in the workplace. The wage system at Meteor was 
complicated. It deployed various payment methods, like monthly pay, daily pay, 
hourly pay, overtime work pay and production bonus, at the same time. Ail the office 
staff and staff above line leader grades were paid at a monthly rate. The line 
operators and manual workers were mostly paid at an hourly rate. Normal working 
hours, in the daytime were paid in renminbi, with RMB 2.4 per hour. Overtime work 
at night was paid in Hong Kong dollars, at $3.6 per horn*. The worker preferred Hong 
Kong dollars because they could buy imported foreign commodities.
Male staff had a more stable form of payment, and the average wage of male 
workers in the Meteor was 42% higher than that of female workers. There were five 
supervisors, two male and three female. The male supervisors earned 900 yuan per 
month, but the female supervisors were paid 200 less. All the female operators were 
paid at an hourly rate, with the average pay around 400 to 600 yuan a month. One 
third of the pay depended on overtime work; otherwise the basic wage would be just 
enough to pay the food and rent. “We all hate night work, but it is the only way to 
earn Hong Kong dollars and the money,” line girls on the shop floor often 
complained to me(I was the only one in the workplace not paid).
Finally, the uniforms and overalls of our factory helped to symbolize and draw 
the labouring bodies into the world of sex hierarchies. Men and women were put in 
different kinds and different colors of uniforms and overalls. These signified 
position, status and power. Except for the director, everybody — the managers, the 
office staff, the shopfloor staff and the workers — were asked to be properly 
uniformed. But there were great differences between who wore uniform and who 
wore overalls. The male engineers and technicians had to wear white shirts, whereas 
the male supervisors had blue shirts, and the female supervisors blue dress sets. 
Shirts and dress sets were formally recognized as uniforms, clearly articulating the 
symbols and representation of power that belonged to the management strata. 
Uniforms and overalls were the basic cutting line differentiating between the
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managerial staff and the basic workers, the male and the female, and the controller 
and the controlled.
Despite the fact that the forepersons and line leaders might sometimes be 
considered as the representatives of the management strata, they nevertheless were 
dressed in overalls rather than unifonns, but in a different colour from that of the 
operators. They were dressed in yellow, with all the operators in white and blue. 
Operators on the QC lines wore white overalls, symbolizing a slightly higher status 
than the production lines operators in blue. The gender hierarchies covertly revealed 
and reproduced in uniforms and overalls were often unrecognized. I poignantly came 
to the realization of myself as an inferior sex with a degraded body, when I put on a 
blue overall as a line girl working on the shopfloor and looked at Tin and Shen, our 
assistant managers, as they walked through our benches in proper shirts and pants. 
They were superior, even by appearance.
Perverted bodies
Nevertheless, dagongmei as an obedient and submissive social body was merely 
a hegemonic construction: though powerful enough, it was often contradicted in real 
life struggles. For example, the hegemonic power failed to co-opt Fat Guy’s sexual 
identity. Fat Guy worked with me on the same line and was always a headache for 
management. She refused to feminize herself and openly acted butch. She was quick 
to air grievances and express her opinions when she saw unreasonable arrangements 
or unfairness. But she was loved as well as loathed by our line leader and foreman. 
She often worked faster than anyone else on the line and was able to help the others 
when their work was piling up. She rarely asked for sick leave; rather, she often 
helped take girls suffering from menstrual pains or other bodily discomfort to the rest 
room or the hospital. It was considered inappropriate for unrelated male workers to 
touch the female body, especially when the girl was menstruating. Everybody knew 
Fat Guy’s important role on our line. Thus, the regulation of sex did not work on her. 
That is not to say that the factory disciplinary machine completely failed to regulate 
her behaviour, but it needed to resort to other strategies.
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Despite a lot of gossip and innuendo about her, Fat Guy insisted on having her 
own way. “I don’t mind that people say that I’m mannish. I don’t like girls timid, 
screaming and fussing all the time.”
Fat Guy liked to make friends with boys rather than girls in the factory. She 
often went out with male workers to see films or videos with violent and heroic plots. 
Women’s talk at night, the most usual entertainment after working, did not attract her 
much. She thought girls gossiped and murmured too much. Girls in the workplace, 
on the other hand accepted her as butch and treated her as a boy. They came to her 
when they needed help. Here, body, sex, identity, had no one-to-one correspondence; 
and neither body nor sex could provide legitimacy for sexual identity. The sexual 
identity was not split, but ambivalent and different.
The ideal construct of dagongmei as a docile feminine body was further 
disrupted in my mind when one day I saw an unbelievably terrible scene:
Girls ’ Fight
It was a winter night, windy and cold. At ten, after overtime, I dragged my 
extremely tired body back to the dormitory with Fat Guy. Fat Guy told me she would 
queue up for hot water for me to bathe, and she asked me to have a few minutes rest 
in bed. Every night we would struggle over whether to bathe or not, especially on 
cold nights; if yes, we needed to queue up for hot water, sometimes for more than 
half a hour. At the end of our dorm rooms, a big stove warmed hot water between ten 
and twelve at night in the stove room. Since hot water was provided within limited 
hours, women frequently helped relatives, co-villagers, and good friends to wait for 
hot water. Sometimes one person would bring four or five buckets from the long 
queue. Queue jumping happened frequently and squabbles and arguments followed. 
It was a site of contestation.
I told Fat Guy I would check the queue first. If it was too long, I would not take 
a bath that night. When we entered the dormitory gate, approaching the stove room, I 
heard loud noises and I thought it was another argument. Fat Guy screamed, “They 
are fighting, they are fighting with each other.” We ran to the spot; two groups of 
girls were wrestling. With roaring rage, one girl hit the other girl’s face with great
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strength. On the other side, another girl fought back by scratching the hair of her 
opposite. As Fat Guy tried hard to stop the fighting, she was pushed away by a thin 
young girl with grave force. I stood still, terribly frightened by the violence. ...
I couldn’t sleep at that night, forced to contemplate conventionally and sadly on 
how these girls could be so violent?. Violence is often believed to be a male 
attribute; it belongs only to man. Fighting should only happen to men, not to women. 
But at that night, my convention was disrupted again. It hurt to ask why these young 
girls were so brutal, so aggressive as boys sometimes were. And I knew it was 
senseless to ask about “human nature”. We were all forced to live in an inhuman, 
harsh and intolerable environment. No one knew how long they could stand it. 
Leaving the factory, and going back to the village was one choice. But suspicion, 
quarreling, and even fighting were also ways to release grievances, especially those 
suppressed for a long time. It was the outside environment that mattered. What was 
the point if I retreated back to the “inside” of a subject, the “nature” of a human 
being? Violence is a social relationship and must therefore be located in its historical 
and social context. Violence is never sexually prescribed, it is socially and culturally 
assigned.
The fighting girls were all dismissed on the second morning. No investigation 
into who was right or wrong was needed. These girls all confronted factory 
discipline, and the reason that everyone in the workplace knew in their hearts was: 
they did not behave like girls! They were like unruly boys or animals.
Women's talk, Herstory and Negotiating Female Subjects
After bathing, about half past ten at night, it was the time of women’s talk. 
Talking was so important in factory life when everybody was kept mute for working 
a whole day. Women grouped to each other based on the ethno-kin lines that 
provided the most crucial supporting networks for their daily accommodation in a 
new industrial world. Girls from the same villages, counties, or simply same 
provinces, sharing the same dialect and similar living habits would make close links 
among each other. When the time of their own came, that was so minimal, talking
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everywhere would start. We often heard men complain that when several women 
came together, you could never stop their talking. aQi zui ba she” (seven mouths and 
eight tongues), was a Chinese idiom used to designate talkative women who were so 
eager to speak out, at least should operate seven mouths to fully express themselves. 
“Qi zui ba she”, of course, was term of contempt; its semantic meaning overtly 
showed the desire and power of men to keep the women silent. Women’s talk had 
long been seen as a threat to patriarchal order (Cassell 1977, Spender 1980). In the 
workplace women’s talk was a double threat to the male order as well as the 
managerial order. At night women gossiped about the managerial figures, exchanged 
information on personnel policies and found out who was punished for confronting 
the factory rules, who succeeded in finding a boyfriend, who was so disgusting and 
always flirting with the girls. They chatted about sex, childbirth, family and 
complained about food. Since I could speak fluent Chaozhou dialect, sometimes I 
jumped in the talk among the Chaozhou women.
Two Chaozhou cooking maids, aged over forty, circling by several girls, was the 
target of complaint. “Aunt, do you think the food in our canteen is too poor?” Lan, a 
young girl from Chaoyang asked.
An younger cook instantly replied, “Daughters, I never want you to eat poor 
rice. But what can I do? I do my best to serve you.”
“But aunt, the food is really rotten, not even my family’s pigs will eat it.” 
Another girl called Jin interrupted.
“Oh girls, don’t talk, something bad that will spoil your fortune. You are all 
young, you all had never eaten bitterness and gone through hard times. At the time of 
famine in 60s, we all ate wild vegetables and tree bark.” The older maid spoke in a 
rather sentimental way, calling back her memory of hard times to convince the young 
girls.
“Wow, aunt, you are talking about something terrible. But the age has changed.” 
Tong-tong stopped the words of the maid.
“You are too lucky, and too happy in this generation. You’ve got no sense of 
women’s bitterness in the past. You now have pretty clothes, earn your own money 
and go where you want to go. Who could be like you when we were young? We 
never dreamed of leaving the family and the village. Women, always kept at the
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home, did all the cooking and chores, waiting to get married and give birth to sons,” 
The maid insisted on talking. All the girls chuckled. The maid felt a little bit easier 
and continued to talk about “women’s bitter herstory”.
“You don’t understand women’s lives, do you? You won’t know what bitterness 
is before you taste it. Girls, there is still long road ahead of you. In future, when you 
think you can marry a husband and enjoy happiness, you will find yourself alone in a 
foreign family that is not your own, never. Your father-in-law and mother-in-law will 
keep a strict eye on you, and even your husband can’t help you. And within two 
years, if you still can’t lay eggs, then you will know what kind of life will follow 
you. All the gossips in the village will target you. You feel shame for yourself and 
your husband’s family. Old Master in the village will start to prescribe herbal 
medicines to help you. Then comes the big stomach, the ten months pain and the 
extraordinary pain at the moment of delivery. You are all young, you can’t even 
imagine the pain. It kills you, it kills you, but every woman will go through it. It is 
woman’s destiny.” The older maid muttered to great interest.
“Oh, aunt, please don’t terrify us. I don’t want to be like that. There is no point 
in us living like that,” Jin stressed her view.
“But there is no choice; when I was young, I thought Chairman Mao could help 
us, I heard of women’s emancipation. I guessed I could stay in my own family and 
didn’t need to marry out. But still my father asked me to marry out at the age of 
nineteen,” The younger maid supplemented the older.
“Oh, oh, aunts, your age is past. Nowadays, we can run away from our families 
and find a job in the factory. We can send money back to our fathers and they will be 
happy too.” Tong-tong showed optimism.
“You are telling child’s tales. How about when you get older and older? Will the 
factory still want you? Women’s place is in the family. You don’t believe me, do 
you?” the older maid said.
One of the main theme of the women’s talk in various cultures was to articulate 
the herstory of women’s lives and tell it to the younger generation through spoken 
words. Excluded by the formal and official written records in our patriarchal world, 
women’s experiences of their own lives were either kept marginal, trivialized, or 
simply seen as non-existent in our history (Ardener 1975, Rich 1979). But stripping
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away women’s right to write or to be written could not keep their mouths shut. It was 
not true that women trapped in a patriarchal order could never express themselves, 
could only have “a problem without a name”, or had to translate their experiences 
into the male code in order to express themselves(Ardener 1975; Irigaray 1977; 
Olsen 1978). My study in the workplace shows that in whatever oppressed place, 
women have never been a muted group. That belief could only be a dream of male 
dominance. The women herstories in China have long been an oral tradition, 
memorized, imagined, and passed through generation and generation (Croll 1995:11- 
12). It was this kind of women’s oral herstories that helped to construct women’s life 
world and make sense of women’s experiences to themselves. The oral tradition, a 
rich cultural capital, provided not only stories, examples and models, but also a lively 
genealogy, from which women could learn and negotiate themselves as female 
subjects.
It was usually the case that the older women, who had more experience in life, 
obtained more power in articulating what women’s life should be and what was 
women’s fate. But the above episode showed that women’s oral herstories were 
never reified, and far from authoritarian and totalizing. There were always spaces for 
different women in different generations to share their own experiences, to shape 
their various world views and to negotiate their own identities. Although “women’s 
bitterness” was the embracing theme across all Chinese women’s herstories, there 
was still room for women of different ages to participate in negotiating how much 
“women’s bitterness” a “normal” women should undertake. Lan, Jin, and Tong-tong 
belonged to a younger generation who run away from the patriarchal family, and 
found jobs in big city. Even if the jobs were temporary, they were not willing to eat 
the same poor food their aunts did. Life stories of the past might provide a reference 
and mirror for the younger generation to make sense of women’s lives. But they 
could not over-determine any matrix. They were not rules like written down 
documents which taught you how to behave yourself. Marriage and giving birth to 
sons might be the inevitable fate of women in the previous generations. But for our 
young factory girls, short-term escape to the city had already let them know there 
were other possibilities and alternatives of life. “The age had changed,” they said,
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and believed it strongly. But nobody had yet said how they could work out the 
changes in their own lives.
Gossips, power and multiple identities
Another night I was invited to eat “sweet soup” in a Cantonese group. The girls 
were all from Qingyuan, the poorest rural area in Guangdong Province, and they all 
worked in the QC Department. Food and gossip, the most enjoyable moments in our 
factory life! Gossip flowed naturally, wildly, and again came to focus on Miss Tang, 
the manager of their Department, who was from Hong Kong. Miss Tang’s sexual 
orientation was always a topic of gossip, and that Miss Tang was a lesbian was both 
top secret in the factory and known to everybody. Many women told me about her 
and each asked me to keep her secret. Mr. Tang was the nickname given by her 
subordinates in front of her. Behind her back, everybody dubbed her “nanren tou”, 
Man’s Head, to emphasize her maculinized appearance and personality.
Qing turned the gossip on Miss Tang: “I saw nanren tou eating with her 
girlfriend in the McDonald’s.”
“When? Did you see her girlfriend? Is she pretty?” All the other girls asked.
“Last Sunday. I could only see her the side of her face, you know, I dared not 
enter. I looked from the glass wall. I guess she doesn’t look bad. Very well dressed 
and strong make-up. Dong told me that one day she saw them walking in the street. 
Her girlfriend was taller than her,” Qing answered.
“But our nanren tou looks quite handsome, doesn’t she?” Bin said.
“Wow, somebody is secretly in love with our nanren toul” Qing teased, and all 
the girls laughed.
Getting teased, Bin responded instantly, “What rubbish you are talking? Will I 
love a person who is so harsh to us? I think because she treats people so hard and so 
emotionless, that’s why she become abnormal. Can I love a pseudo-man, who is in 
fact a woman? Can I?”
We continued to laugh despite Bin’s explanation. “Why not? She is rich, 
powerful and handsome. I bet if she chooses you, we can all get promoted. Please do 
sacrifice yourself!” Another girl called Hua cackled.
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“But how can a woman love a woman? Hm, I am asking seriously. How can two 
women have sex? Can they give birth to baby?” Bin turned her head to me, expecting 
an answer from me and trying to divert our attention from her. Unwilling to intervene 
in their talk, I simply said, “They can have sex, but they can’t have a baby through 
their sexual intercourse.”
Qing added, “I saw a magazine one day, It said that in the western countries 
they have a lot of gays and lesbians, who don’t care about social and family pressure 
and insist on getting married to each other.”
“How strange! They can many. But it’s good for them, isn’t it? At least they can 
have family,” another girl named San said.
“But it’s still a pity they can’t give birth to a baby. I think a woman’s life can’t 
be complete without getting through marriage and the delivery of babies,” Bin 
muttered.
“Oh, Bin, your thoughts are a little bit out-dated. Today, who will care about the 
stuff of delivering sons? Happiness is more important!” Qing responded.
“Yet finding a good husband is still important, isn’t it? When we go back home, 
we can’t stay our whole life in our father’s house, can we?” Hua asked.
“Oh, Hua, you are talking5 with somebody, aren’t you? When are you going to 
marry him?” Bin asked back. All of us chuckled again and Hua blushed.
“I still have no idea. I don’t want to go back home too early. But last New Year 
when I was back home, the man’s family already asked my father. Last month, my 
boyfriend came to visit me. He tried to convince me to come back home too.” Hua 
spoke in an embarrassed tone,
“What a lucky woman! You must have done a lot of good things in your 
previous life. By the way, will you accept sex before your married life? Qing teased 
again, and we all fell into chuckles.
Hua instantly flushed and shouted, “I won’t, I won’t!”
“Wow, virginity is so important to her.” Qing continued to make jokes.
“I do believe that virginity is important for women. We shouldn’t easily lose it 
to someone if we can’t be sure if he’ll marry you or not. You know, there is no hope
J talking means dating somebody.
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for us to get married if there is a rumor that we have sex with somebody before,” Bin 
talked in a rather thoughtful mood.
“My father will beat me to death if he knows I have that relation with a man in 
the city,” the quiet San murmured.
“Oh, I don’t think it is wrong. If I really love a man, I don’t mind,” Qing raised 
her tone, a naughty expression on her face.
“Alas, what a liberated woman!” All the girls turned to joke at Qing and 
laughter continued.
Food, gossip, jokes and laughter were all too crucial for us in dealing with hard 
and boring factory life. Gossips and laughter demonstrated the power of the female 
workers, however minimal, to tease the patriarchal and capitalist orders. Paul Willis 
pointed out a long time ago, that “having a l a f f w a s  a way to defeat boredom and 
fear, to ease the hardship and brutality of life, and thus was a way out of almost 
anything (1977). “Having a laff’ was clearly a weapon of the weak to fight against 
the alienation of work and the subsumption of labour to capital. Of course I had a 
problem with laughing at Miss Tang’s lesbianism as an abnormality, and that kept 
me silent throughout the whole conversation. But at that moment, still bound by their 
cultural practices, laughing at Miss Tang’s sexuality was one way for the girls to air 
their grievances against the brutal life in the factory. Moreover, “mucking in” the 
manager’s sexual affairs, if one was willing, was a possible way to get promotion and 
advantages. The factory girls learned that sexuality was political, and something they 
could decide to manipulate it or not. Like labour, sexuality was also something that 
belonged to the workers, but which could be alienated and subsumed to the logic of 
capital. Sexual relationships between male supervisors and female line girls were not 
absent in our workplace, but were frowned on heavily by all those not involved. 
Maybe out of envy and competition, since there were many fewer male than female 
workers. Dating and sexual relations were usually often seen as advantageous and 
functional, but in the end were futile, if not evil.
Another focus for gossip was the love affair between Gen, one of the 
supervisors in the Production Department, and Jing, now the secretary of the 
Department. People kept on telling me that Jing was only a line girl before she knew 
Gen, and how she was a nice and humble girl before. But now she was completely
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proud and seldom talked even to her ethnic-kin group. “You see the strong make-up, 
nobody is stronger than her. I am sure I won’t want to learn from her, selling sex in 
exchange for a higher position.” I had already forgotten who passed on this gossip to 
me.
Despite some bias, there were real social and cultural reasons for them to worry 
about any love and sexual relations they might have. First, if the man was an urban 
citizen, his family probably would not accept a girl of rural origin. Second, if both 
sides came from different provinces, the girl’s family might not approve the affair 
either, since the marriage system in China was still patrilineal. No family wanted 
their daughter to marry far away, unless they were really poor. Third, there were 
many rumors in the workplace that once a woman got pregnant, the man would run 
away and there would be no hope of finding him. It was an anonymous industrial 
world, not a communal village where everybody knew each other. Most girls thought 
that it was not worth it to exchange sex for a short term interest and, in the end, ruin 
one’s whole life.
“Having a la ff’ thus was more than a weapon that was deployed to poke at the 
management. Jokes, laughter and rumors were exactly where the women workers 
played out their gender subjectivities. Having a laugh was having their views and 
ideas on sex, love and marriage exchanged, conjured, and thus helped to suture their 
female identities. Jokes and laughter had more importance than is usually assumed. 
During joking and laughing, women were more capable of articulating their feelings 
and emotions, albeit conflicting and ambivalent, such as love and hatred, desire and 
fear; dream and anxiety. There was Bin who thought “a woman could not be 
complete without getting married and giving birth to babies.” There was Hua who 
took marriage as an important life path for women. But there was also Qing who said 
sex for happiness should be acceptable. Feelings and emotions expressed in the 
talking and joking were all part of a process of sexualization (Hearn, Jeff & Parkin 
1987). They were how girls colluded to play out themselves as sexualized subjects.
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Cultural Representation o f  dagongmei
In Shenzhen and other economic developing zones, numerous popular 
magazines and stories centering on dagongmei emerged in the past ten years. The 
most famous were Shenzhen Ren (Shenzhen People), Nil Bao (Women’s Magazine), 
Dagongmei (Working Girls) and Wailaigong (Migrant Workers). The themes always 
stressed the struggle of life and death in the modern industrial world, the changing 
attitudes towards sex, love and marriage and the desire of turning into a modern man 
or woman. These magazines helped to create a variety of lively images of 
dagongmei. Not without imagination, and not without exception, the working girls 
were often portrayed as sexualized subjects. Sometimes they were even actively 
sexual agents, who dared not only to leave the village looking for a job, but also 
looked for love and men. Often coated in a sad mood, predicting the difficulties of 
pursuing “true” love, the stories nevertheless provided a new construction of female 
subjectivities, in contrast to the old traditional image of submissive Chinese women. 
In a column, “Special Economic Zone cannot take care of dagongmeVs love” in 
Shenzhen Ren (1994:11), several short stories told how active and bold the 
dagongmei were in seeking love:
One male line leader and ten line girls
On the first day working on the packaging line, Ping said: the male line leader 
was so handsome! Working for two years, she had been in six factories, but it was 
the first time she’d met a handsome line leader. Ping’s words threatened the other 
nine girls on the same line, for the line leader had became the scrambling little prince 
of ten hearts.
The line leader was a Guangdong boy. He didn’t complete his university study 
and went out to work. 1.72 metre tall, he was not too fat and not too thin. With a 
white skin and wearing a pair of glasses, he looked mature and a little bit shy. His 
actions were sharp and his words generous; he played no favourites among the ten 
girls, nor said anything unnecessary to anyone. For what needed reproach, he 
reproached all. For what needed concern, he showed concern to all.
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The ten love seeds sprouted at the same time. Those who were bold wrote love 
letters and sent gifts to him. Those who was timid loved him secretly in their hearts. 
Among the line girls, a war of love was launched openly, seriously affecting 
production. The male line leader could not deal with the situation and was forced to 
leave the factory. Without a word to the line girls, he was gone.
One foreman and six working girls
The foreman, with the surname of Lai, could not compete with the other boys in 
the company, as he was short and quiet. From day to night he toiled hard on 
production and nothing was special about him. He was only aged 22, but the workers 
all called him “old boy” or “work mania”.
However, six pretty girls in the workplace all loved him. They had all written 
love letters to him and waited for his reply. But he never uttered a word, as if nothing 
had happened. Cing was the prettiest girl in the workplace. Unlike the other girls, she 
was not disappointed and never stopped writing letters to him. Everyday, she was the 
first one on the shopfloor and worked very hard to increase the work pieces, in order 
to attracted the foreman’s attention. Yet he still made no move.
Finally Cing was in despair, and could not face the foreman. She quit her job 
and became a salesgirl in a hardware store. However, the foreman often came to the 
store to buy materials. She quit the job again and wrote to him: she would go 
somewhere he could not see her. She went to work in a big hotel as a waitress. 
Unfortunately, there was nowhere she could hide; every Sunday, the foreman went 
with the boss to have breakfast in the hotel. They met again...
Cing wrote another letter: “You don’t love me. I can’t see you again, I have to 
go.” She left town.
One handy boy and a woman supervisor
Coming from Guangxi as a boy, it was not easy for little Tao to find a job in a 
craft factory. He worked as a handy boy. He cleaned the shopfloor and the toilets, 
and loaded materials and products. He got a lower wage than anybody else and often
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felt inferior. However, as the slang goes: a fool has more happiness. He received a 
love letter from Miss Chan, the famous production supervisor in the factory.
Little Tao was throbbing and could not believe i t  Yet after a couple of letters 
from Miss Chan to “invade” him, he finally “surrendered”.
They rented a flat and lived together. Miss Chan took the role of breadwinner. 
She paid for all little Tao spent and helped him to send money back home 
regularly....
Little Tao could never believe in the “love” he had found. Not knowing how to 
take advantages from people, he left quietly, his hot and sincere lover in tears.
Not without problems, all these stories construe hot and desiring female 
subjects; dagongmei who are far more active than men in expressing and pursuing 
love. The traditional hegemonic discourses framed women as passive sexual objects, 
waiting for men the hunter. But popular culture instead favours an impressive image, 
a modern working girl who challenges traditional sexual relations and takes active 
roles. The Chinese peasant girls no longer stay at home, following their parents’ 
arrangements or waiting for the matchmaker to decide their fate. Instead they were 
encouraged to get out, to leave their village and look for their own love and life. 
“Your body is your own”, “Holding tight to love” and “Control your own fate” -  all 
these hidden messages were conveyed through popular culture and became 
contemporary mottoes for modem female life.
This was life in a transitional period. Old cultural practices, new urban 
cosmopolitan models, pressures and guidance from the communal rural society, 
desires and pursuits in a modern yet anonymous industrial world, all mixed up and 
worked together to form significance for new femininities. There were no fixed 
boundaries and stable reference frames, no harbours in which new subjects could 
take refuge. As Elisabeth Croll said,
Confusion is the prevalent theme in present-day representations of women 
and in the written and spoken words of women themselves. Tension and 
confusions is openly expressed again and again in the numerous short 
stories in the past ten years in China.
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(1995:172)
In the workplace, alternative models of sexuality like Miss Tang’s, new ideas from 
the western countries through mass media and popular culture, new experiences in 
urban life, all kind of contradictory ideas, behaviours and experiences were nurtured 
and contributed to making fluid and split female subjects. Women workers in 
contemporary China were forced to live with conflictive feelings, not of their own 
making.
To end this chapter, I introduce one of the most popular songs in the workplace. 
During my stay in the Meteor, I could find no way to escape hearing it everyday:
Tomorrow I am going to marry you6
Second hand, minute hand ticks and ticks in my heart
My eyes glisten and glisten with emptiness
My heart goes pit-a-pat, pit-a-pat, throbbing continuously
I ask myself how much I love you 
How eager to live with you and fly far way
My heart’s throbbing up and down, up and down continuously Wow.....
Tomorrow I am going to marry you
Tomorrow I am going to marry you
If not the everyday traffic disturbs my dream
(If not that night the electricity stopped, I discovered my loneliness and 
emptiness)
Tomorrow I am going to marry you 
Tomorrow I finally marry you 
If not ask me
6 A song sang by a Taiwanese male singer in Mandarin. My own 
translation.
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If not persuade me
If not at the suitable time, you let my heart throb
(But at this particular moment, I feel frightened and afraid)
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Chapter VII Scream, Dream and Transgression in the Workplace
A scream pitched into the darkness o f  the night. It was four in the 
morning as usual. Yan always had the same nightmare and 
shrieked again. I was woken by the ghost-like voice, to find it 
passing, and the deep silence o f  the night reigned again.
I moved to Bin’s room and shared a bunk with her because there were 
complaints about a woman worker called Yan who screamed late every night in her 
room. Eight people crowded into one small room, less than 100 square feet, sharing 
four double-decked iron beds; lucky to be thin enough to jam into the room. This 
was, however, a normal dormitory in Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in China. 
Relations among the girls in this room were tense, not only due to a lack of space and 
privacy, but also because of Yan’s screams, which first frightened all her room mates 
and then disturbed everybody’s sleep. I suffered too, not from disturbances in my 
sleep, but from a difficulty in grasping, understanding and then speaking for the 
voice. Yan herself seemed to suffer least; she consciously woke up at a particular 
moment of her screams and then fell asleep again immediately. A high pitched voice 
followed by a dreadful silence - after a week’s stay in the room, I was disturbed by an 
anxiety to understand the voice. Can the subaltern speak? Can one experience the 
other’s experiences? For the former, Gayatri C. Spivak says No; for the latter, R. D. 
Laing says No. Silence is the only response.
The silence brings me to the experiences of human suffering, pain, transgression 
and resistance. Some of those experiences are non-communicable, while some are 
universal human experiences. The experiences I had in the workplace were 
nevertheless rooted in the local world, bounded by specific historical epoch and 
socio-cultural transformation. The last, but not the least, questions I would like to ask 
in this chapter include :
1. Can there be an anthropology of the voice? I had no difficulty in experiencing 
the dreadful silence after the voice. But the voice itself spoke nothing. It emptied 
its fullness with a high-pitched sound and an overwhelming power in destroying
2 3 2
language. How can I record the voice, understand the voice, bring it into the 
symbolic world and pin it down into my signifying chains? What are the grounds 
and ethics of interpretation? Where is the limit, the possibility of speaking for 
the impossibility?
2. Can there be an anthropology of human pain? At the end of the ethnographic 
study, I am pushing myself to the limit of bodily pain, which as a universal 
human experience again defies the very possibilities of cultural categories and 
symbolization. Can anthropology provide a way to capture the core of human 
suffering? If pain is forced to be spoken out, are there any cultural differences of 
inscription, significance and then different experiences of human pain? If bodily 
pain is experienced as bridging the somatic and social space, as Arthur Kleinman 
argued, can the discipline of anthropology transcend the oppositional productions 
of “truth” of pain between biomedicine and psycho-analyses?
3. Can dream and scream be considered as acts of transgression? If Freudian 
psychoanalysis was attacked for driving all meanings of dreams and screams into 
the realm of unconsciousness, then can we argue that between the borderland of 
consciousness and unconsciousness lies the very possibility of resistance? What 
can we learn from Foucault’s reading of dreams as an odyssey of human 
freedom?
The Voice Breaking Out
V an’s midnight screams have been going on for a month. She said 
she didn’t know why she cried out. N or could she control it. “I feel 
depressed when I hear people gossiping about my screaming. I 
have no idea what it is. When I am awake, it disappears and I sleep  
again. But 1 have a dream that is the sam e every night. I dreamed 1 
am going to a pier, and am about to take a boat to cross a river. 
The river separates the two villages and there is no other w ay than 
going by boat if  I want to go to the other village. I need to take the 
boat. I see the boat is leaving and I hurry. But I find my body can’t 
m ove, it’s too painful, too tired to m ove. I’m terribly scared  
because the boat is leaving. I’ll be left behind and the sky is 
turning dark. It’s the evening. I have no w ay to g o .”
2 3 3
Yan was too terrified in her dreams to control herself and stop screaming. Yet at 
the moment she screamed she woke up and fell asleep again. While Yan and the 
other girls were so tired they slept again, I woke up for a while. I heard the silence, a 
deep sigh from Ping who slept in the upper deck, and the noise of grinding teeth from 
Bin who was laying beside me. I found myself in extreme anxiety and agony because 
my past training in sociology or anthropology provided me with no knowledge by 
which to apprehend the situation. I was lost in the field. I was lost at the particular 
moment that I woke up to hear the voice. And if I could not experience Yan’s 
experiences, I shared the fear and the pain, though in other ways.
World, self and voice were all lost, or nearly lost, as Elaine Scarry says, when 
the body is going through intense pain (1985). As a novice anthropologist, I felt 
unbearable pain to meet and to hear a voice I could not make sense of. I did not know 
how to bring it to a wider audience. It was due to no foreign culture, or an alien place 
that I had the complete sense of otherness in the field. It was the voice. The voice 
was resistant to language, without its significance or referentiality. It could not be 
seen, be touched, had no “reality” when it manifested itself in the air that I came to 
encounter. If as Michel de Certeau said, our era is a sort of epic of the eyes, “our 
society is characterized by a cancerous growth of vision, measuring everything by its 
ability to show and be shown” (1984:xxi), then can our “showbiz academics” still 
accept something that is invisible, or even pre-language? But there was no choice. 
The voice was so powerful, and with its boundless referential power, it shrieked into 
the symbolic world and nullified any claims of the world. It was directly from the 
heart and the body of the subaltern, from a person who was often excluded in the 
written, from a specific human being who struggled to live out her life. It was from a 
dagongmei, a displaced subject.
It was in the encounter with the voice in the field, and in an attempt to 
understand, to interpret and to codify the possible meanings of its impossibility, that I 
was forced to realize the practices of knowing, as an anthropologist. Anthropology 
has long been taken as the study of the other. (The other was not only limited in the 
sense of other people, other culture, but the complete otherness of experiences.) It has 
no space of its own, and only by nomadic migration to the other’s place can it dwell
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itself. Anthropology cannot know itself, has no identity of its own unless it knows 
the other, finds out what is the other. The nature of adventure has nothing to do with 
romantic imagination, but with its inescapable fate of practicing itself It lives on the 
space of other, and is marked by its nomadic itinerary wandering itself to the area of 
the unknown. Its condition is its non-condition with itself (de Certeau 1984:161). As 
Michel de Certeau described the nature of heterological literature, anthropology is a 
scriptural operation of the other, like going through a “sexual” process if it wants to 
find out its own borderland, its final limit:
They advance according to a “sexual” process that posits the arrival of the
other, the different, as a detour necessary for their progress  this
“sexual” functioning of heterological writing, a functioning that never 
succeeds entirely, transforms it into an erotic: it is the inaccessibility of its 
“objects” that makes it produce.
(1984:161-162)
If the encounter with the voice in the field was like a sexual encounter, then the 
experience was undoubtedly more painful than pleasurable. Yan’s screams tempted 
me to a foreign, risky terrain, somewhere between sound and word, between 
language and non-language, between consciousness and unconsciousness where I had 
never been before. But thanks to the temptation, I arrived at an ecstasy— the limited 
experience of knowing not the other but myself (Bataille 1991). I learned that pain, 
the possibility of writing, arises from the impossibility of experience. Reality was not 
“out there”, and neither was history of individuals or the collective a straight 
reflection of reality. The intrusion into the gap, the fissure between the presence and 
unpresence, between the symbolic and unsymbolic, gave the possibility of finding 
meanings.
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The Personal Trauma
I don’t know why I have that dream, and everyday it is the same. 
The pier, the river is so familiar to me. It seem s that I have been 
there in my life before. ... Oh, when did I start to have this dream? 
A month ago, w e were kept to do overtime work until 11:30 PM 
for three consecutive days. And we needed to m ove to a new  
dormitory on Sunday morning. I felt so tired that every part o f  my 
body was aching, as i f  it is not my own body. 1 could not control it 
and stop the pain. When all my room-mates w ent shopping and the 
room was empty, I urged m yse lf to cry out, so loudly that I m yse lf  
couldn’t believe it. I was shocked by the sound, and afterward, I 
have that dream and scream at night. It’s repeating and repeating.
Yan’s dreams and screams resonated to some extent with what Freudian 
described as traumatic neurosis. Cathy Caruth has provided the most general 
description of a trauma,
In its general definition, trauma is described as the response to an 
unexpected or overwhelming violent event or events that are not fully 
grasped as they occur, but return later in repeated flashbacks, nightmares, 
and other repetitive phenomena. Traumatic experience, beyond the 
psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a certain 
paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an 
absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the 
form of belatedness. The repetitions of the traumatic event— which remain 
unavailable to consciousness but intrude repeatedly on sight— thus suggest 
a larger relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be seen 
or what can be known, and is inextricably tied up with the belatedness and 
incomprehensibility that remain at the heart of this repetitive seeing.
(1996:91-92)
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The persistent repetitiveness of Yan’s dreams and screams seemed to tell us that she 
was going through some sort of traumatic experiences. But other than the 
extraordinary pain, there was no unexpected or sudden event happened in her life that 
could be singled out as the personal trauma to which psychoanalysis might suggest. 
On the surface and in her daily life, she was as ordinary as other factory workers, 
though they all had their own personal stories. Yan had worked in Meteor for thirteen 
months when I met her, and moved into her dormitory at the end of March 1996. No 
industrial accident has happened to her, nor any great change in her family except the 
death of her grandmother in the Chinese New Year of 1996. She went home to her 
village in Hunan when she got the news that her grandmother was seriously ill. Her 
grandmother died on the fifth day of the New Year and she returned to the factory the 
next day without attending the burial ceremony. Yan took her grandmother’s passing 
away as natural death because she died at eighty-three. The death did cause pain, but 
it was not an unexpected shock in Yan’s life.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud defined,
In the case of the ordinary traumatic neuroses two characteristics emerge 
prominently: first, that the chief weight in their causation seems to rest 
upon the factor of surprise, of fright; and secondly that a wound or injury 
inflicted simultaneously works as a rule against the development of a 
neurosis.
(1950:9-10)
Freud believed that anxiety and fear were not enough to produce a traumatic 
neurosis; what was needed was a state of surprise and fright that a person was not 
prepared for (1950:10). Since the consciousness was not well prepared to confront the 
sudden event or tragedy, it went to the realm of unconsciousness and was reenacted 
there, out of the wish and control of the person. But there was no single shocking 
event in Yan’s life. In Freud’s study of the Jewish massacre, he conceived the trauma 
as the belated experience of a “childhood” tragedy- the killing of Moses in early 
Jewish history. I have no interest, nor do I see the point in tracing Yan’s traumatic 
experiences into her childhood. Nor I am interested in the origin of the human psyche
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in any essentialized form. I try to make sense of, however, Yan’s dreams and screams 
in the very presence of her experience in the social life. The trauma, I perceived, was 
both psychological and social.
One thing I could assure from Yan’s traumatic experiences was that the bodily 
pain she suffered from overtime work in the factory was at first exposed in the realm 
of consciousness. She shrieked in the afternoon when nobody was in the dormitory. 
Then a displacement took place into the unconsciousness realm: the experience went 
to her dreams and unwittingly, repetitively was reenacted there. The screaming that 
followed happened somewhere in between consciousness and unconsciousness. She 
woke up at a particular moment of the screaming and fell asleep again. The detour 
from the realm of consciousness to unconsciousness and back to consciousness again 
entailed a double telling of the story that we are going to explore.
Yan saw the dream and scream as an uncontrollable “evil” force that was bom 
from her body. There was nothing said of spirits or ghosts such as are often said to 
haunt women workers in Southeast Asian countries (Ong 1986). Yan, however, 
thought she suffered from xin-bing, the illness of the heart. Though she always 
emphasized that she could not understand the reason, she often said, “There must be 
something wrong inside me”, “I am sick, you know, that is why I have the dream and 
scream”. For her the dream and scream was a signal of her sickness. The illness of 
the heart, though inward and psychological, was not separated from the body which 
came to live out the pain and the scream. Thus dream and scream were an index of 
bodily imbalance as well. She felt the evil was not an external force that came to 
dominate her, but grew inside from her body and mind. Though I try hard to avoid 
essentializing “Chineseness” in order to avoid creating Oriental subjects, Yan’s way 
of seeing was quite typically “Chinese”. She saw the body and the mind, the natural 
and the social, the inner and the outside world as a harmonious whole, forced to split 
only by a pathological or irregular state. And she felt that if the outside world was 
sick, the inner self could not escape the evil either. So although I tried to see 
the trauma as social, as something external that came to afflict the self, the 
sufferer, Yan, took it as something from inside, from herself. She felt that only 
she could be blamed. “I want to heal myself. It is my fault” was her thinking. She 
turned the outside inward and saw the sickness eroding from inside,
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from her heart and body. Yan’s “false consciousness” thus was cultural bias rather 
than class bias or anything else.
Yan’s “false consciousness” was deepened by the other women workers in the 
workplace, especially those who treated her as an abnormal person. There were not 
only complaints about her, but also rumors and gossip everywhere. While some 
joked that she was pursued by spirits, some guessed she was bullied by a man in the 
workplace. Some were more understanding and thought that she had a personal 
secret or suffering that could not be told. Yan never openly talked about her dream 
and scream with any co-workers, so people often discussed it behind her back. 
Gossip often resulted in rumors that tended to exaggerate her situation, especially for 
those who never heard the screams. “Screaming like a nu gui (female ghost)”, 
“Crying out with daunting voice, like being struck by a storm”, “It’s so scary, she 
screamed with a trembling body that could never calm”, and “She never stopped 
screaming at night; the high-pitched voice was very ghostly” were the common 
words of workers’ talk and gossip. Yan knew that people often gossiped about her. 
But the more people talked about her, the more she isolated herself and the more 
anxiously she wanted to cure herself. She was aware that other workers didn’t want 
to make friends with her because she had the strange habit of screaming at night. “I 
simply don’t know how to say it and how to explain to people. I know people are 
making stories of me. ... But what can I do? I do feel guilty toward my room mates. 
You know we are already short of sleeping hours, I really don’t want to disturb 
people’s sleep. It’s my fault, I want to heal myself as soon as possible,” Yan told me 
with a depressed voice. But Yan was too ashamed to see a doctor, especially when 
she did not know how to articulate her “illness”. During my stay in the field, she 
never went to see a doctor. Yan took on herself the sole responsibility for the trauma 
and developed a sense of guilt which I thought further worsened her situation.
The room mates, though directly affected by her screams, were actually more 
sympathetic to her. Ping, a big sister in the room, was Yan’s local mate from the 
same place of origin, Hunan. She was the one who tried to talk to Yan and asked her 
to control the scream. Ping worried what would happen if Yan could not control her 
scream. If the upper management thought that her screaming affected others’ sleep 
and worse, others’ working mood, then she might not be able to stay long in the
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factory. Ping told me her worry one night when Yan was not in the room: “You 
know, if Yan is not a capable person, I don’t think the company will keep her. There 
is too much gossip about her and people take her as an abnormal person. ... Nobody 
would like an abnormal person working in the factory.” Bin, the girl I shared the 
bunk with, was less concerned about her job, but more about her health, since Bin 
had her own problem of back ache. She thought that Yan’s screaming was daunting 
and disturbing, but she also felt close to her and said, “Sometimes I want to scream 
as well, but I just can’t. Her scream seems to fill the air with my own pain. I really 
think that sometimes.” Common bodily pain was the source of empathy on the basic 
of which Bin tried to tolerate Yan’s disturbances. “She must have deep suffering that 
cannot be voiced. I feel pity for her, you know, she is such a nice and capable girl.
One night I saw her cry ing  ” Bin started to tell me Yan’s story in a very small
voice when I slept beside her at night.
Chronic Pain: Body and Work Process
“I get a nagging pain in my back. It often hurts me. After I had 
worked here for several months, I started to have that pain. You  
know, I am already better than the assem bly girls who sit all day 
and night on the line. I’m just doing typing, recording and 
bookkeeping in the Production Department. Som etim es I get the 
chance to walk around and take a rest, drink som e water. But still I 
suffer from the pain, I don’t know why. Som etim es it runs to the 
back, som etim es it runs to the neck. ”
Yan was a clerk in the Production Department. This was her second job after 
graduating from secondary school in her hometown and spending one year studying 
accountancy in Guangzhou. Yan’s understanding of her pain was ambivalent. 
Sometimes she thought it was overtly due to the overloaded work and stress, yet 
sometimes she murmured that at the age of 24 she was too old to work in the factory. 
She no longer had the energy to toil for twelve hours each day. The average age of all 
female workers in the factory was 20.2, and most of the line girls were only sixteen 
to eighteen. Old age meant a body too deteriorated to endure the industrial work. The
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factory girls expected their health to deteriorate after working for more than two 
years in the city.
The electronic industry is notorious for using toxic chemicals and creating 
health damage to workers. Since I am not well equipped with medical knowledge, 
nor knowledge of chemical effects or industrial health hazards, I cannot go deep to 
explore those hazards that might damage the bodily organs, such as heart and lung 
problems, blood and cell damage, procreation problems and even cancers. Rather, 
based on the daily experiences shared with my co-workers, I focus on chronic pains 
that were extensively shared in the workplace- headache, sore throat, flu and cough, 
stomach problems, back ache, nausea, eye strains, dizziness and weakness and 
menstrual pain.
Nearly every process and job along the electronic production line involves the 
use or manipulation of a complex series of chemical processes. Since it is beyond my 
knowledge to provide a step-by-step overview of the production processes, I can only 
highlight some of the major work processes that cause obvious hazards and where 
my co-workers told me of their suffering. Cleaning, the first job of semiconductor 
assembly, used most of the chemical cleaning agents such as solvents, acids and 
alkalis for degreasing, rinsing, etching, oxidizing and buffing the electronic chips or 
dies. Acids and organic solvents can be highly toxic and cause long-term effects on 
human health. Workers on the shop floor were easily exposed to toxic cleaning 
agents, especially those involved in the assembly of PCBs (printed circuit boards) 
and semiconductor assembly. Some forms of cleaning took place in nearly each 
major work process and it was an essential step in soldering, bonding, plating, 
encapsulating and other assembly processes (Gassert 1985). Dip cleaning was the 
method used in the Meteor; electronic chips and PCBs were cleaned in a large bath of 
heated solution before they came to be assembled. Organic solvents such as alcohol, 
aliphatic, aromatic or chlorinated hydrocarbons were the most common and probably 
the most poisonous chemicals used in the workplace. While some were in pure 
solution, others were mixed with or used to dilute other substances such as inks, 
paints, plastics and glues. The cleaning room was a disgusting place; workers were 
unwilling to work there. Chemical fumes and smells were nauseating and often
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caused narcotic effects such as headache, drowsy, dizzy or drunk feeling and might 
cause long-term illness of the skin, nervous system or problems with internal organs.
I noticed Hui-ping, a girl of twenty, because she had a particularly pale face. She 
had worked in the cleaning room for nearly a year, she told me she had a serious 
headache and felt dizzy all the time:
“You know, none of the workers are willing to work in the cleaning room. So 
they bully the fresh worker. When I came to work here, they placed me in the room 
and never let me move out. The smells in the room are stuffy, and worse than those 
smells in the hospital. Those acids make me feel dizzy all the time and I can’t 
concentrate my mind well. Recently I find my head too painful to describe. I think of 
going back home if my headache cannot improve.”
The turn-over rate of workers in the cleaning room probably was the highest in 
the workplace, since few workers could stand the working conditions for more than a 
year. According to a handbook on health hazards in the electronic industry, cleaning 
jobs are often hazardous; acute injuries, illnesses and, occasionally, sudden death can 
result from exposure to strong irritant chemicals such as acids and alkalis. Bums of 
the skin, eyes and lungs are common with corrosive chemicals. Other less dangerous 
chemicals can cause chronic skin or lung problems such as dermatitis, allergic 
sensitization, sore throat, cough, asthma and conjunctivitis. Most solvents and acids 
are absorbed quickly through the skin and enter the bloodstream where they can 
travel throughout the body causing cell and organ damages. Fumes, vapours, mists 
and gases are also inhaled and pass through the lungs into the bloodstream, causing 
immediate effects on the nervous system such as headache, dizziness, or drowsiness 
(Gassert 1985:120).
Bonding was another essential work process that obviously caused chronic 
pains. Bonding is the heart of semiconductor assembly in electronics production, 
since it connects the electronic die to the IC (integrated circuit microchip) on a frame 
to create an electrical circuit. Produced by a machine with a computer monitor and a 
microscope, it was a semi-automatic job, since the machine required a bonding 
worker for its operation and maintenance. There were two types of bonding in the 
workplace: die bonding and wire bonding. Die bonding was a hand-made process; 
the minuscule semiconductor chips (dies) were mounted on the frame with a
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transistor, diode or IC. Die bonding, or die-attachment, involved the application of 
epoxy resin in the frames along with a curing agent, so that the dies could be fixed on 
the frames. Workers used a pair of tweezers to separate the chips and then put them 
onto the frames with extreme care since the chips could easily drop off. Chips were 
the most expensive electronic component in the whole production; workers were 
often reminded of this and were put under pressure to work with minute care. Wire 
bonding, the next step after die-attachment used aluminum wires to create an electric 
circuit. An electric chip would not work unless it was connected by wire to the 
electrical terminals of the frame. Ultrasound was applied in the wire bonding; the 
sound wave caused the molecules in the wire and the contact points to vibrate and 
shake together, forming bonds. Since both the die and the wire were extremely 
minute and thin, the workers could only perform the job by using the microscope and 
the computer monitor to fix the wire and the contact points. Later drops of black 
epoxy glue would be coated on the bonded die in order to protect them from damage. 
Workers held a gun, shooting drops of glue on the frames and then put them into an 
oven to be baked to fully cure the epoxy. Epoxy resin is known for its poisonous 
nature and hazards to workers health, especially in skin and lung-related illnesses 
(Gassert 1985:122-123).
Bonding was a work process notable for the extreme smallness of the objects it 
worked with. Long-time use of microscope and over-concentration on detail caused 
eyestrain, dizziness, headache and stress. Permanent eyesight damage resulted if the 
worker continuously used the microscope for more than two years. Bonding 
machines in the Meteor operated 24-hours. Besides the electronic components it 
produced, the machines were the most costly fixed property in the workplace, so that 
the company could not afford to stop production. Workers were arranged on two 
shifts. Since I could not observe production in the daytime, I learned the work 
process in the night. There were forty-six workers in the Bonding Department 
inclusive of technicians, foremen and line leaders. All the bonding workers were 
female, and said to be experienced workers who had worked more than two years in 
the factory before being moved in the Bonding Room. Sharp eyes, thin fingers and 
good work attitudes were particularly important in the bonding job, said Lun, the 
foreman. He explained,
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“Damaged chips are incurable, so we have high pressure to do everything in the 
right way. ... In the night hours, workers usually don’t have enough spirit to 
concentrate on work, so that the work pace is lower and there is more breakage.”
“The wage and bonus here is a little bit higher than for the workers in other 
assembly lines. The bonding job is harder and energy-consuming.” Surrounded by 
the rhythmic sound of the bonding machines, Lun needed to raise his voice when he 
talked to me. The temperature in the room was much lower than in the other rooms 
and lines on the shopfloor. Maintenance of the chips and machine required cool 
conditions. The big contrast between the cool temperature in the working room and 
hot temperature outside the workplace, especially in the summer time, often caused 
workers to get flu, colds and coughs, as they were in and out for lunch and dinner. 
Workers’ faints most often occurred in the Bonding Room, especially in the time of 
women’s menstrual pain.
Siu-mei, an old worker in the Bonding Room told me one night,
“We are often told that we are at the heart of the production and the most 
important workers in the company. But what can we have? Fifty yen more than other 
workers in the workplace. Yet we all know that our eyesight is becoming weaker and 
weaker. Sometimes when I leave the factory, I do not dare to touch the sunlight. I 
find my vision blurred and I can’t walk a straight line.”
Another girl, Hon-ling, sat beside Siu-mei. She jumped into our conversation:
“I just worry about my eyestrain, I’ve got headache and stomach ache (what she 
meant was menstrual pain) too. I f  s too stressful to work here. Night and day are 
turned upside down. I demand to move out but there is still no reply. You know I 
don’t want to faint myself one day. ...”
There was a common belief in the Bonding Room that once the women 
developed eyestrain, headache and menstrual pain, they could never be cured. Both 
western medicines and Chinese herbal medicines were tried, but all were said to be 
useless, no help at all. Hon-ling said she had the headache after working half a year 
in the Bonding Room and she tried several ways to heal herself, but nothing helped. 
“Sometime it seems that the pain is incurable. Even when I go back home, it follows 
me,” Hon-ling tried to convince me. Bad sleep in the daytime and a stressful working 
situation at night contributed to the general weakness of workers’ health and the
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specific illnesses of each worker. Sometimes just by looking at the face, one could 
tell a fresh from an old worker. Rosy face, an insignia of the young village girl, faded 
after just a year or two in the factory.
The intensity of bodily pain of course varied among workers. There was no 
“pain thermometer” that could measure the pain and the experience of pain was 
inseparable from personal perception and social influence (Good, Brodwin and 
Kleinman et al 1994:6). The experience of pain of one worker could easily affect 
other workers, especially in the same line or same working room. Headache, back 
ache and menstrual pain were pervasive in the workplace. These problems however 
were invisible, especially when most of the women kept their individual issues secret 
and remained silent. Yet once the problems were evoked, nearly every worker in the 
workplace could tell her own story. The processes of bodily pain thus were both 
psychosomatic and socio-cultural. Chronic pain, because o f its persistence and 
incurability, provided an index of social alienation and domination in the workplace. 
Arthur Kleinman, on the other hand argues that chronic pain is the embodiment of 
human suffering, and can be viewed as a process of embodiment of resistance to the 
lived flow of daily experience (1994:174). Chronic pain, he believes, was a source of 
power, with its uncompromising refusal to be cured that can provide a powerful 
challenge to the micropolitics of social relations (1994:187). Pain would not only 
lower the work pace, but could sometimes cause direct interruption or stoppage to the 
production. Dizziness and eyestrain would affect the accuracy and efficiency of the 
bonding workers in managing the machine. Thus a painful body was not a defeated 
body. It was a resistant shield to the micropower that afflicted directly on the self. 
The collective manipulation of chronic pain in the workplace therefore could be seen 
as the fundamental bodily resistance to the work, to the industrial labour that was too 
alienating and too stressful to the workers. This argument can be illuminated by 
analyzing the menstrual pain of women workers.
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Menstrual Politics: Women’s Time v s  Industrial Time
1 don’t know why, it’s so painful that I can’t control it. Inside my 
body, something turned upside down, like a knife cutting me into 
pieces. And the blood, the blood never seem ed to stop flowing.
(Lan, age 19)
Women’s fainted time and again in the workplace. On a hot May afternoon, a 
girl called Lan on line A fainted again. Her face turned pale, her lips became 
bloodless, and the body was as cold as ice and trembling. No one could stop the cold 
and the pain. Production was interrupted. “It’s the woman’s issue, woman’s period 
and woman’s fate.” Women on the line all knew what happened, and every time they 
sigh, worrying that the suffering would come to them sooner and later. Every month 
there would be one or two women sent to the clinic suffering from dysmenorrhea. It 
was a threat, a pain, an inescapable issue shared by all women in the workplace 
irrespective of age (between the age of menarche and menopause), locality and 
ethnicity. This common experience of women inevitably exposed to the conflict 
between the uncompromising nature of industrial time and a woman’s life.
The women’s period is “the moment of truth that will not sustain lies”, Penelope 
Shuttle and Peter Redgrove argued in their brilliant book, The Wise Wound: E ve’s 
Curse and Everywoman (1978). The truth, here, I want to articulate in the particular 
context at China’s workplace, was the alienation, the arbitrariness of disciplinary 
time that intruded, dissected, and reorganized women’s life. That time was inherently 
contradictory to their sense of time, produced closer to their common bodily 
experiences. Women’s life, women’s sense of time, I will argue, is more loyal to 
their bodies. Or one can say women’s life is more fatalistic, bound by their bodily 
experience. With insight from Julie Kristeva, we know that women’s time is 
particular. It can never be fully incorporated into the social time, as it is organized by 
a periodical or cyclical sense of time as women live out their bodily change and 
repetition in everyday practices. According to Toril Moi’s exegesis, Kristeva in the 
paper “Women’s Time” provides a feminine mode of time in contrast to the historical 
and social time: “Female subjectivity would seem to be linked both to cyclical time
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(repetition) and to monumental time (eternity), at least in so far as both ways of 
conceptualizing time from the perspective of motherhood and reproduction. The time 
of history, however, can be characterized as linear time: time as project, teleology, 
departure, progression and arrival”, which nevertheless is contradictory to women’s 
time (1986:187). Women’s time is maternal time; the menstrual cycle, the cycle of 
marriage and procreation, the cycle of puberty and motherhood, are all crucial bodily 
experiences in making up a woman’s life. Women’s body, as the container of the 
female sexual subjects is much more important than men’s body in shaping women’s 
life form and chance. The menstrual cycle, the cycle of ease and pain, the cycle of 
nature and harmony in Chinese physiology, is the most important factor in 
organizing women’s sense of time as it runs repetitively in monthly cycles. The 
cyclical sense of time, inevitably is going to conflict with the linear, progressive and 
aggressive male industrial time. As Emily Martin rightly said,
Women, grounded whether they like it or not in cyclical bodily 
experiences, live both the time of industrial society and another kind of 
time that is often incompatible with the first.
(1987:198)
At night after the overtime work, I went to visit Lan. She lay on her bed, still 
looking pale and weak. At the age of 19, she often suffered from menstrual pain.
“I don’t know why, it’s so painful that I can’t control it. Inside my body, 
something turned upside down, like a knife cutting me into pieces. And the blood, 
the blood never seemed to stop flowing.” Lan told me.
“What did the nurse do to you?” I asked.
“The nurse gave me an injection, and after a few hours, the pain was gone, but I 
was too weak and dizzy, so I fell asleep again. When I woke up, it was already 
evening and the nurse asked me to leave. ... But I was so afraid, I could feel the blood 
was still flowing. It was very embarrassing that my pants were getting stained and 
red,” Lan told me in a low tone.
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“Did you have the pain when you were in your hometown?” Lan came from a 
village in Jiangxi. Before she moved out to work in the factory, she helped her family 
by doing farm work at home.
“No, I didn’t feel any discomfort when it came. I didn’t even know it would 
cause pain. Sometimes my mother asked me not to go to the rice field when the 
period came. She said the water in the field would make me have pain, but I didn’t 
feel the hurt. I would take rest when I felt tired,” Lan said.
Over half of the women in the workplace were subjected to dysmenorrhea, 
though the degree of pain varied from one to another and from time to time. 
Menstrual pains occurred less often when the women were in the village. Most of the 
women said they started to have the pain after working one or two years in the 
workplace. But some told me once they moved out the village, they suffered 
immediately from the pain. This common rhythm of suffering, while it caused pain 
to the women, couldn’t help but at the same time cause a “headache” to the 
production machine. The disciplinary time was scientifically studied and deliberately 
organized, but the woman’s body, had its own clock, and could never be totally 
regulated and subsumed. A woman’s faint often stopped the assembly line until her 
position was filled by somebody else. The loss of production was expected but it 
could strike at any time. Especially at the time of a rush order, the women’s faints 
were often taken as bad omens foretelling the possibility of not being able to meet the 
order date. A sudden change of environment, long working hours, extreme work 
pressure all contributed to disturb the menstrual cycles. So some would prolong their 
period from five to seven days, some had periods lasting over a month and some 
simply would stop and never have periods. Menstrual disorder disturbed women’s 
time and made it harder for the disciplinary machine to control the women’s lives.
On the shop floor line leaders kept at hand unknown pills, to provide when the 
workers claimed menstrual discomfort. Nobody could ask for sick-leave because of 
menstrual pain. Bai-lan, the line leader told me,
“Too many women had this kind of problem. If we allowed one to take rest, 
then all the others would ask for it as well. What can we do? Production cannot be 
stopped. We give the pills to the girls to stop the pain. Or, if they faint, we send them 
to the hospital.”
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These unknown pills, which I guessed were panedols and contraceptive pills, 
were distributed by the Personnel Department to the line.
“So we keep them. Whenever the girls suffer from the pain, we give them water 
and the pills. Sometimes these pills really work, it can stop the pain within a short 
time.” Bai-lan explained to me.
Girls on the line had no choice but to depend on these pills. Some thought they 
were panaceas, and could not live without them:
“I don’t know what the pills are, but every time when I feel pain, I eat them and 
I feel released. ... Sometimes I am afraid that the line leader will refuse to give them 
to me, so I keep some of the pills myself.” (Fu-xing, a girl on line B).
Only a few refused to take them because of rumors that they could damage 
health, especially fertility. While the company encouraged the girls to take the pills 
when they suffered from menstrual pains, there were also worries that the 
contraceptive pills would be misused and sexual encounters encouraged. So they 
warned the girls that these pills could not be used except for menstrual disorders. 
The line leader often reminded the girls:
“These pills are not for fun. If you use them wrong, you’ll make a big mistake.” 
The lack of an explicit explanation for these pills stimulated myths and rumors 
that was a strategy of the production machine to control the female body and the 
sexual behaviours. Providing the unknown pills thus was the attempt to regulate the 
female body, to rechannel the women’s time into the mainstream of the disciplinary 
time.
It was thus not an accidental occurrence, nor an unintended play of patriarchy, 
that the industrial world was kept largely for male for such a long time, especially in 
the western societies. For Karl Marx, labour is the most distinctive human practice. It 
distinguishes human beings from other species, and in work humans experience 
freedom, self-praxis and a creative transformation of nature in accord with human 
needs. But under capitalism, labour is subsumed for the interest of capital, no longer 
for self-praxis and self-fulfillment. Thus labour becomes the alienation of human 
practice under capitalist relation of production. The workers experience alienation at 
least in two ways: loss of control of their product and loss control of their productive 
activity; they do not possess the means of production, the method, the time or the
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result of production. In short, the alienation of labour is the loss of control over life 
and the experience of life as an object. This objectification of human life is the 
utmost evil of capitalism. Marx puts it clearly,
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labour 
becomes an object, an external existence, but that it exists outside him, 
independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on 
its confronting him; it means that the life which he has conferred on the 
object confronts him as something hostile and alien.
(1964:108)
Marx’s labour, nevertheless, is an asexual labour and the alienation he indicted 
is a general experience for both male and female workers. Here I want to elaborate 
how the alienation of labour experienced by male and female workers is sexually 
different and gendered in nature. Female workers, I argue, can be subject to more 
acute and deeper alienating forces than male workers, as a woman’s physiology, 
body and sense of time are fundamentally contradictoiy to the capitalist mode of 
production and the industrialized mode of time. Women’s time was less able to be 
surrendered, and women’s bodies were most difficult to regulate, Pre-menstrual 
syndrome, menstrual pain, maternal leave and sickness all are women’s issues that 
are out of the control of the capitalist machine. Women’s labour is devalued and 
discriminated against precisely because of the difficulty for the machine of instituting 
and rechanneling women’s time and life into industrial time. In the world dominated 
by the capitalist mode of production, women are then second class not only as sexual 
subjects, but also as labourers. Women workers are cheaper because they are the less 
able to live up to the production machine, the disciplinary time. Socialist feminism is 
right to say that women are oppressed by double alienation, as women and as 
workers. But we need to further pinpoint how the double alienation is not 
independent, but closely interconnected and mutually deepening (Bartky, 1990). It is 
not enough to say that women as workers are alienated in material production, while 
as females are estranged in cultural production. While it is possible to separate the
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double alienation, I would rather say, women, already estranged by bio-cultural 
production, are further deeply alienated in economic production.
Despite the fact that dysmenorrhea was a serious problem in the workplace 
affecting women’s health and production, menstruation was still taboo, not to be 
talked directly or in public. The fear of talking came from the male staff who took the 
issue as a purely female issue, dirty and disgusting. They refused to talk, to mention 
and to help when they saw girls suffer from menstrual pain or faint. The menstruating 
body, for the male supervisors or managers, was a taboo body that not only disrupted 
production, but also polluted the workplace and offended their masculinity. Here 
Chinese local culture and the imperatives of the production machine were in conflict. 
Female labour had to be drawn out from the domestic sphere, to the workplace. But 
female bodies were still restricted in Chinese patriarchal culture, especially in the 
rural context. Women were conceived as polluting objects when they were 
menstruating or pregnant. It was better to keep them at home and not let them show 
up in the public. Local practices vary, but in many places in China today, 
menstruating women are not allowed to perform ancestor worship, participate in 
public rituals such as wedding or funeral ceremonies, or eat with male family 
members at the same table. The women’s liberation movement in Mao’s socialist era, 
although it challenged feudal practices on gender issues, only focused on the 
marriage and work systems. It did not touch a lot of hidden beliefs, such as the 
menstruation taboo. Reform China and international capital needed female labour, 
especially rural female labour. They had no other way but to deal with these hidden 
beliefs. Though Deleuze and Guattari believed that the capitalist machine was able to 
conquer, co-opt, and reterritorialize all sorts of residual, artificial, imaginary or 
symbolic territorialities wherever it moved (1984), the machine in the workplace 
seemed to leave menstruation as a gray area it could not tackle. The worn-out 
Chinese patriarchal machine continued to manipulate practice.
Since the labour of the polluted female bodies was wanted, the presence of the 
taboo bodies could no longer be hidden. The patriarchal machine took a 
schizophrenic stance and wanted to keep menstruation as a disguised phenomenon in 
the public space. Dirty, ugly, undesirable and unmentionable - these were the male’s 
attitudes towards female menstrual flow. The blood was a threat to the cool space of
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the workplace as well as to the purity of male sexuality. There was still a firm belief 
that men should avoid sexual encounters with menstrual women lest male potency be 
threatened, and the man’s body polluted. Menstruating women thus should not show 
up in the public space. But since they were now everywhere in the workplace, the 
women should at least behave themselves well and try their best to hide the flow, the 
rag, the sanitary towels or whatever related to the issue. It was forbidden to use the 
word menstruation in daily language, even among girls themselves; “that issue”, “big 
aunt”, and “the dirt” were the euphemisms. When the girls talked of menstrual pain, 
they called it “stomach ache” to each other, which I misunderstood for quite a long 
time. So when they sometimes wanted to speak of stomach ache, they had to 
emphasize it as a “real stomach ache” and not the fake one. While the girls could not 
hide their body in the workplace, they were taught to hide their blood with extreme 
care. A stain on their pants would be seen as a great shame. Careless girls would not 
only be reproached by the line leaders, but also depreciated by other women as well. 
Sanitary towels had to be kept secret and it was a great sin to expose them to public 
view. I was given a serious lesson by my room mates, though out of good will, when 
I didn’t notice the strictness of the taboo and put sanitary towels everywhere on my 
bed. My misunderstanding of the bed as a private space led me to relax control in a 
way which was unacceptable to my room mates. Since six people shared the room 
and the beds were next to each other, in the eyes of the girls there nothing was 
private. I became an anxious woman during my period. Self-technologizing was most 
complete on the issue of menstruation. The negative male attitude produced 
derogatory subjects who learned to be shameful of their own body. Shame or 
embarrassment about mentioning the women’s issue made it almost impossible for 
the women to ask for a work recess, even when they suffered from serious pain. That 
is why faints were so common on the shop floor.
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Pain, Fragmentation and Anger
I tried very hard to control my body. I clenched my teeth 
and gnawed my finger, but my body w as still trembling. It 
was out o f  my control; it was cold sweating and m y inside 
continued to tremble. I hated it so much, I hated that issue 
(menstruation). Why should wom en suffer from that?
(Ling-yue, aged 18)
I want to go back home, I can’t stand the pain here. N obody  
w ill care for you, but everybody looks at you. I feel ashamed 
to have that issue and the pain on the line. M y body is 
sim ply uncontrollable and so disgusting. I want to dig a 
hole and bury m yself at the mom ent I ask help from the line 
leader.
(Shui-hua, aged 20)
Women learned shame for their bodies from outside social violence, whereas 
they had gone through inner splitting and fragmentation from their inside bodily 
experiences and mutations. Emily Martin argues that women suffer from alienation 
with respect to part of the self much more acutely than men:
For one thing, becoming sexually female entails inner fragmentation of the 
self. A woman must become only a physical body in order to be sexual.
(1989:21)
Splitting the self from the body, treating the body as an object for the self, was the 
common experience of the women, particularly when they went through menstrual 
pain. “It was out of my control. ... I hated it so much”, “It cut my body into pieces”- 
the body was not only taken as an object, but sometimes as an opponent to oneself. In 
facing agony, women not merely split their mind and body, but also turned 
themselves into a number of personae (Martin, 1989:21). If the women wanted to 
retain the “will to power” over their life and body, dividing the self was one of the 
way out to resist extreme bodily pain and to prevent total self collapsing. The intense,
2 5 3
extreme bodily pain will destroy the integrity of the self and create some sort of 
schizophrenic experience. Since it was often out of the control, the sufferers would 
try to exteriorize the pain as something that was opposite to their bodies, and the 
bodies opposite to their selves. The pain attacked the body. The body, failing to 
sustain the pain, in return took revenge on the self. It was the pain that caused the 
splitting of the body and self. Or we could say the splitting of the self from the body 
was a life ruse to confront the unbearable pain. Such externalization formed a buffer 
that could prevent the complete disintegration of the body/self complex.
Inner fragmentation thus was the common experience of women in defending 
against the loss of self caused by bodily pain. What I want to elucidate is how this 
inner fragmentation of women’s body is related to social violence and alienation.
R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari all believed that schizophrenia- the splitting 
of self is not a syndrome for a few. Rather it is a common phenomenon, an everyday 
life tactic of survival for normal people to live in modem capitalist societies (1984). 
R. D. Laing was once irritated and said,
Torn, body, mind and spirit, by inner contradictions, pulled in different 
directions, Man cut off from his own mind, cut off equally from his own 
body- a half crazed creature in a mad world.
(1967:46-47)
To survive in a mad industrial world, to go through social alienation, what the human 
being can do is to tear themselves apart, both mind and body. The destruction of the 
social, in Laing’s eyes, comes through the destruction of the self. The divided self, 
estranged from oneself and society, he argued, cannot experience either oneself or 
others as “real” or “whole”. The self invents a false self and with it one confronts 
both the outside world and one’s own despair. The disintegration of the real self 
keeps pace with the growing unreality of the false self until, in the extremes of 
schizophrenic breakdown, the whole self disintegrates (Laing, 1969).
The divided self, the schizoid boy, as R. D. Laing, Deleuze and Guattari’s said, 
is not sexually differentiated. Here I want to argue again that the process of 
disintegration of the self, or the experience of schizophrenia, is specifically gendered
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in nature. Women as sexual subjects first experience an inner fragmentation from 
their bodily existence. Second, as a social body, as alienated labour, as half crazed 
creatures in a mad world, they live out a further disintegration of the self. Labour 
alienation worsened the female body conditions, which in turn deepened the self 
destruction when women experienced both inner bodily fragmentation and social 
alienation at the same time. A woman in the workplace not merely tore her mind and 
body apart, but further dissected her body into numerable pieces. Tearing the body 
into parts was a possible way of confronting the impossibility of lessening extreme 
individual and social pain. Social alienation and bodily alienation were well 
integrated in the bodies of the female workers. Suffering from the menstrual pain, 
Ling-yue bit her teeth and gnawed her finger, hoping by tearing the bodily parts to 
alleviate the intolerable pain. Treating the body as an object, that is hostile and 
disgusting object, was the common experience of bodily alienation of the women 
workers. But Shui-huang would not further torture herself if her pain was not gazed 
at in public, and subjected to social alienation at the same time. “Why should women 
suffer from that issneT  was an indictment of women’s own body. But the indictment 
was more grievous and the suffering more acute in the workplace, a male- 
manipulated public space. In social alienation the disciplinary machine first ruined 
the female body and then made bodily alienation unacceptable when exposed to the 
social. “I want to dig a hole and bury myself’ illustrated the shame of women’s 
bodily alienation before the socially alienated male space. Shui-huang strongly 
desired to conceal her bodily pain from the workplace, and it was plain too that by 
exposing bodily pain in public, Shui-huang suffered shame and social pain. A woman 
thus not only suffered her own bodily pain, but the outside social pain that deepened 
the inner one. Bodily alienation and social alienation were mutually reinforcing.
But where was the fragmentation, where did the fissure of transgression lie. The 
menstrual body itself was the body of resistance. The failure of the disciplinary 
machine to control the menstrual body was very plain. No matter how deliberately 
the movement of bodily acts was measured, and no matter how the pace of work was 
scientifically calculated in minutes and seconds, the female body had its own rhythm 
of time and suffering. A woman was not a robot. A woman’s body was a body of 
flesh and blood that could be regulated, but never changed and totally subsumed.
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While most of the women’s time was successfully regulated, the exact moment of a 
woman’s menstrual period, the outrageous pain, the depression and the anger could 
not be precisely anticipated. Fainting, the extreme experience of bodily pain, could 
be seen as the fundamental challenge to the disciplinary machine. Fainting was not 
an illness, but surely a dysfunction of the female body that could live in its own 
rhythm. This obviously exposed both the violence of industrial time and its failure to 
turn the female body into a working robot. Time and time again, fainting in the 
workplace disrupted the production machine, causing chaos and uncertainty for the 
production plan.
Menstruation, a sign of femininity, united women of different ages and 
backgrounds in the workplace. Menstruation provides a mark of womanhood, a rite 
of passage turning girlhood into womanhood. It demonstrates the very possibility of 
procreation, asserting women’s power of creation and self-identity. Despite the 
shame and disgust attached to menstruation by the society, Emily Martin said,
the positive feelings women themselves have about menstruation also 
allow them to act in their own behalf, not just as members of private 
families inside the home. The primary positive feeling many women have 
about menstruation is that it defines them as woman.
(1989:101)
Whilst a women’s body and time is unique, women’s pain can be shared. In times of 
trouble, every woman would come to help, even if it meant violating the factory 
regulations. Women often left their work seats without asking for a permit to help 
other women when there was serious pain or fainting. Ignoring serious warnings, 
they kept right on bringing water, finding a thick cover to warm their sisters’ bodies, 
or accompanying them to the washroom. Production on the line would be interrupted, 
but none of the workers cared. Severe reproaches would come from the higher 
management but women simply “listened without hearing”. The washroom was often 
conceived of as a place of transgression, where women could avoid disciplinary 
control and find room for themselves (Shapiro-Perl 1984; Martin 1989). The 
washroom was not only a place where women could keep their menstrual blood from
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showing. It was also the place that they could preserve a bit of autonomy for 
themselves in a context where their bodily state and movements were rigidly 
controlled (Martin 1989:94). Women found in the concrete experiences of their 
bodies a different notion of time, the opposite of the industrial time in the workplace.
The premenstrual syndrome of low mood, bad temper and a surly reluctance to 
work was another act of resistance to the disciplinary machine. Sudden crying often 
broke out. It was claimed this was just before the menstruation period. Some of the 
women could hide their tears from the shop floor until they got back to the dorm 
room. But some of them burst into tears on the line. It was often said that women 
were easily irritated when they were “waiting for that issue” and if they were 
criticized by their line leaders at that moment, they would often lose their temper. It 
was a moment of hassle and of the untouchable. And if the line leaders wanted to 
avoid the girls’ anger or bad temper for “no reason”, it was better to leave them 
alone. Bai-lan, my line leader told me, “When you see some girls suddenly lose their 
temper for no reason, then you know they are disturbed by that matter.”
The unnamed anger often drove the girls into confrontation of the factory 
disciplines or sometimes even disobedience of the upper management. There was 
gossip among girls about Choi-ping, a girl on my line, that at the moment of her 
issue she refused to change her work position, and burst into anger and tears when 
the line leader told her to do so. Choi-ping was a quiet and obedient girl all the time. 
So when her anger suddenly grew and directly opposed the disciplinary order, Bai- 
lan and all the women on the line were surprised and thought that she was suffered 
from that issue. The anger demonstrated a power that the girls usually hid. At the 
moment of menstruation, anger was released and power came. As Susan Griffin said, 
the anger was the roaring from inside, it was a timely blessing that women showed 
their anger and power. In description of a woman suffering from anger, she wrote,
And so her anger grew. It swept through her like a fire. She was more than 
shaken. She thought she was consumed. But she was illuminated with her 
rage; she was bright with fury. And though she still trembled, one day she 
saw she had survived this blaze. And after a time she came to see this anger-
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that-was-so-long-denied as a blessing.
(1978:185)
It was a moment of legitimate rage, a moment when women knew their bodily 
limit and the limit of subordination to the social and institutional violence. Every 
woman on the line had a well-stocked arsenal of anger and it was only a matter of 
time before it flared. A reproach from the line leader, a change of work position, an 
argument among workers, could all accelerate an outburst of anger against the 
complex of bodily and social violence. The moment of menstruation ended tolerance. 
“Sometimes they become very moody and slow down their work. ... But it is difficult 
to know whether they are really suffering from that issue or simply pretend,” Bai-lan 
murmured to me, showing her inability to control the menstrual troubles on the line. 
Menstruation, an issue of women’s oppression, might act as a weapon to confront the 
disciplinary control. The refusal of the workers to cope with the work pace, the 
unwillingness to follow an unreasonable management order, or sudden burst into 
tears and anger all turned the disciplinary machine into a “paper tiger”. A stigma of 
the shameful female body, the menstrual flow could sometimes be a sharp weapon to 
disrupt production and protect the women’s body from complete immersion into the 
production machine. It was a moment of a red splash of freedom.
Yan ’s Pain: between the Body and the Social
I think I love him.
I am poor, but I am not greedy.
I was wondering about going back home or finding a job
elsewhere. I really had no idea at the beginning. ...
Back to Yan’s story of pain. We already know that industrial labour caused her 
bodily pain, and her psychosomatic pain was embedded in a wider social and cultural 
context. When Yan mentioned that at the age of 24 she was too old to work in the 
factory, it designated not only her physical state, but something more subtle and
cultural that affected her life. The issue of age was laden with gendered and cultural
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significance. Yan was brought up in a town in the western part of Hunan Province, 
the province where Mao Zedong was born. The area where she lived was one of the 
poorest counties in the province. But her family was not poor, since both her father 
and mother were the official cadres and worked in the township government. She had 
an elder sister and a younger brother, and all three of them had secondary or higher 
education. Since her parents were the educated people and government officials, the 
children were expected to have as much higher education as possible. After 
secondary school, Yan tried her best to get into university but failed twice in the 
examinations. At the age of 19, she was sent by her parent to a one-year course in 
accountancy in Guangzhou. After the course, she went back home to be an 
accountant in the forestry branch of the township government.
She was not satisfied with the job and the life in a small, poor town. After a year 
in Guangzhou she already knew the great disparity between the urban and the rural. 
“I was a cadre in my hometown, but my wage was just two hundred dollars. An 
ordinary worker in Guangzhou earned more than me,” she said. Aside from the wage, 
there was too great a gap in material life style. None of the youngsters were willing 
to stay in the town: “Educated or not, they all went to Guangdong looking for 
chances.” Yan convinced me that she was not particularly ambitious. She went with 
her elder sister to work in Dongguan, another economic development zone in 
Guangdong. When her elder sister married a local citizen there, their hukou were 
transferred from their hometown to Dongguan by paying five thousands dollars per 
head to the local government. As I have discussed in Chapter III, in the period of 
socialist construction, the hukou system was one of the most effective mechanisms 
by which to control and distribute population. One’s fate was tied to the area of one’s 
birth. In the village, one’s whole life would be as a peasant. If luckily, in the city one 
would be a worker, part of a privileged class that enjoyed all the products of the 
peasants, but not vice versa. Population mobility was not permitted unless part of the 
state plan. With the open-door policy and economic reform, the labour surplus from 
the rural areas was drawn to cities to meet the needs of private or international 
capital. After being bound to the land for three decades, it was the first time that the 
whole of the Chinese peasantry gained freedom to move, and freedom to experience 
the inequality between the urban and the rural.
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Yan spent more than two years in Dongguan, working as a secretary in an 
electronic company and earning six hundred yuan per month. She felt happy in the 
first year as she was supported by her sister’s family; she ate and slept there, 
enjoying the sort of family life that was beyond the dreams of any dagongmei who 
worked far away from her hometown. As a secretary, directly serving the general 
manager of the company. She held as a high status job. She said she could learn a lot, 
especially about how to deal with complicated human relationships. She became 
quite mature in that year. Then her affair with the general manager, a Hong Kong 
man in his mid-forties, made her leave the company, and even Dongguan.
Yan told me the story one night when we went to a book shop. “He treated me 
so nicely, like an uncle, teaching me a lot of things, I didn’t hate him, frankly. We 
worked as a pair of good partners and he never scolded or criticized me. ... But he 
had a family, wife, sons and daughters in Hong Kong. Sometimes they came to visit 
him and had fun there. ... Hm, he wanted to take me as a lover and promised to house 
me and take care of me if I was willing to follow him. You know, a lot of girls now 
are looking for that kind of relationship and waiting for men to feed them. They don’t 
mind the status. But I was so hesitant, so fearful that something out of my control 
would happen. It might affect my whole life.”
She refused the relationship and left the company. Asked if she regretted it, she 
responded with a smile, and said, “Sometimes I do miss him.” It seemed clear that 
they were actually sexually attracted to each other, and the reason for her refusal was 
more than an ethical issue. She was ambivalent enough that even she herself could 
not quite tell what she felt. In Shenzhen, there were residential areas called er-nai 
cun, concubine’s villages or second-wife villages, where all the women fed by Hong 
Kong businessmen lived. When I went through there with other women workers, 
they often made fun of the women they saw, picking on way they dressed and their 
make-up. “Bu yao mian z f \  shameless, or “mai shen”, selling body, were the 
common phases used to make fun of the women. “Mian zi” meant not only one’s 
own dignity, but also one’s relationship with others, especially the family and the 
community. “Bu yao mian zi” not only insulted oneself, but also one’s family and 
hometown. To be an er-nai was to be an illegal wife and an immoral woman, whose 
immorality lay in her reluctance to work for herself and in her greed in enjoying a
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luxurious life and breaking up another woman’s family. Mai shen was a kind of 
exchange of one’s body for a better life, with overtone of material pursuit.
Yan often kept silent when other girls gossiped about the women they saw in the 
street. Sometimes she would comment, “It’s their business, don’t stick your nose in 
it.” From her experience, it was not money that attracted her to the man for her 
decision to leave him was not without consideration of mian zi. Her elder sister, her 
parents being government cadres and her high educational background all contributed 
to her anxiety and thus the repression of her desires. “I am poor, but I am not 
greedy.” In our interaction for months, Yan never forgot to convey this clear message 
to me. It was poverty that led her to leave her hometown, looking for a better life 
elsewhere. But it was not poverty that drove her to love a Hong Kong man. She had 
mixed feelings. She didn’t consider her love illegal or immoral, but certainly mian zi 
and the uncertainty of the future led her to give up the relationship. The repression of 
Yan’s desires was both sexual and cultural. The culture was laden with monogamous 
value and full of discrimination against the poor and women involved. 
Discrimination was severe when the men were from the far upper classes and there 
was huge gap of material life between the male and the female.
Leaving Dongguan, Yan was caught in an impasse. “I was wondering whether 
to go home or find a job somewhere else. I really had no idea at the beginning. I 
missed my hometown so much and definitely wanted to return. But I found I had no 
choice. My hukou was moved out and I could no longer find a job in the government.
I found nowhere to settle. I could not go back to my hometown.”
It was at that particular moment that Yan realized that once her life was put in 
transition, she could never go back. She felt her life was out of control forever. She 
often told me she felt she was floating. The paradox was that although she suppressed 
her desire to love a man, in order to prevent her future becoming uncontrollable, she 
found her life was already in an uncontrollable state. The sudden realization, I 
believed, was the possible cause of her trauma. Yan realized something she could not 
accept, and the process of realization was a process of refusal.
Bruno Bettelheim, in his study of Nazi concentration camps, stated that radical 
social change could lead to the destruction of the human psyche and the integrity of 
self (1960). Bettelheim’s emphasis on a concrete external social environment, rather
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than any inner psychic essence, in regulating the personal life, was a valuable study 
in social psychology. But his social “reality” was too reified, too “out there”; he did 
not see how different people perceived and imagined the social reality.
In Yan’s story, we can find a far more dynamic relationship between the 
individual and the social. The social might be “out there”, but it could not affect an 
individual’s life unless the individual turned it inside out. The rapid social change 
might be beyond Yan’s control, and it could only destroy her sense of self at the 
particular moment she realized it and refused it. But there was never a dichotomy 
between the individual and the social; the individual was always in the process, to a 
varying extent, of realizing the social. In this sense, we can understand what “the 
individual is impersonal” means. But it is more important for us to decode the 
process of im-personalization and to show that the social never ceases to impose 
violence on the self; and that the self, with its existence as being-in-the world, could 
not but realize the reality.
Yan’s story continued...
I know I had no more choice. When I’m wandering about the 
street o f  this big city, I know it is not m y place, it does not belong  
to me. But I have to stay. I see people selling stu ff at the side o f  
the road, I wonder whether m y life w ill finish soon ......
Leaving Dongguan, she was helped by a relative and found a job in Shenzhen, 
where we worked together. Yan was not happy with the job. As an ordinary clerk in 
one of the departments in the Company, she enjoyed none of the status and privileges 
she had in Dongguan. Above her was a huge hierarchy. After working at the Meteor 
for a year, she knew she had little chance of promotion, without particular guanxi, 
nepotistic relationships or kin in the higher hierarchy. She worked twelve hours a 
day, not including overtime work. In Dongguan, She usually worked ten hours and 
had some leisure time of her own at night. In Shenzhen, without the support from her 
sister’s family, she had to eat in the factory and sleep in the dormitory. She had to 
depend on herself for everything.
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“Previously I didn’t think factory life was so exploitative. I knew the bosses 
always made a lot of money and the workers wages were mean. In that company in
Dongguan, I knew almost everyone’s wage  Well, the workers earn very little
and I know that a meal the general manager takes in the restaurant costs more than a 
worker’s monthly salary. There is also unfairness among the workers. Some earn 
double or triple the others. But at that time, I didn’t question anything. I accepted it, 
it’s human’s fate,” Yan told me one day when several workers were complaining 
about the wages.
Yan only earned five hundred and fifty yuan per month, fifty yuan less than 
before. Yan thought she was worth more because what she did in the Company was 
more than a clerk’s work. Since she knew computer typing and the excel program 
and had experience of taking minutes, she actually undertook most of the 
department’s office work. The sense of oneself as a commodity was quite strong 
among the workers in the Company in general. But it was particularly acute for Yan. 
In Marx’s terminology, it was the experience of alienation. The acute sense of 
alienation might be due to the sudden changes in social life in China in the past 
decade. Before entering industrial life, life in the countryside was tied to the land and 
to nature; in some way it was a subsistence economy, and the labour they contributed 
was realized in products they could possess. Leaving the land and going to the city 
they had to experience another life, in which they could only sell their labour for 
cash. Mai shen was not only a term for women selling their bodies to men sexually, 
but was also often used for selling your body to the capitalists. They were forced to 
sense themselves as proletariat, having nothing but only their bodies when leaving 
the villages. The great contrast of the industrial and agricultural life helped them to 
develop a sense of alienation and class exploitation.
The realization of class consciousness, again, was varied and always fluid. In 
Dongguan Yan was more willing to cope with the industrial life and felt justified in 
selling her body. In Shenzhen she started to complain about her wages and grew 
more aware of inequality and exploitation. Her views towards the boss she worked 
for changed as the situation changed. Now she put herself in a completely 
oppositional class position, while in Dongguan she had been in a more ambiguous 
state. The most extreme way she put it was: “Before I controlled people, now I am
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controlled  In the eyes of the managers, workers are only stuff that could be
thrown away at will.”
Given the long working hours and harsh working conditions, the common 
feeling in the workplace was that the workers “worked like dogs”. They told jokes 
about work like: “Is your only regret that you were not bom a foreign dog?”, “Next 
incarnation? Remember to be born elsewhere, even as a dog”, or “Fate takes turns, 
fate will turn one day.” While some of the workers dreamed of becoming petty 
capitalists one day, others were more realistic. They knew that after several years of 
toiling in the factory, they had to go back to the village. For the women, it meant that 
they were going to get married before they became too old. Few of them could hope 
to stay in city unless they could find local husbands. As I have discussed in Chapter 
II, there was little chance for the peasantry to turn themselves into a real proletariat 
and form a new working class in the city. The socialist state in China ruled out the 
possibility of the birth of a new urban proletariat.
For marriage, Yan was again caught in between. At the age of 24, she really 
needed to think of marriage. In China, especially for rural women, the age of 24 was 
nearly the limit for a woman to enjoy the freedom of single life. Celibacy could not 
be accepted in the village life. Marriage was still “the big event of the entire life”, 
especially for women to settle for their future life, not in the family of origin, but the 
family of husband. Girls in the factory often returned home at the age of 23 or 24; 
sometimes they decided this themselves, and sometimes their parents requested it. In 
China, even in remote villages, people have the freedom to choose their own 
partners, but introduction by others is still a common practice and parents can still 
exert a tremendous effect on the final decision. Resistance to marriage was not 
impossible, but then women would have to depend totally on themselves, given that 
their families would object and it was an insult to the families of the grooms. Women 
in the workplace were always torn between family expectations and industrial 
demands, between marriage pressures and the temptations of city life. Sometimes it 
seems that the capitalist regime made use of the cultural expectations in exploiting 
the women’s lives. It was normal practice that most of the women would leave the 
factory automatically at 23 or 24, so they could contribute their labour between 
sixteen and twenty-four, the most energetic period of their lives. The capitalist
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machine therefore could extract the maximum of labour capacity during the women’s 
golden age. After working four to five years for twelve hours per day in the factory, 
they were totally worn out. It was high time for them to get married and continue 
their labour by giving birth to sons, serving the patriarchal machine. The socialist 
machine did not smash the patriarchal machine, nor did the capitalist motor; in fact, 
they worked happily with each other, hand in hand, gear meshing with gear.
Yan did not have a clue about her future married life, since her original hukou 
had been cancelled, and the last thing she wanted was to look for a husband in her 
rural hometown. She was lost whenever she thought of her married life.
“But why don’t you find a man in Dongguan or Shenzhen?” I asked her one day.
“It’s not as easy as buying vegetables. The men with local hukou in Shenzhen 
will not look for women of rural origin. There are plenty of pretty urban girls from
the North, from the big cities for them to choose In Dongguan, my sister did help
me introducing partners, but sometimes I don’t like people, sometimes people don’t 
like me. Well, it’s not easy ” She sighed.
“But can you think of not getting married?” I persisted.
“I do. Sometimes I don’t want to think too much and let the time pass. What 
can I do? Yet the problem is I need to find a job to survive. I really don’t know how 
many years I can keep working with a worn-out body. Even if  my health could 
support it, I don’t think the Company wants an old woman.”
Yan kept silent afterward. The great anxiety of her life was not difficult to 
understand. The wear and tear of her life, as we said before, was as much 
psychosomatic as biocultural. The socialist machine produced the hukou system that 
bounded her mobility. The capitalist machine sapped her youth and energy. And 
finally the patriarchal machine made her lost in the world. Triple oppressions; we 
come nearer to Yan’s dream and scream.
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Dream, voice and resistance
In and by its transcendence the dream discloses the original 
movement by which existence, in its irreducible solitude, projects 
itself toward a world which constitutes itself as the setting o f  its 
history.
By breaking with the objectivity w hich fascinates waking 
consciousness and by reinstating the human subject in its radical 
freedom, the dream discloses paradoxically the m ovem ent o f  
freedom toward the world, the point o f  origin from which freedom  
makes itself world.
the trajectory o f  the dream, the w hole O dyssey o f  human freedom.
M. Foucault (1985), D ream  an d  Existence
We are now back on the trajectory of Yan’s dream and scream. Domination 
foretells a story of resistance. If the narrative of Yan’s personal story disclosed the 
social and cultural violence on an individual, then the final question we are eager to 
ask is how the individual reacted, lived out and resisted the violent reality. Were 
dream and scream acts of transgression? If we don’t want to fall into the trap of 
saying that resistance could only happen in the unconscious, then we have to go 
beyond Freud’s psychoanalysis in interpreting dreams. Secondly, if  we want to argue 
that Yan’s trauma was more than an inner personal psychical crisis, then again we 
must submerge it in a larger social and cultural context, without subjecting it to a 
cultural determinism.
Luckily we can find a final resort in Foucault’s interpretation of dreams. 
Dreams, as Foucault believed, are not a fulfillment of a repressed desire, nor a 
rhapsody of images that help dreamers to escape the reality. Rather dreams are a 
specific form of human experience, entailing the very possibility of the theory of 
Existenz. As he put it,
But a dream is without doubt quite other than a rhapsody of images, for the
simple reason what a dream is an imaginary experience; and if it cannot be
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exhausted— as we saw earlier— by a psychological analysis, this is because 
it relates also to a theory of knowledge.
( 1985:43)
Foucault’s paper on Dream, Imagination and Existence provides another possible 
reading of dreams. Foucault attacks Freud’s dream theory by saying “Freud 
psychologized the dream” rather than anything else. There was a double reductionism 
in Freud’s theory. Firstly, he turned the meanings of dream into the unconsciousness 
in the process of saving its “meaninglessness” conceived by the 19th century 
academics, and second, by a over-psychologized translation of symbolic meanings 
into the images of dream. “The dream experience, by contrast, has a content all the 
richer to the degree that it is irreducible to the psychological determinations to which 
one tries to adapt it.” (1985:44)
The first step Foucault did was to rescue the meanings of dream from the 
unconscious space and the psychological overtuning. Dream, as the imaginary 
experience, was the practice of human existence and the very possibility of 
transcendence. Only by admitting that dream was a sign of imaginary experience, a 
possible experience that could break through and transcend the dichotomy between 
the objectivity and subjectivity, between the consciousness and unconsciousness, 
then beings were provided the experience of freeing oneself and making oneself in 
the world:
the dream: like every imaginary experience, is an anthropological index of 
transcendence; and in this transcendence it announces the world into man 
by making itself into a world, and by giving itself the species of light, fire, 
water and darkness. In its anthropological significance, the history of the 
dream teaches us that it both reveals the world in its transcendence and 
modulates the world in its substance, playing on its material character.
(1985:49)
Rather than taking dream experience as a displacement or a wishful fulfillment of the 
repressed desire, correspondent to a “lack” in waking reality, Foucault wanted to
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restore the very possibility of human imaginary experience, which entailed a journey 
of radical freedom into the world with its transcendence. As he said, “Man has 
known, since antiquity, that in dreams he encounters what he is and what he will be, 
what he has done and what he is going to do, discovering there the knot that ties his 
freedom to the necessity of the world.” (1985:47)
Yan’s dream could be read as the trajectory of realization of her being-in-the- 
world and the very possibility of freedom and resistance. Yan was caught in triple 
oppressions. The pursuit of an industrial life rewarded her with a torn body. Sexual 
desire and moral pressure captured her in stress. The cultural demand of a marital life 
and the state control of her mobility snared her in the middle, with no possible 
progress or retreat. She realized all these suddenly, unexpectedly, in a new situation. 
The bodily pain she suffered was more than physical and mental; it was social and 
cultural as well. The individual pain was inscribed with a social and cultural trauma; 
it was reenacted repeatedly through the individual life. Yan’s dream was specific, but 
its specificity entailed the very truth of the universal. It was the struggle of a female 
worker at the crossroads of a Chinese society transforming itself into industrial 
capitalism.
Yan resumed the unity of body and self by driving the struggle with the pain 
into the dream. In the dream, she didn’t give up but continued with a hopeless 
struggle. She was rumiing across the river, trying to reach a foreign land. “Sometimes 
I find the scene in the dream is very familiar to me, I must have been there before. 
It’s like a calling of going back home. I am running and running...” Yan said. The 
dream, for her, was like a space of home', in Heidegger’s sense, it was the dwelling of 
Existenz, the hope, the very possibility of actualization of the being-in-the world. The 
dream itself was home to Yan’s life, very familiar, very intimate, very authentic, 
while in the dream she was running toward somewhere strange and foreign. “I don’t 
know why I am so desperate to cross the river. I simply make up my mind to do so, 
to chase the boat. I am so determined. Seeing the boat is leaving, I find myself full of 
extraordinary force... it seems like I am going to break, break through something that 
blocks my way.” In my view, there are at least three possible readings of the 
crossing. In the Chinese village scene, a river always divided the land of one’s own 
and the other’s place. A woman crossing the river left her hometown and moved to
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an alien land. A possible traditional way of reading the dream was that on getting 
married, as the marriage practice in China was still patrilineal and patriarchal, the 
woman had to leave her own village in order to start a new life in her husband’s 
family in a strange community. In a contemporary context, a woman crossing the 
river and leaving her own land might also mean going out to look for a job in the 
city. The economic reform, the pouring of international capital into the Chinese 
society opened up new possibilities, created desires and hopes for the village girls to 
pursue a new life path, as I have discussed in Chapter III. In a more transcendental 
sense, it might mean the breaking between the old and the new way of life; Yan’s 
determination was a break with her past life, with all the pains and unbearable beings 
of existence. Projecting to cross the river was to expect a future life in the foreign 
land that might open up new rays of light. A life of twenty-four years was too young 
to be destroyed. It was an experience of being alien, of nomadism. The urge, the 
calling, was the strong desire to look for something new, though she was actually 
caught half-way, torn by a painful body. “Despite the great force that I seem to 
possess, my body simply stands still and refuses to move.” Both the stillness and the 
running were inevitable in Yan’s life.
There was a gap between the realms of consciousness and unconsciousness. But 
by going through the unconscious, Yan saved a lost self. And by extending her 
imaginary experiences, she fused both realms and freely experienced herself in the 
world. The sleeping soul was never asleep, but more sensitive and active than the 
waking soul in actualizing herself in the distant world. The repetitiveness of the 
dream, the traumatic experiences, could be read as an insistence on continuing one’s 
struggle and on one’s freedom to do so. It was seemingly fatalistic and inescapable. 
In this sense, Freud was wrong to say that dream was the guardian of sleep. As 
Foucault argued,
If Consciousness sleeps during sleep, existence awakens in the dream.
Sleep, itself, goes toward the life that it is preparing, that it is spelling out, 
that it favors. If it is a seeming death, this is by a ruse of life, which does 
not want to die; it “plays dead,” but “from fear of death.” It remains of the
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order of life.
(1985:54)
In wakening, not sleeping, the dream shed light on the freedom of existence. 
Lacan, in re-reading the dream of a burning child in Freud’s The Interpretation o f  
Dreams, also emphasized the awakening implication rather than sleeping function of 
the dream. The father of the burning child woke up in the dream too late to see his 
child’s death. The father-son relationship in the dream was the ethical relation of 
one’s being to the other, to the world. The trauma was the inevitable fate responding 
to the call of the dead child (Caruth 1996:97-100). Yan didn’t prolong her sleep in 
the dream, rather she continued her struggle in the oneiric experiences. Her failure in 
her dream to get into a boat was her predicament: she had no way forward or 
backward. And this quagmire did not end in sleep or escape. She struggled and 
struggled to realize a worn-out body that could not move. The projection of the future 
was blocked again in the dream. But she didn’t give up. She broke out in a scream, 
an authentic resistance, and woke herself up at the very end of the dream. If the 
unconscious realm did not provide nirvana, she returned to the conscious. The voice, 
in between the conscious and unconscious, declared the very existence of her 
struggle. It crossed all the realms between language and non-language, between the 
imaginary and the real, between the self and the world. The voice was a final source 
of self-extension; the self extended out beyond the boundaries of any personal and 
cultural limits, occupied a space much larger than the body (Scarry 1985:33). Yan 
was an the odyssey of human freedom and resistance.
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Chapter VIII The Politics of Experiences: Writing or not
The explosion will not happen today. It is too soon ... 
or too late.
I do not com e with timeless truths.
My consciousness is not illuminated with ultimate radiance. 
Nevertheless, in complete composure, I think it w ould be good  
if  certain things were said.
These things 1 am going to say, not shout. For it is a long time 
since shouting has gone out o f  my life.
So very long ...
Why write this book? N o one has asked m e for it.
Especially those to whom it is directed.
Frantz Fanon, B lack Skin, White M asks
Two years before I went to study in Britain, on 19th November 1993, a blaze 
engulfed a Hong Kong capital-owned toy company in Kuiyong, Shenzhen, it killed 
over eighty workers and twenty were seriously burned and sixty injured1. The blaze 
caused the collapse of the factory building, but, did not dash the dreams of the young 
Chinese dagongmei who continued to flood into the industrial zones for a better life 
and chances. I am still not sure whether it is those survivors who lived with dream 
and desire, or the fire and those deaths that directed me to the present project. Fanon 
is right to say, “No one has asked me for it, especially those to whom it is 
directed.”( 1967:7) But why write it? To be honest, I cannot provide the readers with 
high-sounding intellectual or academic reasons. Those I love and am concerned for 
probably don’t have the time or the chance to read what I write. Why still keep on 
murmuring? Again, as for Fanon, it is the urge, the pain, the impossibility of not 
writing that drives me to the stories.
As a participant in a concern group organized in Hong Kong, I went to meet 
one of the survivors from the Shenzhen fire in the local hospital, Xiao-ming, a young 
girl of twenty-one who was a fresh migrant worker from a Hubei village. When I met 
her in the hospital, her body was completely burned with all the skin seared and 
charred. She was left with a pretty face and flashing innocent eyes. She was calm
1 Mingbao, 20th Novem ber 1993.
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even if she could not control her emotions. She let her tears flow down slowly and 
she never let her weeping disturb our talking. Worried that recalling memories of the 
fire would be too hard for her, I did not take the initiative and mention the fire. We 
chatted about her childhood, her family and her work experiences in Shenzhen. For 
one rainy and stuffy afternoon in the hospital, I was moved by her story and lost in 
her world.
“I was lucky that I could go to school. Not all the girls in our hometown went 
to school. When I was young, our village was still very poor. ...”
“I liked dancing... I won a number of prizes in school competitions. Once I 
was chosen by the teacher to participate the cross-school competition in the town. ... 
Yes, I was excited and happy that I could go to the town.”
“Kids liked to fight, to jump, to sing, but I liked to dance, so I thought I could 
be a dancer someday... you know, when people were green, they were silly and had 
dreams. I was often praised in the school, so 1 really wondered if I could be a 
dancer...”
“I am the eldest daughter in the family... I have one younger sister and two 
younger brothers. I quit my study when my younger siblings needed to go to school 
and we didn’t have enough money.”
“It’s not easy to go to my village. It’s in a mountainous area that no train or 
bus can reach. You need to walk about an hour to reach home. ... I don’t know how 
to go back home now... Do you think I can go home? Hm, but you can go for fun, 
there are rivers and lake, a lot of fruit trees. I know you chengshi ren (people living 
in town or city) will like it.”
“People there are poor, but very simple... there is almost no trust in the city. I 
am attracted by the city life, but I don’t like the city person.”
“For a couple of years, I helped my parents doing farm work and housework. 
Young people nowadays no longer like tilling the fields. I didn’t either. Everybody 
said working in the outside was more fun and could earn a lot of money.”
“In 1990 I got out with my co-villagers and found a job in a garment factory 
in Shenzhen. Getting out the first time was so exciting; the big city, the skyscrapers, 
a lot of shops and a lot of people. ... It was like watching a film, and I was there.
Everything was interesting to me, and I found myself very rustic and innocent. ... I 
made up my mind to work in Shenzhen.”
“But I was not happy with my first job. The factory often delayed paying our 
wages. We were supposed to be paid on the first day of each month, but the factory 
was often late, sometimes a month, sometimes two months. ... Well, the wage was 
not particularly lower than other factories. I could make about three hundred yuan 
each month.”
“I left the factory in May 1991, and was introduced by my cousin to Zhili Toy 
Company. It was a big big plant, with over six hundred workers. I met a lot of co­
villagers in the new factory. ... Work was very hard there, we worked from sunrise to 
midnight. Everyday I was worn out, all my energy gone. ... But I felt happy working 
there. I had a lot of relatives and friends, we chatted a lot and helped each other.”
“After that I seldom thought of working in another factory. ... Every three 
months I could send about six hundred yuan back to my hometown to my father. I 
thought I could at least work there for another two or three years.”
“But then the fire happened, the fire... ”
Xiao-ming was satisfied with her job in the Zhili Toy Company. Her 
contribution improved her family’s economic situation and one of her younger 
brothers was entered into senior secondary school. She planned to work for another 
three years so her brothers could have enough money for higher education. Her 
parents hoped she would marry out by 23 or 24, before she was too old. In the 
village, marriage was still considered “the major matter of one’s whole life”. So the 
older generation worried that girls working in the city might delay marriage for too 
long and spoil their whole lives. Xiao-ming and her friends, nevertheless, had other 
thoughts. They knew that after marriage they would move to another village and 
would be forced to stay at home for the rest of their life. They would probably have 
no chance to work in the city any more. In the Chinese New Year of 1992, a wish 
became a plan: save money for a tour of Beijing, the capital, before they were 
married out.
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In 1993 Xiao-ming began to save money for herself. By late autumn, after 
sending money to her family, she had five hundred yuan for herself. On the night of 
19 November 1993, the fire burned the money and burned the dream. ...
The factory doors were locked, the window bar sealed and the fire-exit 
passages were congested. Six hundred workers were trapped in the fire with no way 
to escape. The workers’ dorms were inside the factory premises. The ground floor 
was the store room and the workers’ canteen, the first to the fourth floor were the 
shopfloors and the fifth and the sixth floors were the workers’ dormitories. To 
prevent stealing and control workers’ movement, all the doors, including the stair 
doors were locked at night.
“Though I don’t know how I can survive, 1 still think that I am lucky to 
escape the gate of hell.”
When Xiao-ming was wakened by noises, the dorm was already very smoky 
and she could hardly believe there was a real fire. She ran out of the room and saw 
some male workers hysterically hit the window bars. She tried to move to the stairs 
but was soon trampled by workers behind her.
“There was shouting and screaming and I was like everybody went mad.” She 
fell down and choked. Flames roared up through the stairs and burnt her body. At 
that moment she thought she would die. A co-villager came to help and move her to 
the window and she had no choice but to jump down.
What the story told
I ran into the tragedy before I made up my mind to study for a doctorate. I 
still believe it was the involvement in the support group, the experience of that pain, 
that led me to study the life and struggle of dagongmei. As a student who liked pure 
literature, my sensitivity to the changes in Chinese society, was first of all brought 
out by meeting Xiao-ming in 1993 and the pain that persistently followed. It was 
through Xiao-ming’s trauma, and probably my own trauma as well, that I first 
realized there was no individual story which was not political and social. Xiao- 
ming’s fate might be personal, but her trauma was social, historical and collective in 
nature. With my love of personal fiction and concern for individual lives, the
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coincidental encounter with Xiao-ming finally brought me to a concern for the social, 
or more specifically, the relationships between social violence and individual lives. It 
was not just a matter of changing from pure literature to sociology and anthropology. 
It was also a change in my understanding of myself in the world, a movement across 
boundaries into new horizons. The trauma opened me up: I realized rapid changes in 
Chinese society, the arbitrary force of society on individuals, and the reaction and 
transgressions of the self.
The rapid changes of China in the past two decades - the opening of the 
country to international capital and the introduction of market mechanisms to rescue 
the declining legitimacy of the party-state, and thus the contractual engineering of the 
society by both market and state inflicted double wounds on Chinese society. The 
hybrid marriage of state socialist power and the capitalist system technologized the 
society and the individual. At this time, in contemporary China, land and labour, 
nature and human life are produced as commodities for sale, not merely by the 
“capitalist” market, but by the “socialist” state-party. The decentering of the central 
power, and the weakening of the ideological apparatus, are far from a “retreat of 
state” in regulating social life (Shue, 1995). Rather, the worn-out yet still existing 
hukou system, the parochial nature of city governments with expanding 
administrative power, the strict control of population and urban development, and the 
hard crushing of independent labour organizations all dictate the specific process of 
proletarianization in China. The persistent influx of peasant migrants into the urban 
areas in the last decade did not give birth to the new Chinese working class. The 
making of the class force is, after all, retarded, shattered and destroyed not by the 
market apparatus, but by the state machine. Dagongmei, as half-peasants, half 
proletariat are the displaced subjects produced by the hybrid conjugation of state and 
market machines.
Xiao-ming’s escape from the gate of hell began the pain of writing and the 
urge to disclose the double wounds. My later fieldwork confronted me with the 
delicate microphysics of power in the workplace. The production machine, plugged 
into the state and market machines, is the immediate means for crafting the displaced 
subjects. The human body, the producing body, is the interface or the threshold 
where the violent forces, be they political or economic or be they complicit or
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conflicting, do their work. But the state and market are not the only springs of power. 
Local cultural practice, in China the patriarchal culture, comes onto the scene as well. 
The process of gendering, the regulation of sex and sexuality and the dominance of 
marriage and family life showed the great strength of culture in sexucilizing the 
displaced subjects. Triple oppressions - the capitalist market, the state-party and the 
patriarchal culture are my conclusion, despite the risk of over-generalization and 
simplification.
Yan’s scream was the scream of our epoch, decrying the violence and 
absurdity of the triple oppressions.
When Xiao-ming told me about her story, it seemed that she was speaking 
about the pain of another body. Her calmness and lack of emotion struck me. It 
seemed that pain could only be spoken out in the process of othering the self. Xiao- 
ming’s narrative, and the way she told it as if telling another’s story, pushed me to 
understand how individuals deal with pain. The process of othering the pain, the 
strategy of dividing the self, so that the spoken self or the performed self emerged as 
distant, cool and alienated seemed the only possible way to defend the vulnerable 
inner self (Laing 1966; Sennett and Cobb 1972; Scarry 1985). Talking to Xiao-ming,
I struggled to control my tears, so I could imitate a rational self and not spoil our 
dialogue. It was the first time I gained an acute sense of how I reacted to myself and 
at the same time to the other and the social. There are at least two layers of 
awareness. First, individual fiction is always social and political in nature. Second, 
the individual is “dividual” and splitting when confronting with an alienated socius. 
Thus, there is not only a realization of extending the self to the social, but also a 
crisis of knowing and experiencing the self.
Inner fragmentation, as I have argued, was the common defense of the women 
workers against the loss of self caused by bodily pain. In this thesis I have tried to 
show how the splitting of the self is an effect of social violence and historical 
alienation. Schizophrenia, the splitting of self, is a stigma of our age. To look at it is 
to uncover the violence and destruction of the advent of capitalism in the state 
socialist society. Deleuze and Guattari put it,
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Schizophrenia as a process is desiring-production, but it is this 
production as it functions at the end, as the limit of social production 
determined by the conditions of capitalism. It is our very own “malady”, 
modem man’s sickness.
(1987:130)
Body in pain can destroy not only the integrity of a person’s self, but also
one’s language. Pain can be spoken out through the process of othering of the self;
but if  it turns into oneself, it is resistant to language. Elaine Scarry says,
It is the intense pain that destroys a person’s self and world, a
destruction experienced spatially as either the contraction of the universe 
down to the immediate vicinity of the body or as the body swelling to 
fill the entire universe. Intense pain is also language-destroying: as the 
content of one’s world disintegrates, so the content of one’s language 
disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and 
project the self is robbed of its source and its subject.
(1985:35)
The body in pain is bereft of the sources of speech. Yan’s scream is an attempt to 
express herself, to resist the pain and to reunite the split body and self. Xiao-ming 
spoke out through the process of othering, and Yan destroyed language by screaming. 
Both resisted a possible disintegration of the self. The painful bodies thus are not the 
defeated bodies, but the transgressive bodies.
Throughout the thesis I have to see my co-workers and friends and the people I 
loved as pioneers who teased out the tensions in all the structural and historical forces 
they faced. I have also struggled to see them as practical agents who consciously and 
unconsciously manipulate the body politic and co-opt, negotiate with or confront those 
tensions and forces. Everyday life struggles took diverse forms, negotiating not only 
with economic and political factors, but also cultural and psychic experiences. While 
daily grumbles and grievances could be found everywhere, a proportion of workers 
still gained some satisfaction and achievement. The high wages they could earn, the
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money they could send back to their families, the skill they learned and the sense of 
pride and new identity they achieved all contributed to a sense of self-fulfillment. 
Time and time again “heroic stories” told how one or two women succeeded in 
climbing up the career ladder and ended up with a marriage in the urban area via 
personal effort, commitment to the work and building up networks in the city. These 
“heroic stories” construed the dreams and hopes of the whole generation of dagongmei 
and, continuously helped to produce desires of factory life. Pain and hurt persisted. 
Occasionally there were fires and deaths.
And if Yan’s scream helped her to release the pain and hurt, it also foretold the 
tales of transgression, the politics and poetics of resistance in the workplace. My pain, 
through the process of othering, through the impossibility of writing her dream and 
scream and many other women’s stories, was aired as well. Yan’s scream was my 
scream, helping me to live out the limited experience.
Minor Literature as Practising Anthropology
As I come to the end I would like to argue that native anthropological 
practices, if they are contribute to anything other than mainstream anthropology, 
should be undertaken to create a minor literature. I derive this concept from the 
insights of Deleuze and Guattari in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Deleuze and 
Guattari saw three points as characteristic of minor literature. Firstly, the language of 
minor literature is affected by “a high coefficient of deterritorialization”. A minor 
literature does not come from a minor language; it is constructed by a minority within 
a major language (1986:16). Secondly, everything in the minor literature is political. In 
major literature, when the individual concern joins with other individual concerns, the 
social milieu serves as a background. Minor literature is completely different in the 
way that “its cramped space forces each individual intrigue to connect immediately to 
politics, to the social it formed” (1986:17). Thirdly, everything in minor literature 
takes on a collective value. There are “no possibilities for an individuated enunciation 
that would belong to this or that ‘master’ and that could be separated from a collective 
enunciation” (1986:17). Minor literature, after all, is the literature o f  people's concern:
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There is never an individuated subject; there are only collective 
assemblages of enunciation, and minor literature expresses these acts 
insofar they are not imposed from without and insofar as they exist only as 
diabolical powers to come or revolutionary forces to be constructed.
(1986:18).
Bringing these insights to the practice of my native anthropology in China, I 
have tried to make my ethnography a minor literature, adventuring into the 
borderlands, hoping to discover new terrain, new encounters and new experiences, but 
not without paying attention to the risks and dangers. I have struggled to avoid 
locating this project in any major languages, in the mainstream anthropological canon 
or in China studies. As an “intellectual nomad” wandering in the field, I intrude and 
am bound to intrude into a new cross-disciplinary terrain. My training in sociology, 
anthropology, China studies and feminist studies became pale and weak when I 
encountered the richness and complexity of those lived experiences. Therefore, I 
sometimes go here, sometimes go there, enjoying the search. I look for a theoretical 
lens in Pandora’s box, a magic house which never belongs to any single discipline. I 
am not going to argue that “theory” and “experience” can never be separated, but like a 
mother-child dyad, they cannot exist without each other. Experiencing is the same 
process as theorizing; they are all evocative in nature.
As a practice of minor literature, native anthropology should be brave enough 
to ask and explore new questions that cross over many disciplines. But also, as 
Mayfair Yang says, by adopting a different strategic and peripheral position, it can 
contribute to the critique of Eurocentrism as well (1994). Native anthropology, if it has 
any vision, should not provide an alternative version of local modernity, but disclose 
the power and ideology enmeshed in the discourse of Chinese modernity, a hegemonic 
construct of both state and capital. The direct immediacy of the field in one’s own 
society can prompt a more acutely political consciousness. The native anthropologist is 
not interested in exploring another culture, another society that is new to him or her. 
Gazing at one’s own society and culture becomes more problematic if one is not 
engaged in political practices. There will be no reason to study one’s own society as an 
“another culture” if the process of othering does not spring from pain, from the urge to 
diagnose one’s society.
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A “revised politics of location” of anthropology is advocated to ask questions 
about anthropologists themselves, starting the work from “home”, from the place one 
began (Mackey 1991; Lindisfarne 1996). It is plain for native anthropologists that they 
have no other choice but to start work from “home” and go back “home”. But it is not 
a single return route from home to home (“home - home”). Stepping out of one’s home 
onto the road, wandering or in exile, is an attempt of nomading into new lands and a 
reterritorization of every wonderful land. It is not an alternative “home” but an 
extended home with more spacious land and hopefully more fresh and healthy air (i.e. 
“home - home - to - becoming”).
The project, the search for the life and struggle of dagongmei in contemporary 
China, is thus a desire of the “homeless” intellectual, through the practice of native 
anthropology, to build herself a nest, if not return to the old home. Whether I have 
succeeded or not is open for further discussion.
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Workers on the Shopfloor
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